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Abstract

The Political Economy of Accounting and the 2003 Iraq War is concerned with the
relationship between accounting technology and the bread and butter question for
empires, their exercising of unrestricted power. The preservation of a global hegemonic
empire necessitates the maintenance of a polarised existence between the hegemon and
the rest of the world. This necessitates the capacity to exercise far-reaching forms of
power, and indicates the presence of a plethora of subservient technologies. This thesis
is concerned with confirming the scope and extent of the roles of accounting technology
within imperial power exertions.
The thesis utilises the case study of the exertion of powers by the United States upon
Iraqi space, known as the 2003 Iraq War, as it offers a distinct modern-day illustration
of multiple applications of imperial powers. The 2003 Iraq War involved the waging of
an illegal and globally unpopular pre-emptive war, as well as an invasion, occupation
and attempted radical economic and socio-geopolitical ‘de-territorialisation’ and ‘reterritorialisation’ of Iraq. Accounting’s roles and contributions within the stages of
planning, execution and management of this project are of primary focus so as to
confirm that accounting can be an enabling force for power: it is embedded in political,
economic and cultural complexities the most fundamental dynamics of which revolve
around the acquisition and execution of power for the sake of dominant interests.
Whilst mainstream research portrays accounting as a mundane, value-free calculative
practice that is ultimately concerned with the science of quantitative efficiency, this
thesis applies the critical approach to accounting research to question mainstream
assumptions and, instead, to demonstrate the political inherence and interested nature of
accounting. More specifically, it utilises Tinker’s (1980) Political Economy of
Accounting (PEA) method of investigation because PEA recognises that an
interpretation of the economic realm is incomplete in the absence of an understanding of
the social and political contexts within which it operates. PEA underscores
accounting’s interested nature: that accounting operates within a wider environment of
structures and institutions within which economic, social and political forces interact
and interplay. Since PEA adopts this conflict model of society, it acknowledges the
existence of dominant interests that exert dominant influence so as to realise dominant
control over the majority of society. Therefore, PEA concedes that accounting is a
ii

socially contested and constructed technology that can be manipulated so as to exert
diverse forms of power; power is at the forefront of PEA’s approach to accounting
research. In addition, this thesis examines the historical geography of capitalism
(Harvey, 1985, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2005a, 2007a) and its interplay with accounting
technologies through space and time so as to provide an understanding of the rich
intersections between capitalism, accounting and space. This novel fusion is referred to
as the capitalism’s accountings of space concept, and its propositions are utilised as
guiding parameters of investigation throughout the thesis. Accordingly, this thesis is a
trans-disciplinary mode of investigation that utilises historical interpretations to situate
accounting technology within the broader social, economic and political contexts within
which it operates in imperial projects.
The findings of this thesis confirm that, far from being a neutral, value-free mechanism
for decision-making, the allocation of resources and the realisation of efficiency goals,
accounting is a partial language and an interested tool that is appropriated to further the
interests of dominant political and economic groups. Accounting was not an objective
element within the United States’ power exertions upon Iraqi space; rather it was an
essential and subservient instrument. This thesis demonstrates that accounting,
accountability, budgeting and auditing mechanisms were used strategically for the
benefit of elitist interests that not only opposed the interests of the majority Iraqi
population but also, afforded adverse repercussions to the rest of the world. This thesis
will display the power relations that the US’s intervention brought into effect, including
powers of subjugation and oppression that contributed to and fuelled indigenous
resistance, and will also demonstrate accounting’s roles in the dispossession and
exploitation of Iraq. Most significantly, knowledge of the applications of accounting
within the contexts of socio-ecopolitical polarisation, death, destruction and despair
provides the means to illuminate the far-reaching and dire potentials of accounting,
thereby facilitating for emancipatory change.
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Chapter One

Introduction

1

The Bread and Butter Question: The tenacious quest for power
I was in the East End of London yesterday and attended a meeting of the
unemployed. I listened to the wild speeches, which were just a cry for "bread,"
"bread," and on my way home I pondered over the scene and I became more
than ever convinced of the importance of imperialism …. My cherished idea is
a solution for the social problem, i.e., in order to save the 40 million
inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we colonial
statesmen must acquire new lands for settling the surplus population, to
provide new markets for the goods produced in the factories and mines. The
Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter question. If you want to
avoid civil war, you must become imperialists (Cecil Rhodes, 1895, quoted in
Robbins, 1999, pp.93–94).

Capitalism’s survival depends on the exercise of power.

Within a limited world,

capitalism’s compulsion for limitless capital accumulation can be realised only at the
expense of others.

Contrary to Adam Smith’s benevolent narrative of original

accumulation, which claimed that capital was “silently and gradually accumulated by
the private frugality and good conduct of individuals, by their universal, continual and
uninterrupted effort to better their own condition” (Smith, 1998, p.208), the historical
trajectory of capitalism through space and time is grounded in a polarising process that
utilises power to propel its progression through the regression of others (Arrighi, 1994;
Braudel, 1977; Chomsky, 1999a; Chomsky & Herman, 1979a, 1979b, Harvey, 1975,
1981, 1985, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2007a, 2007b; Marx, 1973; Muzio,
2007; Weber, 1978; Wood, 2003). Rather than being a process of peaceful, linear
development through Smith’s ‘original accumulations’ narrative, instead, capitalism’s
advancement has historically been contingent on acts of ‘primitive accumulation’ and
‘accumulation by dispossession’ that have expropriated, subjugated, oppressed and
exploited the masses for the benefit of the minority elite (Harvey, 2004, 2007a, 2007b;
Marx, 1973; Perelman, 2000; Plumwood, 1993). Accordingly, the exercise of power is
a bread and butter question for capitalism; capitalism’s survival is not only dependent
on the power to further accumulate capital at the expense of others, but also the power
to justify and legitimise this furtherance so as to minimise acts of resistance and the
prospects of emancipatory change based on alternate justice-centred theories of political
economy.
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Mirroring this correlation between capitalism and power is the transition that occurred
within capitalism at the beginning of the fifteenth century. The propelling of European
states towards territorial conquest, so as to subjugate more space to capital’s
accumulation processes and to gradually form a global capitalist economy, did not
transpire until scattered capitalist powers concentrated and created a fusion between
dominant state and capital powers. Indeed, the historical trajectory of capitalism has
been shaped by the leadership of hegemonic power and business blocs, which have
utilised their superior powers in the quest to destroy all barriers to the accumulation
process, to ‘annihilate space by time’, through accelerated geographical expansion and
socio-eco-geopolitical restructurings (Arrighi, 1994; Braudel, 1977; Brenner, 1997,
1998, 1999; Harvey, 1975, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2007a, 2007b; Marx, 1973;
Weber, 1978). Capitalist hegemony has historically been passed from Venice and
Genoa, to the Dutch, followed by the British and, since the end of World War II, to the
United States (US). Each shift in hegemony has brought with it a shift in the regime of
capital accumulation, which the hegemon imposes so as to reconfigure the socioeconomic and geopolitical ordering of the capitalist world in a way that satisfies its
multi-dimensional interests (Arrighi, 1994). Accordingly, the exercising of power is
also a bread and butter question for capitalism’s hegemonic power guardian. A
hegemon’s capacity to differentially employ power in relation to others is not only
essential to its imposition of the regime that realises its fused interests with capitalism,
but is also crucial to its ability to legitimise and justify this regime, including its
polarising effects, in order to sustain it and the hegemon’s continued benefiting as
leader of the global capital economy.

The Political Economy of Accounting and the 2003 Iraq War is concerned with the
relationship between accounting technology and the bread and butter question for
empires, their exercising of ‘untrammelled power’ (Connelly, 2006).

This thesis

confirms the scope and extent of roles of accounting within imperial exertions of power.
In so doing, it also demonstrates accounting’s multi-dimensional potentials that can
range from encouraging the proliferation of peace and its contributing to destruction. In
order to achieve these objectives, this thesis utilises the case study of the exertion of
powers by the US upon Iraqi space, known as the 2003 Iraq War or Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF). It examines the principal eco-political motivations that underlay why
3

this supreme power performance was undertaken and demonstrates how these ecopolitical motivations and their objectives were executed through the exploitation of
power. In answering both questions, accounting’s role and contributions within the
stages of planning, execution and management of OIF are of primary focus so as to
confirm “how accounting systems operate in their social, political and economic context
…” (Cooper & Sherer, 1984, p.207). This thesis demonstrates how accounting when
harnessed as a source of power can be an enabling force for power and is embedded in
political, economic and cultural complexities, the most fundamental dynamics of which
revolve around the acquisition and execution of power for the sake of dominant
interests.

The rise of British hegemony brought about a development in capitalism’s spatial
expansion: rather than imperial exercises of power being merely directed towards the
realisation of imperial rule or commercial supremacy, emphasis was placed on spaces’
production of value. Accordingly, British imperialism necessitated the dispersion of its
domestic economy’s ideological imperatives regarding value-creation so as to capture
more space, and power within its orbit (Wood, 2003). US President Woodrow Wilson
identified with this ideal, which he believed obligated the hegemon to employ all forms
of power to ‘batter down’ the doors of ‘unwilling nations’ and, once realised, to keep
them opened (Chomsky, 1990). When hegemony was passed to the US, it advanced
this model by pursing what has been termed ‘Open Door Imperialism’: the US sought to
batter down closed spaces to its interests, and keep them open, by utilising both its
diplomatic and military powers. This approach came to form the basis of its foreign
policy strategy of controlling without owning (Bacevich, 2002; Dorrien, 2004;
Gallagher & Robinson, 1953; Kramer & Michalowski, 2005; Perkins, 1984; Robinson,
1984; Williams, 1959). Accordingly, US imperialism has engendered an exhaustive
pursuit of power exertions: non-coercive influence has been progressed through its
dominance over techno and social-scientific knowledge, its global cultural and
ideological reach and its economic power.

This influence has been essentially

supplemented by indispensible forms of coercive power, most notably through its
unprecedented military might, which empowers it with the threat of military action or
inaction, but also through coercive non-military techniques, such as the employment of
economic sanctions and political penetrative powers that can foment socio-political
4

(un)rest and (dis)unity that either diminish or reinforce state regimes (Ahmad, 2004;
Chomsky, 1999a, 1999b, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2008, Chomsky & Herman, 1979a, 1979b;
Harvey, 2007a; Knorr, 1973).

Most importantly, by possessing the capacity to exercise a wide variety of coercive and
non-coercive forms of influence, the US has been able to garner the power of partial
visibility: its imperial role and actions are customarily undertaken within the realm of
plausible deniability, thereby diminishing its accountability whilst also conjuring
popular support, and earning it the title of being an ‘Empire in denial’ (Chandler, 2006;
Ferguson, 2004; Harvey, 2003, 2004; Stoler, 2006). Expressions of power by the US
form its imperial footprints upon space and in time: these are evident not only by means
of both its covert and overt coercive interventions throughout the world, such as in
Indonesia, Vietnam, Iran, Chile and Cuba (Chomsky, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1999a, 1999b,
2004, 2008; Falk, 1995; Chomsky & Herman, 1979a, 1979b), but also through
interventions by its global network of institutions and development agencies, such as
NATO, the World Bank, USAID and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which,
through its leadership, represent varied expressions of its global power. This global
network acts to promote, impose, enforce and maintain US global order and has
“profoundly engaged in shaping the structure of political, social, economic and cultural
life in many states …” (Orford, 2003, p.17). Meanwhile, the more than 737 global
military bases of the US and its numerous ‘black site’ global secret prisons, including
the notoriously explicit Guantanamo Bay facility, represent its modern imperial colonies
that function to police and discipline into compliance the global populace (Johnson,
2006; Blum, 1995).

Since the 1970s, US imperialism has been expressed through its dissemination of the
neoliberal eco-political regime, which seeks to transform space into that of pure
competition: to maximise entrepreneurial freedom of accumulation so as to maximise
spaces’ production of value. It is a regime that developed out of the neoclassical
approach to the political economy, which defines the economic realm as comprising
private actors who employ rational choice in pursuit of self-interest maximisation and
the efficient management of resources, and defines the political realm as the use of
5

public power for the realisation of the same causes (Caporaso & Levine, 1992).
Accordingly, it not only propagates utmost freedoms to the market, and minimal
interventions from the state, but has also profoundly exaggerated the fusion between
dominant power and dominant capital groups. Whilst the results from neoliberalism’s
approach to re-engineering global capital accumulation have been skewed towards the
interest of restoring class power to the richest strata, nevertheless it has rationalised this
freed market onslaught on all space by promoting individual emancipation through
market emancipation.

Using such emancipatory rhetoric, the US justifies and

legitimises its imperial transgressions upon spaces and their inhabitants; echoing
colonial stereotypes, acts of subjugation, oppression, dispossession and exploitation are
instead narrated as being acts of benevolence, heroism and sacrifice that transfer
knowledge, liberty, democracy and prosperity to troubled ‘Others’ (Boot, 2001, 2002,
2003, 2004; Ferguson, 2003b; Ignatieff, 2002, 2003a, 2003b; Morgan, 2003).

Neoliberalism’s ‘market fundamentalism’ has brought about novel means, ‘disaster
capitalism’ and the imposition of ‘economic shock therapy’, to efficiently conquer
space through rapidity in action (Klein, 2007; Stiglitz, 2002, 2004). Crises that cause
collective societal trauma and humanitarian strife, such as natural disasters, political
coup d’etats and wars, are perceived as opportunities for the rapid imposition of radical
neoliberal configurations. This is because crises-born collective trauma facilitate swift
impositions of radical neoliberal change in the absence of meaningful resistance, whilst
also generating societal psychological reactions that facilitate adjustment and
acceptance (Friedman, 1982; Klein, 2007).

Whilst the US’s application of this

methodology required exertions of power so as to rapidly conquer space in various
countries, such as in Chile and Russia, its battering down of Iraq’s doors using shock
therapy was most distinctive. This is because the US’s imperial footprint upon Iraqi
space in the year 2003 was the culmination of two previous significant exertions of US
power upon Iraq, the 1991 Gulf War and the imposition of arduous economic sanctions
between 1990-2003, both of which were exercised with an intent of bringing about
favourable regime change and compliance with US global order. Moreover, whilst
previous US applications of power through shock therapy were employed within the
realm of plausible deniability, the 2003 Iraqi venture was an explicit, highly ambitious,
and all-inclusive imperial power project that involved the waging of an illegal and
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globally unpopular pre-emptive war, invasion, occupation and comprehensive
neoliberal reconstruction comprising both economic shock therapy and sociogeopolitical re-engineering. Indeed, multiple commentators of the time noted, and
commended, that the 2003 Iraqi War marked the US hegemon’s ‘obligatory’ transition
from being an ‘Empire in denial’ to a formal and unapologetic empire that exercised its
powers for the sake of humanity (Boot, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004; Ferguson, 2003b;
Ignatieff, 2002, 2003a, 2003b; Morgan, 2003). According to this mindset, Iraq was to
be an ultimate demonstration of the US’s unequivocal power and authority over the
world; Iraq was to receive “the sort of enlightened foreign administration once provided
by self-confident Englishmen in jodhpurs and pith helmets” (Boot, 2001).

The overall objective of OIF, as stated by Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz,
was to bring about ‘state ending’ as opposed to ‘regime change’ (Baker et al., 2010).
Although this was a novel and ambiguous concept, within its name lay an indication of
the gravity of its meaning. The 2003 battering down of Iraq’s doors not only abruptly
brought an end to Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime, but also systematically destroyed
essential infrastructure, terminated state monopoly on violence by suspending the army,
police and secret services, annulled its socialist-based constitution, gutted the state
apparatus of its human capital, and damaged the environment. OIF also pursued a
policy of intentional indifference to the systematic destruction of state institutions,
including their institutional memories; it facilitated and contributed to the destruction of
Iraq’s collective cultural and historical memories, which have been described as acts of
attempted ‘mnemocide’, and it ignored the systematic targeted assassinations of Iraq’s
intellectual capital, including its academics and scientists (Adriaensens, 2009; AlTikriti, 2007, 2009, 2010; Bahrani, 2008, 2009; Baker et al., 2009; Ismael & Ismael,
2015; Fisk, 2006; Herring, 2009; Hodges, 2006; Human Rights Watch, 2006; Klein,
2007; Poole, 2006; UNESCO PRESS, 2006; UNHCR, 2005; Wilkinson, 2008; Zoepf,
2006). The result was immediate state failure, societal disorientation, scarcity of basic
social services, intellectual poverty, subjugation, lawlessness, violence, and a power
vacuum that only the US could fill. Following the widespread destruction, the US
attempted ambitious reconstruction and state-building projects that sought to impose a
radical form of neoliberal ideology throughout the country’s socio-economic and geopolitical landscapes. The result was billions of dollars of transfers in public wealth to
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the dominant capital group, largely failed reconstruction projects, human rights abuses,
the accentuation of ethno-sectarian cleavages, civil war, ethnic cleansing and the
possibility of territorial partitioning. In addition, a neoliberal-based constitution and
economy were established, and an incompetent, inefficient and corrupt new neoliberal
Iraqi state, built on fragmented political authority, was founded. Finally, the US project
in Iraq brought about the death, injury, illness and dislocation of millions of Iraqi
people, and the death, injury and illness of thousands of the US’s Coalition of the
Willing (COW) and foreign private military contractors (PMCs).

Whilst there existed detailed US Department of Defense (DoD) and State Department
plans that largely foresaw and planned for all stages of OIF, including during postinvasion, those plans were largely ignored by those in US power positions.

For

example, the combined average of several DoD plans that estimated troop strength
requirements for a successful war, invasion and occupation of Iraq was 425,000 troops.
According to military plans, the provisioning of such troop strength was crucial so as to
hold the capacity to perform several duties that were deemed essential for the success of
OIF. For example, troops would be required to effectively secure Iraq’s borders, to
establish law and order, and to provide a secure environment for successful
reconstruction, humanitarian aid efforts and for economic growth. In addition, forces
would be needed to stop the epidemic mnemocide of Iraq’s collective memory, to
protect Iraq’s intellectual capital and to guard weapons depots, including the most
notorious weapons of mass destruction (WMD) had they existed. Most notably, such a
force would be capable of withholding the development of resistance through
insurgency, to stop the arming of insurgency and the development of terror groups, to
adapt to the demands of counter-insurgency, and to withhold the development of a
sectarian-based civil war and ethnic cleansing. As such, the existence of such a force
was fundamental not only to the winning of the ‘hearts and minds’ of Iraqi civilians, but
also to the success of OIF in its entirety. Nevertheless, and in spite of the apparent
significance of the provisioning of adequate troop strength, Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld ordered the initiation of OIF with just 130,600 troops
(Belasco, 2009).

8

The US’s imperial project upon Iraqi space of the year 2003 offers a distinct and radical
modern-day case study of multiple applications of imperial powers. The “essence of
empire is not military force, but the exercise of untrammelled power” (Connelly, 2006,
p.32). Moreover, the complicated and sometimes ambiguous, yet far-reaching, nature
of OIF’s power exertions indicate the presence of a plethora of subservient technologies
that actively facilitated the event. It is because of the significance and extent of this
contemporary imperial project upon Iraqi space that it was chosen as a case study for
this thesis; investigating the roles of accounting technology within its power exertions
will bring to visibility the overarching roles of accounting within such ventures.

Accounting for Power
Accounting as a technology of governance
The US’s 2003 war, invasion, occupation and reconstruction of Iraq was a profound
demonstration of imperial powers, which could not be accomplished had it not been for
tools of imperial power. Foucault’s (1982) work on ‘governmentality’ has shown that
different forms of power, such as powers of subjectification, discipline and biopower,
are derived from technologies of government. Unlike imperial ‘hardware’, such as
military equipment that provide the physical means for spatial expansion, technologies
of government, such as accounting, represent imperial ‘software’ that provide the
mechanisms through which the power to administer spatial transformation and
management is derived (Bell et al., 1995; Headrick, 1981, 1988; Neu, 2000; Said,
1979).

Accounting, accountability, budgeting and auditing mechanisms are

fundamental technologies of government, which provide techniques that are employed
to extend, justify, mediate and control its power over space. Accounting’s production
of knowledge for imperialist rule facilitates an efficient and profitable governance at a
distance, which has enabled the enforcement of imperial policies throughout space and
time (Barry, 1996; Catchpowle & Cooper, 2005; Funnell & Walker, 2013; Graham &
Latour, 1987; Miller & Rose, 1990; Neu, 2000a, 2013; Neu et al., 2006; Raco, 2003;
Robson, 1992; Rose, 1999, 2004). It is through the production of knowledge that the
power to subjugate, to discipline and to control is derived (Said, 1979). Accounting
also shapes public policy; it contributes to the regulatory scheme that has permitted acts
of primitive accumulation and accumulation by dispossession to become embedded and
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to flourish (Arnold & Sikka, 2001; Lehman, 2005; Gallhofer et al., 2011; Thornburg &
Roberts, 2008).

It provides imperial powers with a discourse that privileges the

imperatives of the economy over social considerations, thereby empowering their
exploitative encroachments on the environment and society with legitimation and
justification (Neu & Ocampo Gomez, 2007). Additionally, imperial processes that
permit the accumulation of capital at the expense of others globally work in and through
accounting and its mechanisms, which operate within the institutions of the world order
(Andrew et al., 2016; Annisette, 1999, 2004; Arnold, 2005; Arnold & Cooper, 1999;
Arnold & Sikka, 2001; Arundhati, 2001; Catchpowle et al., 2004; Catchpowle &
Cooper, 2005, 2009, Caramanis, 1999, 2002; Funnell et al., 2009; Gallhofer & Haslam,
2006, 2007; Gallhofer et al., 2011; Graham & Neu, 2003; Lehman, 2005; Martin, 1993;
Neu et al., 2006; Neu & Ocampo Gomez, 2007).

Accounting’s quantitative techniques, such as counting, ranking, ordering and
measuring, are forms of spatial calculation that translate space in adherence to the
dominant form of rationality (Crampton & Elden, 2006; Osborne & Rose, 2004).
Accounting translates distant space and ideology into a conceptual form that is
comprehensible to imperial powers, thereby facilitating their mobilising of this
knowledge to their advantage (Funnell, 1998; Graham & Neu, 2013; Latour, 1987;
Miller & Rose, 1990; Neu, 2000a, 2000b; Neu et al., 2001; Said, 1979). Accounting
discourse has been shown to construct a particular visibility of distant lands and their
inhabitants; it is a technology through which visibility is focussed on their alleged
failings, as defined by the dominant ideology (Said, 1979, 1993; Funnell & Walker,
2013). Accordingly, it provides justification for intervention by the conqueror and
legitimises the imposition of change that transfers the knowledge and practices of the
conqueror’s dominant ideology to the ‘under-developed’ other (Bakre, 2005, 2008;
Ferguson, 2003a; Davie, 2005; Latour, 1987; Murdoch & Ward, 1997; Neu, 1999,
2000a, 2000b; Neu & Heincke, 2004; O’Regan, 2010; Said, 1979, 1993). In this regard,
accounting techniques for measuring, monitoring, shaping and disciplining behaviour
make these a mechanism for social re-engineering in servitude of imperial powers
(Greer, 2006, 2009; Preston & Oakes, 2001). Since accounting mechanisms provide the
means for reward and punishment, they contribute to imperial objectives of sanctifying
their dominant ideology, subverting that of the conquered and of driving the indigenous
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to assimilate (Annisette, 1999, 2000, Bakre, 2005, 2008; Bush & Maltby, 2004; Greer,
2009; Hoskin & Macve, 1986; Caramanis, 1999; Miller & Rose, 1990; Neu, 1999,
2000a; Neu & Therrien, 2003; O’Regan, 2010; Preston & Oakes, 2001; Walker, 2003).
In addition, accounting has contributed to processes of collaborative bargaining between
imperial powers and indigenous elite with the purpose of empowering the imperial core
over the periphery (Arnold & Cooper, 1999; Davie, 2000; Walker, 2003; Tinken, 1985;
Tinker et al., 1991). Accordingly, accounting provides the micro-techniques through
which macro-objectives are realised. It is mobilised to impose control and to discipline
society in compliance with that which serves the dominant elite.

Accounting mechanisms are implicated in the construction of ‘rules of difference’ that
subordinate an ‘inferior’ conquered; this is an imperative function of accounting that
facilitates the implementation of imperial policies of subjugation and exploitation (Bush
& Maltby, 2004; Davie, 2005; Ferguson, 2003; Fleischman et al., 2013; Funnell, 2001;
Graham & Neu, 2013; Greer, 2006; Neu, 1999; O’Regan, 2010; Preston & Oakes, 2001;
Walker, 2003, 2004, 2013).

By being ‘instruments of alienation’, accounting

techniques serve the interests of imperial power blocs by facilitating the exploitation of
humans and their resources and relieving the conscience of the exploiters (Arendt, 1948;
Fleischman et al., 2013; Hopper, 2013; Hooper & Kearins, 2013; Plumwood, 1993).
Indeed, accounting mechanisms have sustained slave regimes and have functioned to
ease processes of primitive accumulation by contributing to acts of dispossession,
oppression, exploitation and silencing of the ‘Other’ (Fleischman, 2004; Fleischman et
al., 2004a, 2004b, 2013; Fleischman & Tyson, 2004; Gallhofer & Chew, 2000; Gibson,
2000; Hoogvelt & Tinker, 1978; Hooper & Kearins, 2004, 2008; Hooper & Pratt, 1995;
Maltby & Tsamenyi, 2010). Accounting is implicated in the construction of the power
to separate, subordinate and exclude indigenous inhabitants by ‘disabling’ indigenous
agency and translating imperial forms of injustice, inequality and oppression into
practice (Davie, 2005; Neu & Graham, 2006). Also, accounting techniques have been
implicated in acts of domination, repression, genocide, in stigmatisation and
degradation, in facilitating racism, in dehumanising and distancing the Other, and in
attempts at annihilating others (Chwastiak & Lehman, 2008; Fleischman et al., 2013;
Fleischman & Tyson, 2000; Funnell, 1998; Lippman & Wilson, 2007; Macintosh &
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Scapens, 1990, 1991; Neu, 2000a; Neu & Therrien, 2003; O’Regan, 2013; Walker,
2004, 2008, 2013).

Accounting for coercive power
At times of war, several studies into military accounting have demonstrated how
accounting can be utilised to increase military power by enhancing military operations,
effectiveness and efficiency (Black, 2001; Chwastiak, 2006; Cobbin & Burrows, 2010;
Funnell, 2005, 2006; Funnell & Chwastiak, 2010, 2015a, Harris, 1911, 1931; Talbot,
2010). Heier (2010) showed the role of accounting in managing and, thus, facilitating
necessary transportation mechanisms for the enhanced movement of forces during
combat. Similarly, Bujaki (2010) showed how accounting information was used as a
discourse to convince the government to build enhanced infrastructure for defence
purposes in Canada.

Nevertheless, Mayer-Sommer demonstrated how excessive

accounting controls were not effective at preventing abuses of public funds by political
interests in the US during the Civil War of 1861-5, thereby enabling transfers of wealth.
Similarly, Chwastiak (2013) showed that auditing practices during the 2003 Iraq War
helped to manage the impact of corporate malfeasance by reconstructing it as waste, and
blaming low level employees and the Iraqis for the fraud. Also, Chwastiak (2006) has
shown that accounting techniques failed to impose rational control on the turmoil of the
Vietnam War, rather, distorted the mindset of US leadership and created contradictions
that contributed to US failure in Vietnam.

Accounting is implicated in the expansion of a fusion between the US state and military
private industry, known as the military industrial complex (MIC), that holds “the
potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power …” (Office of the Federal Register,
1961). Chwastiak (1996, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2006) has demonstrated that accounting
techniques have abetted unethical behaviour, masked the transformation of wastes into
riches and the inefficient allocation of resources. They have also rationalised and
normalised defense spending during periods of social crises, and have played an integral
role in normalising the preparation for nuclear war.

As such, accounting has

contributed to the transfer of wealth from the masses to the elite, to the promotion of
militarisation, and to the potential for war and mass killings at the expense of peace,
12

security, the economy and society. By facilitating the expansion of militarisation,
accounting exaggerates the coercive power of the empire, thereby extending its capacity
to subordinate, oppress and exploit others (Funnell & Chwastiak, 2010; Omond, 1933;).
This is confirmed through the way in which civilians of the British Parliament in the
seventeenth century utilised accounting mechanisms to control military finances,
thereby protecting against the potential for the national armed forces to oppress its
citizenry (Funnell, 1990, 1997, 2007, 2008, Funnell & Chwastiak, 2010, 2015a).

Accounting has contributed to the rationalisation and normalisation of the use of
coercive forms of power, which has facilitated the expansion of war (Chwastiak &
Lehman, 2008). Its failure to capture qualitative human interactions, such as morality
and ethics, empowers the empire to exercise unethical behaviour in its pursuit of the
realisation of self-interests (Chwastiak & Lehman, 2008; Lovell, 1995; Funnell, 1998;
Shearer, 2002; Walker, 2000).

Chwastiak (2015b) has shown that organisational

processes and rationalities have been utilised to normalise acts of torture by the US state
in its War on Terror (WoT). Accounting has also empowered the eco-political elite by
creating necessary visibilities and invisibilities with regards to the costs of war that have
helped legitimise their use of force to achieve imperial objectives. Indeed, Chwatiak
and Lehman (2008) have demonstrated that accounting supports the delusion that
wealth preservation is more valuable than human life or the environment. Furthermore,
by deeming the social and environmental costs of war invisible, accounting under-costs
the true costs of war, thereby empowering the eco-political elite to utilise it as a viable
option (Chwastiak, 2008; Chwastiak & Lehman, 2008; Funnell & Chwastiak, 2015a).
Moreover, by instilling rational business practices on war, accounting has provided the
ideological justifications for destruction (Chwastiak, 2001, 2006; Chwastiak & Lehman,
2008; Funnell, 2006; Funnell & Chwastiak, 2015a;). Indeed, Catchpowle and Cooper
(2005) have demonstrated the nexus between war and profit and have raised awareness
of how the accounting profession could have played a moderating role in Iraq that
would have compelled the US government to account for its business dealings in Iraq.

Accounting obfuscates the socio-environmental effects of non-military coercive
exertions of power, such as those of the ‘silent war’ of economic sanctions, thereby
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relieving the political elite of accountability and moral anguish (Chwastiak & Lehman,
2008). In Iraq, economic sanctions had genocidal effects, yet accounting’s emphasis on
efficiency through cost-reduction legitimised their imposition, whilst masking their
qualitative effects. Such quantitative instrumental reasoning has been shown to have
also facilitated previous acts of genocide (Funnell, 1998; Lippman & Wilson, 2007;
Neu, 2000a; Neu & Therrien, 2003).

Following from this logic of accounting,

Chwastiak (2015a) has demonstrated accounting’s role in transforming the state crime
of ‘Extraordinary Rendition’ into a business opportunity, by elevating the profit motive
and suppressing the criminality of the action, during the WoT.

Since accounting

focuses on profit and loss as the ultimate metrics of value, it does not distinguish
between profitable activities that destroy and those that construct. Accordingly, it has
empowered dominant capitalist groups with the ideological justification to profit from
destructive activities, such as war and torture, by treating such activities as mere
opportunities for business transactions (Chwastiak, 2015b; Chwastiak & Lehman,
2008). Conversely, it has also incentivised the political elite to increasingly realise
power-gains through violent coercive mechanisms; by outsourcing warfare to dominant
capital groups like PMCs, the elites benefit from unaccountable mercenary forces that
realise their interests from a distance, whilst also decreasing the visible eco-political
costs that are associated with coercive exertions of power. Accordingly, acts of killing,
subjugation, oppression and exploitation for imperial interests are applied under the
shelter of plausible deniability (Chwastiak, 2007a, 2008, 2015a).

Accordingly,

privatised warfare can be conceptualised as a form of ‘contract killing’; whilst
individual contracts to kill are considered criminal and punishable under the law,
equivalent contracts made between the state and private corporations, which are
solicitations of murder, subjugation and oppression, are permissible and enforceable by
law, and are managed by accounting techniques.

The interested nature of accounting for power
Accounting cannot be regarded as a neutral social-science that objectively reports
economic events or facts (Argyris, 1990; Burchell et al., 1980; Hopwood, 1990;
Hopwood & Miller, 1994; Hoskin & Macve, 1994; Kloot, 1997; Macintosh & Hopper,
2005; Neimark & Tinker, 1986; Otley, 1994; Riccaboni et al., 2006; Tinker, 1980;
Tinker et al., 1982). Accounting produces knowledge that is value-laden and is a
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product of social construction that serves the political and economic elite (Burchell et
al., 1980; Funnell & Chwastiak, 2015; Hopwood & Miller, 1994; Macintosh & Hopper,
2005; Neimark & Tinker, 1986; Tinker, 1980; Tinker et al., 1982). It is a cultural force
that mirrors certain values that comply with and serve the dominant ideology that is
produced by dominant powers (Burchell et al., 1980; Funnell & Chwastiak, 2015;
Macintosh & Hopper, 2005; O’Regan, 2010; Neu & Heincke, 2004; Previtis & Merino,
1998; Said, 1993). Yet accounting provides the means to mystify these realities and to
conceal the true nature of socio-ecopolitical relationships. This is because accounting
systems provide the means to justify, legitimise and rationalise the dominant ideology
and its derivative policies, implications and constructed order.

For example, it

facilitates, sustains and rationalises capitalism’s polarising distribution of wealth and
power in society in a way that deepens inequalities. Accordingly, accounting is a vital
power resource that has evolved with the development of capitalism to occupy an ever
more significant role and position in society (Burchell et al., 1980; Funnell, 2001;
Macintosh & Hopper, 2005). This requires that accounting must be identified as a
mechanism through which complex interplays of political and social processes are
explained.

Tinker (1980, p.158) has shown that political and social conditions form the foundation
upon which the economic is established, “thus the accounting results are only as good
as their political and social precepts”. Moreover, accounting’s production of power
cannot be distinguished from its relation to politics, for “When power mobilises through
relations, and between people, politics is inevitable” (Wickramasinghe, 2006, p.341).
Indeed, Clegg (2005, p.161) recognises that “the process of mobilizing power is the
process of politics”. By mediating relations between people in a way that adheres to a
dominant ideology and its status quo distribution of wealth and power, accounting
cannot be politically neutral. Rather, it is a technology of power, of discourse, of
knowledge, of social re-engineering and of practices of surveillance and control, which
serve the interests of dominant political and economic groups.

The choice of an accounting measurement system will always affect the way things are
counted; by necessarily producing those who gain and those who lose, accounting is a
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product of social conflict and social power struggles (Cooper & Sherer, 1984; Funnell
& Chwastiak, 2015a; Macintosh & Hopper, 2005).

Similarly, budgeting, which

determines the distribution of income and reflects the intentions of organisations, will
also produce both winners and losers and is an essential determinant of organisational
success or failure.

Budgetary arrangements, including budgetary policies and

participation in the budgeting process, cannot be separated from managerial attitudes
and ideological leanings.

Consequently, budgeting is interrelated with political

strategies, power struggles and organisational control structures (Hopwood, 1978;
Hopwood & Miller, 1994; Savage, 2013a, 2013b, Wildavsky, 1961, 1967, 1986, 1992;
Wildavsky & Webber, 1986). Most importantly, control over public revenue is a
determinant for either the expansion or contraction of military power. Therefore, it is
through accounting techniques that ultimate power is exerted on the capacity to use
military force. Accordingly, there exists a “nexus between political hegemony and
public finances …” which accounting negotiates (Funnell & Chwastiak, 2015b, p.1).

The political elite often utilise accounting’s calculative practices, which produce
seemingly objective and scientific knowledge, to legitimise and justify their decisions
against the judgement of those with expertise (Chwastiak, 2006; Funnell & Chwastiak,
2015a). Although accounting’s calculative practices produce incomplete knowledge,
the elite only consider that which can be quantified. Qualitative considerations, such as
morals, ethics, social and environmental justice and equity, are disregarded.
Accounting knowledge is partial. Nevertheless, its ability to reduce things to a single
quantitative figure empowers the elite as it facilitates processes of comparison and
evaluation that permit political and economic governance. Moreover, accounting is
shaped by and plays an active role in shaping public policy. Therefore, it cannot be
politically neutral. Rather, it is a “social practice embedded in a context shaping it and
with which it interacts” (Gallhofer et al., 2011, p.377). The politically inherent nature
of accounting is confirmed through the variations in requirements for accounting for
social and environmental disclosures that are shaped by the influence of the sociopolitical economy of countries (Bushman & Piotroski, 2006; Williams, 1999). It is
further confirmed through the intensified promotion of the standards of the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), which are founded upon the dominant ideology,
as benchmarks for ‘proper’ accounting, and their imposition upon other countries by
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international institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF (Gallhofer et al., 2011).
As such, it is a governance technology through which complex interplays of political
and social processes are explained.

The Political Economy of Accounting and the 2003 Iraq War
Research Objectives
The central research objective of this thesis is to demonstrate the interested nature of the
socio-ecopolitical dimensions of accounting that played out in the lead-up to, and
throughout, the US’s 2003 imperial de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation project
of Iraqi space. In broader terms, this research aims to reveal the rich intersection
between questions of space and of accounting by showing the ways in which
accounting, as a source of power, is an essential component for the construction of the
socio-ecopolitical dimensions of space for capitalist imperial interests.

Until recently, the concept that accounting performed interested roles within imperial
spatial expansions was considered implausible within accounting thought. For example,
Solomons (1991, p. 287) asserted that “to suggest any direct connection between broad
developments (such as the appearance and disappearance of colonialism) would be
farfetched indeed”. While there has recently been growing interest and contributions to
the broader study of accounting and state empires, the research has primarily focused on
the role of accounting and accountants in the enactment and maintenance of historical
empires, particularly that of late 19th century British imperialism. Importantly, each of
such studies has focused on demonstrating accounting’s role within a distinct process or
practice of a specific empire. There has been no attempt at broadening the scope of
research so as to analyse the interrelationship between multiple roles of accounting and
the overall realisation of eco-political spatial projects. Doing so would enable the
development of a more comprehensive understanding, a concept that can explain the
purpose, practices and implications that arise from the nexus between accounting,
capitalism and imperial space. This thesis seeks to address these gaps in knowledge by
performing a trans-disciplinary study that connects accounting with the eco-political
dynamics of imperial spatial expansions.

The study proposes the Capitalism’s
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Accountings of Space (CAS) concept, which explains the purpose, practices and
implications of the interrelationship between accounting, capitalism and imperial space.
It then applies this concept to investigate the contemporary imperial case study of the
2003 Iraq War, ranging between pre- to post-invasion, so as to understand the roles of
accounting within it, and to confirm the concept’s propositions.

Resolving the two primary questions of this thesis, why and how capitalist imperial
exertions of power upon space occur within an accounting context, broader research
objectives are also met. The thesis will demonstrate that accounting technologies were
used strategically in the context of the Iraq War in 2003 for the benefit of elitist
interests; these not only opposed the interests of the majority Iraqi population, but also
brought about extensive regional and global negative repercussions like the rise of terror
group ISIS, the spread of regional insecurity, economic instability and the global
refugee crisis. Accordingly, it will confirm that, far from being a neutral, value-free
mechanism for decision-making, the allocation of resources and the realisation of
efficiency goals, accounting is a partial language and an interested tool that is harnessed
to further the interests of dominant political and economic groups. It will show that
accounting information “has an ideological function in that it is used to legitimize
particular activities or rationalize past behaviour” (Cooper & Sherer, 1984, p.223). The
thesis will also display accounting’s roles in power relations that the US intervention
brought into effect, including powers of subjugation and oppression that contributed to
and fuelled indigenous resistance.

Moreover, it will show accounting’s role in the

dispossession and exploitation of Iraq, which were enabled through the transforming of
Iraq into a space of exception, and the imposition of a neoliberal regime that the US
established during its occupation. Accordingly, the thesis aims to explore the socioecopolitical dimensions of ‘accounting power’, both the socio-ecopolitical power of
accounting representations and also the role of socio-ecopolitical accounting dimensions
in revealing the operation of power relations. Finally, by exposing the dynamics of
power relations and accounting, this thesis invites others to challenge the status quo,
thereby providing an opportunity for emancipatory change.
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Methodological Bearings
The methodology applied in this thesis is based on a critical approach to accounting
research, which enables an analysis of the political, economic and social influences on
accounting, whilst also permitting the questioning of mainstream assumptions. More
specifically, this thesis utilises Tinker’s (1980) Political Economy of Accounting (PEA)
method, which recognises that there are two dimensions of capital: firstly as economic
forces of production and secondly as social relations of production (Bhaduri, 1969).
Fundamentally, PEA acknowledges that economic order is premised upon various social
institutions, such as state, religious, political, legal and social, which are representatives
of social relations. Following from this, PEA recognises that “an understanding of
social and political processes (the social relations) is indispensable to interpreting
economic performance …” (Tinker, 1980, p.154). Accordingly, it is a trans-disciplinary
mode of investigation that emphasises the interplay between political and economic
forces in society, and situates “the accounting functions within the broader structural
and institutional environment in which it operates” (Cooper & Sherer, 1984, p.217).

The PEA approach brings power to the forefront of accounting research by critiquing
the marginalist economics’ conception of society, which assumes that power is broadly
spread and that no one individual or group is able to constantly exercise influence upon
society; PEA recognises that this conception permits an unproblematic view of
accounting technologies (Tinker, 1977). In contrast, PEA adopts a conflict model of
society that recognises that dominant groups are able to exert both influence and control
upon the mass majority over long periods of time (Bichler & Nitzan, 2004; Chandler,
2006; Harvey, 1985, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005b, 2007b, 2007a; Nitzan, 1998, 2001;
Nitzan & Bichler, 2009; Stanworth & Giddens, 1974; Wood, 2003). In addition, it
recognises the role of the state in actively promoting and managing this created order,
including in its management of accounting regulations. Therefore, the PEA approach
entails “drawing attention to the conflicting political and economic interests at stake in
accounting” (Hopwood & Miller, 1994, p.16). PEA acknowledges that accounting is a
socially contested and created technology, and insists that accounting systems can be
mechanisms through which power is applied. In order to confirm this, PEA emphasises
the historical context of the institutional environment within society so as to develop an
understanding of its role within society’s current economic ordering (Merino &
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Neimark, 1982; Zeff, 1978). This thesis applies this notion by examining the historical
geography of capitalism theory (Harvey, 1985, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2005a, 2007a) and its
interplay with accounting technology through space and time. This novel fusion is
referred to in this thesis as the capitalism’s accountings of space (CAS) concept.
Through its application, a sequential progression through space and time is generated
that provides a methodical means of confirming the intricate interplay between
accounting and the eco-political realms. Moreover, this progression can be followed to
the space of Iraq and to the time of 2003, thereby providing a methodically-based
preliminary solution to the thesis’ two underlying interrogations.

Contrary to the mainstream perception that accounting plays a passive function in
society (Peasnell, 1978), PEA views the potential in accounting to play an active and
emancipatory role. Since PEA is concerned with exposing the power afforded to elites
through their appropriations of accounting technology, it sheds light on the accounting
methods and mechanisms that are utilised for power production.

Accordingly, it

facilitates for the challenging of elites by bringing about change. In a similar way, PEA
highlights issues of social welfare and the distribution of wealth, instead of the notion of
market equilibrium. By insisting on the social construction of the current polarised
economic order PEA challenges the mainstream perception that frames this order as
scientific truth.

Therefore, it begins to move down the avenue that leads to

emancipatory change. Finally, PEA adopts an emancipated perception of individuals,
their motivations and accounting’s role within society by recognising that the promotion
of the self-interest notion is a consequence of the current economic order and, thus,
identifies the potential for positive change (Cooper & Sherer, 1984). By demonstrating
the interplays of power within the 2003 Iraq War case study, and the ways through
which accounting technologies were appropriated so as to serve their interests, this
thesis seeks to bring to visibility the potential for accounting to challenge them through
bringing about emancipatory change. The perceived passive role of accounting within
imperial projects will be invalidated, thereby facilitating for wider society to oppose,
challenge, control and limit destructive activities of dominant capital and power groups.
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Contributions of the thesis
Empirically, the in-depth analysis of the 2003 Iraq War as a case study brings novel
elements for analysing the interested nature of accounting within the context of
capitalist imperial expansions.

Whilst selected accounting literature have analysed

accounting’s role within certain processes or practices of the 2003 Iraq War
(Catchpowle & Cooper, 2005, 2009, Chwastiak, 2007b, 2008, 2009, 2013, 2015a,
2015b; Chwastiak & Lehman, 2008; Funnell & Chwastiak, 2015b), there has been no
thorough investigation into the event in its entirety. Such a thorough investigation
engenders novel elements for research as it enables a broad and panoramic examination
of events that permits the identification of modes through which separable accounting
processes/practices can interrelate and combine to serve multiple overall accounting
purposes within an imperial project.

Accordingly, this thesis makes a number of

contributions to knowledge, predominantly with regards to accounting and the US’s
Imperial project upon Iraqi space, but also with regards to broad-spectrum roles of
accounting within capitalist imperial ventures.

Concerning the latter, the thesis’

illustration of key intersections between accounting and the historical trajectory of
capitalism, which provides a methodically-based understanding of the underlying
dynamics between accounting, capitalism and space leading up to the present time, is an
original contribution to accounting knowledge. Furthermore, the thesis’ utilisation of
its CAS accounting concept as a guide for investigating the issues is a novel
contribution, as it provides a new research tool that can similarly be applied to guide
future studies of capitalist imperial projects.

Concerning the US’s imperial project upon Iraqi space, the thesis contributes to
knowledge by demonstrating various accounting mechanisms that combined to
essentially contribute to an overall narrative of de-valuation of the existing eco-political
territorialisation of Iraqi space. This de-valuation was an essential precursor for the
initiation of subsequent de-territorialisation processes. The thesis shows that these
accounting mechanisms facilitated the de-valuation of Iraqi space to a space of
exception that was reminiscent of a state of terra nullius, a land belonging to nobody,
which is an original contribution to accounting knowledge. Also new to accounting
knowledge is this thesis’ identification of the role of accounting in the US’s deployment
of insufficient troops to Iraq, which proved to be a decisive element of facilitation
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within subsequent de-territorialisation processes of Iraqi space. Within this context, the
thesis’ examination of the roles of accounting in the attempted cultural cleansing of
Iraq, including destruction of its historical, intellectual and educational assets, is an
original contribution to accounting knowledge.

With regards the economic re-territorialisation of Iraq, the thesis contributes to existing
knowledge by investigating it within the parameters of the CAS concept.

It

demonstrates how accounting logic was used to legitimise and justify the use of
economic shock therapy for re-territorialisation, despite its track record of failings.
Furthermore, the thesis makes evident the role of deficient accounting, accountability,
auditing and budgeting mechanisms, used during the US’s initial administration of Iraq
by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in maintaining its created space of
exception where re-territorialisation could continue and accelerated transfers of Iraqi
wealth could flourish. With regards to transfers in Iraqi wealth, the thesis makes an
original contribution to knowledge by identifying how transfers to foreign capital
groups were normalised through otherwise prohibited accounting transfer-pricing
practices. Also, whilst the thesis confirms Cooper and Catchpowle’s (2009) finding that
the accounting technology of auditing was successful in providing an imperfect, yet
independent audit of the CPA’s use of Iraqi funds during its post-war administration of
Iraq, it differs by situating this form of ‘counter-account’ within the CAS concept to
establish its significance.

Accordingly, it concludes that the auditing process was

profoundly contained by imperial influences; its significance was rendered
inconsequential as it failed to stop the plundering of Iraqi wealth, or permit subsequent
corruption-related convictions. Accordingly, the thesis confirms Chwastiak’s (2009,
2013) similar findings pertaining to audits of the use of US reconstruction funds for
post-war Iraq. Finally, the thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge in this
subject by exhibiting how the CPA also manipulated indigenous auditing mechanisms,
which served to facilitate a continuation of corrupt practices, the transfer of Iraqi wealth
and the obstruction of corruption-related convictions after the end of the CPA’s rule.

Accounting literature has not discussed how accounting was instrumentalised during the
occupation to socio-geopolitically re-engineer Iraq. During its occupation, the US
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attempted to re-engineer the collective mindset of Iraqi society, to reconfigure the
spatial/scalar ordering of Iraq, and to secure the eco-political acquiescence of future
Iraqi governments. This thesis’ investigation of the roles of accounting within these
imperial processes yields multiple original contributions to accounting knowledge.
Firstly, the thesis shows the role of accounting logic in the US’s use of a ‘divide and
conquer’ imperial strategy in Iraq to realise its objectives, and the profound role of
discriminative revenue-sharing arrangements and the establishment of anaemic
budgetary processes and institutions in its implementation. It will demonstrate the role
of accounting in the US’s attempted re-engineering of the collective mindset of the Iraqi
people, which sought to build a neoliberal individualist-based, self-interest centred
mindset. In addition, it will show how accounting contributed to the obstruction of the
democratic will of the Iraqi people by transforming unethical US state behaviour, which
transformed Iraqi elections into ‘selection processes’, into a commodity and normal
business routine for profit that was outsourced. In a similar way, it will show how the
US outsourced heterogeneous sites and agencies to entrench imperial ideology within
Iraq in an attempt to re-engineer the collective mindset of Iraqi society, and to reinforce
a policy of assimilation. By analysing the combined effects of these processes, the
thesis will demonstrate how they served to sharpen ethno-sectarian identities, extend the
reach of US domination within Iraqi constitution-building processes and, consequently,
to establish a tripartite ethno-sectarian federalised state structure that was most
conducive to imperial interests. Also, the thesis will show that accounting rhetoric was
used to legitimise and justify the establishment of this decentralised Iraqi state structure
that permitted a greater role for private agencies and actors, and eased access for
dominant capital groups, thereby unleashing market forces throughout Iraqi space.

The thesis will demonstrate the role of the US’s establishment of anaemic Iraqi
budgetary processes and institutions to further diminish Iraqi state capacity, thereby
serving to build power structures of domination and subordination. Furthermore, the
role of these processes in justifying and legitimising the enforced privatisation of the
Iraqi oil industry will be shown, and an original contribution showing the role of
accounting in masking the resulting accumulation by dispossession through accounting
practices related to production-sharing agreements (PSAs) will be demonstrated.
Another original contribution to accounting knowledge will be made with regards to the
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role of the US’s procurement system in facilitating an import-driven Iraqi economy
rather than nurturing indigenous production capabilities, and how it enabled a system of
patronage and favouritism that further debilitated the Iraqi state whilst accommodating
US interests. Whilst Cooper and Catchpowle (2009) concluded that the audit reports of
the CPA showed no evidence that the US pursued the colonialist policy of working with
local elites and state apparatuses, this thesis will show that this policy was, in actuality,
enacted by the US through its procurement system and its discriminatory revenuesharing arrangements in Iraq. Finally, the thesis provides another original contribution
to knowledge by demonstrating how metrics relating to budgetary execution and
investment expenditures were utilised as overriding measures of efficiency that
facilitated another wave of virulent corruption in Iraq, whilst also extending imperial
domination. In this regard, the thesis demonstrates the significant power that financial
and accounting controls provided to US political elite, as well as the resulting effects of
decreased Iraqi state capacity.

CAS concept is also used to investigate the power afforded to imperialist elite through
accounting technologies that project a feasible representation of an imperial project.
Whilst Chwastiak (2007, 2008), Chwastiak and Lehman (2008) and Funnell and
Chwastiak (2015b) have demonstrated how government accounting practices contribute
to official discourse that conceals from visibility the true costs of war and its effects,
their work discussed this process by considering instances from a collection of wars,
including that of the Nazis, the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War and the War on
Terror’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Accordingly, there has been no in-depth analysis
of the methods through which this process was achieved in Iraq, which would also
permit a more accurate comprehension of the costs associated with an imperial project
of this scale in its entirety. This thesis will fill this gap in knowledge by providing an
extensive analysis of the multiple accounting methods through which the visibility of
economic costs pertaining the imperial project on Iraq were manipulated, and also how
human, environmental and other social costs were tactfully omitted from accounts. The
study broadens its temporal scope so as to acknowledge all three major contemporary
US imperial footprints that together brought about the opening of Iraqi space, being the
1991 Gulf War, the 1990-2003 economic sanctions and the 2003 Iraq War. Whilst
Chwastiak and Lehman (2008) explained the role of accounting logic in the
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rationalisation of economic sanctions, this thesis expands on the outcomes and effects
of this logic, and also makes an original contribution by bringing to visibility some of
the economic costs that are sustained by perpetrators of economic sanctions, yet remain
invisible due to current accounting methods.

The thesis demonstrates significant modes through which accounting technology was
utilised during different stages of the Iraq project so as to build and reinforce power
structures that would enable the restructuring and management of Iraqi space for
capitalist imperial interests.

Accounting literature has not discussed the use of

accounting within the US’ DoD in the lead-up to the war and invasion of Iraq, only in
the DoD’s 1960s pre-planning for nuclear warfare (Chwastiak, 2001) and its effects
upon visibilities within the DoD during the Vietnam War (Chwastiak, 2006). This
thesis fills this gap in knowledge by explaining how accounting, through the newly
revised Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES), was
strategically deployed by the DoD’s civilian command to afford the Bush
administration’s neo-conservative ideology primacy within DoD pre-war decisionmaking process. Accordingly, it provides an original contribution to knowledge by
showing the accounting means through which the DoD’s decision-making processes
were politicised in the interest of the neo-conservative elite, and points to the
ramifications of such an arrangement, including for key resource allocation decisions
during the war, invasion and occupation of Iraq. These include decisions regarding the
initiation of multiple wars simultaneously, the US’s use of WMD and unmanned
predator aerial drones, and in decisions that led to shortages in supplies and
reinforcements, such as in tanks and armoured vehicles. This study also further expands
on knowledge of the means through which accounting systems were utilised to
manipulate eco-political costs with regards to the war and invasion of Iraq so as to
manage a ‘profitable’ representation of the imperial venture.

Chwastiak (2006) is the only accounting paper that has discussed the effects of the
Planning, Programming and Budgeting (PPB) accounting system on visibilities within
the DoD and on decision-making by US leadership during war, being the Vietnam War.
This thesis makes original contributions to this knowledge by analysing the effects of
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the revised PPBE system on visibilities within the DoD and on decision-making by US
leadership during the three stages of war, invasion and occupation of Iraq. Such an
analysis enables the exploration of novel associations between accounting and violent
translations of imperial power in Iraq. For example, the analysis will show how lax
accounting and accountability methods, accounting logic and the use of PPBES’
measures of performance (MoPs) and measures of effectiveness (MoEs) facilitated a
mechanical employment of ‘counter-insurgency’ tactics that were against international
law, such as the operationalization of a mass-incarceration ‘machine’ in Iraq and the use
of torture. Whilst Chwastiak’s (2015a, 2015b) papers discuss the issue of torture in
Iraq, this thesis provides original contributions to this knowledge by identifying novel
means through which accounting contributed to the employment of torture in Iraq, such
as the role of MoEs and MoPs, and the lax accounting records and accountability
methods that were utilised within US-run prisons in Iraq. Also new to accounting
literature is this thesis’ exhibiting of the role of accounting in the relaxation of US
military Rules of Engagement (ROE) in Iraq, which led to the incitement of
unwarranted civilian killings from a distance. Furthermore, this study will show the
role of accounting in the decision to utilise notorious sectarian-based paramilitary forces
as a form of counter-insurgency and their effects, such as their eliciting of ethnic
cleansings and the Iraqi civil war.

Sources of research
Generating the interplay between accounting and the historical trajectory of capitalism
relied upon a thorough search of relevant trans-disciplinary literature. These included
material relating to Harvey’s (1985, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2005a, 2007a) well established
historical geography of capitalism theory, alongside accounting material that
demonstrated the ideological underpinnings, discourses and techniques of accounting
that correspondingly applied to key stages in this trajectory. For example, the thesis
combined literature about the drive of early capitalist empires to conquer space through
acts of primitive accumulation of foreign lands, with literature that correspondingly
showed the role of accounting in performing ‘software’ functions that ultimately served
to facilitate, justify and legitimate the resulting processes of alienation, subjugation,
exploitation and assimilation. Similarly, the thesis combined literature regarding the
drive of the contemporary US capitalist empire to conquer space through acts of
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accumulation by dispossession, with accounting literature that demonstrated its roles in
facilitating, justifying and legitimating such transfers of wealth, including its roles in
processes of privatisation, financialisation, state redistributions, and the management
and manipulation of crises. Awareness of the ideological underpinnings, discourses and
techniques of accounting that applied within key stages of the historical trajectory of
capitalism provided a sequential confirmation of the eco-political inherence of
accounting and its role as a technology of imperialist rule and governance through space
and time.

In addition, it brought into visibility the rich intersections between

accounting, capitalism and space, which served to underscore the central propositions of
the CAS concept.

The remainder of the thesis drew heavily from a detailed examination of predominantly
primary resources that originated from the US government and its agencies, prominent
participants, international institutions and non-governmental organisations. During this
stage of research, the CAS concept was used to identify key constructs that served to
channel its collection of resources and to analyse their implications. For example, the
key construct of de-territorialisation directed the gathering of material regarding each of
the socio-ecopolitical de-territorialisation processes that occurred in Iraq. In analysing
this material, the thesis realised specificity by also utilising CAS constructs regarding
the purposes of accounting, such as de-valuation and the building of power structures,
to examine and identify the roles of accounting within these processes. Overwhelming
reliance throughout the thesis on primary resources was meant to ensure that the
developed narrative, and its related conclusions, clearly originated from actual events.
For example, material regarding why the 1991 Gulf War did not end with a US invasion
of Baghdad and the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, being due to ‘incalculable
human and political costs’, was collected directly from the Presidential memoir of
President George H. W. Bush, which was also co-authored by his National Security
Advisor, Brent Scowcroft. By largely drawing on the authority of those involved, the
thesis gave them the overarching presence and priority within its developed narrative.

In light of the controversial and sensitive nature of the events and practices that are the
focus of this research, some materials were inaccessible; they remain the subject of
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secrecy protections. However, the great wealth of primary source material available
permitted a very thorough and comprehensive rendition of events that compensated this
limitation. These resources enabled the thesis to get behind what was being said, by
demonstrating what actually happened. In doing so, it shed light on what was also
being hidden.

Below is an overview of the categories of sources of data for this thesis; a more detailed
enlargement on theses categories is available in Appendix 1.
1. Official governmental sources.
2. Official communications.
3. International institutions.
4. Non-governmental organisations.
5. Military institutions.
6. Trans-disciplinary journal articles and books.
7. Private accounting firms.
8. News media sources.

Chapter Outline
Chapter Two: This chapter introduces the central underpinnings of the CAS concept
and traces the historical trajectory of capitalism through space and time so as to provide
a theoretical foundation upon which the remainder of the thesis will be developed. It
shows that capitalism’s progression through space and time has been premised upon a
fusion between dominant power and capital groups fused into hegemonic power blocs,
and their interests. In addition, the chapter demonstrates the roles and contributions of
accounting ideological underpinnings, discourses and techniques that correspond to key
stages within this trajectory, thereby demonstrating how accounting has evolved
through space and time as a response to the needs of dominant power and capital
groups.

This analysis brings to light the rich intersections between accounting,

capitalism and space, and substantiates the central propositions of the CAS concept.
The chapter builds until it reaches the space of Iraq and the year of 2003, where it
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provides a preliminary methodically-based evaluation of why and how capitalism’s
progression led to the 2003 Iraq War.

Chapter Three: This chapter begins to apply the CAS concept to the case study so as
to realise the research objectives of the thesis. It examines the accounting methods
through which a deceptive under-costing of the US’s imperial project in Iraq was
created, and provides an alternative ‘costing’ of the project in its entirety. It undertakes
an in-depth analysis of the imperial project by expanding the temporal scope of its
accounting for costs so as to include the 1991 Gulf War, the 1990-2003 economic
sanctions and the 2003 Iraq War. In doing so, the chapter exposes the ‘methods behind
the magician’s trick’; that is, it demonstrates the various ways in which accounting
practices were utilised by the political elite to project a feasible perception of their
exertions of power on Iraq, thereby garnering public support and legitimacy, and
maintaining an empire in denial. Moreover, it also provides an ‘accounting for the
unaccounted for’, as it exhibits the costs to Iraq from these imperial exertions of power,
thereby demonstrating the de-territorialisation processes that were realised in Iraq,
whilst also shedding light on their immense human, environmental and social
ramifications.

Accordingly, the chapter emphasises the emancipatory potential of

accounting technology if it is appropriated in ways that counter current practices.

Chapter Four: This chapter continues the application of the CAS concept by
demonstrating how the coercive de-territorialisation of Iraq was juxtaposed with
ideological invasion. It shows how the US applied a terra nullius-like principle on Iraqi
space that effectively de-territorialised its existing socialist-based indigenous juridical
framework, thereby providing a clean slate for neoliberal re-territorialisation through
economic shock therapy.

The chapter explains accounting’s contributions to the

facilitation of this process, before presenting the most controversial of the US’s newly
imposed laws, their effects and, where relevant, the contributions of accounting. The
final section of the chapter shows how accounting was appropriated to accelerate
processes of economic re-territorialisation of Iraq, including an acceleration of its
accompanying transfers of wealth.

Importantly, it demonstrates the extent of

capitalism’s influence upon current accounting practices: whilst audits of the CPA
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illustrated the potential for the production of counter-accounts that challenged capitalist
interests, the chapter will demonstrate that their effects were largely curtailed by the
capitalist hegemonic bloc. Moreover, it will confirm this proposition of the CAS
concept by demonstrating how the US sought to extend this influence by
institutionalising debilitated auditing mechanisms within Iraqi government accounting
practices.

Chapter Five: This chapter builds upon its predecessor by showing that the US’s
imperial project in Iraq did not only aim to reconfigure Iraq’s economy in compliance
with the neoliberal regime.

The chapter demonstrates that the US attempted an

ambitious and holistic project that involved the novel ‘state-ending’ of Iraq and, thus,
required state-building, including of its social and geopolitical realms, in a way that was
most conducive to US interests. Most importantly, the focus of the chapter is on
demonstrating how accounting and budgetary mechanisms facilitated the realisation of
the required social and geopolitical reconfigurations that were required by dominant
power and capital interests. It also details the methods utilised by the US so as to
establish anaemic budgetary processes and institutions in Iraq, and their roles in
diminishing Iraqi state capacity and building power structures of domination and
subordination. The chapter will also further develop the preliminary evaluations of
chapter two by showing the geo-ecopolitical strategic importance of gaining access and
control of Iraqi oil, to the hegemonic bloc.

Chapter Six: This chapter utilises the CAS concept to understand the role of
accounting in providing the Bush administration’s neo-conservative ideology
dominance within the DoD’s decision-making processes.

This power structure is

especially significant, as neo-conservative ideological primacy over key resource
allocation decisions within the DoD will be shown to have profoundly influenced the
imperial project’s trajectory and de-territorialisation outcomes in Iraq. The chapter
demonstrates that SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld’s reforms to the DoD’s PPB accounting
system were the primary means through which he was able to gain the power to
dominate key military expertise-related decisions within the Pentagon. It also exhibits
the central underpinnings of neo-conservative ideology so as to situate them within
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context of US intentions in Iraqi space, thereby providing another layer of solutions to
the primary questions of the thesis and building upon the preliminary findings of
chapter two.

Chapter Seven: This chapter builds upon its predecessor by demonstrating ways in
which the PPBE accounting system affected visibilities and decision-making processes
within the DoD during the war, invasion and occupation of Iraq. The effects of the
PPBES’s mindset, which simplifies complexities and reduces the multi-dimensional
representations of reality into one-dimensional, quantitative, cause-effect relationships,
are shown beginning from the way OIF was rationalised and represented to the way it
was managed. Moreover, the chapter will show that this mindset led US leadership to
focus on PPBES’s quantitative metrics as the primary measures of progress and
performance during the war, invasion and occupation. As such, their attention was
diverted away from critical qualitative influencers like the establishment of law and
order and winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Iraqi populace; this generated fissures
between perceptions and reality that contributed to the failure of OIF. In addition, it
will demonstrate how the use of these metrics, along with accounting logic and
techniques, facilitated, justified and legitimated the US’s application of dysfunctional
and unjust policies during its occupation of Iraq.

These include the US’s

operationalisation of a mass-incarceration ‘machine’, its use of torture, its setting of
laissez fair ROE, and its implementation of the ‘Salvador Option’ in Iraq. As such, it
also serves to corroborate the major propositions of the CAS concept contributed to the
building and re-inforcement of also played a role in bringing to bear an unjust war that
contributed to the eventual failure of OIF.

Chapter Eight: This chapter consolidates the findings of this thesis by reconciling
them with the CAS concept. In so doing, it makes evident how the thesis has resolved
its primary questions and research objectives, whilst also substantiating the central
propositions of the CAS concept.
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Chapter Two

Capitalism’s Accountings of Space: The interplay
between imperialism, capital accumulation, and
accounting
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Introduction
This chapter presents the CAS concept by exhibiting the interplay between accounting
and the historical trajectory of capitalism.

The resulting theoretical framework of

knowledge will be utilised as the foundation upon which the remainder of this thesis
will be developed. By understanding the historical trajectory of capitalism, the ways
through which capitalism has shaped imperial interests and, through them, has defined
capitalist footprints upon space and time, a sequential process can be developed that
continues to the present day. Awareness of accounting’s ideological underpinnings,
discourses and techniques that correspondingly apply to key stages in this trajectory,
provides the means to understand the eco-political inherence of accounting and its role
as a technology of imperialist rule and governance. Indeed, Funnell (2001, p.187)
explains that “The evolution of modern accounting consists essentially of a series of
pragmatic responses to the needs of capital”.

The first section will explain the central propositions of this thesis’ CAS concept by
elaborating upon Harvey’s (1985, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2005a, 2007a) HGC theory so as to
establish the conceptual underpinnings of the thesis. It will also provide a clear and
informative explanation of the thesis’ ontological views regarding accounting and space
so as to clarify their intended meanings, before elaborating on their interrelationships by
providing an overview of accounting’s roles in the construction of space for empires.
This section then progresses to illustrate key intersections of accounting with the
historical trajectory of capitalism up until the 1970’s. Focussing on capitalist imperial
forms, it will identify capital’s inherent drive for geographic expansion, the key actors
within this drive, and accounting’s role in justifying, legitimating and facilitating
appropriate conditions for this order. The section that follows will discuss the rise of
the neoliberal capital accumulation imperialist order, which is led by the United States
(US). This section is divided into three sub-sections: the first distinguishes between the
neoliberal order and that preceding it, including its main objectives and dominant
actors.

It will also detail the various processes through which gains in capital

accumulation are realised and how accounting technology serves these processes. The
second sub-section will demonstrate the ways neoliberalism seeks to re-engineer spatial
and scalar configurations, including social arrangements, so as to facilitate piercings of
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state sovereignty. Such piercings are shown to be essential means for capitalism’s
conquering of space and for the US’s realisation of its eco-political interests.
Throughout this discussion, accounting’s essential roles within this framework will be
exhibited. The final sub-section will situate the Iraq War within the historical trajectory
of capitalism so as to reach a preliminary understanding of how and why the US chose
to launch a war, invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. The final section will sum up
the chapter’s findings in a conclusion.

Accounting for Capitalism’s Conquering of Space
Capitalism’s accountings of space concept
There are varied interpretations of what constitutes an ‘empire’, the most basic of which
can be categorised as territorial and non-territorial, each with several subtypes
(Steinmetz, 2005). The principle facet of these variations is the conception of the
degree of sovereignty bequeathed by an empire upon a foreign land (Stoler, 2006;
Steinmetz, 2005; Muzio, 2007; Ahmad, 2004). Territorial forms of empire, known as
colonialism, involve the inclusive annexation of territory, along with its sovereignty,
and the subjugating of a people to a single supreme power (Pagden, 2003; Steinmetz,
2005). It involves “the implanting of settlements on distant territory” (Said, 1993, p.8).
Steinmetz (2005, p.356) defines empire as “a relationship of political domination over a
periphery by a core and therefore encompasses the transfer of various practices from
center to margin”. Meanwhile, non-territorial forms of empire, or imperialism, are “in
some respects a more comprehensive concept” (Osterhammel, 1995, p.21) as they
involve the control of space, in a “much more sweeping agenda of controlling the world
or a region” (Steinmetz, 2005, p.342).

Said (1993, p.8) sees imperialism as the

“practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling a
distant territory”. Under imperialist empires, the empire’s activities subdue the locus of
sovereignty; ostensibly preserving the subject’s external appearance of autonomy,
whilst taming a closely manipulated internal state of affairs:
Like colonial powers, imperialist ones intervene to depose regimes or to create
new ones, but unlike colonizers they subsequently recede into the background,
leaving behind a military base, a new constitution, loyal local leaders, advisors,
ambassadors, and political operatives (Steinmetz, 2005, p.349).
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Imperialist ventures have no interest in the micromanagement of affairs. Instead, they
impose a series of macro polities whose “technologies of rule thrive on the production
of exceptions and their uneven and changing proliferation” (Stoler, 2006, p.128). The
production of ‘spaces of exception’ facilitate the empire with the necessary conditions
that enable the realisation of its interests by lifting conventional accountability
mechanisms, thereby creating exceptions to principles and laws, whilst also protecting it
from prosecution (Agamben, 1998; Mbembe, 2003; Schmitt, 1985; Stoler, 2006). As
such, the generation of spaces of exception grant the empire power: power to exploit
and power to justify and legitimise this exploitation.

Carl Schmitt (2006; 1985)

expresses imperialism as the political ordering of space, identifying it as the ‘Nomos’:
the “global division of spheres of influence … within which states extend the tentacles
of their power beyond their political boundaries” (Steinmetz, 2005, p.350).

Harvey (2003) and Wood (2003) demonstrate that there have been many kinds of
imperialisms. Wood (2003) provides a historical overview that shows various imperial
forms, such as land, bureaucracy, trade and capitalist. Harvey (2007a, p.61) explains
that capitalist imperialism “arose out of surpluses piled up by localised groups of traders
and merchants who pillaged the rest of the world”. Marx conceived these acts as forms
of ‘primitive’ or ‘original’ accumulation, which he perceived as being intrinsic to
capitalism because of its inner crisis tendencies (Marx, 1973). Capitalism’s inner crisis
tendencies stem from its success at generating ever-growing surpluses in production, or
over-accumulation. Accompanying the perpetual growth in surpluses is the increasing
difficulty with which capitalists find profitable avenues to dispose of their surplus-value
produce. A crisis occurs when “large scale and system-wide phases of devaluation and
destruction of capital surpluses that cannot profitably be absorbed” transpire (Harvey,
2007, p.62). Since one of the most effective avenues for surplus capital absorption is
through geographic expansion and geographic restructuring, which Harvey (2001,
2007b, 2005b) refers to as the ‘spatial fix’, capitalism necessitates a perpetual
realisation of these processes. The historical geography of capitalism acknowledges the
effects of this imperative cycle, perpetuated by the endless accumulation of capital:
capitalism repetitively creates a geographical landscape that facilitates its interests
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during a certain temporal scope, only to later destroy it so as to build a betteraccommodating different landscape during another. The HGC has been moulded by a
dynamic of continual ‘de-territorialisation’ and ‘re-territorialisation’ processes.
Capitalism’s de-territorialisation drive describes capitalism’s impulsion to eliminate all
barriers to its accumulation process, as it searches the globe for the means to absorb its
surpluses through the likes of new investment opportunities and cheaper raw materials.
This universalising tendency of capitalism is also accompanied by what Marx famously
described as its drive to “annihilate this space with time”; to eliminate barriers and
extend its spatial orbit of circulation through power afforded by increased velocity
(Marx, 1973, p.539). Speed not only signals an increased capacity to eliminate barriers
of spatial distance, but also for increased efficiency and productivity as the value of
time-input becomes compressed (Harvey, 1990).

Accordingly, this capitalist de-

territorialisation drive for accelerated power and wealth is propelled by accounting
logic, as the cost-minimisation and profit-maximisation motives that are sanctified by
accounting reasoning provide it with both legitimisation and justification. In order to
achieve this drive, capitalism must also undertake re-territorialisation processes by
producing configurations of territorial organisation that enable its accelerated
circulation over global space, such as large-scale transportation infrastructures and
communications networks (Brenner, 1999; Harvey, 1985). Accordingly, capitalism
“not only never is but never can be stationary”; its geographical expansion and
restructuring is premised upon its destruction of existing apparatuses and the creation of
better suiting eco-political mutations, a process that Schumpeter (1975, p.82) describes
as ‘creative destruction’. Correspondingly, the historical geography of capitalism is
interpreted as a “restless formation and re-formation of geographical landscapes”
(Harvey, 1985, p.150), where
Space is not merely a physical container within which capitalist development
unfolds, but one of its constitutive social dimensions, continually constructed,
deconstructed, and reconstructed through an historically specific, multi-scalar
dialectic of de- and re- territorialization (Brenner, 1999, p.43).

The inherent social dimensions of space for capitalist development, the continual
reengineering of space through processes of de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation,
cannot materialise without the subservient omnipresence of both the quantitative and
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social/qualitative dimensions of accounting technology. At its most basic level, a
decision to creatively destroy or reconstruct an existing form of spatial organisation
essentially requires the creativity of accounting techniques as the decision is largely
built upon a narrative of (de)-valuation. The methods of valuation that accounting
provides, through the information produced by its measurement systems and also
through its analysis and interpretation of this information, ensures that accounting’s role
in a narrative of (de)-valuation for capitalism is indispensable. Moreover, accounting’s
social dimensions work to justify, legitimate and promote this narrative as accounting
has an epistemological character: it is a knowledge that is created and disseminated in
response to, and bound by, a particular ontological view (Chua, 1986; Rose & Miller,
1992). Although accounting’s systems of measurement, analysis and interpretation are
a product of such social construction, its information and rhetoric are nevertheless
presented to society as a form of objective and scientific truth. This has the effect of
universalising the constructed as a natural truth that artlessly negates alternative
narratives. Thereby accounting’s “’impartiality’ operates coercively” (Brown & Frame,
2007, p. 7). In addition, since the social construction and control of accounting systems
are undertaken by dominant elites within society, these groups are able to entrench their
perspectives and interests, whilst also enjoying the strategic advantages of information
asymmetry that bequeaths them supremacy in the manipulation and management of
space from a distance (Bigoni & Funnell, 2018; McKinlay et al, 2010). Together, these
social dimensions of accounting technology have the effect of not only playing a major
role in determining what and how things are to be represented and interpreted within a
narrative of (de)-valuation but, perhaps most notably, they influence what and how
others are to be excluded or silenced. On another level, the relationship of accounting
with power structures makes it a vital constitutive instrument for elites in their pursuit
of controlling, justifying, legitimating and promoting the parameters within which
processes of problematization, decision-making, implementation, management and
dissent unfold within de- and re-territorialisation processes, as will be expanded upon
throughout this thesis. Indeed, accounting “can influence perceptions, change language
and infuse dialogue, thereby permeating the ways in which priorities, concerns and
worries, and new possibilities for action are expressed” (Hopwood, 1990, p. 9).
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Capitalism’s accountings of space (CAS) is a concept that is built upon this ontological
recognition of accounting and space. Accounting is not merely an objective set of
quantitative practices through which capitalist development is measured, recorded and
analysed within a physical container of space. Rather, CAS views accounting, like
space itself, as an essential social dimension of capitalism; a non-static, narrativeproducing technology that is appropriated by capitalism so as to facilitate the
development of space for it, and to inhibit the occurrence and effects of ‘counteraccounts’ that can obstruct its progress and interests. Indeed, CAS believes that whilst
accounting’s malleability provides potential for the production of counter-accounts that
can challenge capitalist interests (Arnold & Hammond, 1994; Miller, 1998), accounting
is, in actuality, inundated by capitalism (Armstrong, 2002; Brown & Frame, 2007;
Cooper & Sherer, 1984; Nagel, 1986; Power, 1992). Moreover, the deceptive myth of
impartiality that works to divorce accounting from its underlying eco-socio-political
dimensions endows it with the capacity “to eclipse other forms of knowledge and other
forms of social life” (Power, 1992, p. 477). As such, the occurrence of counteraccounts can be contained, and their effects distorted. Therefore, CAS is a concept
about the accounting means through which capitalism conquers space. It proposes that
capitalism’s subsistence necessitates the obligatory recurrence of the spatial fix
throughout time; this both causes and requires the commandeering of an adjoined spaceaccounting for capitalism, whilst also requiring the obfuscation of the social dimensions
of both by maintaining their deceptive appearances of mutual independence and
impartiality. Accounting plays three primary roles within de- and re-territorialisation
projects: its indispensable contributions to a narrative of (de)-valuation of space for
capitalism, its manipulation of economic costs and dismissal of socio-political costs so
as to project a ‘feasible/profitable’ representation of the projects to decision makers and
the general populace, and its roles in building and reinforcing power structures that
enable the restructuring and management of space for capitalism. CAS establishes that
it is dependably in and through accounting technologies that the continual de- and reterritorialisation processes of space for capitalism are realised.
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Accounting and the construction of space for empire
Technologies of accounting play an essential role in the social construction of space for
capitalism, by constructing “the calculable spaces that individuals inhabit” (Miller,
1992, p. 75), and make meaning of space through their interpretations (Tinker, 1991).
Throughout time, “Accounting methods, techniques, ideas and practices, those
accounting and those accounted for, the roles of accounting within and between
individuals and organizations, the place and significance of accounting in society …”
have been essential influencers of, and compatibly evolving tools for, social
development (Napier, 2006, p. 445). Scholars of accounting history have demonstrated
that being a technology that changes in relation to, and for, eco-socio-political structures
in space, accounting is both a consequence and constitutive of change through time
(Bigoni & Funnell, 2018; Bigoni et al, 2018a; Burchell et al, 1985; Hopwood, 1985,
1987, 1990, 1992; Littleton, 1933; Miller, 1992; Napier, 2006; Tinker, 1980). It is a
technology that is socially constructed, yet the maintenance of its deceptive impartiality
works “to licence a violence upon people” as it consigns natural truth claims to its
profound constitutive effects upon space and people, thereby making constructed effects
appear innate (O’Leary, 1985, p. 100). This is further sanctioned by the proliferation of
accounting’s instrumental form of reasoning through society as it transforms sociopolitical acts into mere calculable and technical issues, thereby stripping them of their
social dimensions and easing governance and control.

In the context of empire, accounting is one of the ‘technologies of government’ through
which the empire extends and mediates its power, or ‘governmentality’ over space.
This view stems from Foucault’s (1982) work on ‘governmentality’, or the ‘conduct of
conduct’, which was primarily concerned with revealing the mechanisms through which
technologies of government, such as accounting, generate powers of subjectification,
discipline and power over biological life, known as biopower (Crampton & Elden,
2006; Foucault, 1978, 1983, 1990, 2003; Rose-Redwood, 2006).

Following from

Foucault’s work, accounting has been shown to perform a ’software’ function for
imperialism that enables the imposition of dominance and control over distant
inhabitants and territories (Bell et al., 1995; Headrick, 1981, 1988; Neu, 2000b). Unlike
imperial ‘hardware’, such as military equipment that provide the forceful means for
geographical expansion, imperial ‘software’, such as geography and accounting,
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provide the knowledge that is necessary for imperial rule, and lead “to important
transformations in spatial order and management” (Crampton & Elden, 2006, p.682).
Accounting technologies are intrinsic to governmentality as they enable the empire to
administer space through the production of knowledge, rules of difference, states of
exception, legitimacy, justification, subjugation, exploitation, control and degrees of
accountability in space and time (Chwastiak, 2006, 2007a,; Chwastiak & Lehman,
2008; Foucault, 1982, 1983; Funnell, 1998; Funnell & Chwastiak, 2015a; Headrick,
1981, 1988; Miller, 1990; Miller & Rose, 1990; Neimark & Tinker, 1986; Neu, 2000a,
2000b; Neu & Heincke, 2004; Neu & Therrien, 2003; Rose, 1991; Walker,, 2000, 2003,
2004; O’Regan, 2010).

Said (1979, p.36) has emphasised the value of knowledge in the generation of increased
power to subjugate, to discipline and to control: “Knowledge of subject races … is what
makes their management easy and profitable; knowledge gives power, more power
requires more knowledge, and so on an increasingly profitable dialectic of information
and control”. Accounting’s production of knowledge for imperialist rule facilitates an
efficient and profitable ‘governance at a distance’ (Barry, 1996; Funnell, 1998; Funnell
& Walker, 2013; Graham & Neu, 2013; Latour, 1987; Miller & Rose, 1990; Neu,
2000a; Raco, 2003; Robson, 1992; Rose, 1999, 2004). Accordingly, Miller and Rose
(1990, p.5) have called for
attention to the particular technical devices of writing, listing, numbering and
computing that render a realm into discourse as a knowable, calculable and
administrable object. ‘Knowing’ an object in such a way that it can be
governed is more than a purely speculative activity: it requires the invention
of procedures of notation, ways of collecting and presenting statistics, the
transportation of these to centres where calculations and judgements can be
made and so forth. It is through such procedures of inscription that the diverse
domains of ‘governmentality’ are made up, that ‘objects’ such as the
economy, the enterprise, the social field and the family are rendered in a
particular conceptual form and made amenable to intervention and regulation.

According to Rose (1999, p.36), in order to govern “it is necessary to render visible the
space over which government is to be exercised”. Visibility is realised when space is
“regulated in ways which enable authorities to act; a space that is measured, directed
and standardized” (Barry, 1996, pp.127–128). Crampton and Elden (2006) have shown
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how quantitative techniques, such as numbering, counting, ranking, ordering and
measuring, come together as forms of spatial calculation, and form a model of
‘rationality’ that is a part of the process of making space “amenable to thought”
(Osborne & Rose, 2004, p.212). Accounting makes “visible distant locales, thereby,
allowing local knowledge to be mobilized by imperial powers” (Neu, 2000b, p.170).
Indeed, accounting is one of the technologies through which “The implicit geography of
the natives is made explicit … the local knowledge of the savages becomes the
universal knowledge … the fuzzy, approximate and ungrounded beliefs of the locals are
turned into a precise, certain and justified knowledge” (emphasis in original Latour,
1987, p.216).

Accounting techniques translate distant societies into a conceptual form that is
comprehensible to imperial powers, thereby facilitating subsequent interventions and
governance from a distance (Funnell, 1998, 2013; Graham & Neu, 2013; Latour, 1987;
Miller & Rose, 1990; Neu, 2000a; Neu et al., 2001; Said, 1979). Therefore, it is a
cultural force that expresses certain values that adhere to the imperial power’s dominant
ideology (O’Regan, 2010; Neu & Heincke, 2004; Said, 1993). Moreover, accounting’s
provisioning of knowledge of distant spaces within the realm of imperial rationale
permits the re-territorialisation of space in conformance with its underlying dominant
ideology (Murdoch & Ward, 1997; Neu & Heincke, 2004; Said, 1979). By measuring
and ‘codifying’ distant space and then “sending this code back, the shape of the sighted
lands may be redrawn by those who have not sighted them” (Latour, 1987, p.224).
Indeed, accounting assists in imposing the imperial’s ideological underpinnings by
providing techniques for measuring, monitoring and shaping behaviour, thereby
providing the means “to shape, normalise and instrumentalise the conduct, thought,
decisions and aspirations of others in order to achieve the objectives they consider
desirable” (Miller & Rose, 1990, p.8). Furthermore, by providing a mechanism for
reward and punishment, it heightens imperial ideology, subverts the culture of the
conquered and drives for assimilation (Miller & Rose, 1990; Neu, 1999, 2000a; Neu &
Therrien, 2003; Bush & Maltby, 2004; Walker, 2003). As such, accounting provides
the means through which the “oppressor seeks to incorporate the native into its moral
universe, a universe alien to the native mind” (O’Regan, 2010, p.417). It provides the
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micro-techniques, the regulative and distributive, through which the macro-objectives of
the empire are realised.

Accounting for early capitalist empires
Arrighi (1994), Braudel (1977) and Weber (1978) agree that the most important
transition within capitalist imperialism occurred when European states were propelled
towards territorial conquest and the formation of a truly global capitalist world economy
at the beginning of the fifteenth century. This occurred when scattered capitalist powers
concentrated and created a fusion between state and capital, which Mickhail (2007, p.3)
describes as an ”unholy union between the economic (agora) and political (pnyx)
space”. Indeed, Braudel (emphasis added 1977, p.64) emphasises that “Capitalism only
triumphs when it becomes identified with the state, when it is the state”. Similarly,
Arrighi’s (1994, p.10) work in The Long Twentieth Century explains that the historical
trajectory of capitalism has been shaped by “the leadership of particular communities
and blocs of governmental and business agencies which were uniquely well placed to
turn to their own advantage the unintended consequences of the actions of other
agencies”. Shifts of hegemony have occurred from Venice and Genoa, to the Dutch,
followed by the British and, finally, the US. Such shifts have been a result of, and
result in, “Long periods of crisis, restructuring and reorganization; in short, of
discontinuous change …” whereby each hegemony sets the strategies and structures,
known as the ideology or regime of capital accumulation, through which an expansion
and restructuring of the capitalist world economy occurs (Arrighi, 1994, p.1).

Most significantly, the rise of British imperialism placed great emphasis on the
production of value, rather than mere value exchanges and, thus, transformed the
objective of empire, being “not simply about establishing imperial rule or even
commercial supremacy but about extending the logic and imperatives of the domestic
economy and drawing others into its orbit” (Wood, 2003, p.100). Accounting played an
integral role in the formulation of this conception by producing discourse pertaining to
profit maximisation through the efficient management of resources and the reduction of
waste. This discourse was invoked to legitimise and justify the empire’s occupation and
exploitation of ‘unoccupied’ or ‘unused’ land that was conceptualised as not creating
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sufficient value. This rationalisation provided ideological justification for the extended
geographic expansion of capitalism, and a foundation upon which a legitimate legal
claim to such expansion within the rules of private property law was conceived, known
as the res nullius principle. Res nullius established the nature of natural rights of
property in the eighteenth century. Its author, Emeric de Vattel, argued that mere
residence on land, whilst failing to cultivate it so as to produce value from it, did not
warrant natural private property rights. Instead, residents like the Ancient Germans,
modern Tartars and the indigenous of North America, who “prefer to live by plunder,
fail in their duty to themselves, injuring their neighbours, and deserve to be
exterminated like wild beasts of prey … The people of these vast tracts of land rather
roamed over them than inhabited them” (quoted in Wood, 2003, p.94). This notion was
built upon by John Locke who justified acts of primitive accumulation of ‘unused’ land
despite the existence of a local sovereign who worked the land. Locke argued that this
was because the right of property stemmed from labour that “puts the difference of
value on everything” (quoted in Wood, 2003, p.97).

Labour that insufficiently

cultivates land will lead to insufficient productions of value/profits and, thus, the
occupation of the land effectively constituted waste. Indeed, Locke compared one acre
of land in ‘unimproved’ America with similar, but ‘improved’, land in England and
concluded that the former would not be worth 1/1000 of the latter, “if we calculate ‘all
the Profit an Indian received from it were it valued and sold here’” (quoted in Wood,
2003, p.98).

Sir William Blackstone, whose legal opinion was widely respected in Britain in 1788,
and was used to legally distinguish the newly ‘discovered’ New Holland, or Australia,
echoed Locke’s reasoning. A century later, Blackstone’s opinion was called terra
nullius. In 1971, Justice Blackburn (Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty Ltd, 1971, p.201) held in
Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty Ltd and The Commonwealth of Australia that Blackstone’s
distinguishing of colonies of settlement, being ‘desert and uncultivated’, had “always
been taken to include territory in which live uncivilized inhabitants in a primitive state
of society”.

As such, the indigenous were considered ‘primitive’ because their

ideological understanding of value-creation from their land opposed that of the imperial
conqueror, who at the time defined it as being through land cultivation and the
domestication of animals. In sum, both the terra nullius and res nullius principles
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shared a common ideological justification for the British empire’s acts of primitive
accumulation of land. The ultimate source of property rights was through its dominant
ideological understanding of value-creation: where there is “no proper commerce and
hence no improvement, there is no property; and any land left in this state is available
for appropriation” (Wood, 2003, p.98).

Capitalism’s drive to conquer space through acts of primitive accumulation, such as the
appropriation of foreign land, was justified by accounting discourse pertaining to the
creation of value/profit. Indeed, Said (1979, 1993) emphasises the power of discourse
in constructing a particular visibility of the colony and the conquered. Within this
context, accounting provided the technology through which visibility was given “to the
alleged failings of the conquered and, therefore, a means to justify subsequent action as
redemptive” (Funnell & Walker, 2013, p.5).

Moreover, accounting information

constructed a particular image of the conquered that was employed so as to provide the
imperial power with a sense of ‘obligation’ to intervene, to subjugate, and to exploit
(Ferguson, 2003; Neu, 1999, 2000a, 2000b; Neu & Heincke, 2004; Said, 1993;
O’Regan, 2010). Accordingly, it justified the subjugation of the conquered through
altruistic motives that intended their ‘civilisation’ and, thus, legitimated the
implementation of imperial policies of exploitation (Fleischman et al., 2013; Funnell,
2001; Graham & Neu, 2013; Walker, 2013; O’Regan, 2010). Within this context,
accounting technologies have been shown to serve the interests of imperialist powers as
well as those of the dominant class by serving as ‘instruments of alienation’.
Accounting has also contributed to processes of collaborative bargaining between
imperial powers and indigenous elite with the purpose of empowering the imperial core
over the periphery (Arnold & Cooper, 1999; Davie, 2000; Tinker, 1985; Tinker et al.,
1991; Walker, 2003).

Accounting is implicated in the facilitation of acts of exploitation, such as the
exploitation of humans and their resources (Fleischman et al., 2013; Hooper & Kearins,
2013; Hopper, 2013). Accounting has been shown to have sustained slave regimes; by
promoting oppressive living standards for them, some have claimed that it contributed
to their significantly shortened life expectancies (Fleischman, 2004; Fleischman et al.,
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2004a, 2004b, 2013; Fleischman & Tyson, 2004). In addition, accounting has been
shown to play a function in the “dispossession, oppression and silencing of indigenous
peoples” so as to ease the process of primitive accumulation (Gallhofer & Chew, 2000,
p.265). Moreover, accounting techniques have been implicated in acts of repression,
genocide, in stigmatisation and degradation, in facilitating racism, in dehumanisation
and in attempts at annihilating others (Fleischman et al., 2013; Fleischman & Tyson,
2000; Funnell, 1998; Lippman & Wilson, 2007; Neu, 2000a; Neu & Therrien, 2003;
O’Regan, 2013; Walker, 2004, 2008, 2013).

In sum, accounting has historically

performed a role of sustenance for acts of primitive accumulation as it served the ecopolitical interests of imperial regimes by providing techniques of facilitation,
legitimisation and justification.

Speaking in 1919, Woodrow Wilson captured the

British ideology of capital accumulation that propelled its imperial practices:
Since trade ignores national boundaries and the manufacturer insists on
having the world as a market, the flag of his nation must follow him, and the
doors of the nations which are closed against him must be battered down.
Concessions obtained by financiers must be safeguarded by ministers of
state, even if the sovereignty of unwilling nations be outraged in the process.
Colonies must be obtained or planted, in order that no useful corner of the
world may be overlooked or left unused (emphasis added, quoted in
Chomsky, 1990, p.14).

This regime of accumulation was supported by the then newly independent US, which
was later termed ‘Open Door Imperialism’ (Williams, 1959). The first reference to this
mode of thought was made in the 1899 Open Door Notes of US Secretary of State John
Hay, who promoted a diplomacy that sought to enable capitalist powers free and equal
access to Chinese markets. This conception of diplomacy was propped up by extensive
military might that provided an ultimate source of coercive power and, together, they
formed the design of the US’s foreign policy strategy of controlling without owning
(Bacevich, 2002; Dorrien, 2004; Kramer & Michalowski, 2005; Perkins, 1984;
Williams, 1959).

Accounting for US hegemony and an empire in denial
When British hegemony was passed to the US post World War II, the US shaped the
new imperial regime by establishing the Bretton Woods institutions through which it set
the rules of the world economy (Wood, 2003). Geographic expansion or globalisation,
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used a variety of mechanisms to conquer spatial barriers, including technological
changes such as those that increased the speed of transport and communication, and
through regulative changes such as the elimination of state-imposed tariffs. Also,
globalisation was realised through cultural changes that eliminated popular resistance to
the ideology of commodification, and through outright military force (Harvey, 2007).
Importantly, US imperialism sought to utilise technological advances in speed so as to
annihilate space by time. Speed in communications, transport and military capacities
enabled for the compression of global space in a way that broadened the reach and
effects of US imperial influence. As such, US imperialism became not only reliant on
its military might, but also on an amalgamation of imperial powers, known as its
‘imperial radiance’. These enabled the US the power to invoke a more holistic capture
of collective thought in favour of its interests, and “can be distinguished from the
deliberate exercise of political power outside national boundaries” (Steinmetz, 2005,
p.344). Indeed, American
military supremacy over its would-be rivals is supplemented then by the
overwhelming power of its currency and finance, and its dominance over the
global production of techno-scientific as well as social-scientific
intelligentsias, and its global cultural and ideological reach through its
dominance over mass entertainment and (dis)information (Ahmad, 2004,
p.46).

The resonance of imperial radiance lies not only in its ‘peaceful’ supplementation of
coercive techniques, but also in its generation of a sense of global social cohesion or
universalism in favour of US knowledge and ideals that grants the US legitimacy and
justification for its actions. Pilger (2003, p.5) identifies these as “new versions of old
power” that facilitate the capability “as never before of penetrating societies
everywhere”. The capacity to ‘peacefully’ penetrate other societies empowers the US
Empire by granting it a perception of invisibility; interventions that sever the
sovereignty of other nation states can be undertaken within the realm of plausible
deniability. Accordingly, dissent and accountability are kept under control, and US
citizenry are conditioned into a state of denial; theirs is an ‘Empire in denial’ (Chandler,
2006; Ferguson, 2004). Indeed, “The popular tradition within the United States is anticolonial and anti-imperial and it has taken a very substantive conjuring trick, if not
outright deception, to mask the imperial role of the US in world affairs …” (Harvey,
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2004, p.82), for “being an effective empire has long been contingent on partial visibility
– sustaining the ability to remain an unaccountable one” (Stoler, 2006, p.142).

Whilst imperial radiance is an intrinsic component of US imperialism that enables the
realisation

of

macro-objectives

through

micro-techniques,

supplemented, however, by unprecedented US coercive capacity.

it

is

essentially

Indeed, imperial

radiance is “enabled by and enabling of coercive practices”; it is because of the
empire’s coercive practices that it is able to exude its imperial radiance, and it is
because of its imperial radiance that imperial coercive crimes, such as pre-emptive war,
mass murder and torture, are sustainable (Stoler, 2006, p.134).

Accordingly, the

sustenance of a globalised system of capitalism entailed the expanding of US military
power so as to provide the necessary corresponding military might. This demand was
augmented by the Cold War’s armaments race, which together enabled the
capitalisation of the US’s politico-military apparatus, known as the MIC, whereby
government, industry and the military formed an intrinsic pact and became a dominant
capital/power group. Accounting is also implicated in the proliferation of this group:
Chwastiak (1996, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2006, 2008) demonstrated accounting’s role
by showing how accounting techniques were employed not to achieve efficiency within
the DoD, rather were deployed to enable the expansion of the MIC by masking the
transformation of wastes into riches, the inefficient allocation of resources, by abetting
unethical behaviour, and by rationalising and normalising defense spending during
periods of social crises. In addition, Chwastiak (1996, p.365) showed how accounting’s
reliance on neoclassical economics as its theoretical foundation led to the promotion of
capital accumulations by “defense firms at the expense of peace and security and the
militarization of thought, the economy and social relations”. Also, Chwastiak (2001,
p.501) showed how the DoD’s use of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting system
(PPBS) normalised the creation of nuclear weaponry as it “caused the economics of
defense to be elevated to a position of supremacy, transforming the planning for war
into a routine resource allocation exercise, rather than an insane preparation for
genocide”. Moreover, Chwastiak (2001; 2006) demonstrated that this mindset was
advanced through the PPB system’s redefining of the normative and cognitive processes
in a way that effectively subordinated military expertise and knowledge to quantitative
instrumental rationality.
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Importantly, accounting’s roles in facilitating, justifying and legitimising the expansion
of the US’s MIC ultimately served to mask both the MIC’s existence and effects from
US populace.

Since the MIC’s expansion was essential to the sustenance of US

capitalist imperialism, accounting’s masking of it essentially contributed to the US’s
conjuring trick of maintaining an empire in denial. Additionally, by concealing the
US’s imperial role and managing acts of MIC waste, fraud and transfers of wealth,
accounting served to under-cost expenditures of US coercion, thereby affording them a
deceiving perception of feasibility amongst decision-makers and the populous. This
perception was also advanced by the PPB system: its quantitative mode of instrumental
rationality narrowed the definition of costs to only that which could be quantified. As
such, human, social and environmental qualitative costs were deemed invisible, thereby
serving to further under-cost coercive expenditures and to confirm the adjoining
feasibility perception. Ultimately, accounting’s masking of the real eco-political costs
of exertions of imperial power is an imperative necessity for the US’s maintenance of
an empire in denial, as will be expanded upon in chapter three. This is because it
diverts popular focus away from the MIC/imperial foundations of US exertions of
power, and from both the real economic, and human, environmental and other social
costs of such power applications. US President Eisenhower (Office of the Federal
Register, 1961) had warned against ‘grave implications’ from the rise of such
configurations: “unwarranted influence … by the military-industrial complex” had to be
subdued, he warned, as “the potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists
and will persist”.

When the crisis of capital accumulation occurred in the 1970’s and the Bretton Woods
arrangements were discarded, capitalism mutated into a neoliberal form that demanded
the creative destruction of much of the previously existing eco-political and sociogeographic apparatuses. The rise of neoliberalism also engendered what Harvey (2003;
2004; 2007) describes as a ‘new imperialism’ that more aggressively pursues the
capitalist objective of annihilating space by time.
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The Neoliberal Regime and its Re-Territorialisation Process
Accounting for the dominant capital group and neoliberal accumulations
by dispossession
Harvey (2007, p.22) defines neoliberalism as “a theory of political economic practices
proposing that human well-being can best be advanced by the maximization of
entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private
property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade”. It has been
described as an eco-political ‘counter-revolution’ by the capitalist class who, after the
recession and capitalist crisis of the 1970’s, were politically threatened both by a
growing convergence of labour and urban social movements that saw Communist and
Socialist parties gaining increased power, and also economically threatened by restraints
to their already fallen share of overall economic gains (Harvey, 2005a, 2007; Dumenil
& Levy, 2004a, 2004c).

Accordingly, whilst neoliberalism emerged so as to re-

engineer the global capital accumulation regime and revive it, its engineering has been
skewed towards the interest of restoring class power to the richest strata, which has also
been described as differential capital accumulation to the dominant capital group
(Harvey, 2003, 2007; Dumenil & Levy, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2005, Nitzan, 1998,
2001; Bichler & Nitzan, 2006a; Nitzan & Bichler, 2009). The dominant capital group
“consists of the owners and top executives of the largest corporations at the core of the
political economy (as well as smaller contenders whose power is rapidly rising)”
(Bichler & Nitzan, 2006a, p.43). Empirical evidence shows that neoliberalism has
enabled their gaining of capital accumulations at a pace that surpasses that of the rest of
the population, thereby leading to a persistent, or differential, rise in their share of total
income (Bichler & Nitzan, 2006a, p.43).

Dumenil and Levy (2004b), Harvey (2005a, 2007b) and Piketty and Saez (2003) refer to
the rising trend in income polarisation during the neoliberal era; the share of the top 1%
of income earners in the US has rapidly increased from 8% in the 1980’s to 15% by
2000. A similar scenario unfolded in Britain where the top 1% of income earners
doubled their share of the national income during the same period and, in countries like
Russia, China and India, their adoption of neoliberal practices has been accompanied by
a rapid surge in income inequalities and the formation of oligarchical groups of upper49

class power. The differential nature of neoliberal capital accumulation is similarly
exhibited by Nitzan and Bichler (2006a, p.45), who show that there has been “a
persistent exponential uptrend” in favour of the dominant capital group: the profit
stream of a dominant capital firm in the US that was 5,000 times the income of an
average US employee in the 1950’s rose to a comparable figure of 25,000 in the 1990’s,
and the net profit of a dominant capital firm in the US that was 500 times bigger than an
average US firm in the 1950’s rose to a comparable 7,000 times in the late 1990’s.
Most recently, research by Piketty et al. (2016) further substantiated this pattern,
showing that growth in the income of the bottom half of the US population has been
close to zero since the 1970’s, whilst the top 1% have gained income growths of 300%.
The pattern is similarly played out on a global scale; the income growth for the bottom
10% increased by less an $3 a year between 1988 and 2011, whilst the top 1%
experienced income growths of 182 times that amount (Hardoon et al., 2016).
Moreover, since 2015, “the richest 1% has owned more wealth than the rest of the
planet” and, as of 2016, “Eight men now own the same amount of wealth as the poorest
half of the world” (Hardoon, 2017, p.2). Accordingly, whilst “Neoliberalism has not
proven effective at revitalizing global capital accumulation …”, it has succeeded in
restoring class power by enabling dominant capital to garner increases in wealth and,
thus, power (Harvey, 2007, p.29).

In order for this regime of redistribution to take effect, processes that are the modern
equivalent of primitive accumulation, what Harvey (2003, 2004, 2005a, 2007b) terms
‘accumulation by dispossession’, have intensified. Such processes primarily aim to
redistribute wealth and assets from public/collective ownership and benefit, to private
ownership and benefit, and have centred around four main avenues. The first avenue is
through the commodification and privatisation of public assets such as land and natural
resources; of public utilities like water and transportation; of social welfare provisions
like housing and education; of public institutions like universities and prisons, and even
of warfare like the outsourcing of private military contractors. Arundhati (2001, p.40)
has argued that “These are the assets that the state holds in trust for the people it
represents … To snatch these away and sell them as stock to private companies is a
process of barbaric dispossession on a scale that has no parallel in history”.
Accounting’s role as a facilitator of such transfers of wealth and power has been widely
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demonstrated and primarily centres on its discourse that presumes that ownership
changes induce better financial and management controls that increase efficiency,
transparency, accountability and profits (Andrew et al., 2016; Funnell et al., 2009;
Josiah et al., 2010; Mennicken, 2013; Stiglitz, 2008; Uddin & Hopper, 2003). Also,
accounting is a central part of the regulatory apparatus that has permitted accumulations
by dispossession through privatisation to flourish in the global south, and is an
‘informing technology’ that facilitates governance at a distance by neoliberal
international institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, that enforce privatisation
measures throughout the world (Arnold & Sikka, 2001; Catchpowle et al., 2004;
Lehman, 2005; Neu et al., 2006). Moreover, accounting mindset, which sanctifies the
profit motive over social benefit, justifies the commercialisation of public utilities, of
social welfare provisions and of public institutions (Neu & Ocampo Gomez, 2007).
Catchpowle et al. (2004) and Martin (1993) have shown that the accounting profession
is culpable in its deliberate under-pricing of public assets for privatisation, thereby
facilitating the transfer of public wealth to the private realm.

Finally, Chwastiak

(2007a, 2008) has demonstrated accounting’s role in incentivising politicians to
increasingly privatise warfare as it provides the means for politicians to under-cost both
the economic and political costs of warfare, thereby increasing their power.

Another major avenue for the realisation of accumulation by dispossession is through
financialisation. Neoliberalism’s deregulation of the financial system has transformed it
into “one of the main centers of redistributive activity through speculation, predation,
fraud, and thievery”, and includes acts like structured asset destruction through inflation
or mergers/acquisitions, stock promotions and manipulations, and the promotion of debt
(Harvey, 2007, p.36). Again, accounting practice is implicated in such processes in a
number of ways, the most obvious of which is through its financial reporting
requirements that govern asset valuation and off-balance sheet entities, which are set in
conformance to neoliberal ideology and for the benefit of the dominant capital group
(Arnold, 2009; Boyer, 2007; Ryan, 2008; Zhang, 2011; Zhang et al., 2012). The
introduction of fair value accounting (FVA), for example, legitimises “more
‘estimations’ into the system pushing further risk taking behaviour within the neoliberal
markets” (Zhang, 2011, p.1).

The third major avenue for accumulations by

dispossession is through the management and manipulation of crises, what Klein (2007)
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terms ‘disaster capitalism’. Financial crises have been “orchestrated, managed, and
controlled both to rationalize the system and to redistribute assets”; sudden raises in
interest rates, for example, have forced whole countries into bankruptcy, thereby
subordinating their sovereignty to the ‘structural adjustment’ programs of neoliberal
international institutions, such as the IMF and World Trade Organisation (WTO), whilst
also permitting the pillaging of the local economy by those who have wealth and power
(Harvey, 2007, p.37). Indeed, Wade and Veneroso (1998, pp.20–21) have asserted that
The combination of massive devaluations, IMF-pushed financial
liberalization, and IMF-facilitated recovery may even precipitate the biggest
peacetime transfer of assets from domestic to foreign owners in the past fifty
years anywhere in the world …. One recalls the statement attributed to
Andrew Mellon: ‘In a depression assets return to their rightful owner’.

In addition, crises that cause collective trauma, such as natural disasters and war, are
perceived under neoliberalism as “’clean sheets’ and exciting opportunities …, the
preferred method of advancing corporate goals …” (Klein, 2007, p.6).

Milton

Friedman, the author of this mindset, advised that disasters generate a six to nine month
period during which radical socio-economic re-engineering benefitting dominant capital
can be implemented: the rapidity of change, coupled with the psychological trauma,
would provoke psychological reactions that facilitate adjustment to the economic ‘shock
treatment’ and its resulting accumulations by dispossession (Friedman, 1982).
Friedman (1982, p.7) emphasised the opportunity that disseminates from crisis and,
thus, the imperativeness of properly managing them:
Only a crisis actual or perceived produces real change. When that crisis
occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around.
That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing
policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible
becomes politically inevitable.

Accounting has been shown to support the exploitation of crisis so as to reconfigure the
socio-eco-political landscapes of a country (O’Regan, 2010, 2013).

As discussed

earlier, accounting is a mechanism through which imperial policies have historically
been translated into practice; such policies have included the imposition of imperial
ideology, including its socio-ecopolitical ordering of space (Annisette, 1999, 2000;
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Bush & Maltby, 2004; Caramanis, 1999; Neu, 1999, 2000a, 2000b; O’Regan, 2010,
2013; Said, 1993). Furthermore, accounting plays an intrinsic role in legitimising and
justifying the ‘capitalisation on crises’ mindset. Firstly, the current understanding of
accounting fails to acknowledge that its foundations are a construct of the ‘social
imaginary’; it is not a value-free and scientific truth, rather is a value-laden construct
that is shaped by a way of thinking that has bore individualism and an atomised society
that instrumentally views others in abstract forms (Chwastiak & Lehman, 2008; Taylor,
2007). This mindset has created an accounting that fails to capture qualitative human
interactions, such as morality and ethics, as it only focuses on that which is quantifiable.
Indeed, Lovell (1995) and Funnell (1998) underscore that the accounting profession
operates at the ‘conventional level’ of morality, where priority is given to abiding by
rules and pleasing superiors. Neu and T’aerien (2000) have shown that the early
accounting profession’s ethical approach to war was narrowly defined, and Chwastiak
(1996; 1998; 1999; 2001; 2006) has shown how accounting encourages unethical
behaviour by rationalising and normalising a permanent war economy. Furthermore,
Shearer (2002) and Chwastiak and Lehman (2008) have shown that accounting enables
the proliferation of greed, as it constructs accountability within entities in a way that
promotes the pursuit of one’s own good.

Also, Walker (2000) demonstrated

accounting’s abetting of unethical behaviour for profit, by showing that a major reason
why a 1936 committee of professional British accountants chose to hold the Fifth
International Congress on Accounting in Nazi Germany was to secure major British and
US accounting firms’ access to the German market for professional services.

Accompanying accounting’s promotion of greed and unethical behaviour for profit, is
its conflict enhancing potential (Gallhofer & Haslam, 1991). Funnell (2005, 2006),
Chwastiak and Lehman (2008) and Chwastiak (2006, 2007a) have demonstrated how
accounting’s employment of quantitative instrumental rationality focuses attention on
the realisation of efficiency in warfare and the achievement of rapid victory, without
regard for qualitative effects. This function is exaggerated by accounting’s ability to
dehumanise others, and its creation of a distance from people that forbids the
eventuation of feelings of association or empathy (Chwastiak, 2001, 2006; Fleischman
et al., 2013; Funnell, 1998; Funnell & Chwastiak, 2015; Lippman & Wilson, 2007). In
addition, Chwastiak and Lehman (2008, p.314) have demonstrated that accounting
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supports the delusion that the preservation of wealth is more valuable than that of life
and nature by “denying an object any value other than its financial contribution or
detriment”. This is extended by the accounting profession’s fixation on maximising
client interests, which insulates them from concern for the negative socio-economic or
environmental outcomes of their decisions (Roslender, 1996; S. P. Walker, 2000).
Francis (1990) showed that this insulation is exacerbated by the profession’s being
unaccountable for the consequences of their decisions as they are screened behind
claims of professional objectivity and rationalism. Finally, accounting does not
recognise the difference between profits that are generated from destructive or
constructive activities and, thus, legitimises the profiteering from disasters that have
destructive effects on both humans and nature (Boulding, 2000; Chwastiak & Lehman,
2008; Galeano, 1998). Indeed, the final report to Congress of the Commission on
Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (2011) demonstrated the extent of war
profiteering that companies have reaped from the recent US wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The report found that the US government’s expenditure on contracts and
grants exceeded $206 billion, with a ‘conservative estimate’ of between $31 to $60
billion of this money being lost to contract waste and fraud. Moreover, a series of
graphs posted by HalliburtonWatch.org show a positive correlation between war
profiteering and the deaths of US soldiers: the revenues and stock price of Halliburton,
which has been the greatest corporate beneficiary from the Iraq War and whose income
rose from a pre-war loss of $112 million to a profit of $837 million in just the second
year of war, increased proportionately with the number of US soldiers killed between
2003 and 2006 (Chwastiak & Lehman, 2008; HalliburtonWatch.org, 2006).

The final major avenue for accumulations by dispossession is through state
redistributions. A neoliberal state and its institutions reverse socialist policies and
engender the transfer of wealth from the public to the private sector. This is realised
through a variety of means, such as privatisation schemes, austerity schemes that reduce
government expenditures on social welfare, and through revisions to tax laws, such as
tax breaks to corporations and tax benefits to returns on investments (Harvey, 2007). In
addition, the neoliberal state implements social control measures that aim to subdue
and/or repress oppositional movements and acts of popular resistance. As the inequality
gap deepens due to the prolonged implementation of neoliberal redistributive
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techniques, popular resistance increases and, thus, the need for greater state control.
Such control is realised through techniques such as increased surveillance, increased
policing, increased incarcerations and even “in the regime’s many torture cells, inflicted
on the writhing bodies of those deemed most likely to stand in the way of the capitalist
transformation” (Klein, 2007, p.5). Accordingly, whilst one of neoliberalism’s basic
principles is the ‘withering’ of the state, as will be explained in the following section,
nevertheless, neoliberalism necessitates the presence of a powerful neoliberal state
whose role is narrowed to serving dominant capital interests by facilitating the transfers
of wealth and maintaining a controlled society that is receptive to capital investments.
In this regard, Arnold and Cooper (1999) have demonstrated how major accountancy
firms assisted the British government to activate its neo-liberal project during the
1990’s. Ellwood and Newberry (2007, p.549) have also shown that the development of
accrual accounting in the UK and New Zealand public sector provided a means to
reduce the government’s role to that of “procurer of services and enforcer of rules set by
others, thus advancing a controversial privatisation and trade liberalisation agenda
which is consistent with neo-liberal policies”. In addition, Catchpowle et al (2004,
p.1051) have demonstrated how accounting firms “provide an enlarged strategic
intelligence role” for the neoliberal state that enables the realisation of capital
accumulation objectives.

Finally, Chwastiak (2015b, 2015a) and Funnell and

Chwastiak (2015) have shown accounting’s role in assisting state attempts at repressing
oppositional movements by demonstrating how it normalised and commoditised state
crimes, such as torture and extraordinary rendition, against Iraqi insurgents who
opposed the US’s invasion and neoliberal transformation of Iraq.

Neoliberalism’s need for powerful states that can enforce its ideology, along with a
suitable domestic order, is also mirrored globally.

Thomas Friedman (1999, p.8)

acknowledged this need, conceding that “The hidden hand of the market will never
work without a hidden fist … And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe … is called
the United States Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps”. Indeed, the neoliberal
drive to annihilate space by time has nurtured the US war machine that has covered “a
greater part of the globe”, one not even realised “at the peak of the struggle for colonies
…” (Magdoff, 1970, p.240). It has brought about a US pursuit of global power that
transcends that of dominance over mere landforms of space; rather, it has propelled the
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mounting of its tentacles of power also over sea, air and into the galaxy (Steinmetz,
2005; Chomsky, 2006; Chwastiak, 1998). It has propagated an order that necessitates
“this kind of boundless hegemony, this sovereignty without territory, this imperialism
without frontiers” (Wood, 2000, p.193). In 2012, the US share of world military
expenditure was almost 40%; the closest military spending to the US was China, which
expended 9.5% of total world expenditure (Freeman, 2013). The perpetuation of such a
disparity in military expenditure has been seen as a form of investment in its “future
ability to project power globally and intervene and wage war relative to other countries”
(Muzio, 2007, p.527), “so that the sovereignty of the imperial state seems boundless”
(Ahmad, 2004, p.51). In order to maintain its hegemony over the neoliberal capital
accumulation regime and its interests, US military might must also annihilate space by
time: the US’s imperial ‘footprint’ is mapped out through its 737 global military bases
that cover 29,819,492 acres of ‘inventory’ worldwide . Indeed, “Once upon a time, you
could trace the spread of imperialism by counting up colonies. America’s version of the
colony is the military base …” (Johnson, 2006, p.138), and is supported by tens of
thousands of nuclear weapons, dozens of ships and submarines, and numerous ‘black
site’ secret prisons worldwide (Bush, 2006; Johnson, 2006). These act as actual, yet
vague, constabulary that empower the obscurely present empire with rapidity of action
and intimidation mechanisms that both covertly police the global populace into
succumbing to its interests. Blum (1995, p.383) explains, “that is the way the empire
grows … a base in every neighborhood, ready to be mobilized to put down any threat to
imperial rule, real or imagined”.

Meanwhile, the increasing role of the state in sustaining neoliberalism has generated an
even closer overlap between the eco-political spheres.

Under neoliberalism, the

dominant capital group has become intricately involved
in the central power processes of government, the law, ideology, mass
persuasion, international organizations, production, and consumption …
Dominant capital, by its very nature, must become increasingly fused … with
the ruling class in contemporary capitalism (Bichler & Nitzan, 2006a, p.43).

Indeed, since the earnings of some dominant capital firms have today surpassed the
gross domestic product of entire countries, the interdependence between the dominant
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capital group and key political institutions and organisations cannot be exaggerated, and
the increased power of the former ultimately facilitates its increased dictation of the
nature of the latter. As such, dominant capital has become an “incipient form of state
given their ‘social centrality’ to everyday life”, as they exploit the “politics and power
of production rather than production per se” (Muzio, 2007, p.531). They have become
the state within the state and, increasingly, the authoritative united nation within the
globe. It is a history of corporate power deployed to “restructure society and affect its
overall development”, making power both “the means and the end of accumulation”
(Nitzan & Bichler, 2002, pp.9–10). In the US, such influence is realised through
various tactics, such as corporate lobbying, donations, campaign contributions and
‘electioneering communications’, which have prompted much criticism and calls for the
‘drastic alteration’ of campaign finance rules (Blakeman, 2011; Glantz & Begay, 1994;
Luke & Krauss, 2004; Monardi & Glantz, 1998).

Perhaps the ‘final frontier’ of

dominant capital group influence upon the US state has been revealed with the most
recent US election of President Trump. Corporate tactics of influence have seemingly
given way to what Klein (2017a, 2017b) has described as a ‘Corporate Coup d’Etat’ and
‘Neoliberalism’s final frontier’. Rattled by the increasing power and successes of social
movements, such as the global climate movement, the ‘Occupy’ movement and socialist
Presidential candidate Bernie Sanders’ vast popularity, chief executive officers (CEOs)
of dominant capital firms have undertaken a ‘corporate takeover’ of power as evidenced
by their grasping of several positions within Trump’s US cabinet. This is most evident
through the posting of Exxon Mobil’s 2016 CEO, Rex Tillerson, and CKE Restaurants’
2016 CEO, Andrew Puzder, as US Secretary of State and US Secretary of Labor
respectively. During an interview Klein (2017) explained how “it’s almost like they’re
tired of playing the game, they’re tired of the cajoling and the bankrolling and the
legalized bribery, and they’re just going to do the job themselves – you know, cut out
the middleman”.

During the lead up to the Iraq War, the influence of dominant capital groups, such as the
oil cartel and the security and reconstruction industrial complexes, upon the Bush
administration have been acknowledged (England, 2011; Klein, 2007; Leaver & Muttitt,
2007; Muttitt, 2011). Most notably, representatives of leading corporations of the oil
cartel, such as Exxon Mobil, Chevron Texaco and Halliburton, privately met with Vice
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President Cheney’s staff to plan for the post-war operation of the Iraqi oil industry
(Leaver & Muttitt, 2007; Muttitt, 2011). Their influence was to the extent that US
soldiers set up forward bases in Iraq named Camp Shell and Camp Exxon during the
initial assault on Baghdad (Farhi, 2003; Leaver & Muttitt, 2007). A similar situation
also transpired in the United Kingdom (UK), where members of the oil cartel held
secret meetings with UK government officials almost a year before the war to
acknowledge the strategic importance of Iraqi oil for both business and national
interests, and to demand an equitable sharing of Iraqi oil contracts as condition of UK
membership in the US’s COW (Bignell, 2011; Brown et al., 2011; England, 2011).

Accounting for neoliberal spatial and scalar re-configurations
As with previous capital accumulation regimes, neoliberalism has caused de-and reterritorialisation processes.

It has rationalised such changes by naturalising its

fundamental concept of free markets; it appeals to concepts that are embedded in the
commonsense of society by promoting individual emancipation through market
emancipation. Harvey (2007b, p.24) explains that the choice of such “ compelling and
greatly appealing concepts” did not originate by chance, rather were meticulously
chosen by the founding fathers of neoliberalism as instruments for the ideology’s
proliferation, because such “A conceptual apparatus … appeals almost naturally to our
intuitions and instincts”. Subsequently, “an ideological assault upon the media and
upon educational institutions” proliferated, which ultimately aimed to persuade “the
public of the commonsense character of neoliberal propositions” (2007b, p.31). Most
importantly, by appealing to notions of freedom and liberty, neoliberalism harnessed
ideals that have historically invoked change; neoliberal rhetoric garnered the power to
rationally conclude that opposing ideologies, such as socialism and communism, and
their institutions were intuitively wrong, as they were contradictory to humanity’s core
values. Accordingly, the neoliberal capital accumulation regime justified the necessity
to creatively destroy opposing spatial configurations and to construct their neoliberal
equivalents. This also included a reconfiguration of scalar articulations, being the
multi-levelled dimensions of governance across the urban, regional, national and
supranational.
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The neoliberal project aims to adjust both state and society to enable the transformation
of space into that of pure competition, thereby facilitating capital’s annihilation of space
by time (Dardot & Laval, 2009; Hilgers, 2012). Indeed, the reengineering of the state
“is a step necessary for triggering the modifications of subjectivities and social
relations, for making them correspond to the metaphysics of the spontaneous market
order” (Hilgers, 2012, pp.81-82).

Non-neoliberal welfare states are perceived as

exercising undue influence and intervention in the market, which leads to the
disempowerment of liberty and freedom for both the individual and society. This is
because redistributive policies of welfare states are believed to:
replace market freedom that promotes the public gain with paternalist
government protection that generally benefits particular groups …,
redistribution tends to be the mark of non-citizens or subordinate citizens:
those who are deemed inadequate to assume the responsibilities of freedom
because of their incapacity or incivility (McCluskey, 2003, p.789).

Neoliberalism revitalised ‘laissez-faire’ liberalism, literally denoting ‘let them do’,
which advances the primacy of the market over government regulations (Yergin &
Stanislaw, 1998).

Under this mindset, a neoliberal state primarily focuses on

safeguarding private property rights, whilst minimising state interventions in the
market, such as tariffs, regulations and subsidies (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Gaspard,
2004). Consequently, neoliberalism shifted the eco-political organisation of the world
economy from the existing Keynesian welfare state that controlled and regulated the
market, to what has been described as the ‘withdrawal of the state’ (Lemke, 2001),
‘destatisation’ (Jessop, 2002), and the ‘hollowing out’ of the nation state (Swyngedouw,
2004). The new order promoted a “project to ‘get government off the backs of the
people’ and to shrink government to the point where it could be ‘drowned in a bathtub’”
(Harvey, 2007, p.31).

The reordering of the state assumed a dual process; the state was to ‘roll back’ in a way
that achieved a reduction in its sovereignty over space by decentralising and decreasing
its regulatory authority, whilst increasing the infiltration of neoliberal sovereignty upon
vaster spatial scales by leaving alternative governance arrangements that sat in servitude
within the neoliberal eco-political order to emerge, or to ‘roll over’ (Peck & Tickell,
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2008, 2002; Swyngedouw, 2004). This process has been described as “top down
market-based reforms in governance (à la Marxian accounts) and bottom up innovations
in economic governmentality (à la Foucauldian accounts) …” (Sparke, 2009, p.290). In
so doing, the nation state ‘glocalised’ by dispersing its regulatory authority upward to
global transnational organisations, such as the European Union (EU), World Bank and
IMF; downward to regional/local actors, and outwards to private capital. As such,
instead of the Westphalian, hierarchical state order, a decentralized, horizontally
networked infusion between state actors, civil society, such as Non-Government
Organisation (NGOs), and private market actors was prescribed, thereby dispersing
state authority across different scales of governance, and amongst different actors. In
effect, it facilitated “the emergence of private authority in parallel to state authority”
(Costantini, 2015, p.3) and, “Through the transformation of the institution of
sovereignty the division between the sphere of domestic government and international
governance has been blurred and the external influence of major Western powers and
international institutions has been extended …” (Chandler, 2006, pp.9–10). Figure 1
shows
U_ the ‘glocalisation’ of governance:

J,#%4,0#+!,01
#408%
!4-0,+.0#+!,

F:R

A P?;,-%8!(?

C!4#$:D)%4+/0,
E4%%:=408%
D..!/+0#+!,
>CDE=DG

A(4!*%0,
B,+!,

Y!418 Z0,76
J,#%4,0#+!,01
K!,%#04;
E(,8

C0#+!,01
.#0#%

B490,
-!5%4,0,/%

[(91+/ \
*4+50#%
*04#,%4.$+*

](0,-!2.

.-/0'% 1< =$% &-1!/01+.0#+!,2 !" -!5%4,0,/%<

^!/01
+,.#+#(#+!,.6
1!/01
-!5%4,0,/%

=%44+#!4+01
-!5%4,0,/%

Figure 1: The Glocalisation of Governance (Swyngedouw, 2000, p.70).
!" #$% &'()*+,- !" ./01%.2 #$0# %3%)*1+"+%. #$+. -1!/01+.0#+!, !" #$% .#0#% !4 !" !#$%4
"!4). !" -!5%4,0,/%6 #$+. 4%./01+,- !" -!5%4,0,/% !"#%, #07%. *10/% #$4!(-$ 8+.#(49:
+,-1; (,8%)!/40#+/ *4!/%8(4%. 9; 0, +,/4%0.+,-1; 0(#$!4+#04+0, .#0#% 0**040#(.< =$%
8!(91% 4%04#+/(10#+!, !" *!1+#+/01 ./01%. >8!?,?048 #! #$% 4%-+!,01 !4 1!/01 1%5%1@
Neoliberalism depicts this scalar reordering as being a ‘socially innovative’ institutional
(*?048 #! #$% AB6 CDE=D6 FD==6 %#/@ 0,8 !(#?048. #! *4+50#% /0*+#01G 1%08. #!
*!1+#+/01 %3/1(.+!,6
0 ,044!?+,8%)!/40#+/greater
/!,#4!16democracy,
0,86 /!,.%H(%,#1;6
0 4%8%"+,+#+!,
arrangement
of governance
that!"promises
freedom
and liberty
>!4 40#$%4 0 1+)+#0#+!,G !" /+#+I%,.$+* 4+-$#. 0,8 *!?%4< J, .$!4#6 #$% -1!/01+.0#+!, !4
through an increased scope for political participation, and also greater societal
4%./01+,- !" +,.#+#(#+!,01 "!4). 1%08. #! 0 )!4% 0(#!/40#+/6 (,8%)!/40#+/6 0,8 0(#$!4:
prosperity
and wellbeing
through increased
transparency
and efficiency
+#04+0, >H(0.+:G.#0#%
0**040#(.%.
>K!4-0, accountability,
0,8 L!9%4#.6 MNNO@
P?;,-%8!(?6
MNNQ9@
MNNRG >.%% "+-(4% OG< =$+. 8!(91% )!5%)%,# 4%H(+4%. 0 ,%? #$%!4%#+/01 0,8 *40/#+/01
%,-0-%)%,# ?+#$ +..(%. !" -!5%4,0,/%6 4%-(10#+!,6 0,8 /!,#4!1 >S%4,;6 MNNQG< =408+:
60
#+!,01 &.#0#% #$%!4;2 +. ,! 1!,-%4 08%H(0#% #! 8%01 ?+#$ #$% "!4)0#+!, !" .(/$ ,%?
./01%8 "!4). !" 4%10#+!,.$+*. 9%#?%%, -!5%4,0,/% 0,8 /+5+1 .!/+%#; >T+4.#6 MNNUG<

in governance (Batterbury & Fernando, 2006; Béné et al., 2009; Bergh, 2004; Hajer,
2003; Hajer & Versteeg, 2005; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Larson & Soto, 2008; Lemke,
2002, 2007, Swyngedouw, 1992, 2000, 2005). Rolling over procedures are promoted as
offering “a much greater role in policy-making, administration and implementation to
private economic actors on the one hand and to parts of civil society on the other …”
(Swyngedouw, 2005, p.1992).

Accordingly, they are perceived as mechanisms of

empowerment, democracy and social inclusion, a form of ‘governance-beyond-thestate’. In addition, they are claimed to generate financial efficiency and quality gains by
shifting “part of the burden of financing services … to sub-national units and private
providers which can produce these at lower cost” and higher quality (Robinson, 2007,
p.8). Rolling over procedures are a form of outsourcing, privatisation and downsizing
of the state, all of which are neoliberal principles that promise economic and
administrative efficiency and reductions in costs and waste that are associated with
centralised locus of control (Batterbury & Fernando, 2006; Béné et al., 2009; Bergh,
2004; Larson & Soto, 2008). Furthermore, they allegedly provide a solution to the
principal-agent problem, as participants within the new institutional arrangements of
decision-making do so “on the basis of the ‘stakes’ they hold with respect to the issues
these forms of governance attempt to address” (Swyngedouw, 2005, p.1995). As such,
risks relating to agents pursuing self-interest are decreased, as the agents are
transformed into also being the principals and stakeholders, thereby being less likely to
engage in ‘bad’ governance (Batterbury & Fernando, 2006; Béné et al., 2009; Bergh,
2004; Larson & Ribot, 2004; Larson & Soto, 2008).

Neoliberalism’s reshuffling of scales that shifted “the regulatory competence of the state
onto ‘responsible’ and ‘rational’ individuals” (Lemke, 2001, p.202; Swyngedouw,
2005), was “a concerted attempt to make the ‘market imperative’ the ideologically and
politically hegemonic legitimisation of institutional reform” as it subordinated politics
to economics (Swyngedouw, 2000, p.69).

By delegating political authority to the

economic ‘rational-actor’, neoliberalism transformed citizens into calculating
consumers within calculable spaces. Chwastiak and Lehman (2008, p.216) have shown
that reducing people’s primary identities to consumers is an intrinsic objective of
neoliberalism, as such a transformation denotes that “the ultimate relationship is an
arms length transaction in a market”. Accounting fosters this relationship and mindset
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as “The only human interaction captured by accounting is that of buying and selling”
(p.216). In addition, accounting techniques of monitoring, appraisal and control, such
as performance measures, standard costing, benchmarks and budgets, would be used to
render visibility to the individual and, thus, neoliberalism would use the freedom
paradigm as a means to govern/rule (Alonso & Starr, 1987; Cohen, 1999; Foucault,
1988; Joyce, 2003; Lemke, 2001; Miller, 1992; Miller & Napier, 1993; Miller &
O’Leary, 1987; Rose, 1991; Rose-Redwood, 2006; Wool, 2007). Indeed, Foucault
viewed “liberalism … as a form of governmentality which produces subjects capable of
performing their subjectivity through the practice of ‘freedom’, or the shaping of their
own conduct through … the ‘technologies of the self’” (Rose-Redwood, 2006, p.474).
Lemke (2001, p.202) emphasises that
Neoliberalism encourages individuals to give their lives a specific
entrepreneurial form. It responds to stronger ‘demand’ for individual scope
for determination and desired autonomy by ‘supplying’ individuals and
collectives with the possibility of actively participating in the solution of
specific matters and problems which had hitherto been the domain of
specialized state agencies specifically empowered to undertake such tasks.
This participation has a ‘pricetag’: the individuals themselves have to assume
responsibility for these activities and the possible failure thereof.

In addition, by permitting the permeation of both the local and global scalar spheres,
neoliberalism effectively secured capitalism’s greater annihilation of space. This is
because “If the capacity to appropriate place is predicated upon controlling space, then
the scale over which command lines extend will strongly influence the capacity to
appropriate place” (Swyngedouw, 2000, p.70). Accordingly, neoliberalism’s scalar
reconfigurations are a form of neoliberal imperialism as they enable the ‘battering
down’ of scalar barriers to capital accumulation, and facilitate “opening of markets, of
new spaces for investment, and clear fields where financial powers could operate
securely” (Harvey, 2007, p.32).

In addition, the establishment of such ‘glocal’

neoliberal governance both eases and hastens the pace through which capital can
relocate from one space to another, or ‘jump space and scale’, in search for a spatial fix.
This is not only because neoliberal modes of governance facilitate the transfer of wealth
from the public to the private sector, but also because local or regional governments
lack the technical capacities of the central state and, thus, are at a disadvantage when
negotiating with dominant capital groups (Robinson, 2007). Accordingly, dominant
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capital are able to accumulate wealth and then move on, thereby creating uneven spatial
developments and wider regional disparities. Brenner (1999, p.32) explains that the
central consequence of this
has been to thrust the apparently ossified, entrenched fixity of state
territoriality abruptly and dramatically into historical motion, radically
redefining its geographical significance, its organizational structures, and its
interconnections to both sub- and supra-national scales.

Indeed, Ferguson’s (2006, p.206) account of the ‘neoliberal world order’ shows a
tendency towards “a privatized and spatially patchworked project” of territorial
enclaves.

State territory has been divided into ‘graduated sovereignty’: spaces of

exception where accumulation by dispossession thrives, spaces for the haves and spaces
for the have-nots (Agamben, 1998; Ong, 2006). Neoliberal order has generated an
outcome where “developmental apparatus and regimes are applied differently to
segments of national space and/or discrete populations contained within the nationstate” (Sidaway, 2007, p.333), thereby resulting “not in the solidification of differences
among ‘civilizations’ but rather in the proliferation of differentiated sovereignty within
and across borders” (Ong, 2006, p.92). Such fragmentation, along with the US empire’s
network of secret ‘black site’ prison enclaves, ‘extraordinary rendition’ flights and the
Guantanamo Bay enclave, “form an archetypal space of flows, violence and
confinement” where the likes of Al Qaeda have developed and flourish (Devji, 2005;
Sidaway, 2007). Nevertheless, this new world order serves the neoliberal regime; it has
generated greater potentials for capital’s annihilation of space by time where, today, it is
not nation-states developing national resources, but enclaved mineral-rich
patches efficiently exploited by flexible private firms, with security provided
on an ‘as needed’ basis by specialized corporations while the elite cliques who
are nominal holders of sovereignty certify the industry’s legality and
international legitimacy in exchange for a piece of the action (Ferguson, 2006,
p.204).

Accounting for geographies of fear and hope: Situating Iraq within
neoliberal rules of difference
In effect, the neoliberal spatial/scalar doctrine is an imperial doctrine as it is built upon
the supposition of the inequality of space, most crucially in both capacity and
competence in self-governance, but also in its provisioning of an exceptional right and
63

privilege of some over others (Chomsky, 2008; Nardin, 2005; Purdy, 2003).

Its

premising on neoliberal ideology, which naturalises its principles as being universal
ideals, enables its generation of a ‘common-sense’ rule of difference between states that
comply with its teachings and those who don’t, being ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ governance
(Chomsky, 1987, 1999a, 2004, 2008; Chomsky & Barsamian, 2005; Hendrickson,
2003; Nardin, 2005; Record, 2003). Accordingly, it has “imposed itself as a technology
of governance over and above ideology, as the most efficient, rational and pragmatic
means of finding solutions to problems” (Hilgers, 2012, p.85).

According to

neoliberalism, state legitimacy is a measure of its economic efficiency rather than social
equity: its ability to establish a framework of governance upon its territory that
facilitates the efficient allocation of resources and maximises the unhindered pursuit of
self-interest and accumulation of wealth (Fougner, 2006; Hilgers, 2012; McCluskey,
2003). Accordingly, the neoliberal mindset pertaining to legitimate state sovereignty
over territory echoes the accounting-based foundations of rights over land under the
principles of ‘res nullius’ and ‘terra nullius’: the ultimate measure of sovereignty over
land is a measure of the extent of creation of value and reduction of waste. Indeed,
Fougner (2006, p.166) sees neoliberalism’s push for a ‘competitive’ state that
maximises its production of value as “the most recent incarnation in a conceptual
lineage for debating national economic development whose origins may be traced back
to the first half of the nineteenth century”.

The emphasis on efficiency was generated out of “neoclassical economic’s earlytwentieth-century quest for a formal and objective tool for measuring societal wellbeing that could establish economic policy analysis as a science” (McCluskey, 2003,
p.788). Accounting, which is embedded in neoclassical economics and is perceived to
provide objective and scientific truths, serves this purpose by providing techniques
through which an appraisal of state efficiency can be achieved ‘scientifically’. Hilgers
(2012, p.85), however, emphasises that ”The hegemonic technocratic vocabulary of
‘good governance’ is articulated on the basis of axioms posed as scientific truth”.
Indeed, contrary to mainstream belief, accounting knowledge has been shown to be
value-laden and a product of social construct that serves the political and economic elite
(Funnell & Chwastiak, 2015; Hopwood & Miller, 1994; Neimark & Tinker, 1986;
Tinker, 1980; Tinker et al., 1982). It “creates a particular realm of economic calculation
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of which judgements can be made, actions taken or justified, policies devised, and
disputes generated and adjudicated” (Hopwood & Miller, 1994, p.4). As such, by
claiming to provide ‘objective’ and ‘scientific’ measures of state efficiency, accounting
contributes to the conceptualisation of nation states within the neoliberal-conceived
‘good versus bad’ governance axis, thereby both serving and legitimising neoliberal
imperialism’s rule of difference. Furthermore, accounting provides visibility to only
that which can be quantified. Following from this, when appraising state legitimacy,
accounting measures discount the qualitative socio-ecopolitical histories of a country,
such as its experiencing of previous wars, severe economic hardships due to
international sanctions, or its adherence to a different ideological belief system like
socialism, which provide vital context that enable a holistic understanding and
evaluation of state ‘efficiency’ in generating value, or ‘good’ governance. A state that
is built on socialist ideological underpinnings, for example, has an overall governance
objective of achieving social equity, rather than neoliberalism’s market efficiency
(McCluskey, 2003). By negating such contexts and focussing attention on single figure
conclusions, “accounting helps make possible a particular way of governing … the
elegance of the single figure provides a legitimacy that, at least in certain Western
societies, seems difficult to disrupt or disturb” (Hopwood & Miller, 1994, p.3).

Neoliberal imperialism’s rule of difference for state legitimacy, ‘good versus bad’
governance, has been widely heralded by its tools of proliferation, such as the US and
the IMF, as justification for their imperial interventions. The US empire utilises this
rule of difference as the primary justification for its “Battering down the closed doors of
other nations, by military, economic, political, subversive or cultural means …”
(Harvey, 2007, p.63). In the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War, President Bush announced
his 2002 US National Security Strategy, known as the Bush Doctrine. The doctrine
sanctified neoliberal principles, such as freedom and democracy, which it used to justify
US imposition of ‘good’ governance globally, and has been described as “distinctly
militant and even revolutionary in potential application” (Hendrickson, 2003, p.158).
The doctrine began by pronouncing an age premised upon “a distinctly American
internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests”; an age
where “The United States possesses unprecedented and unequalled strength and
influence in the world” that “must be used to promote a balance of power that favors
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freedom” (Bush, 2002, p.1). ‘Freedom’ is defined as a ‘condition’ that the US will
strive to extend across “individual nations, entire regions, and the entire global trading
community to build a world that trades in freedom and therefore grows in prosperity”
(Bush, 2002, p.21). The ‘condition’ is professed to be the “single sustainable model for
national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise” (Bush, 2002, p.1).
Moreover, the doctrine identifies the means through which this condition will be
extended by the US globally: from the provision of a 50 percent increase in
‘development assistance’ “to aid countries that have met the challenge of national
reform” (Bush, 2002, p.21), to increased investments in the ability of ‘freedom-loving
nations’ to engage in coalition warfare so as “to share the burden of defending and
advancing our common interests” (Bush 2002, p.25). In sum, the doctrine indicated the
US’s pursuit of all means, from monetary incentives to outright military interventions,
so as to reshape the world into the “idealistic, transformative, liberating impulse… “ of
“the American Republic…” (Tesón, 2005, pp.19–20), and “destroy governments that do
not meet its test of legitimacy …” (Nardin, 2005, p.25).

Harvey (2007) and Wood (2003) agree, however, that since the economic dominance
that the US once enjoyed has diminished, its reliance on its imperial radiance has
decreased and “is increasingly turning to military force to consolidate its hegemony and
the economic advantages that come with it – for instance with control of oil” (Wood,
2003, p.160). Accompanying this shift has been an adjustment to the rule of difference:
since neoliberalism links the application of neoliberal reconfigurations of governance to
increased freedom and democracy, the neoliberal rule of difference for state legitimacy
has developed into a rhetorical division between geographies of ‘fear’ and ‘hope’.
Under such a context, “secure space is space which is globally integrated. Insecure
space … exists in ‘the gap’, the neighborhoods and regions which remain disconnected
from the global market” (Mitchell, 2010, p.294).

Thomas Friedman (1999, p.7)

memorably encapsulated this division when he confirmed that “no two countries that
both have a McDonald's have ever fought a war since they each got their McDonald's”.
In the lead up to the 2003 Iraq War, another influential voice that extensively
propagated this distinction was senior strategic researcher at the US Naval War College,
advisor for the office of the SECDEF and assistant of the DoD’s Office of Force
Transformation, Thomas Barnett. His voice was influential to the extent that a paper
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that he authored, titled ‘The Pentagon’s New Map’, circulated within the DoD “about
70 times” before the initiation of the war (quoted in Roberts et al., 2003, p.889). Within
this paper, Barnett (2003, p.174) explained “why military engagement with Saddam
Hussein’s regime in Baghdad is not only necessary and inevitable, but good”:
Our next war in the Gulf will mark a historical tipping point - the moment
when Washington takes real ownership of strategic security in the age of
globalization ... the new security paradigm that shapes this age, namely,
Disconnectedness defines danger. Saddam Hussein’s outlaw regime is
dangerously disconnected from the globalizing world, from its rule sets, its
norms, and all the ties that bind countries together in mutually assured
dependence (Barnett, 2003, p.174).

Barnett also illustrated this “disconnectedness defines danger’ conception on a map, as
shown in Figure 2 below, which demonstrated the distinction between the insecure
‘non-integrating gap’ and the ‘functioning core’:
Neoliberal Geopolitics
891

Figure 1: Barnett’s “Core” and “Gap.” Redrawn from maps in Barnett (2003).

Figure 2: Neoliberalism’s Functioning Core and Non-Integrating Gap (Barnett, 2003)

67

In effect, Barnett’s concept amplified neoliberalism’s ‘good versus bad’ governance
rule of difference by harnessing the power of fear to justify an expansion of US coercive
imperial actions. According to this conception, disconnected space, that which failed to
conform to the neoliberal world order, did not only suffer from bad governance but was
also a geography of fear: “a lack, a hole, a stain, and a site of rejection” (Roberts et al.,
2003, p.892). Spaces of fear not only disadvantaged its citizenry, but also existentially
threatened those of the functioning core as, instead of creating value, they ‘exported’ the
likes of terrorism, including the threat of using WMD, disease and illegal migration as
‘feedback’. Furthermore, such spaces’ failure to create sufficient value within the
globalised network was a form of waste that decreased overall prosperity and dislocated
the free flow of the world market (Gill, 1995). In response, Barnett’s rule of difference
legitimised a ‘zero tolerance’ dogma that justified the use of pre-emptive military force
against ‘geographies of fear’ to ‘enforce reconnection’, ‘shrink the gap’ and offset the
lurking dangers (Barnett, 2002, 2003; Barnett & Gaffney, 2005; ‘Discussion with
Thomas Barnett’, 2003; Mitchell, 2010; Roberts et al., 2003). In sum, it was a rule of
difference that harnessed the power of fear to justify the US’s modern-day pre-emptive
military battering down of spatial barriers to capital accumulation; indeed, when faced
with fear, people gather “under the umbrella of power in fear of the demonic enemy”
(Chomsky, 2006, pp.17–18). This shift was reflected in Bush’s 2001 and 2002 State of
the Union Addresses, in which he referred to the US’s pursuing of ‘rogue nations’ and
the ‘axis of evil’, Iran, Iraq and North Korea (Bush, 2002), which later extended to also
include Cuba, Libya and Syria (Bolton, 2002).

During his 2002 speech, Bush made direct associations between neoliberal ‘bad’ or
‘inefficient’ governance conceptions and global insecurity so as to justify the ‘axis of
evil’ threat. For example, Bush claimed that North Korea was arming with WMD
“while starving its citizens”, and Iran was pursuing WMD and exported ‘terror’ “while
an unelected few repress the Iranian people’s hope for freedom” (Bush, 2002). After
establishing this association, he then utilised it to justify any form of US pre-emptive
intervention, as
the price of indifference would be catastrophic …. I will not wait on events,
while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer.
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The United States will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to
threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons (Bush, 2002).

With regards Iraq, which received the most condemnation from the Bush administration
during the lead-up to war, there were extensive attempts to connect it to anthrax attacks
in the US and to the September 11 attacks (9/11), to utilise Iraq’s dismal human rights
record as justification for ‘humanitarian’ intervention, to pose Iraq as a threat to world
security through its alleged possession of WMD, to exhibit Saddam Hussein as a
ruthless, reckless and lying tyrant, and finally to ‘free’ the Iraqi people and bring
‘democracy’ to the Middle East (Harvey, 2003). In actuality, multiple reports and
articles have documented the scale of the ‘disinformation campaign’ that the Bush
administration disseminated so as to portray Iraq as a space of fear that necessitated an
urgent US response, through pre-emptive military war, so as to transform it into a space
of ‘hope’ (Borger, 2003; Coman, 2004; Committee on Armed Services, 2007; Inspector
General US DOD, 2007; Iraq Survey Group, 2004; Rycroft, 2002; Sharpe, 2006;
Sneigoski, 2008; The Center for Public Integrity, 2008; US Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence., 2004, 2006, 2008). For example, the Center for Public Integrity (2008)
studied every public statement made by President Bush and seven of his
administration’s top officials with regard to Iraq’s possession of WMD and Iraq’s links
to Al Qaeda in the two years after the 9/11 attacks. The report found that, together, the
eight top Bush administration officials had made 935 false statements. Moreover, as
illustrated in figure 3 below, the report found that the rate of publicised disinformation
significantly increased in the months including and around the initiation of war:
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Figure 3: False Statements by Month (The Center for Public Integrity, 2008)

In reality, it was the Iraqi state’s “planned economy that constituted the exception: an
economically uncivilized and barren space that had hitherto stood outside and in
opposition to neo-liberalism” (Whyte, 2010, p.149).

Moreover, US leadership

perceived Iraqi space as mirroring that of the greater Middle East, which was also
failing to create sufficient value (O’Brien, 2003; ‘Discussion with Thomas Barnett’,
2003). As such, enforcing Iraq’s reconnection to the global economy was considered a
step towards a broader US imperial project to reconnect the entire Middle Eastern
region, including its vast oil resources, to US neoliberal order and, thus, secure US
world hegemony. In February 2003, Thomas Barnett encapsulated this conviction
during a CNN interview just before the initiation of the Iraq War:
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the way you integrate a Middle East in a broadband fashion with the rest of
the global economy is to remove the security impediments that create such a
security deficit in that part of the world. And the biggest security impediment
right now … is the regime of Saddam Hussein. You move that out of the area
… and hopefully, you can talk about part of the world that over the past
several decades has woefully underperformed economically. Basically the
Muslim population represents something like 20 percent of the global
population, only engages in about 4 percent of the trade (‘Discussion with
Thomas Barnett’, 2003).

Only a few days after Bush declared the US invasion of Iraq a ‘Mission Accomplished’
whilst aboard the Abraham Lincoln on the 1st May 2003, he also reiterated this belief.
During a commencement speech at the University of South Carolina, Bush argued that
“The combined G.D.P. of all Arab countries is smaller than that of Spain” and that “The
Arab world has a great cultural tradition, but is largely missing out on the economic
progress of our time” (quoted in O’Brien, 2003). With his ‘decisive victory’ over Iraq
and the presence of over 160,000 COW soldiers in Iraq as his backdrop, however, Bush
pressed the region’s countries for reform; he envisioned that, under the guidance and
leadership of the US, a new free trade zone for the Middle East would be established
within a decade (Cornwell, 2003; O’Brien, 2003).

Conclusion
It has been the objective of this chapter to demonstrate the CAS concept by exhibiting
the interplay between accounting and the historical trajectory of capitalism so as to
provide a theoretical foundation upon which the remainder of this thesis will draw upon.
Capitalism’s inner crisis tendencies, which stem from its perpetual over-accumulation
of capital, have compelled it to perpetually search for spatial fixes, in the form of spatial
expansions and spatial restructurings, so as to provide avenues for surplus capital
absorption.

Accordingly, the historical geography of capitalism is moulded by

continual de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation processes that ultimately aim to
annihilate space by time. This drive has been primarily fostered by the fusion between
the state and dominant capitalist groups, which have historically shaped the geography
of capitalism through hegemonic power blocs. The British capitalist hegemony, or
British imperialism, has been noted for its great emphasis on spaces’ production of
value.

This bore an imperialist ideology that sought not only imperial rule or
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commercial supremacy, but also the extension of its logic and imperatives globally, and
was supported by the newly independent US through its ‘Open Door Imperialism’
strategy. To justify this expansionary logic, the res nullius principle and its successor,
terra nullius, were developed, which determined that the ultimate source of property
rights was through the dominant power’s ideological conception of value-creation. This
chapter demonstrated that accounting discourse pertaining to the maximisation of profit
and the reduction of waste provided the ideological justification for the formulation of
these de-valuation narratives.

When British hegemony was passed to the US post World War II, US capitalist
imperialism entailed the utilisation of an amalgamation between its imperial radiance
and military might. The necessary presence of superior US military might to sustain its
global order and to oblige conformity generated an unprecedented military build up
through the MIC. This included the establishment of an omnipresent US constabulary
presence throughout the world in the form of modern-day ‘colonies’: a global
‘footprint’ of over 737 military bases, supported by tens of thousands of nuclear
weapons, dozens of ships and submarines, and numerous ‘black site’ prisons. Most
notably, since popular tradition within the US was anti-imperial, US elite required a
substantive conjuring trick to mask both the existence and effects of the MIC, including
the US’s consequent expenditures of coercive imperial power throughout the world.
Accounting technologies were shown to have been essential means that were
appropriated by elites so as to realise this deception and to maintain a US empire in
denial.

When the crisis of capital accumulation occurred in the 1970’s, capitalism mutated into
a neoliberal form that demanded the creative destruction of much of the previously
existing eco-political and socio-geographic apparatuses. Its fundamentalist objective of
annihilating space by time is skewed towards the interest of restoring class power
structures to the dominant capital group. Indeed, the neoliberal era is marked by the
rising trend in income polarisation, with eight men owning the same wealth as the
poorest half of the world as of 2016. In order for this regime of redistribution to take
effect, processes that are the modern equivalent of primitive accumulation, known as
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‘accumulation by dispossession’, have intensified. Such processes primarily aim to
redistribute wealth and assets from public/collective ownership and benefit, to private
ownership and benefit, and have centred around four main avenues, being
commodification and privatisation, financialisation, management and manipulation of
crises, and redistributive and ‘controlling’ practices by neoliberal state apparatuses.
Accounting has been shown to have played an intrinsic role in serving the purpose of
restoring class power structures. Throughout the historical trajectory of capitalism, it
was repetitively appropriated by elites to facilitate, justify and legitimate acts of
exploitation, subjugation and assimilation, including the current neoliberal wave of
accumulation by dispossession processes.

The neoliberal project aims to adjust both state and society to enable the transformation
of space into that of pure competition, thereby facilitating capitalism’s annihilation of
space by time. Citizens are transformed into consumers and the state is driven to be a
competitive neoliberal state that advances the primacy of the market over government
regulations, thereby shrinking; yet also maintaining strong control over society through
increased use of coercive tactics. This has born a phenomenon that is “the paradox of a
state that is both omnipresent and completely absent” (Hilgers, 2012, p.85).

The

reordering of the state assumes a dual process of ‘roll back’ that reduces its sovereignty
over space, and ‘roll over’ that devolves its authority to alternative governance
arrangements, thereby enabling for the ‘glocalisation’ of the state.

Glocalisation

disperses state authority upward to global transnational organisations, downward to
regional/local actors, and outwards to private capital.

As such, a decentralized,

horizontally networked infusion between state actors, civil society and private market
actors is established that disperses state authority across different scales of governance,
thereby facilitating the emergence of private authority parallel to state authority. This
blurs the division of sovereignty and permits the piercing of state sovereignty by
Western powers, dominant capital groups and international institutions. Furthermore,
the establishment of glocal neoliberal governance both eases and hastens the pace
through which capital can ‘jump space and scale’ in search for a spatial fix, especially
since local/regional governments lack the technical capacities of the central state.
Accordingly, this has created uneven spatial developments, wider regional disparities
and has thrust fixed state territoriality into motion. Accounting was shown to serve the
73

dual purposes of transforming citizens into consumers, and states into competitive
neoliberal states.

Both its ideological underpinnings pertaining the realisation of

efficiency, and its quantitative techniques have facilitated, legitimised and justified
these transformations.

Finally, this chapter has demonstrated that US imperialism’s pursuit of the imposition
of neoliberal eco-political and socio-geographic restructurings is premised upon an
imperial rule of difference of ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ governance; its ideological
underpinnings ultimately stem from the res nullius principle regarding spaces’
production of value. In the lead-up to the Iraq War, this was reflected in President
Bush’s 2002 US National Security Strategy.. Accounting has been shown to serve this
rule of difference by providing the technologies through which the modern-day
appraisal of state legitimacy for imperial interests is achieved. Furthermore, since the
economic dominance of the US has been diminishing, it has increasingly turned to the
use of military force so as to consolidate its power and economic advantages. As such,
a shift in the imperial rule of difference occurred so as to provide justification; it divided
the world into geographies of ‘fear’ and ‘hope’. Geographies of hope include all states
that adhere to the neoliberal ‘functioning’ order, whilst non-integrating countries
resemble geographies of fear as they ‘export’ insecurity as ‘feedback’. As a result of
this conceptualisation, Bush was able to warn against ‘rogue’ states and the ‘axis of
evil’, and the military engagement with Iraq’s Saddam Hussein regime became “not
only necessary and inevitable, but good” (Barnett, 2003, p.174). This is although a
majority of the Bush administration’s claims with regards Iraqi security threats were not
legitimate, rather, part of a colossal ‘disinformation campaign’. Clarke’s (2005, p.59)
following resolution may provide an appropriate vantage point to understanding why
capitalism’s historical trajectory led to this point in space and time: “neoliberalism has
conquered the commanding heights of global intellectual, political and economic power,
all of which are mobilised to realise the neoliberal project of subjecting the whole
world’s population to the judgement and morality of capital”. Indeed, it was the Middle
Eastern region’s disconnectedness that constituted the exception and threat, and the
US’s choice to militarily impose reconnection of Iraqi space to its global order was
perceived to be a crucial step towards the realignment of the region in accordance to US
power and capital interests.
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The following chapter will begin the thesis’ application of this chapter’s CAS concept,
along with its acquired framework of knowledge, upon the case study of the Iraq War.
Whilst the major concern of the US’s imperial project upon Iraqi space was to enact
processes of de-territorialisation of the existing opposing socio-ecopolitical systems so
as to open the space to re-territorialisation processes, the CAS concept also emphasises
that the US’s maintenance of a perception of feasibility to these processes is imperative.
Accordingly, the following chapter will demonstrate how US elites repetitively utilised
accounting technology to favourably manage the eco-political costs of US exertions of
coercive power upon Iraqi space, and will also exhibit the resulting de-territorialisation
that transpired.
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Chapter Three

The Methods Behind the Magician’s Trick: Accounting
for the battering down of Iraq’s doors

76

Introduction
The previous chapter provided an overview of the CAS concept; the result of which
enabled a positioning of the Iraq War within the historical trajectory of capitalism.
Accordingly, the chapter presented a primary contextual understanding of why the US
hegemon chose to venture into Iraqi space in the year 2003. The chapter demonstrated
that capitalism’s quest to conquer space has propelled hegemonic power and capital
blocs to spatial expansion and restructuring. The US hegemony inherited a mindset
from the British that sought spatial expansion through “coercion or diplomacy exerted
for purposes of imposing free trading conditions on a weaker society against its will”
(Robinson, 1984, p.48). This mindset intensified in the 1970s with the introduction of a
new capital accumulation regime known for its market fundamentalism; neoliberalism.
This regime has profoundly exaggerated the redistribution of wealth and assets from
public/collective ownership and benefit, to private ownership and benefit through
processes of accumulation by dispossession.

Indeed, “The new imperialism that

evolved after 1970 entailed the construction … of battering rams to smash down all
barriers to capital surplus absorption wherever they were to be found” (Harvey, 2007a,
p.69).

In order to justify these processes, neoliberalism disseminates a rule of

difference that distinguishes between spaces of ‘fear’ and ‘hope’: neoliberal ideology
conflates the moral value of individualist behaviour, and free market operations, with
values of freedom, prosperity and liberty. Spaces that disseminate contrasting systems
of socio-ecopolitical organisation are logically deduced as being opponents of freedoms
of self and market and, thus, depriving, tyrannic and inept (Clarke, 2005; Harvey,
2007b, 2005; Tombs, 2001; Whyte, 2007). Iraqi space lay within the ‘non-integrating
gap’; it was conceptualised as a space of fear that generated socio-ecopolitical
repression and dangers caused by “the tyranny of the planned economy” (Whyte, 2010,
p.143). In addition, neoliberalism’s conquering of Iraqi space was considered by the
US hegemon bloc as an indispensable precursor for the realisation of its greater
interests, including the extending of the neoliberal regime regionally. By incorporating
the region into its orbit, the US empire will have conquered additional spaces, their
peoples, and their resources, including the region’s most significant resource, oil
(‘Discussion with Thomas Barnett’, 2003; Harvey, 2007a; Ismael & Ismael, 2015;
Wood, 2003).
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Whilst forthcoming chapters will elaborate on broader interests, such as the power-gains
of oil and the influence of neoconservative ideology, this chapter will demonstrate a
chief CAS purpose of accounting within which lies the power to either propel or deter
the progression of coercive imperial geographic expansion projects. Since calculations
pertaining to the costs of an imperial venture ultimately resolve questions of feasibility
and intrinsically contribute to the build-up of necessary popular support, the process of
costing an imperial venture is perhaps the greatest demonstration of the ultimate power
afforded by accounting and its techniques to the ruling imperialist elite. This chapter
will demonstrate that it is through accounting techniques that the ruling elite are
afforded the power to invoke the ‘magician’s trick’: deceptive under-costing is not only
summoned through a manipulation of degrees of visibility with regards economic costs,
but also a most significant array of evident costs pertaining the human, environmental
and social effects are tactfully obfuscated into the realm of invisibility (Bilmes &
Stiglitz, 2008b; Chwastiak, 2008; Harvey, 2004; Nordstrom, 2004; Stiglitz, 2008).
What is left in mainstream view is that which the magician desires, “focusing attention
on the need for violence while drawing attention away from both the war-economy
foundations of sovereign power and the price in human life this economy of power
entails” (Nordstrom, 2004, p.34). Since this chapter attempts to account for the deterritorialsiation processes that eventuated upon Iraqi space, it sheds light on the ‘price’
this economy of power entails.

Also, it demonstrates how US failure to utilise

accounting in a similar way also serves to effectively render Iraqi costs unworthy of
account. This confirms another of CAS’s purposes of accounting, being its inherent
role in de-valuing space for imperial interests.

Notably, the chapter does not accept the dominant discourse that narrows mainstream
comprehension of the process of battering down Iraq’s closed doors to the isolated
venture of the 2003 Iraq War. Rather, the chapter demonstrates that the 2003 Iraq War
was the last of three successive attempts by the imperial power to forcefully open Iraqi
space; the three attempts cannot be considered in isolation as they supplemented each
other, each building upon and enhancing the accomplishments of its predecessor. In so
doing, this chapter identifies the first accounting method behind the trick; instead of
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limiting a costing of the US’s imperial project on Iraqi space to the 2003 Iraq War
venture alone, it will provide an overview of costs pertaining the project in its entirety
by considering the 1990-2003 economic sanctions, the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq
War. The first section will provide a theoretical foundation regarding US ‘political
commerce’ concepts, including how coercive power is conceptualised and accounted
for. It will also demonstrate the imperativeness of under-costing coercive exertions of
power for political elitist interests.

The following section will provide a brief

explanation of why an accounting for the US’s imperial project on Iraqi space
necessitates an expansion of the temporal scope to between 1990 and 2003. The
remainder of the chapter is divided into two sections; one provides an overview of costs
of the US from the three ventures separately, whilst the other repeats this overview with
regards Iraqi costs.

Whilst this chapter aims to provide a novel indication of the true costs that are
associated with the US’s imperial project on Iraqi space, its underlying intention is to
challenge accounting’s conventional definitions of costs and to demonstrate that these
definitions primarily serve elitist interests. In so doing, this chapter demonstrates the
emancipatory potential of social accounting; by providing an accounting that transcends
partial and purely economic costs, it demonstrates the enormity of costs and injustices
that are associated with such ventures. Accordingly, it can act as a disincentive for the
progression of future coercive imperial geographic expansion projects. Finally, as this
chapter seeks to demonstrate the emancipatory potential of social accounting, it will not
attempt to value human, social or environmental losses so as to not reinforce the
dominant ideological mindset that conceptualises coercive exertions of power within
purely economic discourses (Chwastiak, 2008; Funnell & Chwastiak, 2015).

Political Commerce: Coercive power and the magician’s trick
The overall mindset of US foreign policy was set by its ‘founding father’, George
Kennan, who established its guiding principle in a top secret Policy Planning Study
prepared for the State Department in 1948. In it, his recommendations centred on the
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maintenance of capitalism’s polarising effects: the wealth disparity between the US and
the rest of the world was to be maintained at all costs:
We have about 50 per cent of the world’s wealth, but only 6.3 per cent of its
population … Our real task in the coming period is to maintain this disparity
… To do so we will have to dispense with all sentimentality and day-dreaming
… We need not deceive ourselves that we can afford today the luxury of
altruism … We should cease to talk about vague … unreal objectives such as
human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratization. The
day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power
concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better
(Kennan, 1948).

Kennan’s guiding principle utilised quantified representations to translate Woodrow
Wilson’s earlier call for the battering down of closed doors for capitalist interests from
the realm of personal rhetoric to the realm of objective, measured and scientific-based
official US foreign policy. His measurement of the required level of disparity between
the US and the rest of the world effectively set a quantified benchmark for US foreign
policy makers. As such, US imperialism became a quantified performance that could be
measured, administered and appraised in and through numbers. In so doing, Kennan
sought to depoliticise politics (Rose, 1991); he drew focus away from the unjust
ramifications that would result from his principle, rather legitimised them, whilst also
summoning a perception that it was quantification, the numbers, that were directing
policy (Chwastiak, 2006; Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988; Mies, 1990, 1998, Porter, 1994a,
1994b, 1995; Rose, 1991). Accordingly, the exertion of coercive forms of power that
caused death, destruction and suffering to other people, such as war, for the realisation
of US imperial interests was not only normalised, but also rationalised as a legitimate
means to realise US national interests.

The early 1800s interpretations regarding war of the renowned Prussian general, Carl
von Clausewitz, further illuminate US conceptualisations regarding the exertion of its
coercive power. Clausewitz’s interpretations became dominant ideology within US
foreign policy during the Vietnam War.

His views were seen as presenting an

economically rational and ‘scientific’ guideline for the use of war that could limit the
potential for irrational use of war as an instrument of foreign policy. Clausewitz
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presented war as “only a part of political intercourse, therefore by no means an
independent thing in itself … war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse,
with a mixture of other means” (emphasis in original, Clausewitz, 1873, p.65). Since
Clausewitz saw politics as commerce, where efficiency in political management
resembled that of efficiency in business management, war was seen as a continuation of
‘political commerce’. Accordingly, he proposed that
If two States go to war with a third, they do not always both look in like
measure upon this common enemy as one that they must destroy or be
destroyed by themselves, the business is often settled like a commercial
transaction; each, according to the amount of the risk he incurs or the
advantage to be expected, takes shares in the concern to the extent of 30,000
or 40,000 men, and acts as if he could not lose more than the amount of his
investment (Clausewitz, 1873, p.64).

The essence of Clausewitz’s analysis presented war in terms of eco-political costbenefit analysis: the ultimate determinant of whether to ‘invest’ in warfare was a
calculation that weighed its ‘costs’ against its intended objectives; efficiency would be
realised when war as a political instrument produced more ‘profitable’ results than its
associate political instruments. This conceptualisation of warfare was in accordance
with Kennan’s quantified foreign policy guidelines, effectively situating numbers as the
ultimate ‘decision-makers’ of war. Moreover, Clausewitz’s uniting the ideology of
economic efficiency and quantitative instrumental reasoning justified the narrowing of
the definition of ‘costs’ to only that which could be quantified. Accordingly, human
and social costs of coercive exertions of power were excluded from account. In effect,
this narrowed definition of costs provided the means for the political elite to perform a
‘magician’s trick’: to obscure visible costs from official accounts, thereby under-costing
coercive exertions of power and granting them an appearance of greater feasibility.

The narrowed definition of costs also ‘scientifically’ vindicated Kennan’s assessment:
the US simply could not ‘afford’ the ‘luxury of altruism’; qualitative considerations,
such as human rights and democracy, could not be counted. In the 1960s, this mindset
was further advanced with the introduction of the PPBS into the DoD, which imposed
an economically rational mindset and a quantitative instrumental form of reasoning as
the guiding parameters of all DoD decision-making (Chwastiak, 2001; Chwastiak &
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Lehman, 2008; Funnell & Chwastiak, 2015). Under PPBS, decisions pertaining to the
use of coercion, including the development and possible use of nuclear weaponry, were
freed from their human, social and environmental considerations. Such is accounting’s
intrinsic role behind the magician’s trick: “government accounting practices contribute
to the creation of the invisible visibilities needed by the state to promote violence by
concealing the human and social costs of war” (Chwastiak, 2008, p.574).

Under-costing coercive exertions of power in official accounts has long been a priority
of the political elite.

Examples that confirm this imperativeness are available in

historical precedents: the direct cost to the North from the American Civil War was
estimated by President Lincoln’s Secretary of the Treasury to cost $240 million, or 7%
of annual US GDP; in actuality, the North expended $3,200 million or 13 times the
anticipated amount. Also, the total direct cost of the Vietnam War was underestimated
by the Pentagon by approximately 90%; instead of the war ending by June 1967 as
anticipated, the war continued until 1973 and costed between $110 – 150 billion
(Nordhaus, 2002; Okun, 1970). Correspondingly, in the lead up to the 2003 Iraq War,
the Bush administration promoted the war by forecasting an ‘economical’ cost of
between $50 – 60 billion (Bilmes & Stiglitz, 2008b; Davis, 2002; Stiglitz, 2008). In
actuality, a December 2014 Congressional Research Service report found that the cost
of war in Iraq totalled $815 billion, or approximately 15 times the original estimated
amount (Belasco, 2014). Considering that the above estimates only included direct
economic expenditures, yet were still so profoundly under-estimated, the salience of
under-costing of coercive exertions of power to the political elite becomes self-evident.

By making coercion seem affordable, focus is diverted away from the existence of a
war-economy and disaster capitalists, thereby concealing imperial intents and managing
acts of waste, fraud and resulting transfers in wealth to the dominant capital group.
Also, under-costing coercive actions affords a perception of feasibility to the populous
that legitimises the resulting budgetary cuts to social welfare expenditures, thereby
limiting dissent.

Finally, by framing public appraisals on whether to commence

coercive actions within a discourse that sanctifies the prominence of their ‘costs’,
society is conditioned into heightening considerations of economic rationality and the
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maximisation of self-interest. This centres attention on the projected bottom line, the
profit or loss of the venture in quantitative terms, and hides “those aspects of war that
touch us emotionally … The deceptions, thereby, disable our capacity to care and
quarantines the political elite from retribution by a disillusioned public” (Funnell &
Chwastiak, 2015, p.162).

Other accounting methods have also served the elite’s trick of creating deceptions in
official US accounts. Daggett (2010, p.3) explains that official figures reported by the
DoD regarding military operations only include the ‘incremental’ costs of military
operations, “the costs of war-related activities over and above the normal, day-to-day
costs of recruiting, paying, training, and equipping standard military forces”. Also,
such figures are reached using cash based accounting instead of the widely favoured
accrual accounting technique, thereby focussing attention on immediate cash
expenditures whilst rendering accruing expenditures invisible (Bilmes & Stiglitz,
2008b; Stiglitz, 2008). The combined effect of the choice to use both these accounting
methods is to under-cost military operations by focussing attention only upon shortterm incremental costs. Not only do these methods ignore even the most obvious
upcoming costs, such as military equipment restorations and veteran care, but they also
lead to inefficient decision-making that generates further costs (Bilmes, 2007, 2013b,
2016; Bilmes & Stiglitz, 2008b; Chwastiak, 2008; Funnell & Chwastiak, 2015;
Hartung, 2003). For example, during the 2003 Iraq War, SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld
avoided raising upfront cash costs and, thus avoided raising the total war budget, by
delaying the purchase of explosive-resistant vehicles that troops had repetitively
requested (Bilmes & Stiglitz, 2008b; Stiglitz, 2008). Whilst his decision did decrease
the war budget in the short-term, in actuality it increased the cost of future disability
payments and ‘death gratuity’ payments that would have to be paid for the resulting
avoidable injuries and deaths.

Another method recently employed to deem costs invisible has been through the
lowering of taxes. Whilst US governments routinely raised taxes during wars so as to
generate enough revenue to cover war costs, such as during the Civil War and both
World War I and II; since 2001, the US government has sharply contrasted this practice
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by reducing taxes and selling US Treasury Bonds (Bilmes, 2016; Bilmes & Stiglitz,
2008b; Joint Economic Committee, 2007). Stiglitz (2008, p.6) explains that “The Bush
administration was trying to persuade America that they could have a war for free”: by
borrowing war-related expenditures, the Administration sought to deem the immediate
costs of war impalpable to US citizenry. Indeed, this method not only defers the
immediate monetary effects of war to future generations, but also the long-term debt
servicing costs, such as the long-term interest on borrowing, are deemed invisible by the
cash based accounting system. As such, shifting the financial costs of war to future
generations affords the political elite the ability to better secure present citizenry
support for their pursuit of wars. Adam Smith (1981, pp.925–926) recognised the
emancipatory potency of tax-financed wars: “Were the expense of war to be defrayed
always by a revenue raised within the year, the taxes … would last no longer than the
war … Wars would in general be more speedily concluded and less wantonly
undertaken”.

Finally, military operations have also been under-costed through the appropriations
process.

Since 2001, wars have been funded through ‘temporary special

appropriations’, a form of emergency appropriations that enable Congress to bypass the
scrutiny of regular budgetary processes (Bilmes, 2016; Bilmes & Stiglitz, 2008b;
Stiglitz, 2008).

This method obscures the full cost of military operations as

expenditures are disbursed between several appropriations that are separate from the
regular defense budget, and that also include expenditures for other non-military costs.
It has also facilitated increases in waste and fraud, and has exacerbated cost
management problems because of its disabling of the conventional accounting and
accountability mechanisms within the regular US budgetary process.

Prior to demonstrating how such accounting methods were applied to under-cost the
US’s battering down of Iraqi doors, the following section will firstly define the temporal
parameters of this imperial project.
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Situating the US’s Imperial Project on Iraqi Space within Full
Spectrum
With regards the US, Tucker and Hendrickson (1992, p.2) note, “The end of the cold
war had dramatically broadened the area of freedom for the nation’s foreign policy” as
the threat of the only rival superpower, the USSR, had disintegrated.

Whilst US

imperialism during the over four decades of Cold War was deployed under the rubric of
containing the Soviet/Communist threat, the post-Cold War era granted the US an
unwavering freedom to pronounce a new and overt imperial order. Indeed, the 1991
Gulf War marked the beginning of what President George H. W. Bush named a ‘New
World Order’ (Bush, 1990).

What the ‘New World Order’ entailed and why Iraqi space was chosen to initiate it
requires an understanding of the lead-up to the 1991 Gulf War. Whilst it is beyond the
scope of this chapter to discuss the reasons that led President Hussein to illegally invade
and occupy Kuwait on the 2nd August 1990, it is important to note that several analysts
have concluded that Saddam was not an irrational actor and, therefore, would not have
made this controversial decision without (mis)understanding some form of acquiescence
from the US, as was previously granted to him before his invasion of Iran and the
subsequent Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 (Boyle, 1992; Chomsky, 1992, 2008; Frank,
1992b; Peters, 1992). For example, Chomsky (2008, p. 29) determines that Saddam’s
invasion of Kuwait was a result of his “perhaps misunderstanding ambiguous signals
from the State Department”, which led him to read “the signals as a ‘green light’ to take
all of Kuwait …” (Chomsky, 1992, p.63). Meanwhile, readings of evidence by other
scholars has led them to conclude that “The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was not an
unexpected bolt of lightning out of the blue” (Frank, 1992b, p.271), rather, was the
result of US and US-sanctioned Kuwaiti actions that intended to incite a provocation
that would justify intervention and war (Boyle, 1992; Chomsky, 1992; Frank, 1992b).
According to Former French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson, Saddam Hussein
“walked into a trap … The Americans were determined to go to war from the start”
(quoted in Frank, 1992b, p.271). It is also worthy to note that there existed a genuine
diplomatic track to a peaceful resolution of the post-invasion debacle: Saddam clearly
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indicated his willingness to negotiate withdrawal from Kuwait on at least six separate
occasions and several countries, including France and Russia, pursued diplomatic
efforts (Chomsky, 1992, 2008, Frank, 1992a, 1992b; Peters, 1992). However, “From
the outset, the U.S. position was clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal: No outcome will
be tolerated other than capitulation to force” (Chomsky, 1992, p.65).

While Iraq’s act of invading Kuwait was unlawful, the usual sequence of responses by
the international community, being condemnation, sanctions and the legal requirement
to employ all peaceful avenues through diplomatic efforts, were not fully administered
(Chomsky, 1992). More specifically, sanctions of unparalleled severity were imposed
in 1990, which triggered Saddam’s repeated Iraqi withdrawal proposals; however,
diplomacy was denied as “Washington moved resolutely to bar the success of peaceful
means” (Chomsky, 1992, p.64).

Following from this apparent US insistence on

initiating war and the dominance of both Carl von Clausewitz’s maxim “that war is the
continuation of politics by other means” (quoted in Campbell, 1993, p.3) and Kennan’s
quantification of US foreign policy; the exertion of power through war must have been
calculated as best serving the US hegemon’s combined eco-political interests. It is also
clear that this form of reasoning resulted in the disregarding of any resulting destruction
and loss of life, or the opportunity costs relating to the forsaking of peaceful avenues
through diplomacy.

Consequently, the intrinsic role of accounting in facilitating

coercive exertions of power by the US is confirmed: accounting discourse pertaining to
economic efficiency and its quantitative instrumental reasoning provide the ideological
justifications that normalise destructive behaviours (Chwastiak, 2001, 2006, 2007a,
2008; Funnell & Chwastiak, 2015a).

Instead of expelling Saddam from Kuwait through other political instruments, the Gulf
War was initiated because it best served the national interest of the US. Chomsky
(quoted in, 1992, p.52) affirms that the war was waged at the end of the Cold War to
decisively confirm the US’s possession of ultimate global authority, to show the world
“that what we say goes”, as announced by President Bush. In effect, Bush’s ‘New
World Order’ was a military reiteration of Kennan’s foreign policy guideline, a lesson
to any state which, like Iraq, defiantly sought independence from the US hegemon’s
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regime: that “North-South political and economic polarization is to continue apace, and
no Southern political-economic challenges thereto will be tolerated” (emphasis in
original Frank, 1992a, p.51). Moreover, until the late 1980s, Iraq’s socialist politicaleconomy represented a relatively successful example of an opposing eco-political
regime, as will be demonstrated further in this chapter. As such, and following from
Clausewitz’s (1873, p.64) explanation that “the political cause of war has a great
influence on the method in which it is conducted”, the US method of radically bombing
Iraq during the Gulf War to an extent which French Foreign Minister Cheysson
described as “annihilating Iraq’s economy”, points to a political cause of obliterating
opposing eco-political regimes (quoted in Frank, 1992b, p.272).

The war was a mighty show of force that sought to reinforce US power amongst its
economic competitors and Western allies: to establish “a new military-centred global
order in which markets, income, and resource shares are defined not by technologicalmarket power, but by political-military dominance” (Petras, 1991, p.482).

Most

significantly, it was to assure free access to Middle East oil: President Bush had denoted
this interest when he described Saddam as having a “stranglehold” on the US economy,
while Secretary of State Baker portrayed Saddam as “sitting on our economic lifeline”
(quoted in Lakoff, 1991, p.25). The US, which had invaded Panama nine months
earlier causing between 4,000 and 7,000 Panamanian fatalities, feared Saddam would
imitate it by installing a Kuwaiti puppet regime before withdrawing, thereby granting
Saddam regional hegemony, and unprecedented power over the flow of oil in the
Middle East (Boyle, 1992; Chomsky, 1992, 2008).

In sum, whilst the 1990 Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait was the pronounced
reason for the initiation of war, it cannot be understood as the primary cause. The
availability of alternate peaceful means to resolve the issue, the surrounding pressing
eco-political motivations, and the US method of applying severe and profoundly
disproportionate force and destruction, which will be further demonstrated below, point
to grander intentions than that of merely evicting Saddam from Kuwait. Indeed, “the
events and issues under consideration were in actuality washed in shades of gray”
(Campbell, 1993, p.3). The US’s 1991 insistence on expending military force on Iraqi
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space was a primary result of the pursuit of its combined imperial interests, including
the geographical expansion of its capital accumulation regime, safeguarding its access
to oil and the affirmation of its global hegemonic and power position (Campbell, 1993;
Chomsky, 1992, 2008, Frank, 1992a, 1992b; Kubursi & Mansur, 1993; O’Connor,
1991; Peters, 1992; Petras, 1991). As such, any accounting for the costs of the US’s
imperial project on Iraqi space cannot be restricted to those of the 2003 Iraq War
temporal domain. The endeavour to batter down Iraq’s defiantly closed doors and to
utilise this project as a forewarning to others did not originate in the temporal space of
2003 alone, rather was activated as of 1990 (Ricks, 2006). This is perhaps the most
obvious, yet obscure, method behind the magician’s trick on Iraqi space. By failing to
cost the imperial project on Iraqi space in its entirety, not only are costs significantly
diminished, but also the very existence of an unrelenting imperial project to open Iraqi
space is effectively concealed. Instead, each power exertion on Iraq is afforded a
perception of isolation that permits the establishment of unconnected justifications that
have the ultimate effect of establishing legitimacy and garnering popular support.

Battering Down Iraq’s Doors: Counting US Costs
The 1991 Gulf War
The 1991 Gulf War lasted 43 days, and included a massive bombing campaign against
Iraq: Coalition air forces, led by the US, flew 118,000 raids, dropped more than 179,000
bombs and attacked nearly 800 targets (Gordon, 2010). The official direct cost of the
War to the US was $61 billion (Daggett, 2010). However, estimates of actual direct
costs to the US have ranged between $7 billion in expenditures and $8 billion in gains
as most of the cost of the war was paid by foreign pledges (Chwastiak, 2008; Funnell &
Chwastiak, 2015; Quinn, 1994). Whilst the Bush administration benefited politically
from the perception of waging a war with little expenditures, the perception was a
deception as the costs of the war did not end with the conclusion of hostilities. For
example, the most prominent human cost to the US from this war is a health issue that
has specifically affected only Gulf War veterans, known as Gulf War Illness or
Syndrome. A consistent illness profile has emerged, including “chronic headaches,
cognitive difficulties, widespread pain, unexplained fatigue, chronic diarrhea, skin
rashes, respiratory problems, and other abnormalities” (Research Advisory Committee
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on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses, 2008, p.3). Of the 697,000 US veterans who served in
this war, at least one quarter, or approximately 175,000 veterans, have been officially
diagnosed with this condition, and many still suffer its symptoms (Research Advisory
Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses, 2008). Direct costs of this illness are
associated with the long-term costs of medical care and the monthly disability
compensation payments that are ongoing even after over 20 years of war-end (Bilmes,
2013b). In 2002, the cost of medical care for Gulf War Illness veterans alone was
estimated to cost the US more than $2 billion annually (Chwastiak, 2008; Funnell &
Chwastiak, 2015). In addition, the US government has expended hundreds of millions
of dollars on research into this illness, with no tangible results in achieving an effective
treatment, and few veteran recoveries over time (Research Advisory Committee on Gulf
War Veterans’ Illnesses, 2008).

There have also been other health issues affecting Gulf War veterans. Of the 697,000
Gulf War veterans, an estimated 48% required medical treatment and an estimated 44%
were expected to eventually claim monthly disability benefits. In 2005, 14 years after
the end of the Gulf War, disability entitlement payments were still costing over
$600,000 per year (Bilmes, 2007).

There are also opportunity costs associated with

these health issues: society bares a cost regarding the potential output that has been
foregone due to seriously injured/ill veterans. This cost extends to also include the one
in five cases of seriously ill soldiers who also need a family member to forgo
employment to look after them (Bilmes & Stiglitz, 2008a, 2008b). In addition, studies
have provided evidence of excess rates of birth defects in Gulf War veterans’ children
in comparison to non-deployed era veterans, and abnormal health problems extending
into family members (Research Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses,
2008). Finally, there are also costs associated with payments to surviving family of
Gulf War Veterans who died as a result of Gulf War-related illnesses. Known as
‘Survivors’ benefits’, immediate family members of Gulf War veterans, such as
spouses, dependent children and dependent parents, are entitled to various benefits,
including health care, education and home loan benefits (U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs, 2015). Although these are ongoing costs of the war, nevertheless, they have
simply been excluded from the war’s budget and veiled from public perception.
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1990-2003 Economic Sanctions
According to the US’s Congressional Budget Office (CBO), sanctions are restrictions
on “the flow of goods, services, or capital between the United States and another
country in order to promote foreign policies or enhance national security”
(Congressional Budget Office, 1999, p.ix). What have been described as “the most
punitive and extensive sanctions in history …” were imposed upon Iraq in the form of
near total financial and trade embargos, which were imposed through the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) at the behest of the US and UK between 1990 and
2003 (Harding, 2004, p.182). The US’s intended aim was to deny crucial resources for
the Saddam regime to maintain social stability and order, thereby undermining its
legitimacy and providing oppositional groups with leverage to rally citizenry support
and achieve regime change (Chomsky, 1992, 1999; Peksen, 2009). In actuality, the
sanctions were a form of silent economic warfare that continued for almost thirteen
years and resulted in “the deaths of more people in Iraq than have been slain by all socalled weapons of mass destruction throughout history” (Mueller & Mueller, 1999,
p.51).

Nevertheless, and in defiance of growing international disapproval and

condemnation of the immeasurable human costs of the sanctions, three different US
presidents worked to ensure they were continually imposed as long as Saddam remained
in power (Aziz, 2000).

The reason behind the US’s insistence on the use of sanctions is because they are
perceived by the political elite as a continuation of politics by other means. Sanctions,
like warfare, are seen as a form of Clausewitz’s ‘political commerce’; accordingly, the
possibility of their use is a determinant of a calculation of cost-benefit analysis. Whilst
the Gulf War devastated the Iraqi economy, army and infrastructure, and could have
easily continued to forcefully dislodge Saddam from power, the costs of removing
Saddam through war were not feasible to US interests. President Bush and his National
Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft explained that
Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an occupation of
Iraq, would have … incurred incalculable human and political costs.
Apprehending him was probably impossible … We would have been forced to
occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq. The coalition would instantly have
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collapsed, the Arabs deserting it in anger and other allies pulling out as well
… Had we gone the invasion route, the U.S. could conceivably still be an
occupying power in a bitterly hostile land. It would have been a dramatically
different – and perhaps barren – outcome (quoted in Cerf & Sifry, 2003,
p.102; Bush & Scowcroft, 1998).

Since removing Saddam from power through war would engender ‘incalculable’ costs,
the US sought to realise its objective through a less costly political instrument.
Sanctions followed “the impeccable logic of accounting by offering a low cost
alternative to war”, regardless of the resulting human, social and environmental costs
(Chwastiak & Lehman, 2008, p.321). Indeed, sanctions on Iraq were viewed as an
especially feasible foreign policy tool as “costs are likely to be tiny when the sanctions
are imposed on small developing economies – the most common target” (Congressional
Budget Office, 1999, p.ix). Moreover, since the CBO establishes that the ultimate aim
of sanctions is to realise US interests “by making objectionable actions more costly for
other countries” (Congressional Budget Office, 1999, p.ix), it follows a mindset that
encourages the infliction of as many costs as needed on a target country until it heeds to
US interests. Reflecting the impact of this mindset on US leadership; when Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright was questioned during a television interview about the death
of over half a million Iraqi children as a result of the sanctions, Albright responded, “I
think that is a very hard choice, but the price, we think, the price is worth it” (‘We think
the price is worth it.’, 1996). US interests in Iraq and the level of Iraqi defiance to those
interests led to the imposition of lethal sanctions: the sanctions effectively turned “a
program of international governance into a legitimized act of mass slaughter” (Gordon,
2002, p.43). As such, accounting permitted the mechanical application of genocidal
policies of ‘mass slaughter’, as it focussed decision-makers’ attention on economically
rational considerations pertaining cost and benefit. Its dissemination of quantitative
instrumental reasoning effectively divorced decision-makers from the qualitative effects
of their decision.

While the US government projects a perception that sanctions are virtually costless to
the US, in practice there are many hidden costs. In the only major study on US costs
from sanctions, a 1997 paper by the Peterson Institute for International Economics
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found that sanctions cost the US approximately $19 billion annually in reduced exports
of goods and more than 200,000 jobs in the relatively higher-wage export sector, which
translated into approximately $1 billion annually in national income (Hufbauer et al.,
1997). Nevertheless, the CBO (1999, p.xii) worked to demote the significance of such
costs, explaining that “they are very small compared with total national income in 1997
of more than $6.6 trillion and total goods exports of nearly $700 billion”. However, the
findings of a more recent study by the National Iranian American Council in 2014
provide an indication that the costs to the US from its imposition of sanctions are much
greater. The study found that US sanctions on Iran alone between 1995 and 2012 cost
the US “between $134.7 and $175.3 billion in potential export revenue to Iran”, and
between 214 657 and 279 389 lost job opportunities for 2008 alone (Leslie et al., 2014,
p.12). Barry Bosworth, a senior fellow in the Brookings Institution’s Economic Studies
Program, verified these estimates: “The number cited for the United States is actually
the magnitude by which U.S.-Iran trade fell short of the predicted magnitude relative to
trade of other countries with Iran” (McAuliff, 2014). Moreover, there are also costs to
the US that are associated with the detrimental economic effects that are generated
because of both Iraq’s decreased supply of oil, such as higher global oil prices, and its
reduced capacity to import goods. Also, there is the opportunity cost to US businesses
rising from their inability to invest in Iraq, especially in its lucrative oil industry.
Finally, there are long-term costs that may arise after sanctions are lifted; for example,
there are the costs of foreign firms replacing US firms, the perception by the previously
sanctioned country of US firms as ‘unreliable suppliers’, and the competitive advantage
afforded to other countries because sanctioned countries may avoid buying from US
exporters (Hufbauer et al., 1997).

US costs pertaining to the almost thirteen years of comprehensive sanctions on Iraq did
not appear on government budgets, rather were altogether deemed invisible, outside the
realm of public consciousness. This “allowed the United States to pursue its policy
goals with little cost and relative impunity” (Harding, 2004, p.187). Thus, accounting
practices have been directly implicated in normalising the use of genocidal sanctions
upon Iraq by rendering the use of sanctions a most ‘profitable’ coercive foreign policy
tool for US political elite. Indeed, “the dominant powers have shown that they can
inflict enormous pain at remarkably little cost to themselves … in a matter of months or
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years whole economies can be devastated ...” (Mueller & Mueller, 1999, p.49). Yet
again, mundane accounting practices have been implicated in both the application of
genocidal policies, and in the soothing of the executor’s conscience (Chwastiak &
Lehman, 2008; Funnell, 1998; Neu, 2000).

2003 Iraq War, invasion and occupation
As noted earlier, the Bush administration estimated a total cost for the 2003 war with
Iraq of between $50 and $60 billion (Bilmes & Stiglitz, 2006, 2008b; Davis, 2002;
Foldvary, 2008). In a December 2014 Congressional Research Service report, however,
the cost of war in Iraq totalled $815 billion (Belasco, 2014), while the National
Priorities Project, which tallied all funding appropriated by Congress through the end of
fiscal year 2015, calculated the cost at over $820 billion (National Priorities Project,
2017). Whilst the discrepancy between the political estimates and the official figures is
approximately fifteen fold, multiple studies have underscored the profound undercosting of even the official figures (Bilmes, 2007, 2016, Bilmes & Stiglitz, 2006, 2008a;
Chwastiak, 2008; Crawford, 2016; Edwards, 2010; Funnell & Chwastiak, 2015; Joint
Economic Committee, 2007; Nordhaus, 2002; Stiglitz, 2008; Wheeler, 2011). For
example, the Joint Economic Committee of Congress (2007) estimated that the actual
cost of the war would be $3.5 trillion, while Yale economist Nordhaus (2002) projected
total cost to reach $2 trillion.

Crawford (2016) from the Watson Institute for

International and Public Affairs estimated Iraq War costs at more than $2.2 trillion, not
including additional cumulative interest through 2053 on the war’s appropriations
estimated at 3.634 trillion, and a study by Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz and Harvard
Professor Linda Bilmes (2008a) projected total costs under a best-case scenario to be
$2.279 trillion, reaching $4.995 trillion under a realistic-moderate scenario.

As with the Gulf War, the discrepancies between official figures and scholarly attempts
at costing the war stem from, and therefore demonstrate the political inherence of,
accounting practices. Whilst official budgets utilise cash based accounting to focus on
incremental, short-term expenditures, thereby under-costing the war; scholarly attempts
at costing the war acknowledge the accrual of liabilities that are not calculated under
cash accounting, and also broaden the definition of costs so as to include budgetary,
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social and macroeconomic costs that are associated with the war. For example, a most
obvious cost of the Iraq War that is beyond the direct fiscal impacts is that pertaining to
the long-term treatment of injured or disabled veterans, and their long-term disability
entitlement payments.

Bilmes and Stiglitz (2008a) have estimated that the future

unfunded cost of these disabilities will be in excess of $600 billion. In addition, there is
the opportunity cost from lost productivity from the injured/disabled, and from family
members who leave work to care for them. There is also a gap between government
accounting’s valuing of life lost as a result of the war and the actual cost to society and
families. Whilst the government currently values life at between $7-8 billion within
safety and environmental regulations, the war’s ‘death gratuity’ is only accounted for as
$500,000 (Stiglitz, 2008). As of 10th March 2017, this gap applies to 4,424 US military
fatalities (Department of Defense, 2017).

Another major source of non-direct fiscal expenditures is generated from how the war
was financed. Since the Iraq War has been funded through borrowed money, multitrillion dollars in cumulative interest payments will be paid into the future, yet are not
included in the official costs of the war (Bilmes, 2016; Bilmes & Stiglitz, 2006, 2008b;
Joint Economic Committee, 2007; Stiglitz, 2008; Wheeler, 2011). Moreover, increased
borrowing displaces productive investment by business and the US government, thereby
reducing overall productivity in the economy for many years and costing tens of
thousands of jobs (Crawford, 2016; Edwards, 2011; Garrett-Peltier, 2011; Heintz,
2011). The Joint Economic Committee (2007) forecasted foregone investment return at
$870 billion. The US economy also endured extra costs pertaining to the disrupted
world oil markets as a result of the war, and increased oil prices. Other costs that fail to
be included in official accounts of the war include future expansions, repairs and refits
of the military and its equipment so as to return them to pre-war capabilities,
depreciation costs of equipment damaged or consumed more rapidly than in peacetime,
and war veteran’s eligibility for educational and home loan benefits (Bilmes, 2013a,
2013b; Bilmes & Stiglitz, 2008b; Crawford, 2016; Edwards, 2010; Joint Economic
Committee, 2007). There are also increases in the number of DoD civilian employees
that have been recruited to administer the war, increases in base and bonus payments to
army recruits to boost recruiting so as to replenish a depleting force, and the broader
national security impacts of the war leading to Homeland Security costs: between 2002
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and 2016, the Department of Homeland Security has received $548 billion (Bilmes,
2013a, 2013b; Crawford, 2016). Finally, there are various opportunity costs, where the
trillions of dollars of expenditures in Iraq could have been spent to benefit US citizenry,
such as the provision of universal health care, to reduce the federal debt and to increase
government services (Bilmes & Stiglitz, 2008b; Foldvary, 2008; Stiglitz, 2008).

Whilst the use of a cash-based accounting system, the financing of the war through
debt, and a narrowed definition of costs have most evidently served elitist interest by
greatly under-cutting the cost of the 2003 Iraq War, other misapplications of accounting
methods also played a major role in their trickery. Bilmes and Stiglitz (2008a) criticise
the profoundly substandard government accounting practices in the federal budget; they
reveal that had a private firm practiced such techniques, the Securities and Exchange
Commission would have prosecuted them.

They pronounce, “For students of

‘government failure’, the Iraq War is a case study” (Bilmes & Stiglitz, 2008b, p.xix).
Likewise, Belasco (2011, p.42) admits that her Congressional Research Service report
into the war costs was constrained by government accounting practices that “limited
transparency”. Meanwhile, in answering the question as to why a descriptive essay on
the costs of the war is not a straightforward matter, Wheeler (2011, p.1) explains,
“Because the Pentagon and Congress have been sloppy, inept and misleading in how
they have managed and accounted for appropriations, there are many uncertainties,
unknowns, and biases …”.

For decades, the DoD’s Office of the Inspector General (DoD OIG) and the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) have reported profound problems with the
Pentagon’s accounting and accountability practices (Wheeler, 2011). GAO has reported
that the DoD’s financial management represents a high-risk area
for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement … DOD’s pervasive financial
and related business management and system deficiencies continue to
adversely affect its ability to control costs; ensure basic accountability;
anticipate future costs and claims on the budget; measure performance;
maintain funds control; prevent and detect fraud, waste and abuse; and address
pressing management issues (Department of Defense Inspector General, 2009,
p.2).
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The pervasive nature of the reported high-risk accounting deficiencies that have
occurred over decades of time, their significant inefficient effects, and the fact that they
have consistently failed to be amended, together indicate an intended grander purpose
for their on-going infirmity. The DoD OIG (2009, p.4) reported that the DoD’s control
and monitoring of expenditures prevented the “DOD from collecting and reporting
financial information … that is accurate, reliable, and timely”. Moreover, the “DOD
frequently enters ‘unsupported’ (i.e. imaginary) amounts in its books and uses those
figures to make the books balance” (Wheeler, 2011, p.3). In addition, “the value of
DOD property and material in the possession of contractors is not reliably reported”
(Department of Defense Inspector General, 2009, p.7), and “The cost and depreciation
of the DOD general property, plant, and equipment are not reliably reported …” (p.8).
Finally, and just one day before the 9/11 attacks of 2001, SECDEF Rumsfeld
announced that decades-old defective accounting practices had led to $2.3 trillion in
untraceable transactions (Rumsfeld, 2001). In sum, the DoD has endured a historical
trajectory of incompetence in accounting practices that renders its accounting futile,
thereby rendering the DoD unaccountable.

With regards the Iraq War, an unaccountable DoD played a major role in facilitating the
magician’s trick. For example, whilst it was standard procedure to establish a separate
account to track operation funds during previous wars, such an account was not
established for the 2003 Iraq War. Instead, “War and baseline funds are mixed in the
same accounts” (Bilmes & Stiglitz, 2008b, p.9; Foldvary, 2008). As such, sifting warrelated costs from the DoD’s usual baseline expenditures, such as its procurement of
new weapons, military construction and maintenance, is a profoundly arduous task.
Moreover, some war-related costs, such as increased weapons procurement for the war
and increases in active duty pay, have become ‘institutionalised’ in the base budget,
thereby deemed invisible (Bilmes, 2013a; Bilmes & Stiglitz, 2008b; Crawford, 2016;
Wheeler, 2011).

Wheeler (2011) demonstrates this by comparing the Bush

administration’s pre-war DoD base budget plan to post-war years.

He reports an

unexplainable total growth of $616.2 billion over the 2002-2011 periods. Since the
increased expenditures were not spent on improving or upgrading the existing Navy, Air
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Force or the Army’s brigade combat teams as they have generally become “smaller,
older, and less ready to fight”, he concludes that the entire sum of extra appropriations
are attributable to the Iraq War (Wheeler, 2011, p.14). Whilst other scholars concur that
there are Iraq War costs that have been institutionalised into the base budget, they have
nonetheless been inclined to attribute only an estimated percentage of the total extra
appropriations to the Iraq War (Bilmes, 2013a; Bilmes & Stiglitz, 2008b; Stiglitz,
2008). Finally, an unaccountable DoD was also realised through deficient budgetary
practices.

Since Congress appropriated war spending through ‘emergency

appropriations’ that lacked proper budgetary scrutiny and oversight, these
appropriations became “a magnet for pet nonwar spending projects that senators and
congressmen want to slip in under the radar” (Bilmes, 2016). For example, Wheeler
(2011, pp.8-9) describes how “Congress has from time to time added C-17 transport
aircraft and other programs to ‘emergency supplementals’ for Iraq and Afghanistan,
thereby exploiting the politically favoured war spending bills to fund defense equipment
that was not requested by DOD”.

In order for the political elite to perform their magician’s trick, it is imperative that an
acquiescent accounting technology provides the methodology. Since the trick is to
under-cost the war, to mystify interests of the MIC, and to obscure profound waste,
corruption and transfers in wealth to the dominant capital group, it is essential that
accounting provides a legitimate process through which the DoD will ultimately stand
unaccountable. The subservience of accounting to elitist interests has been profoundly
demonstrated through the accounts of the 2003 Iraq War.

Accounting for the Unaccounted for: Counting Iraqi costs
Chapter two explained that capitalism’s geographic expansion is premised upon
processes of destruction, the de-territorialisation of existing socio-ecopolitical
apparatuses, followed by subsequent re-territorialisation processes that are based on the
dominant regime. Applying this knowledge to the US’s imperial project on Iraqi space
provides a broader contextual understanding of what transpired in Iraq, and why. Each
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of the three US imperial footprints upon Iraq was not a regular exertion of power;
rather, each was a severe incarnation of its kind. The 1991 Gulf War bore “the heaviest
bombing campaign in the history of war …” to that date (Ismael & Perry, 2014, p.95),
the ensuing sanctions were “the most severe ever imposed” (Nordhaus, 2002, p.53), and
the 2003 Iraq War utilised ‘Shock and Awe’, the military version of free-market
fundamentalism’s annihilation of space by time, which ordained the US “the ability to
‘own’ the dimension of time – moving more quickly than an opponent …”, and
“’Dominance’ … the ability to control a situation totally” (Ullman & Wade, 1996,
p.xxvii). Iraqi space, home to a 1990 population of just 17.5 million people, resided
within an entanglement of US imperial interests, yet remained unwaveringly defiant.
As such, its doors were not only to be forced open for the hegemon bloc’s exploitation,
but this exertion of force was also to serve the world an illustrative example: one of the
‘New World Order’ and the other of the ‘New Middle East’.

Before the destruction, the Iraqi people consumed an average 3,000 calories per day,
one the of highest per-capita food-availability ratings in the region; 92% of the Iraqi
people enjoyed access to clean water; 93% enjoyed access to free health care; adult
literacy was around 95%, one of the highest in the world; female literacy was 85%; and
Iraqi physicians were mostly trained in Europe or the US, with one-quarter being Board
certified (Gordon, 2010; Pilger, 2003). During periods of peace, Iraqi oil production
reached 3 million barrels per day (bpd), translating into approximately 1 billion barrels
per year (Nordhaus, 2002). Overall, Iraq had “a relatively large, healthy, well-fed, welleducated middle class”, and the “Iraqi welfare state was … among the most
comprehensive and generous in the Arab world” (Pilger, 2003, p.95). Indeed, in terms
of social development, the United Nations reported that Iraq was “fast approaching
standards comparable to those of developed countries” as of the mid-1980s (UNDP,
2002, p.11). For the new capitalist regime to take hold, however, the old welfare state
had to be destroyed to facilitate the re-territorialisation project. Whilst accounting
methods were utilised by US elite to profoundly limit the counting of US costs from this
project, they altogether failed to count Iraqi costs, thereby eliminating them from
existence and muting their emancipatory potential through social accounting. If costs to
Iraq, including the social and human, were given visibility, the potential for resistance
that would have led to a discontinuing of the project would have been greater, as people
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“would have to determine whether abstract goals like freedom and democracy were
worth the human carnage and despair required” (Chwastiak, 2008, p.582).

The

following section will provide an accounting for the unaccounted for; it will offer an
overview of some of the costs wrought upon Iraqi space and its people.

The 1991 Gulf War
Although this war had been promoted by military officials as an example of the new age
in ‘precision warfare’ that limited Iraqi costs to the destruction of ‘hard’ military
targets, the report presented in the immediate aftermath by the UN Under Secretary
General Marti Ahtisaari, portrayed a strikingly opposing depiction of affairs (Ahtisaari,
1991; Lewis, 1991; Norris, 1991; Orford, 2003). The report found that the bombing had
wrought near-apocalyptic results upon the economic infrastructure of what
had been, until January 1991, a rather highly urbanized and mechanized
society. Now, most means of modern life support have been destroyed or
rendered tenuous. Iraq has, for some time to come, been relegated to a preindustrial age, but with all the disabilities of post-industrial dependency on an
intensive use of energy and technology (Ahtisaari, 1991, para.8).

The costs included the destruction of approximately 9,000 civilian homes, thereby
immediately displacing 72,000 people. Also, approximately 90% of Iraqi industrial
workers would be deprived of income as their source of work had been incapacitated
(Ahtisaari, 1991). Meanwhile, damages to water supply infrastructure had left Baghdad
with per-day water levels of 30-40 litres per person, less than 10% of the 450 litres per
person levels of pre-war Baghdad (Ahtisaari, 1991; Lewis, 1991; Pilger, 2003).
Moreover, the price of basic foods increased by as much as 4,500%; almost half the
telephone lines were damaged beyond repair; and 20 power stations had been damaged
or destroyed, causing damage or destruction to 85-90% of Iraq’s national power grid,
and reducing energy generating capacity from a pre-war level of 9,000 megawatts
(MW), to just 340 MW in March 1991 (Gordon, 2010). With regards the destruction of
fuel and energy means, the UN’s report found that unless urgent reparations and
essential supplies were underway, “food that is imported cannot be preserved and
distributed; water cannot be purified; sewage cannot be pumped away and cleansed;
crops cannot be irrigated; medicaments cannot be conveyed where they are required;
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needs cannot even be effectively assessed” (Ahtisaari, 1991, para.37).

Overall,

Alnasrawi (1994) estimated that the bombing campaign destroyed about $230 billion of
Iraqi infrastructure that was essential for the provisioning of basic human services.
Consequently, a severe humanitarian crisis was unfolding, which led Ahtisaari to call
upon the immediate removal of sanctions on food, agricultural equipment and
agricultural supplies, and the urgent supply of all life-supporting items (Ahtisaari, 1991;
Lewis, 1991). His report warned,
It is unmistakable that the Iraqi people may soon face a further imminent
catastrophe, which could include epidemic and famine, if massive lifesupporting needs are not rapidly met. The long summer, with its often 45 or
even 50 degree temperatures is only weeks away. Time is short (Ahtisaari,
1991, para.37).

This warning was confirmed by a Harvard University study, which concluded that Iraq
was en route to a “‘public health catastrophe’ involving tens of thousands of deaths by
the end of 1991 alone” (Herring, 2002, p.40). Despite the warnings, however, the
comprehensive economic sanctions did not end, rather, continued in what has been
described as “a conscious and callous choice to deny an entire society the means
necessary to survive” (Herring, 2002, p.41).

With regards Gulf War-related costs to Iraqi life, despite a senior US officer explaining
that “This is the first war in modern times where every screwdriver, every nail is
accounted for”, this stringent accounting failed to account for Iraqi dead (quoted in
Pilger, 2003, p.131). Orford (2003, p.191) explains that US policy was “the control of
necrology”, which entailed the censoring of Iraqi wounded and dead so as to disavow
them from public conscience. This was largely achieved through the US’s maintaining
of ultimate control over the reporting of mainstream media outlets through a method
known as ‘embedded’ or ‘in-bed’ journalism (Ignatius, 2010; Kolmer & Semetko, 2009;
The War You Don’t See, 2010; Tuosto, 2008; Ziede, 2005). Another key method
through which this trick was achieved was through the utilisation of accounting
discourse pertaining to the ‘efficiency’ of the Pentagon’s new ‘precision weaponry’,
which ‘surgically’ hit only ‘hard’ Iraqi military targets. In actuality, the precision
‘smart bombs’, “which were often outfitted with TV-friendly cameras, represented just
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7 percent of all bombs dropped in the conflict”, with a ‘precision-strike’ probability of
just 50 percent (Seybolt et al., 2013, p.36). With regards the remaining 93% of ‘dumb’
bombs, “nearly 70 percent of the 88,500 tons of bombs dropped in the conflict missed
their targets entirely” (Seybolt et al., 2013, p.37; Knightley, 2004), thereby “frequently
destroying private homes and killing civilians” (Research Unit for Political Economy,
2003, p.38). An example of one such frequency occurred when a bomb destroyed a
civilian bomb shelter, killing over 400 women and children (Chwastiak, 2008; Funnell
& Chwastiak, 2015; Research Unit for Political Economy, 2003). By focussing public
attention away from the human costs of the bombing and, instead, using accounting
discourse to emphasise the efficiency of the weaponry, the value of Iraqi life was
diminished. A new measure of the war’s ‘progress’ and ‘success’ surfaced: the public
was conditioned into an accounting for the successful “destruction of … targets, rather
than body counts” (Seybolt et al., 2013, p.36).

Nevertheless, a fair indication of Iraqi deaths that resulted from the Gulf War is realised
from a comparison of the estimates of several subsequent studies. Daponte (1993)
estimated 13,000 civilian and 40,000 Iraqi military personnel deaths in the immediate
aftermath, and a further 70,000 civilian deaths within the first year due to destructions
in essential components of civilian infrastructure. In a later study however, Daponte
estimated total Iraqi deaths in the war and immediate aftermath at 205,500 (Magnusson,
2003). The Medical Educational Trust also conducted a study that estimated a total of
250,000 men, women, children and Iraqi soldiers had been killed in the short aftermath
of the military attack (Lee & Haines, 1991). This study was supported by US and
French intelligence estimates that reported “in excess of 200,000 deaths” (quoted in
Pilger, 2003, p.132).

Meanwhile, whilst US Commanding General Norman

Schwarzkopf refused to estimate civilian causalities in a testimony to Congress, he did
indicate that at least 100,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed (Pilger, 2003). An estimated
25,000 withdrawing Iraqi soldiers were killed “in their vehicles on what became known
as the ‘Highway of Death’” alone (Ismael & Perry, 2014, p.95; Peters, 1992). Soldiers
were “burnt beyond recognition by fissile weapons” (Seybolt et al., 2013, p.37); US
pilots described the onslaught as “shooting fish in a barrel” (quoted in Peters, 1992,
p.15). Furthermore, snow plows mounted on tanks and combat earthmovers were used
to bury thousands of Iraqi soldiers alive in trenches (Frank, 1992a; Pilger, 2003; Sloyan,
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1991). Such atrocities violated “several international conventions to which the USA is
a signatory. These include the 1907 and 1923 Hague, the 1948-50 Geneva, Nuremberg
and Genocide Conventions on rules and crimes of war, as well as the UN Declaration of
Human Rights …” (Frank, 1992b, p.274). Whilst estimates indicate over 100,000 Iraqi
soldier deaths in 43 days, the total deaths for all Coalition Forces (CF) that participated
in the war were 343 deaths, 148 of which were from the US (Lee & Haines, 1991;
Pilger, 2003). Peters (1992, p.15) reminds us that “The ability and willingness to carry
out one-sided slaughter is a traditional feature of empire”.

During the Gulf War, accounting’s quantitative form of instrumental reasoning also
echoed with regards the US’s first-time use of a WMD, Depleted Uranium (DU) (Kirby,
1999; Nuclear Policy Research Institute, 2003; Pilger, 2003). The Nuclear Policy
Research Institute (NPRI) (2003) provided detailed reports of both expenditure and
accuracy: it had expended 320 tons of DU during the Gulf War, 259 tons of which were
deployed from air. Deployment from air presented a critical weakness, however, as
“many missed the intended hard targets. Therefore, the majority … remain scattered
across the landscape in larger fragments or whole” (Nuclear Policy Research Institute,
2003, pp.7–8). Whilst the notion that a majority of 259 tons of WMD laid ‘scattered
across the landscape’ would normally generate feelings of disgust and anguish at the
possible human and environmental destruction, focus was instead diverted to the
quantitative technicalities of DU performance measurements.

Indeed, the report

disavowed the resulting destruction by drawing attention to how the use of DU secured
the Coalition forces a ‘marked operational advantage’. DoD Special Assistant of Gulf
War Illnesses, Bernard Rotsker, commended how “DU rounds ripped through [Iraqi]
tanks like a hot knife through butter, and their guns were totally … ineffective in
penetrating American armor protected with DU shielding” (quoted in Nuclear Policy
Research Institute, 2003, p.7). In effect, the appraisal process of DU use echoed that of
the DoD during the 1960s when the PPBS reduced the decision regarding nuclear
weaponry-use to an instrumental relation between the means and the end objective of
maximising ‘enemy’ deaths, thereby effectively “converting the ‘unthinkable’ into a
technical and mundane resource allocation problem” (Chwastiak, 2001, p.501). Far
from considering the human, social and environmental costs from DU use in Iraq, the
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NPRI report counted the US’s instrumental gains, being that “It undoubtedly saved
thousands of American lives” (Nuclear Policy Research Institute, 2003, p.7).

Subsequent studies and developments in Iraq provide an indication of the qualitative
costs that resulted from the use of DU weaponry during the Gulf War. The GAO (1993,
pp.17–18) found that “inhaled insoluble oxides stay in the lungs longer and pose a
potential cancer risk due to radiation. Ingested DU dust can also pose both a radioactive
and a toxicity risk”. Similarly, a study by the Army Environmental Policy Institute
(AEPI) (1995) found that “The risk associated with DU in the body are both chemical
and radiological”. Meanwhile, a 1991 report by the UK Atomic Energy Authority
found that every 8% of the 320 tons of DU fired upon Iraq had the propensity to cause
half a million potential deaths if inhaled (Pilger, 2003). Following from the revelation
that a majority of the 259 tons of DU remained scattered on Iraqi desert, the potential
costs in health and life from inhaling DU dust were draconian. Indeed, a cancer
specialist in the Iraqi city of Basra, and member of Britain’s Royal College of
Physicians, Dr Al-Ali, described the extent of the danger:
it is like Chernobyl here; the genetic effects are new to us. The mushrooms
grow huge, and the fish in what was once a beautiful river are inedible. Even
the grapes in my garden have mutated and can’t be eaten … we have an
increased percentage of congenital malformation, an increase of malignancy,
leukaemia, brain tumours … (quoted in Pilger, 2003, pp.49–51).

Overall, the Gulf War wrought incalculable human, social and environmental costs, in
addition to an estimated $230 billion loss in infrastructure and uncertain costs to the
economy. An indication as to the extent of destruction to Iraq’s economy is attainable
through a calculation pertaining to the loss in infrastructure. Iraqi gross domestic
product (GDP) is estimated to have averaged $25 billion in the 1990s (Nordhaus, 2002);
this suggests that the costs to infrastructure alone accounted for over nine years of total
Iraqi GDP. Hiltermann (1991, p.111) found that “the total devastation of the strategic
infrastructure (power installations, telecommunications, airports, some industrial
facilities) had made normal life in this country so dependent on modern technology
virtually impossible”. The ‘near-apocalyptic’ destruction, which was wrought by a
profoundly disproportionate use of force, points to US objectives that far surpassed
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merely forcing the withdrawal of Saddam’s army from Kuwait. What can be concluded
is that the US sought to annihilate the capacities of Iraq’s welfare state and economy,
thereby subordinating its people to US will. Indeed, the Washington Post later reported
that the US employed ‘strategic bombing’, where
Some targets … were bombed primarily to create postwar leverage over Iraq,
not to influence the course of the conflict itself. Military planners hoped the
bombing would amplify the economic and psychological impact of
international sanctions on Iraqi society … Because of these goals, damage to
civilian structures and interests, invariably described by briefers during the
war as ‘collateral’ and unintended, was sometimes neither ... they deliberately
did great harm to Iraq’s ability to support itself as an industrial society
(Gellman, 1991).

Chomsky (2008, p.33) confirmed this: the Gulf War’s bombing campaign was
intentionally designed to destroy “power stations and sewage and water facilities,
effectively a form of biological warfare”. According to senior US officers, “The worst
civilian suffering … has resulted … from weapons that hit exactly where they were
aimed – at electrical plants, oil refineries and transportation networks” (Gellman, 1991).
This intentional wide-scaled destruction of civilian infrastructure led French Foreign
Minister Clause Cheysson to state,
I categorically reject notions about avoiding unnecessary damage. The allied
goal of annihilating Iraq’s economy was bound to involve civilian causalities
… 200 000 – a massacre, with a terrifying impact … Why don’t you ask why
the air war lasted 40 days instead of the 15 as planned (quoted in Frank,
1992b, p.272).

1990-2003 Economic Sanctions
Research has long claimed that economic sanctions are generally ineffective in inducing
a re-alignment of actions by a targeted regime in compliance with the sender’s demands
(Galtung, 1967; Hufbauer et al., 1990; Pape, 1997). Rather, scholars have shown that
sanctions may cause disproportionate costs to the citizenry instead of the targeted
regimes, such as the deterioration of human rights, public health, economic conditions,
living standards, education and the development of civil society (Cortright & Lopez,
1995, 1997; Cortright et al., 2001; Galtung, 1967; Gibbons, 1999; Weiss, 1999; Weiss
et al., 1997; Peksen, 2009).
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In Iraq, the most evident economic costs from the sanctions are those pertaining revenue
shortfalls from reduced oil production.

Pre-war production was approximately 3

million bpd; during the period of sanctions, oil production averaged only 1.4 million
bpd, thereby generating a revenue shortfall of about $150 billion or six years of GDP
(Nordhaus, 2002). In 1997, the London School of Economics estimated that real GDP
had fallen by 50% because of losses in real production, and “then fell by a factor of
seven in the price of foreign exchange, due to scarcity” (Gordon, 2010, p.21).
Furthermore, opportunity costs from losses in economic growth were calculated to total
$265.3 billion for the period ending 1995 (Gordon, 2010).

However, by moving

beyond purely economic costs, a more holistic accounting for costs from sanctions can
be established. The sanctions on Iraq, which were established through UN Resolution
661, were very stringent; banning all trade, all financial dealings and freezing all Iraqi
assets abroad, whilst exempting only “supplies intended strictly for medical purposes,
and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs”, along with their payments (UN
Security Council, 1990).

During the first year of sanctions, the US also sought to

exhaust remaining Iraqi cash reserves by refusing it any means to raise funds until
August 1991. This had the result of covertly broadening the effect of the sanctions,
denying the Iraqi people food importations that had accounted for 70% of consumption
needs for almost a year (Herring, 2002; Lewis, 1991; Pilger, 2003). Consequently, the
Iraqi Ministry of Trade was forced to drop its monthly allocation of essential food items
to citizenry, from 343,000 tons pre-sanctions, to 135,000 tons or 39% of pre-sanction
rates (Ahtisaari, 1991).

The 1996 Oil-for-Food Programme (OFF) that was eventually passed by the UN
granted Iraq a net allowance of approximately $100 per person per annum, which was
also to cover costs relating to infrastructure and elementary services such as energy
(Herring, 2002; Pilger, 2003). A report by a UN Humanitarian Panel (1999, para.46)
emphasised that the OFF was inadequate: “the magnitude of the humanitarian needs is
such that they cannot be met within the context of the parameters set forth”.
Nevertheless, US members of the New York-based body of the UN Security Council
Sanctions Committee, which was responsible for the management of the sanctions and
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all supply contracts, frequently ‘vetoed’ the processing of essential humanitarian
supplies. In 2001, UN Secretary-General, Kofi Anan, reported his grievances: the
delays and vetoes were “seriously impairing the effective implementation of the [Oil for
Food] programme”, whereby water, sanitation and electricity contracts of “paramount
importance to the welfare of the Iraqi people” had been delayed (quoted in Pilger, 2003,
pp.58–59). In effect, the US utilised the UN sanctions and OFF programme as a means
to accentuate the devastation caused by the Gulf War, so as to further undermine the
Iraqi state and to initiate regime change (Arbuthnot, 2000; Chomsky, 2008; Falk, 2008;
Lewis, 1991; Nagy, 2001). Indeed, “the impact of sanctions emerged as the main
barrier to the provision of basic needs and economic recovery” (Harding, 2004, p.183).
Whilst no other country except for the UK blocked import contracts under the OFF
programme, the US intensified its vetoing of contracts over time: from its blocking of
$150 million worth of goods in 1998 alone, it successively further restricted Iraqi
imports, eventually blocking $5 billion of goods in 2002 (Gordon, 2010). Moreover,
Gordon (2010, p.24) describes, “There was no transparency and little consistency …
The large majority of requests were denied without explanation”.

The ‘costs’ to Iraqi life, society and environment from this intentionally devastating, yet
silent and invisible war on civilians were profound. For example, whilst the Gulf War
had severely damaged the water purification plants and their distribution systems, and
also the sewage treatment facilities, the subsequent sanctions limited the importation of
necessary specialised equipment and chemicals to fix the damage and to secure a supply
of purified water. The result was the spreading of epidemics and diseases, such as
cholera and typhoid: incidence of typhoid grew almost thirteen fold between 1990 and
1994, and there was an outbreak of cholera from zero cases in 1989 to 1,344 cases by
1994 (Chomsky, 2008; Gordon, 2010; Nagy, 2001). Furthermore, Gordon (2010, p.35)
explains that the severity of imposed sanctions caused a situation where Iraq was
constantly undergoing complex crises: for example, its increased production of rice to
kerb food shortages led to water stagnation; “this in turn generated mosquitoes and
malaria; but there was neither insecticide available to control the mosquitoes nor drugs
available for treatment of the malaria”. Moreover, whilst local drug production ceased
because of a lack of raw materials, electricity shortages destroyed refrigerated
medicines and laboratory reagents.

Also, a majority of medical equipment was
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rendered obsolete because of both the shortage in spare parts for maintenance and also
because of the impact of fluctuations in electricity supplies (Gordon, 2010; Pilger,
2003). This consequently greatly reduced the capacity of hospitals and surgeries: from
a lack of basic hygiene needs and necessary water supplies, to a limited availability of
medication and diagnostic or therapeutic equipment.

Meanwhile, the Food and

Agriculture Organization (FAO) reported a fivefold increase in the under-five child
mortality rate, and that the food intake of numerous Iraqis was now lower than those of
people in drought-stricken Africa (Carapico, 1998; Gordon, 2010; Nordhaus, 2002;
Pilger, 2003). By 1997, “one million children under five were malnourished … 70
percent of Iraqi women were anaemic” (Gordon, 2010, p.33).

The sanctions had

‘institutionalised’ acute poverty throughout Iraq; by 1995, the UN found 20% of Iraqis
were living in ‘extreme poverty’ (Dreze & Gazdar, 1992; UNICEF, 1998).

On the eve of another war on Iraq, the overall result of the sanctions was a humanitarian
calamity described as ‘genocide’, a ‘war crime’, ‘morally bankrupt’, and an act of
terrorism (Chomsky, 1992, 2008; Frank, 1992b; Gordon, 2002; Mueller & Mueller,
1999; Pilger, 2003). The United Nations summarised the impact of sanctions: Iraq
“experienced a shift from relative affluence to massive poverty” (UNDP, 2002, p.12).
A 2003 report by the United Nation’s Children’s Fund (UNICEF) found “Iraq’s
regression over the past decade is by far the most severe of the 193 countries surveyed”
(quoted in Chomsky, 2003, p.126). According to a 1999 joint report by UNICEF and
the Iraqi Government Ministry of Health (1999), the eight years preceding the report
had witnessed an almost three-fold increase in deaths above the anticipated rate for
children under five years of age, resulting in 500,000 children deaths, or well over 5,000
children deaths per month. Three UN officials, Denis Halliday, Hans von Sponeck and
Jutta Burghardt, resigned in protest of the devastating consequences.

Former UN

Assistant Secretary-General Denis Halliday asserted,
I had been instructed to implement a policy that satisfies the definition of
genocide: a deliberate policy that has effectively killed well over a million
individuals, children and adults. We all know that the regime, Saddam
Hussein, is not paying the price for economic sanctions; on the contrary, he
has been strengthened by them. It is the little people who are losing their
children or their parents for lack of untreated water. What is clear is that the
Security Council is now out of control, for its actions here undermine its own
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Charter, and the Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Convention.
History will slaughter those responsible (quoted in Pilger, 2003, p.56).

The 2003 Iraq War, invasion and occupation
Whilst the Gulf War and the sanctions were utilised in conjunction to de-territorialise
Iraq, to undermine Saddam’s regime and to inflict severe punishment of the civilian
population so as to provoke regime change, the 2003 Iraq War was more radical. The
post-9/11 world’s political climate provided what was described by US political elite as
an ‘opportunity’ for the George W. Bush administration to undertake that which the
George H. W. Bush administration had deemed infeasible over a decade earlier
(Harnden, 2001; Lemman, 2002; Woodward, 2003).

Bush Junior’s administration

decided that it was now feasible for the US to take ‘the invasion route’: to extend war
into invasion and occupation, to physically capture and remove Saddam from power,
and to forcefully install its imperial regime. Since this ‘route’ entailed radical reterritorialisation, it was fundamental that the 2003 war, invasion and occupation
accomplish comprehensive de-territorialisation. For Iraq, the costs from OIF would be
acute.

In effect, the Bush administration’s mindset followed Milton Friedman’s notion of
‘shock treatment’: the psychological shocks that were generated as a result of the 9/11
attacks rendered what was previously perceived as “politically impossible”, now
“politically inevitable” (Friedman, 1982, p.7). Similarly, the psychological shocks that
would generate in Iraq from crises of war, invasion and occupation would be utilised as
platforms for rapid change. Since the 2003 venture was built upon the notion of
psychological shock therapy, fittingly, its war employed a ‘Shock and Awe’ military
campaign. The Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance doctrine was published in
1996 and was perceived as ‘revolutionary’ as it promised the military equivalent of the
capability to annihilate space by time: to establish US dominance over space at rapid
speed by paralysing “the will, perception, and understanding of the adversary to fit or
respond to our strategic policy ends” (Ullman & Wade, 1996, p.xxiv), and by leaving
the adversary “totally impotent and vulnerable to our actions” (Ullman & Wade, 1996,
p.xxv).

In order to achieve such submission from an adversary, Shock and Awe

engendered the creation of “the non-nuclear equivalent of the impact that the atomic
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weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki had on the Japanese” (Ullman & Wade,
1996, p.xxvi).

In sum, Shock and Awe’s primary objective was to terrorise the

population into rapid submission; as such, it underscored that “physical and
psychological effects must be obtained” (Ullman & Wade, 1996, p.xxiv). Accounting
logic and techniques justified and legitimated the use of this doctrine. This is because
the decision to apply Shock and Awe was primarily based upon efficiencymaximisation and cost-minimisation objectives. Subjecting Iraq to the rapidity and
degree of physical destruction that corresponded to nuclear warfare was assessed as
being the most eco-politically cost-effective means to prime the indigenous population
for rapid submission, exploitation and adaptation.

A post-war report by Human Rights Watch (2003) demonstrated some of Iraq’s costs
from Shock and Awe. The report found that US and UK forces had together expended
over 13,000 cluster munitions that, upon impact, contained at least 1.9 million submunitions. Moreover, “Although cluster munition strikes are particularly dangerous in
populated areas …”, US and UK forces intentionally and ”repeatedly used these
weapons in attacks on Iraqi positions in residential neighborhoods” (Human Rights
Watch, 2003, p.6). In addition, explosive remnants of war (ERW), which are “many
tens of thousands of cluster munition ‘duds’, i.e. submunitions that did not explode on
impact …” scattered Iraqi landscape within densely civilian populated areas, thereby
resembling landmines that could cause ongoing human harm into the future (Human
Rights Watch, 2003, p.7). On the effects of the US’s use of so-called ‘precision smart
bombs’ to target senior Iraqi officials, the report found, “While they did not kill a single
targeted individual, the strikes killed and injured dozens of civilians” (Human Rights
Watch, 2003, p.6).

Moreover, this failure was primarily a result of US reliance on

‘unsound targeting methodology’ in the form of faulty intelligence and a failure to
effectively assess potential risks to civilians. Unsound targeting methodology caused
attacks on places where “the intended targets were not even present at the time of the
strikes” (Human Rights Watch, 2003, p.6). Accordingly, the report concluded that such
‘targeting’ was a form of indiscriminate assault upon civilians and, thus, in violation of
International Humanitarian Law (IHL).

Overall, the US’s indiscriminate use of

weaponry had resulted in “thousands of Iraqi civilians … killed or injured during the
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three weeks of fighting from … March 20 to April 9, 2003“ (Human Rights Watch,
2003, p.5).

Buncombe (2003) and Ridha (2004) also raised concerns with regards violation of the
United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, to which the US is a
signatory. Although this convention prohibits the use of napalm weaponry against
civilian populations, it was revealed that Iraqi civilians were exposed to napalm-like
Mark 77 firebombs. Furthermore, DU munitions were again utilised on a wide-scale,
thereby further exposing the Iraqi civilian population and their environment to
radioactive debris that would impact into the future (Kramer & Michalowski, 2005;
Michalowski & Bitten, 2004; Miller, 2003; Nuclear Policy Research Institute, 2003).
Moreover, the Nuclear Policy Research Institute found that “US and UK forces released
a substantial portion of their total DU expenditures in locations ‘where the Iraqi people
live, work, draw water, and grow and sell food’”, thereby concluding that the likelihood
of “potential DU exposures appear even higher than in past conflicts” (Nuclear Policy
Research Institute, 2003, pp.9–10). Also echoed from the Gulf War was the US’s
application of ‘strategic bombing’, whereby the US air force intentionally destroyed
what were declared as being ‘dual use’ Iraqi infrastructure, including electricity and
media installations.

The Human Rights Watch (2003, p.6) report found that the

targeting of electricity installations had “caused serious civilian suffering …”, and
questioned the “legality of the attacks on media installations …”.

Whilst Iraq’s socio-economic costs from the war, such as death, destruction, crippling
of the economy, unemployment and psychological harm were an extension of the
combined effects of the Gulf War and sanctions, the 2003 invasion and occupation
generated novel costs. As explained in chapter two, the neoliberal eco-political project
requires the transformation of citizens: the primary identity of people is reduced to
calculating consumers within calculable spaces, rendering the ultimate relationship as
being that which is adjudicated by the market:
The expansion of neoliberalism supposes the extension of market mechanisms
to the lifeworld … As such, neoliberalism must change people. This is why,
from Lippman to Thatcher’s famous formulation, ‘Economics are the method,
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but the object is to change the soul’, neoliberalism is a political project. The
necessity of making people adapt to a world of generalised competition
supposes a radical reform that transforms the way in which they perceive their
destiny (Hilgers, 2012, p.82).

The deep ideological roots of Iraqi society in Arab socialism meant that its economic
system was founded upon social ownership and collective control of the means of
production, and also that its mindset was compliant with Arab nationalism, or the Arab
unity project (Devlin, 1975).

As such, neoliberalism’s de-territorialisation of Iraq

required more than the destruction of its existing eco-political machineries; it also
required the ‘battering down’ of Iraq’s Arab socialist-based collective memory, by
“degrading of a unifying culture and the depletion of an intelligentsia tied to the old
order” (Baker et al., 2009, p.6). Indeed, evidence suggests that this is what unfolded in
post-invasion Iraq.

Whilst the 2003 war and invasion were illegal under international law as they were not
authorised by the UN Security Council, the subsequent UN Security Council Resolution
1483 acknowledged the US and UK as occupying powers and, thus, obliged them to
fully comply with the related obligations set-out under international law.

These

included their ensuring of “public safety and order, and guarantee the civilian
population’s fundamental rights to food, health care, education, work and freedom of
movement” (Kramer & Michalowski, 2005, p.452). What transpired post-invasion,
however, was another form of societal shock, that of wide-spread “death, looting, fear
and insecurity” (Kramer & Michalowski, 2005, p.452). After Shock and Awe’s bombs
ceased, the first days of post-invasion saw ‘organised looting’ play a prominent role in
the de-territorialisation of Iraq (Ismael & Ismael, 2015).

What was remaining of

ministries necessary for Iraqi state cohesion, with the exception of the Ministry of Oil
that was protected by US tanks and troops, were reduced to skeletal structures that were
ransacked, including of their furnishings, electric cabling, plumbing and institutional
memory in the form of governmental records (Al-Tikriti, 2007, 2009a, 2010; Ismael &
Ismael, 2015; Klein, 2007b). Paralleling this destruction of remaining state institutions
was “a systematic campaign to erase Iraq’s collective memory” (quoted in Al-Tikriti,
2009a, p.94). The collective memory of Iraq, in the form of its cultural patrimony and
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inherited intelligentsia, was left exposed to an attempted ‘cultural cleansing’
(Adriaensens, 2009; Al-Tikriti, 2007, 2009, 2010; Bahrani, 2009; Baker et al., 2009;
Fisk, 2006; Human Rights Watch, 2006; Ismael, 2015; Ismael & Ismael, 2015; Poole,
2006; UNESCO PRESS, 2006; UNHCR, 2005; Wilkinson, 2008; Zoepf, 2006).

The attempted cultural cleansing of Iraq, also known as ‘mnemocide’ (Watenpaugh,
2003), largely occurred through a US policy of inaction. As will be demonstrated in
Chapter Six, this policy was legitimated, justified and facilitated by US failure to
commit sufficient troops to Iraq; a failure largely brought about through accounting
mechanisms pertaining the economically rational management of resources and the
building of power structures. Amongst other repercussions, US troops were unable to
secure the country’s borders or establish law and order (Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction, 2009). Instead, the country plunged into a state of lawlessness,
with widespread looting being its most immediate and ardent feature. In the midst of the
post-invasion lawlessness, a “free rampage of organized looting of cultural, educational
and health facilities and the wholesale burning of historical records …” transpired
(Ismael & Ismael, 2015, p.20). Iraq’s main museums, libraries and archives were not
only looted, but some were also significantly destroyed by organised arson. US troops,
who were sometimes positioned only metres away from the ongoing destruction, refused
to intervene, citing a lack of orders to protect such facilities (Al-Tikriti, 2009; Bahrani,
2009; Baker et al., 2009; Ismael & Ismael, 2015; Watenpaugh, 2003). When the media
finally brought attention to the ongoing destruction after several days, SECDEF
Rumsfeld responded during a press conference that “Freedom is untidy, and free people
are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things”; that the looting was
“part of the price” for the liberation of Iraq; and that “Stuff happens” (Loughlin, 2003).
However, Rumsfeld’s ‘stuff happens’ reduction of the lootings is problematic. Knuth
(2006, p.2) explains that
Condemnations imply that the destruction has no meaning other than to
signify the presence of irrational forces. They effectively dismiss the
destroyers of books as barbaric, ignorant, evil … If instead we acknowledge
the perpetrators as human beings with concerns and a goal … of effecting
social change, a number of questions emerge that usher us into the subject
with clearer meaning and purpose.
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While much of the looting appeared to be undertaken by local offenders, “attacks on
several cultural sites were carried out by organized provocateurs whose identity remains
a mystery …” (Al-Tikriti, 2009a, p.98). The systematic and organised nature of these
onslaughts, including their preparation of necessary tools, inflammables and multiple
trucks to load properties, points to significant pre-planning and possible deeper intents
of the perpetrators, other than the spontaneous pursuit of self-interest. Moreover, whilst
subsequent examinations blamed insufficient pre-war planning and inadequate force
levels for US failure to protect these facilities (Bogdanos, 2008; Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2009), US pre-war studies had included briefings and
expert-authored documents that listed and ranked Iraqi facilities of cultural, historical
and national value that would require protection post-invasion. Iraqi experts had also
briefed Pentagon officials regarding looting concerns, and provided them with details of
locations, informed them of their significance and reminded them of their legal
obligation to protect cultural patrimony (Al-Tikriti, 2009a; Baker et al., 2009; Ismael &
Ismael, 2015; US State Department, 2002).

Nevertheless, the facilities were left

completely unprotected post-invasion.

Justifications that emphasise that troop shortages led to calculations pertaining to the
‘economy of risk’; that planners had to choose to station troops at sites of US ‘strategic
interest’, points at the very least to the direct acquiescence of war planners, and their
subservient accounting techniques, which effectively diminished the value of Iraqi
cultural assets. It also underscores their liability for the ensuing Iraqi losses, open for
future pursuit. Moreover, the looting continued for several days before media attention
seemed to force US action around the 14th April 2003.

Al-Tikriti (2009a, p.97)

observes that “Several hours of looting can be considered a failure of policy, but several
days of looting can only be seen as a policy of failure”. Finally, the subsequent
damaging of Iraq’s main cultural heritage sites because of the building of US military
bases directly at them, including at Ur, the legendary birthplace of Abraham; Babylon,
the capital of Mesopotamia; and Samarra, the Abbasid Islamic imperial city, constitute
an intentional and overt infliction of damage (Bahrani, 2008, 2009; Baker et al., 2009).
Bahrani (2009, p.70) explains that “The digging, bulldozing, filling of sand bags and
blast-barricade containers, the building of barracks and digging of trenches into the
ancient sites have destroyed thousands of years of archaeological material, stratigraphy
113

and historical data …”. The decision to build military bases at such sites could only
have transpired through Pentagon pre-planning and strategic decision-making.

In addition, Iraq’s education system also suffered almost complete destruction. In 2003,
a UNESCO (2003) factsheet described Iraq’s education system prior to US interference:
The Education system in Iraq, prior to 1991, was one of the best in the region,
with over 100% Gross Enrolment Rate for primary schooling and high levels
of literacy, both of men and women. The Higher Education, especially the
scientific and technological institutions, were of an international standard,
staffed by high quality personnel.

By 2005, however, director of the United Nations University’s (UNU) International
Leadership Institute in Jordan, Dr Jairam Reddy, asserted that 84% of Iraq’s higher
education institutions had been subjected to some form of destruction, such as burning
or looting (Baker et al., 2009; Hassan, 2005). In addition, Iraq’s intelligentsia were
exposed to threats of violence, kidnappings and targeted assassinations (Adriaensens,
2009; Baker et al., 2009; BRussells Tribunal, 2008; Fisk, 2006; Gettleman, 2004;
Hodges, 2006; Ismael & Ismael, 2015; UNESCO PRESS, 2006; UNHCR, 2005; Zoepf,
2006). Indeed, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) found that threats
of violence and targeted assassinations of Iraq’s intellectuals, including professors,
lecturers and teachers, were “systematic” (UNHCR, 2005, para.41).

The United

Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) DirectorGeneral, Matsuura, condemned “the campaign of violence waged in Iraq against
academics and intellectuals … the persecution of the custodians of knowledge and skills
is an unacceptable attack against a whole society” (UNESCO PRESS, 2006).

Whilst no official account has been kept of violence inflicted on Iraq’s intelligentsia,
several sources have attempted to record their occurrences. In 2006, Hodges (2006)
reported that over 470 Iraqi academics had been killed. As of 2008, the BRussells
Tribunal had listed the names of 410 assassinated Iraqi academics, including professors
and lecturers (BRussells Tribunal, 2008). Meanwhile, Human Rights Watch and the
Association of University Lecturers in Iraq reported that 331 school teachers were killed
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in the first four months of 2006 alone (Human Rights Watch, 2006; Poole, 2006). By
2007, the International Medical Corps found that Baghdad’s teacher population had
dropped by 80% (quoted in Edwards, 2010, p.2). Moreover, of all murdered academics
by April 2006, 50% were professors, 13% were other academics, 12% were dean/vice
dean, and 6% were department heads (Fuller & Adriaensens, 2009). Robert Fisk (2006)
reported that
university staff suspect that there is a campaign to strip Iraq of its academics,
to complete the destruction of Iraq’s cultural identity which began with the
destruction of the Baghdad Koranic library, the national archives and the
looting of the archaeological museum when the American army entered
Baghdad.

Finally, actions by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the body that ruled Iraq
post-invasion until the end of June 2004, also worked to erase indigenous ideologies
from the Iraqi education system. In a self-evaluating report of its achievements during
time in office, the CPA asserted that it had “completely dismantled” Iraq’s education
system: it dismissed over 12,000 headmasters, headmistresses and teachers; revised
curriculum and printed 8 million revised textbooks; used a World Bank grant to
purchase 72 million new text books; and trained 32,000 secondary school teachers
(Coalition Provisional Authority, 2004, p.23). Baker et al. (2009, p.31) explain that the
revised school curriculum “removed any criticism of the US policy in the Middle East,
as well as any reference to either the 1991 war or to Israeli policy in the occupied
territories”.

Overall, the human, social and environmental consequences that resulted from the 2003
Iraq War, invasion and occupation have been immense. Perhaps the most notable cost
has been the death of Iraqi people. Estimates of total Iraqi deaths from the war,
invasion and occupation have ranged between as little as 120,000 Iraqi deaths as at
January 2013, to approximately 1.1 million deaths as at August 2007 (Iraq Body Count,
2013; Opinion Research Business, 2008; Seybolt et al., 2013). In addition, the UNHCR
estimated an Iraqi ‘total population of concern’, including refugees and internally
displaced persons, of over 4 million people as at December 2014 (UNHCR, 2014).
Other costs will also be demonstrated within the remainder of this thesis, including an
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indication of the economic; costs from the institutionalised corruption; costs to human
rights; costs from the US’s outsourcing of military contractors, including rape, murder
and corruption; and costs pertaining to the generated civil war and ethnic cleansings.
Certainly, a most prominent cost has been that of rampant chaos and violence that
became “a determining fact in shaping reality …” for Iraqis (Nordstrom, 2004, p.60).
Chaos and violence transformed the social fabric of Iraq: “What was once the birthplace
of civilization now lies in ruin: occupied, corrupt, impoverished, chaotic, a sweltering
bed of criminal mayhem, religious fundamentalism, and armed resistance” (Chwastiak,
2008, p.584).

Conclusion
This chapter has corroborated the CAS concept by demonstrating the political inherence
and power of accounting within de-territorialisation processes. Within accounting
techniques is the power to ‘cost’ an imperial venture and to provide variable bottom
lines. A projected efficient bottom line for a project will encourage its commencement,
whilst an inefficient costing will deter its progression. Accordingly, accounting holds an
ultimate power position with regards decision-making for coercive exertions of power.
The political elite understand this power and have, therefore, utilised accounting as a
subservient technology for their governance.

From Clausewitz’s formulations of

‘political commerce’ to Kennan’s quantification of US foreign policy, elitist interests
have dictated a narrowing of the definition of costs, a dominating discourse of economic
efficiency, and a prevalent quantitative instrumental form of reasoning so as to diminish
the scope of costs that accounting accounts. This is their magician’s trick: the creation
of ‘invisible visibilities’ so as to under-cost coercive force and deceive the populous
into submission.

This chapter has demonstrated that the first trick with Iraq is the notion that costs
pertaining to this imperial project reside only within the 2003 War, invasion and
occupation. Instead, it has been shown that US imperial motivations with regards to
Iraqi space have been in place since 1990. The end of the Cold War ordained the US
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with the freedom to assert a ‘New World Order’ upon the world. This order would not
tolerate resistance to the geographical expansion of its capitalist regime, nor
competitiveness with US authority through rival economic powers. Most importantly, it
would not tolerate threats to its ‘economic lifeline’, to a secure access to Middle East
oil. The battering down of Iraq’s doors at the end of the Cold War was to serve as a
practical example of ultimate US power and hegemony, “that what we say goes”.
However, Iraqi defiance led to the implementation of economic warfare through the
imposition of genocidal sanctions for almost thirteen years, thereby killing more people
than have died from all WMD. Under growing international discontent with the human
suffering and losses of Iraq, the 9/11 attacks of 2001 were perceived by US political
elite as an ‘opportunity’ to turn what was ‘politically impossible’ into something that
was ‘politically inevitable’. The Bush administration sought to implement the radical
‘invasion route’, and the 2003 Iraq War was to serve as a birth pang to the ‘New Middle
East’.

Accounting’s role in mystifying the true costs of these imperial footprints on Iraqi space
has been demonstrated in this chapter. With regards costs to the US, it has been shown
how all three wars were severely under-costed through accounting, accountability and
budgetary mechanisms that served to reduce, obscure and outright exclude related costs
from public perception. This evidence also underscores how accounting is being used
to reinstate power structures by undermining democratic governance in the US, the rule
of law and the ultimate power of the people. With regards the costs to Iraq from these
imperial footprints, the chapter showed that the de-territorialisation of Iraq entailed the
destruction of existing eco-political and social ideological foundations so as generate a
‘clear slate’ onto which re-territorialisation could pursue. As such, the costs to Iraq
from this venture were profoundly acute; yet, they were simply unaccounted for within
US government accounts, thereby effectively de-valuing them. This failure to count
Iraqi costs greatly denies the potential to deter such imperial exertions of power in the
future. As such, the chapter sought to account for the unaccounted for. By providing an
overview of some of the economic, social, human and environmental costs endured by
Iraq, the chapter has sought to elucidate the real ‘price’ that rises from the pursuit of
such imperial interests. As such, it contributes to the emancipatory potential of social
accounting: “Indeed, the conclusion is that warfare is an inherently irrational outcome
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whose costs exceed the benefits, even to those who ‘win’” (quoted in Edwards, 2010,
p.2).

The following chapter will demonstrate the subsequent ideological invasion of Iraq
through the application of neoliberal shock therapy.
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Chapter Four

The Re-Territorialisation of Iraq’s Economy Through
Neoliberal Shock Therapy
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Introduction
The previous chapter provided an accounting for the costs of the US’s imperial project
on Iraqi space: the battering down of Iraq’s doors. In order to do so, it firstly attuned
the temporal scope of this account by demonstrating that the US’s application of this
project commenced in 1990, with the imposition of severe economic sanctions, through
the 1991 Gulf War and finally the 2003 Iraq War. Furthermore, it broadened the
definition of ‘costs’ so as to include those that the political elites seek to render
invisible, the social, human and environmental costs of wars and sanctions. Also, it
identified the accounting methods through which even substantial economic costs
pertaining such ventures were mystified within DoD accounts, and omitted from war
spending accounts.

The use of cash-based accounting, the manipulation of

appropriations through ‘emergency supplementals’, and the financing of war through
debt, prevented the reporting of accurate financial information. Finally, it also showed
how faulty DoD accounting practices facilitated acts of corruption, waste and for
transfers of wealth that enriched the military industrial complex.

Accordingly, it

corroborated the CAS concept by demonstrating the political inherence of accounting to
spatial de-territorialisations: DoD accounting, accountability and budgeting mechanisms
were subservient to elitist interests in that they effectively rendered the DoD
unaccountable and the non-economic costs of warfare invisible. In so doing, accounting
accomplished a primary purpose of the CAS concept; it served as a primary mechanism
through which the magician’s trick of producing ‘invisible visibilities’ was realised.

In demonstrating the costs to Iraq from the US’s imperial project, the chapter confirmed
the de-territorialisation criterion of the CAS concept, whilst also demonstrated the
accounting purpose of devaluing space. By being appropriated in a way that rendered
the effects of US de-territorialisation of Iraq invisible, accounting effectively served to
de-value Iraqi space. Chapter three showed how the process of de-territorialising Iraqi
space was initiated through the creation of societal shock from disaster: deterritorialisation was initially realised through the intentionally severe physical
destruction of its Arab socialist-based eco-political institutions, and collective social
underpinnings through war and sanctions. This chapter will build upon this to show
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how a second stage of de-territorialisation of the Iraqi economy was achieved through
the suspension of law and the granting of impunity to US agents in Iraq, thereby
transforming Iraq into a space of exception. The creation of this space provided the US
with a clear slate, akin to that realised with the activation of the terra nullius principle,
which it used to re-territorialise Iraq’s economy with neoliberal policies by force. It
also set into motion corrupt state-corporate activities that accelerated the transformation
process and the ensuing transfers of wealth. Accompanying the implementation of
these practices of economic shock therapy and disaster capitalism, was a subservient
accounting technology that provided techniques that maintained the created liminal
space, the relatively unregulated space of ambiguity, whilst also legitimating it. As
such, the chapter will further validate the CAS concept by revealing more roles of
accounting in the de-valuation of space, and its roles in building power structures.
Moreover, the chapter will also reveal how accounting technology was appropriated by
elites in a way that rendered counter-accounts, in the form of audit reports, inept and
their influences ineffective.

This chapter proceeds as follows: the first section will demonstrate how accounting
discourse pertaining to the efficient allocation of resources and the reduction of waste
provided the ideological justification for the de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation
of Iraq’s economy through economic shock therapy. The following section will provide
an overview of the most controversial neoliberal reforms imposed through shock
therapy and their effects. Finally, the last section will demonstrate the roles assumed by
accounting, accountability, auditing and budgetary mechanisms in facilitating,
administering and legitimating the imposed regime.

Free Market by Force
“Buy when there’s blood in the streets, even if the blood is your own”
(Baron Rothschild quoted in Myers, 2009)
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Following the severe destruction wrought by the wars and invasion of Iraq, the
occupation commenced.

The CPA, headed by its administrator, L. Paul Bremer,

governed Iraq from Bremer’s arrival on 12th May 2003 to his departure on 28th June
2004 (Dobbins et al., 2009). Bremer held sweeping powers, he “could dispose of all
Iraqi state assets and direct all Iraqi government officials. He possessed full executive,
legislative, and judicial authority” (Dobbins et al., 2009, p.xiii). The CPA was a
division of the DoD, therefore, Bremer was subordinate to SECDEF Rumsfeld, but also
had direct communication with the President and White House staff as he was
considered to be a presidential envoy. The CPA operated from within the ‘Green
Zone’, a neoliberal territorial enclave, a heavily guarded “city within a city that houses
the occupation headquarters in Saddam’s former palace” (Klein, 2004, p.46). Whilst
the rest of Iraq was regarded as the ‘Red Zone’, a space of death, violence, despair and
destruction, the Green Zone had
its own electrical grid, its own phone and sanitation systems, its own oil
supply, and its own state-of-the-art hospital with pristine operating theaters –
all protected by walls five meters thick … If you were not among the chosen,
you could get shot just for standing too close to the wall (Klein, 2007a, p.48).

In actuality, the remainder of Iraqi space had become an exposed space for exploitation,
a manufactured state of exception reminiscent to that created under the terra nullius
principle (Agamben, 1998; Ong, 2006; Quan, 2012). As explained in chapter two,
neoliberalism perceives state legitimacy as a measure of its economic efficiency rather
than its social equity. It utilises accounting measures of performance to appraise the
governance of a state against the requisites of its dominant ideology; the requisites of
neoliberalism are for a ‘competitive state’, one that efficiently allocates resources and
maximises the unhindered pursuit of self-interest and accumulation of wealth (Fougner,
2006; Hilgers, 2012; McCluskey, 2003). Accordingly, the neoliberal mindset with
regards to state legitimacy, or sovereignty over land, echoes that of its predecessors the
res nullius and terra nullius principles: where there is “no proper commerce … there is
no property; and any land left in this state is available for appropriation” (Wood, 2003,
p.98). Under this conception, the Iraqi state and its Arab socialist-based regime were
perceived as the modern incarnation of the ‘desert and uncultivated’ space of
indigenous Australia (Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty Ltd, 1971). Iraqi economy and society
were ‘primitive’ as they failed to generate ‘proper commerce’ and stood defiantly
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against conformity within the dominant neoliberal world order. This accounting-based
discourse provided the primary rationale for the ‘appropriation’ of Iraqi space: “it
mobilized a civilizing mission that provided the rationale to treat the country’s
economic and legal system as a blank canvas (Whyte, 2010, p.144, 2016). Indeed,
whilst US forces waged ‘Shock and Awe’ on Iraq, President Bush announced to the
Iraqi people,
This is George W Bush, the President of the United States. At this moment,
the regime of Saddam Hussein is being removed from power … and we will
not stop until Saddam’s corrupt gang is gone … You will be … free to pursue
economic prosperity …You deserve better than tyranny and corruption …
You deserve to live as free people … your nation will soon be free (Bush,
2003).

Bush’s rhetoric effectively framed Saddam’s economic policies as being the source of
tyranny, corruption and repression. The “tyranny of the planned economy” (Whyte,
2010, p.143) provided the justification for the upcoming de-territorialisations of ‘Shock
and Awe’, invasion and occupation, and also for the subsequent re-territorialisation of a
neoliberal regime.

In effect, a modern state of terra nullius was justified: the

exploitation of Iraqi space and the transfer of its wealth would ensue through the
displacement of indigenous agency, the suspension of sovereign laws and the
imposition of the ‘settler’s contract’ (Pateman & Mills, 2007), being neoliberal decrees
which served the interests of the foreign “persona ficta of multinational corporate
entities with headquarters in the U.S.” (emphasis in original Quan, 2012, p.168).

Even before the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq, this intent had already
been indicated by the Bush administration. In a confidential 100-page document titled
Moving The Iraqi Economy From Recovery to Sustainable Growth, the administration
laid out a blueprint for the rapid takeover of the Iraqi economy (Looney, 2003; King,
2003). The document, authored in partnership between the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) and the Department of Treasury, was later given to
a US contractor, Bearing Point, to follow as they executed “sweeping plans to remake
Iraq’s economy in the US’s image” (King, 2003). Bearing Point’s contract specified a
primary objective of creating a new Iraqi government that “will seek to open up its trade
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and investment linkages and to put into place the institutions promoting democracy, free
enterprise, and reliance on market-driven private sector as the engine of economic
recovery and growth” (USAID, 2003, p.77). After one month of invasion in May 2003,
CPA chief Bremer reaffirmed these objectives: declaring it “a historical axiom that
political and economic freedom go hand in hand”, he revealed that:
Our strategic goal in the months ahead is to set in motion policies which
will have the effect of reallocating people and resources from state
enterprises to the more productive private firms … the Coalition will
succeed in transforming the Iraqi economy from a closed, dead-end
system to an open vibrant place to do business. Opportunities for
productive investment abound, and we aim to be sure they are realized
(Bremer, 2003).

In effect, both Bush and Bremer’s rhetoric confirmed neoliberalism’s essential linkage
between free-market priorities and a free and democratic Iraqi state, thereby conflating
the significance of free-markets to the likes of national security and social objectives.
Most importantly, by equating free-market interests to those of a free and democratic
Iraq, “the country as a whole … can no longer be separated from that of a ‘free’
economy, and the body corporate, its new claimant” (Quan, 2012, p.167).

In order to realise a ‘free’ Iraqi economy, another de-territorialisation process
commenced: the creation of a state of exception in Iraq. Klein (2007b, p.8) explains,
“the process deceptively called ‘reconstruction’ began with finishing the job of the
original disaster by erasing what was left of the public sphere”.

The remaining

indigenous juridical framework was suspended; thereby immediately creating a state of
exception that facilitated the imposition of a new force of law. In addition, it generated
an immediate shift in the political structure where “legal authority to take decisions is
transferred from political fora to administrative or bureaucratic officials” (Whyte, 2010,
p.136). Whilst existing Iraqi laws were created through its political institutions, the
post-invasion-created state of exception ordained the administrative officials of the
CPA, namely Paul Bremer, with the authority to make and impose new laws in a
deformalised and unregulated manner, and beyond popular consent (Aradau, 2007). In
effect, the US replaced a dictator who was legitimated through an acknowledged
political system but did not conform to US interests, with an illegitimate dictator who
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negated the conventional separation of legal and political powers, yet conformed to US
interests. Indeed, UN special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi would later describe Bremer as
“the dictator of Iraq. He has the money. He has the signature. Nothing happens
without his agreement in this country” (quoted in Docena, 2005, p.11; Chandrasekaran,
2004).

In the wake of this new de-territorialisation crisis, which complemented those of the
war and invasion, Paul Bremer moved to enact Milton Friedman’s economic shock
therapy doctrine.

As explained in chapter two, Friedman had advised that crises

generate a six to nine month period of opportunity during which rapid economic change
can be imposed. This is because trauma resulting from crises, accompanied by the
rapidity of imposed change, provoke psychological reactions that facilitate society’s
compliant adjustment (Friedman, 1982; Klein, 2004, 2007a, 2007b). The US’s decision
to implement economic shock therapy fundamentally echoed the accounting-based logic
that underscored its decision to apply the Shock and Awe doctrine. Economic shock
therapy was regarded as a most efficient and cost-effective technological means to
rapidly achieve favourable change; to realise capitalism’s annihilation of Iraqi space by
time. Indeed, less than one month after Bush declared the war ‘Mission Accomplished’
on the 1st May 2003, Bremer declared Iraq ‘open for business’ on the 26th May 2003
(Klein, 2003a, 2007b). He progressed to swiftly exploit the limited period of Iraqi
society’s disaster-generated shock: within just six months of his tenure, Bremer had
imposed the most controversial of a series of a hundred rapid-fire CPA Orders that
effectively re-territorialised Iraq with the “imprint of the occupiers”, free-market
fundamentalism (Quan, 2012, p.168; Stiglitz, 2004). Juhasz (2007) refers to “Iraqi laws
governing banking, foreign investment, patents, copyrights, business ownership, taxes,
the media, agriculture and trade were all changed to conform to U.S. goals”. Within six
months, Bremer had dismantled the decades-old juridical apparatus of Iraq’s socialist
regime and instead, established “one empowered to usher in foreign investments and
facilitate the unfettered operations of multinational corporations but disempowered to
provide services to its citizens or promote development and social justice” (Klein,
2007b, pp.124–125).

125

Economic Shock Therapy in Iraq: Controversial Bremer Orders
CPA Orders No. 1 and 2: De-Ba’athification of Iraqi society
On 16th May, after just four days of his arrival in Iraq and whilst quashing early Iraqi
attempts at holding elections to form a sovereign interim government to decide their
future, Bremer commenced with CPA Order No. 1: ‘De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society’
(Chwastiak, 2013; Klein, 2007b; Palast, 2004; Zunes, 2009). This order targeted senior
Baath Party officials by requiring an ‘interview’ of all “top three layers of management
in every national government ministry, affiliated corporations and other government
institutions (e.g., universities and hospitals) … for possible affiliation with Ba’ath
Party” (Coalition Provisional Authority, 2003a, p.1). Those implicated were removed
and banned from future employment in the public sector, a policy which immediately
proclaimed redundant up to 30,000 public sector employees (Klein, 2007b, 2003a). On
23rd May, this Order was promptly complemented with Order No. 2 entitled
‘Dissolution of Entities’, which effectively extended the scope of the ‘deBa’athification’ policy to also cover a list of 26 ‘dissolved entities’ and their
subsidiaries, including the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Information, all military
services such as the Army, Air Force, Navy, Air Defence Force, and the Youth
Organisation and National Olympic Committee.

Klein (2007b, 2003a) estimates that up to a further 500,000 Iraqi public sector
employees were immediately made redundant, including doctors who had no allegiance
to the Ba’ath Party except for being enlisted as children, and low-level civil servants
who had no ties to the Party whatsoever.

The CPA’s self-appraising report, The

Historical Review of CPA Achievements, announced that “More than 12,000 former
Ba’ath Party headmasters, headmistresses and teachers were dismissed” from the
Ministry of Education and schools (Coalition Provisional Authority, 2004a, p.23),
leaving Sunni dominated areas with as little as one or two schoolteachers
(Chandrasekaran, 2006a). The humanitarian and security-related consequences of such
sudden mass discharges in the midst of already dire eco-political circumstances cannot
be overstated, including increased unemployment, poverty, crimes and resistance. In
addition, the policy gutted the state of its institutional memory in the form of its labour
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force expertise. Most notably, the mass discharges immediately realised a primary
neoliberal principle of downsizing the public sector, and also readied public-run
facilities and institutions, such as hospitals and the army, for privatisation
(Chandrasekaran, 2006a; Chwastiak, 2013; Klein, 2003a, 2007b; Schwartz, 2007).
Klein explains that Bremer Orders 1 and 2,
Readied large swaths of state activity for corporate takeover, primed the
Iraqi market for foreign importers to make a killing by eliminating much
of the local competition and made sure there won’t be any unpleasant
Iraqi government interference – in fact, he’s made sure there will be no
Iraqi government at all while key economic decisions are made (2003a,
p.10).

Mahdi (2003) reached a similar conclusion, noting that “privatisation is being imposed
by bombing, looting, freezing of assets, random sacking of staff and exposure to unfair
competition”.

In Addition, Order No. 2 prohibited the “continued possession, transfer, sale, use,
conversion, or concealment” of all assets, “including records and data” belonging to the
dissolved entities. Instead, all Iraqi state assets were to be turned over to Coalition
authorities where they were to be held by the ‘Administrator’ and used to “assist the
Iraqi people and support the recovery of Iraq” (Coalition Provisional Authority, 2003h).
CPA accounting practices, however, facilitated the plundering of seized Iraqi state
assets. Reports by Revenue Watch and the CPA’s Inspector General faulted the CPA’s
management and ‘lax handling’ of Iraq’s seized Assets (CPA Inspector General, 2004b;
Revenue Watch, 2004b). They found that, contrary to CPA Orders 4 and 9 that required
the Facilities Management Office (FMO) to maintain a register of assets and to
undertake adequate recordkeeping to reduce the risk of theft and abuse,
FMO personnel did not adequately manage, secure, and safeguard non-cash
assets … an inventory was not performed … As a result, a potential loss or
theft of non-cash assets existed and, therefore, CPA would not be able to
ensure that non-cash assets would be available for the use and benefit of the
Iraqi people (CPA Inspector General, 2004b, p.3).
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In addition, the Inspector General reported inadequate recordkeeping with regards Iraqi
cash assets frozen abroad, whereby “the validity and the purpose of disbursements for
$116.3 million could not be determined” (quoted in Revenue Watch, 2004b, p.7).
Although various missing documentations were later provided, such deficiencies in
fundamental accounting and accountability practices point to a culture of negligence
that became the central feature of CPA rule.

CPA Order No. 12: Trade liberalization policy
This Order was passed on 7th June, 2003 and suspended “All tariffs, customs duties,
import taxes, licensing fees and similar surcharges for goods entering or leaving Iraq,
and all other trade restrictions that may apply to such goods” until December 31, 2003
(Coalition Provisional Authority, 2003b). The immediate impact of this order was
especially strenuous upon what was remaining of an already debilitated local Iraqi
business environment. After almost thirteen years of ruthless economic sanctions and
the disastrous Shock and Awe war and invasion, local Iraqi businesses were simply
unable to compete against another invasion, this time launched by ‘the big guns’ of
unregulated foreign multinationals.

As reported by The San Francisco Chronicle,

“textile plants and clothing factories have been devastated by the influx of cheap
clothing, much of it made in China”, whilst Iraq’s poultry industry simply “can’t
compete against containers full of American Tyson chicken legs, which are shipped to
the Middle East at bargain-basement prices because Americans prefer white meat to
dark” (Collier, 2003). As a result, local produce of goods was undermined as the Order
“accelerated the closure of hundreds of factories” (Collier, 2003); it increased
unemployment and citizenry frustration, and deprived the country of revenue (Collier,
2003; Docena, 2007, 2005; Klein, 2007b; Zunes, 2009). In effect, this Order not only
annulled Iraq’s sovereignty over trade flows and trade policy, but also contributed to US
policy to debilitate its future capacity to command such policy in support of goals other
than those of a neoliberal regime.

Consistent with BearingPoint’s contract, trade liberalisation and other neoliberal
economic principles were to become enshrined pillars within Iraq’s new laws so as to
build an economy that would eventually meet WTO obligations. The plan had already
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set a February 2004 deadline for an Iraqi application to join the WTO and, thus, CPA
Order 12 was a founding step towards achieving this premeditated objective by ensuring
that Iraq’s “battered economy transformed abruptly into a virtual free-trade zone”
(Anonymous, 2003). Indeed, this policy aligned with Bush’s 9th May Presidential
address, which emphasised that trade liberalisation was an overarching US goal for the
entire Middle East region, announcing plans for a US-Middle East Free Trade Area
(MEFTA) by 2013 (Juhasz, 2004a).

CPA Orders No. 37 and 49: Tax strategy for 2003 and 2004
Order 37 suspended all income tax and real property rent tax payments from 16th April
– 31st December 2003. Furthermore, it specifically suspended ‘specified taxes’ such as
first class hotel and restaurant tax, tax upon transfers of real property, car sale taxes and
petrol excise duties from being applied upon all foreign occupation personnel, including
the CPA, military forces, their contractors/sub-contractors, government agencies and
international organisations. Most importantly, the Order decreed that “The highest
individual and corporate income tax rates for 2004 and subsequent years shall not
exceed 15 percent” (Coalition Provisional Authority, 2003e, p.3), thereby entrenching
what was “long a dream of economic conservatives … finally getting its day – not in the
United States, but in Iraq” (Milbank & Pincus, 2003).

CPA Order No. 49, which was passed in February 2004, complemented this by
decreeing the income tax rate for subsequent years reduced from 40% to up to 15%,
whilst “Foreign companies that are registered in Iraq or otherwise have a permanent
establishment in Iraq will be subject to tax at a fixed rate of 15%” (Coalition
Provisional Authority, 2004c, p.3).

As such, the Order significantly reduced tax

liabilities of dominant capital groups, and equated their tax obligations to those of an
average Iraqi earner. In so doing, the Order deprived the Iraqi government of sizeable
amounts of tax income that would have otherwise served the Iraqi people and, thus,
facilitated transfers of wealth from the public sector to private, dominant capital groups.
As described by a Middle East expert, it was “A piece of social engineering … being
done on Iraq”: in the absence of a sovereign Iraqi government, and with “almost no
support from other members of the U.S.-appointed Iraqi Governing Council” (quoted in
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Milbank & Pincus, 2003). Indeed, it “took L. Paul Bremer … no more than a stroke of
the pen”, to achieve what has eluded others in the US “over the course of a decade and
two presidential campaigns” (Milbank & Pincus, 2003).

The Order also included an ‘exemptions’ clause relieving all foreign occupation
personnel from being “liable for any tax or similar charge within the territory of Iraq”
(Coalition Provisional Authority, 2004c, p.3).

Here, a juxtaposition is strikingly

evident: whilst establishing no tax for the occupiers and regressive tax rates for
dominant capital groups, the CPA 2004 Budget for Iraq imposed a number of novel flat
taxes to be endured by the general indigenous population. In accord with the ‘user-pay’
neoliberal ideology, the CPA declared that “One of the general principles underpinning
this Budget is that Iraqis must contribute to the recovery of their economy” (Ministry of
Finance & Ministry of Planning, 2003, p.18). As such, additional taxes from the public,
such as ‘fees from emergency services’, ‘Social Security Rental Income’ and
‘Pharmaceutical Scrip charges’, were imposed; expecting to yield 96.3 billion New Iraqi
Dinars for the 2004 fiscal year alone (Ministry of Finance & Ministry of Planning,
2003).

CPA Order No. 39: Foreign investment.
This Order is viewed as the most controversial with regards Iraq’s forced neoliberal
economic reconstruction and is most illustrative of how the US applied a terra nulliuslike approach in Iraq that displaced and marginalised indigenous agency and interests,
subordinated them to foreign agency, and facilitated their exploitation. Although the
Order’s stated aim was to ensure that it “promotes and safeguards the general welfare
and interests of the Iraqi people by promoting foreign investment” (Coalition Provisional
Authority, 2003f, p.2), its effects were to skew profoundly against the general welfare
and interests of the Iraqi people. It realises dominant capital’s interests to the extent that
it has been described as a “free market manifesto” (quoted in Docena, 2005, p.2) that
fulfils the “wish list that foreign investors and donor agencies dream of” (Anonymous,
2003). Replacing all existing Iraqi foreign investment laws, the meagre 6-page Order
nevertheless contained the most controversial investment provisions of its equivalent
100-page international trade agreements, such as the Multilateral Agreement on
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Investment (MAI), the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
(Malig, 2005). Whilst such agreements were highly contentious, to the extent that they
expended months and years in negotiations and concessions before approval, Order no.
39 “that effectively binds the Iraqis to a trade agreement that enshrines the rights of
foreign investors, and … surpasses many existing agreements” (Malig, 2005, p.34),
faced no such dissentions or negotiations. In Iraq, CPA staff within their Green Zone
“were not negotiating with the government to accept their ‘structural adjustments’ in
exchange for a loan; they were the government” (Klein, 2004, pp.46–47).

The Order’s main provisions and effects included the following:
1- Privatisation:

Although Iraq’s socialist-based indigenous law forbade any private ownership of stateowned enterprises (SOE), Order 39 rescinded this by permitting 100% foreign
ownership of SOEs in all sectors and geographic locations in Iraq except in “the natural
resources sector involving primary extraction and initial processing” (Coalition
Provisional Authority, 2003f, p.3).

Accordingly, over 200 remaining Iraqi SOEs,

including those administering essential and subsidised services to the Iraqi people, such
as water, electricity, schooling, hospitals and prisons, were immediately made available
for private business takeover. This was despite a 2004 poll which “revealed that 65% of
Iraqis would prefer a largely state-controlled economy and government subsidies of
basic services” (Zunes, 2009, p.102). Since this was a highly contentious decree that
immediately spurred opposition that exacerbated the security situation, and was also
questionable regarding its legality, the CPA delayed its execution, opting instead to
delegate this step to future Iraqi governments. As such, “factories simply closed and
awaited purchase”, a policy that “exacerbated the economic crisis”, further downsized
the public sector, increased unemployment and left Iraqi citizenry impecuniously
dependent on foreign corporations for what had previously been local and affordable
products and services (Abboud, 2008, p.432).
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Whilst the Order exempted the oil sector from privatisation, it is widely recognised that
this was a temporary suppression due to fears of a fierce and united Iraqi opposition
(Docena, 2005, 2007, Juhasz, 2006, 2007; Klein, 2007b; Muttitt, 2011; Zunes, 2009).
At the time, even US oil companies voiced concern “that such a blatant takeover would
be unworkable, given the likely nationalist backlash that would occur” (Zunes, 2009,
p.103). As such, corporate access to Iraqi oil would be imposed through other, less
politically ‘costly’ means, which will be demonstrated in the following chapter.
However, a confirmation of the Bush Administration’s genuine intent was clearly
exhibited in the BearingPoint contract, which explicitly stipulated that it would
“implement USAID-approved recommendations to begin supporting the privatization,
especially those in the oil and supporting industries” (emphasis added USAID, 2003,
p.84). Similarly, in meetings held between December 2002 and April 2003, the State
Department’s Oil and Energy Working Group had settled that Iraq “should be opened to
international oil companies as quickly as possible after war” (quoted in Juhasz, 2007).
2- 100% Foreign ownership, national treatment and unrestricted repatriation of profits

While Order 39 did not cover the resource extraction, banking and insurance sectors,
which would be later addressed through either supplementary schemes or separate CPA
Orders, it did secure foreign business access to all other sectors of the economy.
Although a 2004 poll revealed that only 6.6% of Iraqis “would support a free-market
system where private entrepreneurs have largely unrestricted access to the economy”
(Zunes, 2009, p.102), sections 4 and 6 of Order 39 forbade the application of any such
restrictions and enabled for 100% foreign ownership of Iraqi businesses “on terms no
less favourable than those applicable to an Iraqi investor” (Coalition Provisional
Authority, 2003f, p.3).

In effect, these sections further cemented the new overriding claim of dominant capital
groups over Iraqi space as all other non-Public-sector segments of the economy,
including Iraq’s farms, telecommunications, media, transportation and publishing
businesses, were abruptly opened to foreign penetration and takeover. They forced
unrestricted foreign access to the fragile domestic market and conceded privileges of
local Iraqis to multi-national corporations. Therefore, they effectively seized Iraqi
sovereignty regarding its regulating of the country’s flow of foreign investments, known
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as foreign direct investments (FDIs), thereby preventing the state from acting as an
agent to anything other than dominant capital groups. For example, in exchange for
access to local markets, states may oblige foreign companies to hire local employees, or
to deliver certain provisions to local communities as per their needs. In addition, laws
may obligate the prioritisation of qualified local companies over those of their foreign
counterparts with regards receipt of contracts. ‘National treatment’ effectively nullified
the possibility of any such provisions that would have acted to safeguard the benefit of
the indigenous population. A result of this was that foreign corporations were free to
import less-costly foreign employees from third-world countries instead of local Iraqis
(Klein, 2007b).

Indeed, privatisation and ‘national treatment’ contributed to the

generation of an estimated two million jobless Iraqis as at June 2004, with only 25,000
employed in reconstruction contracts (Abboud, 2008; Juhasz, 2006).

The effects of unregulated influxes of FDIs on developing economies can be
debilitating. As one commentator remarked, “the rest of the world’s pockets are very
deep relative to a small economy’s … absorptive capacity”, which can lead to
significant real appreciations of local currency and discouragement of exports
(Dornbusch & Edwards, 1994, p.103). Accordingly, the United Nations had advised
developing countries to establish quota appropriations with regards FDI influxes that
are customised to address segment needs as “the long-run effect on the real exchange
rate will depend on the sectoral allocation of FDI” (UNCTAD, 1999, p.26). Finally,
‘national treatment’ has also been known to be used by companies to circumvent
domestic regulations on the environment, public health and worker and consumer
safety”, thereby enabling corporations to successfully sue and receive reparation from
national governments for their attempts to prosecute foreign corporate violations
(Juhasz, 2004a). In effect, sections 4 and 6 confirmed the US’s contouring of a strictly
neoliberal Iraqi state, the role of which is narrowed to serving dominant capital interests
and to facilitating transfers of wealth.

Section 7 of Order 39 also confirmed this new role of the Iraqi state by decreeing 100%
tax-free remittances.

The Order permitted Trans-National Corporations (TNCs) to

“transfer abroad without delay all funds associated with its foreign investment,
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including … shares or profits and dividends”, with no requirements for reinvestment in
the Iraqi economy (Coalition Provisional Authority, 2003f, p.4). This section ended the
conventional motivation behind TNCs’ abuse of accounting practices regarding transfer
pricings because the underlying prohibition, the undue transfer of wealth, was no longer
unlawful. The UNCTAD (1999, p.27) had warned “if foreign companies are able to
extract their profits from host countries via intra-company transactions at artificial
prices, the benefits of FDI to host economies are accordingly reduced”. Nevertheless,
this otherwise prohibited act was converted into a lawful and mundane process within
business practice in Iraq, with accounting serving to further legitimise this by
normalising such transfers of wealth and masking their damaging ramifications upon
Iraqi economy and society.

Finally, the role of FDIs in fragile and post-conflict

countries has been recognised (Costantini, 2013, 2015). The effects of ‘anarchic’ flows
of FDI upon unstable environments have been equated to an aggregate reinforcement of
destabilising

dynamics

by

“increasing

levels

of

inequality,

deepening

the

decentralization process, and undermining internal and external balances of power”
(Costantini, 2013, p.263). For example, Klein (2004, p.48) described how “Many of the
businessmen whose companies are threatened by Bremer’s investment laws have made
investments in the resistance”. As will be demonstrated within the forthcoming chapter,
FDI’s destabilising dynamics exacerbated the unstable societal conditions of postinvasion Iraq; they undermined its social cohesion, exacerbated spatial inequality and
increased eco-political instability.

The overall result of Order 39 was that benefits to Iraq from FDI flows were curtailed
whilst their drawbacks were exaggerated.

Iraq was denied access to the standard

benefits associated with FDI flows, such as reinvestments in the local economy and the
targeting of specific in-need regions or industries, and was alternatively left to carry the
“monumental” burden of costs associated with unregulated foreign access to its markets
(Juhasz, 2004). According to Stiglitz (2000), similar policies that were imposed by the
IMF and the US State Treasury on countries like Thailand, Indonesia, Russia and
Argentina were the primary cause for the East Asian Financial crisis of 1998/1999, the
Russian economic crisis of the early 1990s and similar economic crises of Latin
America. In Russia, “by easing the flow of capital in and out Russia – the IMF and
Treasury laid the groundwork for the oligarchs’ plundering … sending money obtained
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by stripping assets and selling the country’s precious national resources into Cypriot
and Swiss bank accounts” (Stiglitz, 2000).
3- 40-Year leases

Section 8 of Order 39 allocated foreign investment licenses for the use of Iraqi property
of up to 40 years, after which they “may be renewed for further such periods” (Coalition
Provisional Authority, 2003f, p.5). As such, succeeding sovereign Iraqi governments
would find themselves locked into contracts entered into under Bremer’s rule for up to
40 years; any attempts at making alternative arrangements would be deemed illegal
(Docena, 2007; Juhasz, 2004a, 2004b; Zunes, 2009).
4- Overriding jurisdiction of international agreements

Section 14 of Order 39 declared, “Where an international agreement to which Iraq is a
party provides for more favorable terms … the more favorable terms under the
international agreement shall apply” (Coalition Provisional Authority, 2003f, p.6).
Moreover, in cases of dispute settlement, the Order gives foreign investors “the legal
authority to enact any international trade agreement of which both countries are party”
and bypass existing Iraqi laws (Juhasz, 2004).

CPA Orders No. 18, 20 and 40: The central bank of Iraq, trade bank of Iraq
and bank law
With Iraq’s financial system, foreign bank companies had been locked out of the market
since a policy of nationalisation was adopted in the 1950s and 1960s. However, the
CPA swiftly reversed this, beginning with its passing of Order 18, which claimed to
adopt measures to ensure the independence of the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI). As such,
it suspended articles of the CBI Law that authorised the bank to loan funds to Iraqi
Ministries, as well as the requirement that the Ministry of Finance approve the CBIs
monetary and credit policy. Instead, the Order gave Bremer, the CPA Administrator,
the final authority to both choose CBI Board members and to approve their decisions
with regards regulating and implementing monetary and credit policy (Coalition
Provisional Authority, 2003c). This Order was followed by Order 20, which set up the
Trade Bank of Iraq (TBI) to “provide financial and related services to facilitate the
importation and exportation of goods and services to and from Iraq” (Coalition
Provisional Authority, 2003d, p.1). The management of this overarching bank was
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delegated to thirteen banks from thirteen countries, most important of which was the US
bank, JP Morgan Chase & Co (Juhasz, 2004a). Although the bank had been implicated
in the Enron scandal, it was still awarded the contract to lead and run the above
consortium.

Order 40 that set the new ‘Bank Law’ of Iraq followed Order 20. This law permitted 6
foreign banks entry into the Iraqi market, whilst allowing an unlimited number of banks
the right to purchase up to 50% of an Iraqi bank (Coalition Provisional Authority,
2003g).

It also appropriated final authority over the banking system to the

Administrator and the CPA. In this way, Bremer was able to transform the Iraqi
banking sector from a previously centralised, state-run system to one that was marketdriven, giving himself and foreign banks control over the Iraqi people’s access to credit
and decreasing Iraqi sovereignty over monetary and credit policy.

CPA Order 81: Patent, industrial design, undisclosed information,
integrated circuits and plant variety law.
Iraq is known to be the birthplace of farming; its people were the first to domesticate
wheat production and bring to bear the concept of agriculture (Hassan, 2005; Smith,
2005).

This heritage was reflected in the indigenous Iraqi Constitution, which

prohibited private ownership of biological resources, thereby safeguarding Iraqi
farmers’ “inherent right, exercised for the past 10,000 years in the fertile Mesopotamian
arc, to save and replant seeds” (Meacher, 2005). Since the early 1970s, strong seed
variety samples, resulting from thousands of years of local farmer cross-pollination
under Iraq’s individual environmental conditions, had been saved at the Abu Ghraib
gene bank. Several of such varieties were also stored at the International Centre for
Agricultural Research in Dry Areas (ICARDA) in Syria. During the de-territorialisation
process wrought by looting, the Abu Ghraib bank was also left unprotected and was,
therefore, destroyed. The CPA failed to repatriate such knowledge from surviving local
farms or from the ICARDA (Hassan, 2005; Smith, 2005). Alternatively, the CPA
sought to “totally reengineer the country’s traditional farming systems into a US-style
corporate agribusiness” (Smith, 2005). The Plant Variety Protection (PVP) section of
Order 81 reversed the indigenous seed-saving policy with a system of private monopoly
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rights over seeds that represented a virtual “takeover of Iraqi agriculture” (Meacher,
2005). In a country where an estimated 97% of farmers used their own saved seeds or
bought from local markets, private companies were permitted to penetrate the Iraqi
agricultural sector with exclusive rights to produce, reproduce, condition for
propagation, sell, market, export, import and store seeds (Coalition Provisional
Authority, 2004g, pp.20–21).

Assisting in the CPA’s efforts was USAID’s Agriculture Reconstruction and
Development Program for Iraq (ARDI), which focussed on accelerating Iraq’s
“transition from a command-and-control production and marketing system to a marketdriven economy where farmers and agribusinesses are able to take risks and realize
profits” (quoted in GRAIN, 2009, p.8). Together, both the CPA and ARDI applied
shock therapy with the central objective to open and privatise Iraq’s agricultural sector,
and to especially dismantle its Public Distribution System (GRAIN, 2009; Looney,
2004). Whilst the CPA abolished agricultural subsidies and ARDI pushed neoliberal
reforms, local Iraqi markets were flooded with foreign, genetically modified, ‘highyield’ seed varieties that promised to double Iraqi farmers’ bottom lines within the first
year. In effect, the profit motive was harnessed to encourage local farmers to abandon
traditional methods so as to yield more profits. Meanwhile, dominant agribusiness’
control was amplified as the adoption of the new technologies was accompanied by an
onslaught of necessary pesticides, herbicides and fungicides (GRAIN, 2009; Hassan,
2005; Smith, 2005). These technologies subjected local Iraqi farmers to ‘impoverished
dependency’ that placed their country’s future in “in the hands of the veritable
multinational corporations that deconstructed it” (Chwastiak, 2009, p.14). As Schwartz
(2007, p. 48) explains:
The changes wrought by the occupation were designed to create dependence
on outsiders for basic infrastructural building blocks, while reducing the
reservoir of usable expertise within the country. As the failures multiplied,
Iraq society would of necessity become less and less able to address the
problems that plagued it, while having fewer and fewer resources with which
to access the outside expertise on which they had become dependent … Given
enough time, the American presence would set in motion a lock-in process of
impoverished dependency.
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Meanwhile, Iraqi farmers who chose not to integrate into this global economy were
subjected to section 66 of Order 81, which prohibited their re-using of seeds of crosspollination, or their saving of other varieties similar to those registered under PVP
(Coalition Provisional Authority, 2004g, p.22).
Overall, the liberalisation of Iraq’s agricultural market and imposition of neoliberal
reforms have negatively impacted Iraq’s economy and have stripped Iraq of its
agricultural and food sovereignty (Docena, 2007, 2005; Hassan, 2005; Meacher, 2005;
Smith, 2005). Iraq has not only been denied the ability to control the development of its
agriculture, but also its economy has been re-engineered so as to generate billions of
dollars in transfers of wealth to foreign dominant agribusinesses.

Accelerating Transformations in Economy and Transfers in
Wealth: Accounting for corruption
Bremer’s CPA Orders had the immediate effect of transforming the ideological contours
of the Iraqi economy from its socialist-based underpinnings to that which was based on
a fundamentalist form of neoliberalism. In so doing, the CPA transgressed the limits
explicitly set by international law.

The roles of the CPA, as prescribed by UN

Resolution 1483, were unambiguous: to meet costs of reconstruction and repair of
Iraq’s infrastructure; the costs of disarmament and the civil administration of the
country; to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi (UK et al., 2003; Whyte, 2007).
The margins of such roles were further bound by international law, which officially
recognised Iraq as being de jure under occupation by the US and UK (United Nations,
2003). As such, provisions of the Geneva and Hague treaties governing powers of an
occupying power were set in motion. In this regard, The Hague (emphasis added,
Article 43) specifically stipulates that an occupier “shall take all the measures in his
power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country”.

This

regulation is complemented by the Geneva Convention 1949 (emphasis added, Article
64), which only authorises occupiers to impose new provisions upon the indigenous of
an occupied territory if they “are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfil its
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obligations … to maintain the orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the
security of the Occupying Power”.

Since the CPA’s imposed reforms were not

‘essential’ to enable its fulfilment of orderly government of Iraqi territory and security
of the occupiers, nor was the CPA ‘absolutely prevented’ from respecting existing
indigenous laws and restoring them; therefore, the Bremer’s Orders contravened the
CPA’s mandate and international laws.

In addition, Article 55 of the Hague “expressly forbids altering the structure of public
resources … the effect … is to outlaw privatization of a country’s assets whilst it is
under occupation by a hostile military power” (Whyte, 2007, p.181). This provision is
reinforced by the US Army’s Law of Land Warfare, which forbids the occupier from
selling non-military property (Klein, 2003b, 2004, 2007b).

Such provisions were

defiantly infringed by Order 39, which set into motion the privatisation of Iraqi SOEs.
Similarly, Article 52 of the Geneva Convention “prohibits contracts, agreements, or
regulations that impair the rights of workers and preserves work opportunities for
persons residing in the occupied territory” (Crum, 2006, pp.67–68). Order 39 also
impaired this provision as it enabled FDIs to bypass worker rights, and to abandon
regulations that preserved work opportunities for the indigenous population.

Bremer’s rapid and illegal imposition of free market by force was described as “extreme
– in fact, stunning”, it is “severe experimentation” to a degree where “ideology
outweighs common sense” (Madrick, 2003). Indeed, whilst the rapidity through which
shock therapy was implemented on Iraq enabled the US to achieve “concessions far in
advance of anything that Iraq as a sovereign nation would be obliged to accept through
the WTO or bi-lateral investment treaties” (Bullard, 2005, p.2), it also significantly
defied ‘common sense’.

This is because the historical record of economic shock

therapy, such as its application in the former Soviet Union; on Eastern European
countries at the fall of the Berlin Wall; and upon Argentina in the form of rapid-fire
“surgery without anesthetic” (Klein, 2003a, p.10), points to the project’s failure. Joseph
Stiglitz (2004) explains,
Shock-therapy countries saw incomes plunge and poverty soar. Social
indicators, such as life expectancy, mirrored the dismal GDP numbers …
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Worse, the prognosis for establishing a stable democracy and the rule of law
in most shock-therapy countries looks bleak.

In comparison, Stiglitz (2004) pointed to other countries, such as Hungary, Poland and
Slovenia, who chose an alternate gradualist approach to market liberalisation so as “to
allow for the rule of law to be established at the same time”. In so doing, these
countries were markedly better able to manage their transitions than their ‘leapfrog’
shock-therapy counterparts. In actuality, neoliberal shock therapy’s failure stems from
its rapid imposition of reforms that let loose capital accumulation processes in the midst
of a largely unregulated environment.

Accordingly, opportunities for corruption,

exploitation and disaster capitalism flourish; a country becomes a space of exception
where accumulation by dispossession thrives whilst the populace suffer. In sum, the
juxtaposition between neoliberal shock therapy and lawlessness has been shown to
create spaces of exception where corrupt practices thrive and transfers of wealth
accelerate (Chwastiak, 2013; Klein, 2007b; Whyte, 2007, 2010, 2016). Moreover, “it is
through corrupt state-corporate activities that far reaching changes to an economy can
occur quickly” (Chwastiak, 2013, p.34).

Despite this historical record, an even more extreme form of economic shock therapy,
which made previous “wrenching reforms look like spa treatments” (Klein, 2003a,
p.10), was advanced in the created space of exception of Iraq. Accompanying the
“wholesale suspension of the country’s constitutional order” was the intentional
establishment of a state of impunity by the Bush administration and the CPA (Whyte,
2016, p.299). On 22nd May 2003, President Bush issued Executive Order (EO) 13303
which provided legal protection for US corporations with regards their transactions with
the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI). The DFI was an account containing Iraqi funds,
mostly oil revenues, that was specified to the CPA by United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1483 so as to cover post-invasion administration and reconstruction
expenditures of Iraq. Also, the EO protected all US corporations and their contractors
from any legal liability in any oil related enterprise. In effect, EO 13303 provided the
corporations with “immunity from prosecution for the theft or embezzlement of oil
revenue … from any safety or environmental violations that might be committed in the
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course of producing Iraqi oil” (Whyte, 2007, p.184). Just over a month after this EO
was issued, Bremer decreed CPA Order No. 17: Status of the Coalition Provisional
Authority, Multinational Force- Iraq, Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq. This
Order granted immunity to members of the Multinational Force (MNF); the CPA;
Foreign Liaison Mission personnel; international consultants and all foreign contractors
and subcontractors who were part of the Coalition; from the Iraqi legal process
(Coalition Provisional Authority, 2004b). Whyte (2010, p.140) explains that taken
together, EO 13303 and CPA Order 17 “provided a carte blanche provision of
immunity from prosecution for white collar and corporate crimes in Iraq”.

The combined effect of the US’s suspension of Iraqi laws, its implementation of
‘extreme’ economic shock therapy and its establishment of a state of impunity for all its
acquaintances in Iraq was to provide the momentum for disaster capitalism to flourish,
thereby accelerating transfers of wealth; and for corrupt state-corporate activities to
commence, thereby accelerating the transformation of the Iraqi economy (Chwastiak,
2013; Klein, 2007a, 2007b, Whyte, 2007, 2010, 2016). Whilst one of the primary
political justifications provided by Bush with regards to the transformation of Iraq’s
economy was the eradication of Saddam-era corruption in the public sector, Bush’s
post-Saddam created-order was that “which privileged the primacy and autonomy of
market actor over laws intended to enshrine universal protections for civilian
populations …” (Whyte, 2007, p.177). In effect, the created state of lawlessness, in
conjunction with the laissez faire reforms and the granted immunity from prosecution,
encouraged the proliferation of acts of corporate corruption that were tolerated,
facilitated and contributed to by the CPA (Chwastiak, 2013; Klein, 2007a, 2007b,
Whyte, 2007, 2010, 2016).

The corruption that was institutionalised by the post-

invasion neoliberal Iraqi ‘state’, the CPA, represented the final frontier of what a
neoliberal state, performing its essential function of engendering transfers of wealth and
facilitating the unhindered pursuit of self-interest, would achieve in the absence of
regulation and public accountability.

It is evident that within the corrupt and lawless milieu that unfolded in post-invasion
Iraq, accounting, accountability, budgeting and auditing mechanisms played a well141

defined role.

As has been demonstrated in the previous chapter, accounting

technologies are utilised by the political elite to attribute legitimacy to processes of
corruption, waste and fraud. Similarly, although the CPA worked within a state of
exception, it nevertheless needed a subservient accounting process through which it
could legitimise its malfeasant practices and also maintain liminal space for corrupt
transactions to flourish. Indeed, Catchpowle and Cooper (2009, p.717) contend that
“the CPA’s compliance with very basic levels of decent public administration were akin
to Guantanamo’s compliance with basic levels of natural justice”. The following
sections will demonstrate some of the ways through which accounting as a technology
was utilised to effectively render the CPA unaccountable.

Deficient auditing processes
CPA Orders 55, 57 and 77 addressed accounting, accountability and auditing issues
through the establishment of the Iraq Commission on Public Integrity (CPI), Iraqi
Inspectors General (IIG) and the Board of Supreme Audit (BSA). Order 77 established
the BSA as the supreme, independent public auditing institution of Iraq that worked
with the CPI and IIG “to ensure that the Iraqi government remains honest, transparent
and accountable to the people of Iraq” (Coalition Provisional Authority, 2004f, p.1). Its
duties included the promulgation of auditing and accounting regulations and the
detection of “evidence of corruption, fraud, waste, abuse and inefficiency in matters
related to the receipt, disbursement, and use of public money” (Coalition Provisional
Authority, 2004f, p.3). However, the Board retained no prosecutorial or enforcement
powers and, therefore, any evidence or allegations pertaining to these issues would be
reported either to the IIG or directly to the CPI.

The IIG was established under Order 57 as “an effective program of audit, investigation
and performance review to provide increased accountability, integrity and oversight of
the ministries and to prevent, deter and identify waste, fraud, abuse of authority and
illegal acts” (Coalition Provisional Authority, 2004e, p.1). The program entailed the
establishment of independent Offices of Inspectors General within each Iraqi Ministry
with the task of performing the above duties as keys to ministry oversight. Inspectors
General report directly to the relevant minister, administrator or CPI. Finally, the CPI
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was established under Order 55 as “an independent body responsible for enforcing anticorruption laws and public service standards; proposing additional legislation … and
heightening the Iraqi people’s demand for honest, transparent and accountable
leadership” (Coalition Provisional Authority, 2004d, pp.1–2). It held sole jurisdiction
for undertaking criminal proceedings with regards cases of misconduct submitted by
either the IIG or BSA.

Hence, the three institutions were formed as a holistic system designed to facilitate
transparency and combat corruption at all levels of Iraqi governance. In practice,
however, this is not what transpired. The BSA was not a newly formed body as it was
already in existence since 1927. Before the CPA’s reforms, the BSA retained sweeping
powers to audit, inspect, request and evaluate state accounts, and also to detect acts of
corruption and fraud. Importantly, it also had the authority to directly refer suspect
criminal activity to the courts (Al-Ali, 2014). The CPA reforms reduced its powers:
information could no longer be directly requested from the ministries, instead, was to be
requested through the IIG. Also, it lost its authority to directly refer evidence of
criminal activity to the courts, rather was obliged to submit them to the IIG or CPI. In
sum, the CPA reforms greatly increased bureaucratic hurdles that would act to impede
the process through which a conviction for corruption-related activities could be secured
(Al-Ali, 2014). Moreover, the increased bureaucracy came at a time when “they had
hardly any staff, when violence against public officials was rising, and when public
expenditure was increasing rapidly” (Al-Ali, 2014, p.198).

There were also deficiencies in the CPA’s establishing of the IIGs: it failed to create a
co-ordinated system for individual inspectors to follow, including consistent operating
procedures for their job. As such, there was a lack of co-ordination between the
methodologies of individual inspectors, which rendered their collective work inefficient.
Also, the CPA failed to address the process through which IIGs would be recruited; this
allowed individual ministries to control the process and led to employment being based
on outright cronyism (Al-Ali, 2014). Evidence demonstrates that this deficiency in the
recruitment process was echoed throughout the CPA’s posts. The majority of its staff
were unqualified for their positions; they were either appointed through cronyism, or
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because of strong shared ideological affiliations with the neo-conservatives of the Bush
Administration (Chandrasekaran, 2006a, 2006b; Catchpowle & Cooper, 2009;
Galbraith, 2006; Gordon & Trainor, 2006; Hartung, 2003; Jamail, 2007). For example,
those who were employed to administer Iraq’s budget were not qualified senior
professionals, rather six young people with no relevant experience. The six, “which
included the daughter of a prominent conservative activist …” had one thing in
common, being that they had all “posted their resumes at the Heritage Foundation, a
conservative Washington think tank” (Catchpowle & Cooper, 2009, p.722).

The effects of the CPA’s flawed recruitment policy were profound. KPMG’s audit of
the CPA found the “lack of documented defined roles and responsibilities of CPA
personnel, the rotation of key CPA personnel” led to deficiencies in internal controls
with regards accountability of CPA personnel (KPMG Bahrain, 2004, para.1.2.2). The
audit noted:
The CPA Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Finance, who is also the
Chairman of the Program Review Board (PRB), was unable to acknowledge
the fair presentation of the statement of cash receipts and payments, the
completeness of significant contracts entered into by the DFI and his
responsibilities for the implementation and operations of accounting and
internal controls systems, designed to prevent and detect fraud and error
(KPMG Bahrain, 2004, para.1.2.3).

Following from this, errors in CPA decisions were common, which led to wasting
billions in Iraqi revenue funds and fuelling of indigenous humanitarian crises,
resentments and insurgency. For example, the CPA appointed James Haveman Jr., a
60-year-old social worker with no medical degree, “but he did have political
connections” and had run a “Christian-oriented adoption agency that urged pregnant
women not to have abortions”, as its senior advisor to Iraq’s Ministry of Health
(Chandrasekaran, 2006b, p.42). James allocated most of the $793 million Iraqi health
budget on renovating maternity hospitals, thereby leaving little money to rehabilitate the
dire hospital emergency rooms or surgical suites of a country reeling from war and
violence (Chandrasekaran, 2006a, 2006b; Catchpowle & Cooper, 2009).

Also, in

March 2004 and despite objections from military commanders, Bremer ordered the
closure of the newspaper of Moktada al-Sadr, the highly renowned Shiite cleric who
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openly resisted the occupation. This “resulted in two months of ferocious ground
combat that was more intense than anything U.S. troops had encountered during the
year-long occupation or even the initial invasion of Iraq” (Chandrasekaran, 2006b,
p.40). Galbraith (2006, p.323) describes that what Iraq needed was “support corps of
well-meaning foreigners”, not the largely unqualified and inexperienced “imperial
Americans cloistered in a palace of the tyrant, eating bacon and drinking beer,
surrounded by Ghurkhas and blast walls”.

Deficient accounting practices
The CPA was granted authority over the DFI, which consisted of funds from the sale of
Iraqi oil, frozen government accounts since Gulf War I and funds from the oil for food
programme totalling $20.7 billion. Also at the CPA’s disposal was $2.7 billion “worth
of cash, rugs, jewels, and other assets seized by US soldiers from Baathist properties”
(Catchpowle & Cooper, 2009, p.730). In auditing the CPA, KPMG reported several
internal control weaknesses; the following is an overview of the weaknesses and their
effects:
1-Irregularity in the appointment of a certified public accounting firm

CPA regulation No. 2 of the 15th June 2003 required the appointment of an independent
auditing firm tasked to develop an efficient accounting system for the CPA to
implement. However, KPMG reported that it was not until October 2003 that a firm
was appointed, and that it didn’t commence work until seven months into the CPA’s
fourteen months in office. As such, the CPA was found to have been implementing an
accounting system deemed ‘rapidly insufficient’ during the first seven months of its
operation. Furthermore, KPMG reported that the appointed firm was not a certified
public accounting firm, but rather a consulting firm; nevertheless it was awarded $1.4
million for its seven months of service (KPMG Bahrain, 2004, para.1.3.1).

In addition, the report found that the new accounting system was maintained by just one
individual who implemented “a cash-based, single entry transaction listing rather than
an accrual-based, double-entry bookkeeping system” (KPMG Bahrain, 2004,
para.1.3.2). As noted in the previous chapter, cash-based accounting systems “do not
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provide the information that is necessary for a government to operate efficiently and
effectively” (Van der Hoek, 2005, p.32), as “the relationship between expenditures and
goals, performance, and means is insufficiently clear” (p. 45). Indeed, KPMG reported
that the CPA’s chosen bookkeeping methods left the DFI “open to fraudulent acts and
prone to error” (Catchpowle & Cooper, 2005, p.12).

In sum, the CPA delayed

appointment of a non-certified accounting firm; it applied a ‘rapidly insufficient’
accounting system during 50% of its time in office, and followed an inefficient cashbased system that would permit for acts of fraud and error, for the rest of its tenure.
2-Irregularity in the establishment of CPA Inspectors General

KPMG noted that although US Public Law 108-106 required the establishment of an
Inspector General (IG) function for the CPA within 30 days of its inception, this did not
transpire until only a few months before the end of the CPA’s tenure.
The IG was appointed only on 20 January 2004. The IG initially visited
Baghdad in February 2004 and additional IG staff mobilized during March
2004. The delay in appointment of the IG may have resulted in the loss of
performance improvement opportunities. (KPMG Bahrain, 2004, para.1.5.1)

Furthermore, although the IG’s scope covered Iraqi Ministries and their expenditures,
IG staff did not directly audit work at Iraqi Ministries, rather they relied on internal
auditor reports of the Iraqi Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the BSA as the main control
over ministerial budgetary spending. Moreover, the report found that the number of
control visits to Iraqi ministries by the BSA were limited to only “the first months posthostilities” (KPMG Bahrain, 2004, para.1.6). As such, controls over disbursements in
ministry budgets were virtually non-existent during the majority of the CPA’s reign,
leading KPMG to again concede that the DFI was open to acts of fraud and corruption
(Catchpowle & Cooper, 2005, 2009; Christian Aid, 2004; Congressional Research
Service, 2005).

Deficient accounting practices also extended into the CPA’s handling of DFI
disbursements. During its 14 months in office, 363 tonnes of new $100 bills worth $12
billion were flown into Baghdad to be disbursed by the CPA in cash. According to a
former senior official within the CPA, “Iraq was awash in cash – in dollar bills. Piles
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and piles of money … We played football with some of the bricks of $100 bills before
delivery” (quoted in Macrae & Fadhil, 2006). The Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction (SIGIR) (2005, p.i) found that the CPA had failed to “establish or
implement sufficient managerial, financial, and contractual controls to ensure DFI
funds were used in a transparent manner”. A report by the International Advisory and
Monitoring Board (IAMB) (2005) found that DFI accounting records were untimely
and incomplete; there were incomplete records of disbursements; possible
misappropriation of oil revenues; and insufficient controls over expenditures. As a
result, SIGIR reports indicate between $8.8 billion and $12 billion of DFI revenue
remained unaccounted for (Gregory, 2006; Krane, 2006; Monbiot, 2005; SIGIR, 2005;
Whyte, 2007).
3-Irregularity in CPA handling of oil revenues.

The IAMB (2004) issued a statement where it detailed its findings with regards
excessive weaknesses in controls over oil extraction, including the absence of oil
metering, poor record-keeping on oil sales and failure to account for oil barter
transactions.

Together, the weaknesses rendered official accounts of oil revenue

illegitimate, which led KPMG to issue a qualified audit opinion of the DFI’s statement
of cash receipts and payments (IAMB, 2004). Chandrasekaran (2006a) claims that
many of the figures published by the CPA were fictitious. For example, two separate
CPA statements that updated basic income and expenditures or the same period
provided two different figures for oil revenue, being $10 billion and $11.5 billion.
Meanwhile, Christian Aid estimated that the revenue for that period was actually $13
billion (Catchpowle & Cooper, 2009).

Finally, the lack of oil metering made it

impossible to identify quantities of oil being smuggled; an estimated 10-25% of Iraq’s
oil was being illegally transferred abroad (Catchpowle & Cooper, 2009). There have
been no explanations by the CPA as to why oil metering was not prioritised; one
petroleum executive reasoned, “The only reason you wouldn’t monitor them is if you
don’t want anyone else to know how much is going through” (quoted in Harriman,
2005).
4-Irregularity in Program Review Board (PRB) operations

The Program Review Board (PRB) “was responsible for recommending expenditure of
resources from the Fund and other sources”, including the reviewing of resource
requirements, their prioritisation and integration into a funding plan (KPMG Bahrain,
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2004, para.2.1). The board’s members were from the US, the UK and Australia, with
only two Iraqi members, one each from the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of
Planning. Board minutes revealed, however, that a majority of meetings and decisions
were undertaken in the absence of the Iraqi delegates (Christian Aid, 2004; Revenue
Watch, 2004c).

KPMG found the use of non-competitive bidding procedures for

various contracts funded by the DFI, non-compliance with contract award evaluation
criteria, lack of monitoring of contract performance and outright theft (KPMG Bahrain,
2004; Revenue Watch, 2004a, 2004c). For example, Revenue Watch (2004b, p.3)
reported “73 percent in dollar value of all the contracts awarded using Iraqi funds were
sole-source contracts that were not competitively bid”, whilst KPMG found “37
contracts totalling more than $185 million for which no contracting files could be
located … an unauthorized advance of almost $3 million … and a case in which …
cheques being made out to contractors … were issued personally to the CPA appointed
head of the Ministry of Health, James Haveman” (Whyte, 2007, pp.185–186).

Details regarding Iraqi-funded contracts managed by the PRB were incomplete and
were consistently withheld from auditors up until 2 months after the CPA’s dissolution,
in August 2004 (Lynch, 2004; Revenue Watch, 2004b). Also, competitive advantages
were given to US companies for competitively tendered contracts through means of
providing very short periods of tender notice (Whyte, 2007). Overall, the CPA awarded
74% of the value of DFI-funded contracts to US firms, 11% to UK firms, 13% to other
members of the COW, and a mere 2% to Iraqi firms (CPA Inspector General, 2004a;
Revenue Watch, 2004b). Christian Aid (2004, p.4) reported that the “It was only in
April 2004 that the CPA belatedly began to reserve any contract from the DFI worth
less than US$500,000 for Iraqi companies”. In effect, the PRB offered legitimacy to a
mechanism through which DFI revenues were distributed from indigenous to mostly US
dominant capital groups.

The PRB was found to have failed to provide transparent accounts of its contracts,
lacked appropriate monitoring and accountability controls for the contracts, and
intentionally prioritised US companies that charged ten times as much as their local
Iraqi counterparts (Christian Aid, 2004; Revenue Watch, 2004d). Most notably, the
148

PRB committed “billions of dollars to hastily conceived projects on the eve of its
completion deadline”, thereby obliging the upcoming interim government to their
commitments (Revenue Watch, 2004c, p.1). Whyte (2007, p.187) explains, “Many of
those transactions were unrecorded; some were based on paperwork submitted just
hours before the CPA’s period of office ended; and some invoices were submitted by
individuals shortly before they left the country”. Confirming this, the Deputy Inspector
General for Iraqi Reconstruction reported that one CPA official was given nearly $7
million and told to spend it in seven days, “He told our auditors that he felt that there
was more emphasis on the speed of spending the money than on the accountability for
that money” (quoted in Macrae & Fadhil, 2006).
5-Irregularity with the International Advisory and Monitory Board, and obstacles
encountered by its appointed auditor, KPMG

UN Resolution 1483 had requested that DFI money be spent in the interests of the Iraqi
people and be independently audited through the IAMB until a sovereign government
be appointed (United Nations, 2003). However, it took five months for the IAMB’s
members, the IMF, World Bank, UN and Arab Development Fund (ADF), just to agree
upon its role (Catchpowle & Cooper, 2009). A Congressional Research Service (2005,
p.4) report found the delay was due to the CPA opposing “international institution
efforts to create a system of ‘special audits’ that would allow the board to look at any
issue”. This was also confirmed by commentary that reported Washington attempts to
limit the IAMB’s responsibilities and functions to those of negligible powers
(Catchpowle & Cooper, 2009; Christian Aid, 2004; Whyte, 2007). In the end, the
IAMB’s role was curtailed; it was “not given the power to sanction the CPA for
financial mismanagement, nor to compel it to cooperate in its investigations … the
IAMB had little power over the CPA in terms of its financial accountability”
(Catchpowle & Cooper, 2009, p.723). Moreover, the delays it encountered because of
US obstructions meant that its first meeting didn’t materialise until December 2003, and
further CPA delays in appointing accountants prevented its working until February
2004, a few months before the CPA’s dissolution (Catchpowle & Cooper, 2009;
Christian Aid, 2004; Congressional Research Service, 2005).
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After almost a year of delays, the IAMB was finally able to announce KPMG in
Bahrain as the selected firm to conduct the audit of the CPA. However, since the CPA
would be formally disbanded on 28th June 2004, KPMG only had a few weeks
remaining to conduct over a year’s worth of auditing (Catchpowle & Cooper, 2009;
Christian Aid, 2004). KPMG feared that the delay in conducting the audit may have
resulted in the loss of evidence, a fear shared by others who reported rumours of the
CPA’s extensive use of paper-shredding machines just before KPMG’s arrival
(Fielding, 2004; Hinks, 2004).

Moreover, KPMG auditors reported that they

“encountered difficulties in performing … duties and meeting with key CPA personnel”
(KPMG Bahrain, 2004, para.1.2.2). CPA staff purported a ‘resistance’ attitude towards
KPMG enquiries, and bureaucratic hurdles were encountered whilst getting passes to
enter the Green Zone (Catchpowle & Cooper, 2005, 2009; Christian Aid, 2004).
Finally, KPMG lacked significant powers; as a UK Foreign Office spokesman admitted
to Christian Aid, no matter the audit results of KPMG, it would be “very hard to bring
[the CPA] to account” after 30th June 2004; this was because “there is no stick to the
audit, except publicity” (quoted in Christian Aid, 2004, p.8).

Conclusion
After showing the effects of the US’s exertion of coercive forms of power upon Iraq in
chapter three, it has been the objective of chapter four to demonstrate the effects of the
US’s ideological invasion of Iraq.

During a 2003 speech at the US Chamber of

Commerce, President Bush announced,
Iraqi democracy will succeed – and that success will send forth the news, from
Damascus to Teheran – that freedom can be the future of every nation. The
establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed
event in the global democratic revolution (quoted in Ismael & Ismael, 2015,
p.21).

Bush’s announcement was a direct product of a mindset founded on the neoliberal
version of the accounting-based principles of res nullius and terra nullius. Iraq had
been defined as a space of ‘no proper commerce’.

Accounting measures of
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performance had evaluated the Iraqi state against the requisites of neoliberal ideology
and concluded that its Arab socialist-based regime generated the modern equivalent of
the ‘desert and uncultivated’ space of indigenous Australia at the time of its
colonisation.

The Iraqi economy failed to generate sufficient value, whilst also

obstructing the capital accumulation process of the world economy as its doors
remained defiantly closed against conformity within the dominant global neoliberal
order. Moreover, this diagnosis of Iraq was extended and applied to some of its
regional neighbours who, according to Thomas Barnett (2003), represented some 20%
of the global population, yet only engaged in about 4% of its trade. Such ailing spaces
within the ‘non-integrating gap’ were considered to be the ‘primitive’ who were in need
of neoliberal ideology so as to ‘reconnect’ them to the ‘civilised’ US hegemonic bloc’s
orbit. The ‘civilising mission’ that was chosen to realise these objectives was the US’s
imperial project on Iraqi space. Accordingly, this chapter has corroborated the primary
CAS accounting purpose of de-valuing space for imperial interests.

Bush and CPA chief Bremer utilised accounting discourse pertaining efficient
management of resources and the reduction of corrupt waste to justify the need to reterritorialise Iraq’s existing economic apparatuses with a fundamentalist form of
neoliberal economy.

Bremer’s one hundred illegal CPA orders worked to both

complete the de-territorialisation of Iraq’s economy that had been previously initiated
through war and sanctions, and to rapidly apply an extremist form of neoliberal
economic shock therapy. Not only were existing indigenous laws suspended, but also a
state of complete immunity was established for US agents working in Iraq through EO
13303 and CPA Order 17. Accordingly, Iraq was instantly transformed into a state of
exception where accumulation by dispossession processes of capital accumulation could
flourish unabated. Under such conditions, the post-invasion Iraqi ‘state’, the CPA, was
seen to be simply performing its essential neoliberal role of facilitating the unhindered
pursuit of self-interest and transfers of wealth, thereby generating a hitherto-expected
configuration of corrupt state-corporate activities.

Not only did this configuration

accelerate the transferring of billions of dollars in Iraqi wealth to dominant capital
groups, but also, “Systematic fraud and bribery served a useful purpose for the AngloAmerican occupation as part of a broader economic strategy designed to provide
structural advantages to western firms entering the Iraqi economy” (Whyte, 2007,
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p.134). As such, the chapter also demonstrated the CAS accounting purpose of building
power structures that enable the management of space for imperial interests.

The realisation of such objectives by the political elite could not have been achieved
had it not been for a subservient accounting technology that maintained liminal space
for corrupt practices to flourish.

Indeed, this chapter demonstrated that whilst

accounting, accountability, budgeting and auditing mechanisms were obstructed by US
political elites, they were still given the appearance of functioning, if not effectively.
Accordingly they were utilised to provide legitimacy to techniques that had effectively
created an unaccountable CPA. From the application of a cash-based, single-entry
transaction accounting system that facilitated inefficiency and ineffectiveness to the use
of accounting practices to normalise what were conventionally recognised as
illegitimate transfers of wealth, accounting was an acquiescent tool of the CPA. Indeed,
it is through the technologies of accounting that corrupt state-corporate activities
became routine, thereby accelerating illegitimate disbursals of revenue and
accumulations of profits; the neoliberal annihilation of space by time.

Finally, auditing mechanisms that were meant to act as instruments of accountability
that would safeguard against malfeasant practices were manipulated, thereby deeming
Both the ineffectiveness of the KPMG audit report in bringing the CPA to account and
the US’s manipulation of indigenous auditing mechanisms for imperial interests
confirm another of the CAS concept propositions. Although accounting’s malleability
provides potential for its production of counter-accounts, it is influenced by capitalist
powers to an extent that these can be obstructed and their effects distorted. Indeed,
auditing mechanisms were appropriated by US political elites to provide a perception
“that the laissez-faire policies of the Bush administration were innocent mistakes,
making the failures appear to be independent of one another …” (Chwastiak, 2013,
p.32).

Whilst the economic re-territorialisation of Iraq was a central feature of the US’s
imperial project on Iraqi space, it wasn’t isolate.

The US’s imperial project also
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required the re-territorialisation of Iraq’s political and social spheres. The following
chapter will demonstrate how these features of the project were undertaken, and the
accounting and budgetary means through which they were facilitated.
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Chapter Five

Accounting for the
Socio-Geopolitical Re-Engineering of Iraq:
The role of budgetary processes and institutions in
state-building Iraq.
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Introduction
The previous chapter demonstrated how, under the coercive capacity of foreign military
invasion and occupation, the economic apparatus of a fundamentalist form of neoliberal
economic regime, which displaced indigenous laws and interests and replaced them
with the ‘settler’s contract’, came into being in Iraq. The chapter elucidated the Bush
administration’s utilisation of rhetoric that conflated the significance of neoliberal ‘freemarkets’ to that of a free, democratic and corruption-free Iraq. In so doing, the Bush
administration effectively equated free-market interests to national security and social
objectives, and provided justification for the subjugation of Iraqi economic space to the
settler’s regime.

In this regard, accounting discourse pertaining to the efficient

management of resources played an intrinsic role in legitimising this rhetoric as it
assigned a value-narrative to neoliberal policies by equating them to increased
efficiency, transparency and accountability and, thus, the reduction of waste, fraud and
corruption.

It aligned neoliberal principles with notions of good governance and

economic efficiency, whilst allocating an opposing narrative of de-valuation to Iraq’s
existing regime.

Meanwhile, the CPA’s intentional obstruction of conventional

accounting, accountability, budgeting and auditing mechanisms served to create liminal
space for corrupt practices to flourish and become institutionalised (Al-Ali, 2014;
Chwastiak, 2013; Ismael and Ismael, 2015; Klein, 2007; Whyte, 2007a). Accordingly,
accounting was utilised to de-value existing Iraqi economic configurations, and to build
power structures that violently opened Iraq’s economic space to its new claimant, the
body corporate persona ficta. By extending “the structural advantages necessary for
Western firms to penetrate – and transform – the economy”, accounting facilitated an
accelerated transfer of Iraqi wealth to dominant capital groups (Whyte, 2007a, p. 192).

This chapter will build upon this knowledge to reveal the means through which the US
sought to secure its stake in Iraq. As explained in chapter two, the neoliberal project
necessitates the reterritorialisation of both the socioeconomic and political-institutional
spaces. Accordingly, US imperial interests necessitated the re-engineering of Iraqi
society, from its socialist/collective underpinnings to that which emphasised
individualism and the maximum pursuit of self-interest, and also to construct a weak
and decentralised spatial/scalar configuration of authority over Iraqi space. This chapter
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will demonstrate the imperialist methods through which the US sought to realise these
reconstructions, and also the ways through which accounting ideology and techniques,
especially budgetary mechanisms, both facilitated and legitimised them. Accordingly,
the chapter further corroborates the CAS concept’s central underpinnings, and will
demonstrate additional means through which accounting and space inherently intersect
for the purpose of building power structures. In addition, it will further expound upon
accounting’s purpose of de-valuing space by demonstrating how accounting legitimated
the US’s ‘state-ending’ of the existing Iraqi state.

The importance of state budgeting has been recognised in the literature, where it is
described as the “linchpin of the state” (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008, p. 135), and as the
“life-blood of the government, the financial reflection of what the government does or
intends to do …” (Wildavsky, 1961, p. 184). Consequently, state-building literature has
emphasised the necessity to develop effective state budgeting arrangements, including
both ‘upstream’ formulations that include political approval of the budget, and
‘downstream’ rules governing the budgetary system, such as planning, procurement,
contracting, payment and auditing, so as to create a strong state (Castillo, 2008, 2011;
Ghani and Lockhart, 2008; Savage, 2013a, 2013b).

Dysfunctional budgetary

arrangements can foment mistrust and sow disunity within communities, thereby
dividing society into fragmented groups, each seeking to maximise its self-interests. As
such, budgets have historically been utilised by empires as a tool for realising power
gains through a strategy known as ‘divide and conquer’. In addition, they have also
been utilised to weaken the capacity of subordinated states because a failure of
budgetary arrangements “contribute to fiscal malfeasance, corruption, and state failure
in providing public services” (Savage, 2013b, p. 2). This chapter will show that the US
utilised dysfunctional budgetary arrangements in Iraq so as to gain power through the
divide and conquer technique, to re-engineer the collective mindset of Iraqi society, to
reconfigure the spatial/scalar ordering of Iraq into that which was most conducive to US
and dominant capital interest, and to secure the eco-political acquiescence of future
Iraqi governments.
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Accounting for US state-building of Iraq
Neoliberal restructuring of Iraq began with the Bremer Orders that, as explained
previously, included minute details covering all aspects of the Iraqi economy but
excluded the most significant petroleum resources, so as to instantaneously subordinate
Iraqi economic space to neoliberal rule. US ambition was that such arrangements
would “take on a life and momentum of their own” by meticulously addressing and
infiltrating Iraqi economic space to an extent that would deem them practically
irreversible (Juhasz, 2004, p. 29). However, Bremer’s Orders represented only one
dimension of US restructuring in Iraq, its economic reconstruction. As explained in
chapter two, the neoliberal globalisation project is understood “as a re-territorialisation
of both socioeconomic and political-institutional spaces that unfolds simultaneously …”
(Brenner, 1999, p. 432). Accordingly, the US also needed to undertake socio-political
re-engineering of Iraq so as to build an apparatus that would secure and sustain
conditions most conducive to both US and dominant capital group interests after US
withdrawal. As such, it proceeded to ‘state-build’ Iraq, which is a process “to develop
capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relationships
(OECD, 2008, p. 1). In this regard, US imperial behaviour in Iraq resembled that of its
predecessor, the British empire, which had also occupied Iraq long enough to
restructure its eco-political space in accordance to its interests, before retreating as an
imperialist influence (Chomsky, 2006, 2008, Harvey, 2003, 2005; Ismael and Ismael,
2015; Zunes, 2009).

Unlike the British Empire, however, modern day imperial ventures are increasingly
being conducted by ‘empires in denial’, within the realm of ‘plausible deniability’.
They aim to exercise “power without the drawback of overt or transparent mechanisms
of political accountability” (Chandler, 2006, p. 10). Yet, they
are much more invasive than those of nineteenth-century empire, preventing
the establishment of strong links between non-Western states and their
societies and resulting in the phenomenon of ‘phantom states’ whose
governing institutions may have extensive external resourcing but lack social
or political legitimacy (Chandler, 2006, p. 9).
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As explained in chapter two, US imperialism has progressed under the guise of
neoliberal rules of difference that centre on the efficiency of institutional frameworks
and overall state capacity.

Indeed, imperial motivations premising the US’s 2003

invasion, occupation and reconstruction of Iraq have been masked behind a neoliberal
framing that conceptualised Iraq as a dysfunctional, inefficient and failing state that
challenged global stability, security and prosperity (Chandler, 2006, 2010; Fukuyama,
2004; Ghani and Lockhart, 2008; Herring, 2009; Herring and Rangwala, 2006;
Ignatieff, 2003; Rotberg, 2004). The Iraqi state’s autonomy to pursue self-interests
within the context of its perceived inefficient state apparatuses was framed as
essentially generating counterproductive results, such as corruption, insufficient
economic growth, insecurity and withholding the flow of global markets (Chandler,
2010). Indeed, Ghani and Lockhart (2008, p. 24) explain that
The rules of the game in failing states – the parameters that people impose
upon themselves to shape their interactions – are poor governance and
rampant corruption. The very means that could bring prosperity to billions –
global capital – cannot find a home in such countries.

Moreover, whilst US neoliberal state-building intervention in Iraq would have
previously been “seen as an altruistic, idealistic … ‘optional’ matter of concern … in a
post-9/11 world, this has become a global issue … a common security-development
paradigm” and, therefore, a necessity (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008, p. 26). This is
because the post-9/11 neoliberal rule of difference had developed into a division
between geographies of ‘fear’ and ‘hope’. According to this division, the Iraqi state’s
‘bad’ governance cast its space inside the realm of the global ‘insecure gap’, as opposed
to those of the ‘functioning core’ power bloc; it was a ‘rogue’ state and part of the ‘axis
of evil’, which not only brought about damaging affects upon its own citizenry, but also
threatened the world with terrorism and WMD (Barnett, 2002, 2003; Mitchell, 2010;
Roberts et al., 2003). Accordingly, legitimacy was accorded to the dispossession of the
Iraqi State’s traditional rights of sovereignty, those of self-governance and nonintervention, thereby stripping the state of its moral legitimacy and political authority.
Moreover, as neoliberalism forms an indispensable linkage between free-markets as the
most efficient allocation of resources, and minimal state intervention in the market as
the most efficient mode of state capacity, its rhetoric legitimised the forced
reconstruction of Iraq’s existing centralised state structure and strong state capacities.
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Hence, the US was granted the ideological justification that warranted the decimation of
both the indigenous Iraqi constitution and the Iraqi state structure so as to state-build
that which would be ‘efficient’. In this way, US state-building engagements in Iraq
were framed as a benevolent, world constabulary duty and, thus, afforded both moral
legitimacy and political authority, whilst obscuring imperial eco-political interests
(Chandler, 2006).

Accounting and accountability mechanisms played an integral role in the collation of
such a conceptualisation.

Firstly, since accounting is based on a problem-solving

mindset that reduces all problems to economics, it contributed to the predominant
framing of Iraq’s complex and multi-dimensional governance problems as simply being
a result of its lack of integration into the neoliberal economic world order. Furthermore,
accounting’s adherence to neoclassical economic ideology, which evaluates public
decisions as a measure of their profitability, contributed to the ideological justification
that an assessment of Iraqi state legitimacy be predominantly carried out within the
narrow realm of its efficiency at creating value (Chwastiak and Lehman, 2008; Rich,
1993; Soper, 1990).

Moreover, accounting techniques, such as measures of

performance, were utilised to portray an ‘objective’ and ‘scientific’ representation of the
Iraqi state (Costantini, 2015; Herring, 2009; Risse, 2011). However, since accounting
measures, benchmarks and rankings were constructed based on “standardised
dimensions borrowed from the European experience …”, the resulting evaluations hid
“important elements of differentiation”, thereby constructing a reality that was not
objective and value-free, rather, framed in accordance to Western understandings of
statehood and, thus, value-laden (Costantini, 2015, p. 23; Risse, 2011). Nevertheless,
accounting information benefited US politicians by making their decision to invade and
reconfigure Iraq appear to be a result of an objective, scientific mechanism; Indeed, “A
decision made by numbers … has at least the appearance of being fair and impersonal
… Quantification is a way of making decisions without seeming to decide. Objectivity
lends authority to officials who have very little of their own” (Porter, 1995, p. 8).

The focus of accounting measures only on quantifiable dimensions of state functions
ensured that qualitative dynamics of historical, social and eco-political significance to
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Iraq’s governance problems were invisible. As such, destructive effects of eco-political
events, such as the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, the first Gulf War and the thirteen year war
of economic sanctions, which left Iraq with an estimated $383 billion in financial
obligations, devastated public service infrastructure and impoverished large swaths of
the population, were bypassed as insignificant and irrelevant (Le Billon, 2005).
Accounting’s quantitative representations permitted this by transforming “the political
into a technical zone of control and calculation … to be discussed in an abstract,
scientific discourse ostensibly devoid of subjective content” (Chwastiak, 2001, p. 502).
Consequently, the role of accounting reasoning in justifying US state-building and the
forced reconnection of Iraq is shown.

Accounting constructed an intrested

representation of Iraq’s governance ‘problems’ as it only brought into visibility that
which could be quantified in accordance with capitalist standardised dimensions of
reality. As such, it enabled the discounting of essential qualitative dimensions of these
problems as they were not represented, thereby deemed invisible.

As a result of accounting’s adherence to Western standardised dimensions of reality, its
attributed meanings “will reflect the value system necessary to reproduce the
distribution of power in society …” (Chwastiak, 2001, p. 502).

Indeed, within

accounting’s description of the Iraqi ‘governance problem’ was also reference to
dominant power and capital groups’ preferred solution, being the need to dismantle the
indigenous

state

configurations

and

to

commence

‘efficient’

state-building

engagements. Accordingly, accounting’s role as a technology of government that is
utilised by authorities to achieve objectives deemed desirable is exposed (Foucault,
1991; Funnell and Chwastiak, 2015; Miller and Rose, 1990; Neu, 2000a; Said, 1993).
Indeed, the accounting profession “cannot escape the reality that they still have a
historical inter-dependent relationship with the state, especially during periods of
imperialistic flux” (Catchpowle and Cooper, 2005, p. 20).
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Iraqi State Destruction, Iraqi Oil and the Interested
Requirements for Building a New Iraqi State
In order to rapidly build an Iraqi state that would be conducive to dominant capital and
power interests, the initial post-invasion period of societal shock and disorientation was
capitalised upon by exposing the indigenous state to rapid and comprehensive
destruction, or state ‘ending’, so as to provide a clear slate onto which rapid change and
the new establishment would be built (Baker et al., 2010; Herring, 2009; Klein, 2007).
‘Ending’ of the ‘terrorist’ Iraqi state had been declared a deliberate policy objective by
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz soon after the 9/11 attacks when he
announced that US foreign policy would focus on “ending states that sponsor terrorism”
(quoted in Baker et al., 2010, p. 3). Although the full meaning of ‘state-ending’ had yet
to be conceptualised, both the (in)actions of the US during the invasion and occupation
periods soon provided a good indication.

The 2003 military invasion brought an abrupt end to Saddam’s governing regime and
destroyed what was remaining of the country’s primary infrastructure, thereby
disengaging state capacity from its ability to provide basic citizenry needs. In addition,
chapter four showed how CPA chief Paul Bremer terminated state monopoly on
violence by suspending state institutions such as the army, police and secret service,
thereby destroying state capacity to maintain law, order and territorial integrity. Bremer
also annulled the existing socialist-based Iraqi constitution and gutted the existing state
apparatus of its human capital by implementing a profound de-Baathification policy,
thereby effectively ridding the state of both its socialist-based mindset and workforce.
Also, chapter three showed that the US assumed a policy of intentional indifference
towards the systematic destruction of state institutions, institutional memory,
universities, intellectual capital and society’s collective memory.

This policy of

indifference not only caused the complete gutting of state institutions, including existing
databases, records and paperwork, but also the targeted assassinations of Iraq’s most
prominent intellectual capital conveniently suppressed possible political rivalry,
silenced indigenous expertise and ideology and, instead, subjugated the Iraqi people to
the intellectual expertise and ideology of its foreign occupiers.

Meanwhile, since

neoliberalism conceptualises society as a devolved collection of individuals who
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primarily pursue self-interest and private property gains, the destruction of Iraq’s
collective memory served to unsettle the shared historical, cultural and socialist
underpinnings of Iraqi social fabric, thereby both symbolising and facilitating an end to
the collective congruence and socialist-based nationalist ideology of the indigenous
state (Baker et al., 2010; Ismael and Ismael, 2015). As former UK Prime Minister and
fervent neoliberal advocate, Margaret Thatcher, had notoriously proclaimed: under
neoliberalism, “there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women,
and there are families” (Thatcher, 1987).

The US objective in Iraq was not only to uproot Saddam’s Ba’athist regime and begin a
process of reform but to holistically destroy the existing Iraqi state, including its
institutions and capacities, its intellectual capital, its socialist-based nationalist
ideological underpinnings and the congruency of its social fabric. The result of US
actions was immediate state failure, societal disorientation, intellectual poverty,
lawlessness and a power vacuum that only the US could fill. Perhaps the most striking
exemplar of US intents, commitments and direction with regards the ‘new Iraq’ is that
provided when juxtaposing the US’s policy towards the destruction of Iraq’s sociopolitical fabric with its policy towards the country’s oil: whilst Iraq’s political and much
of its socio-cohesive landscape were being largely destroyed, only one state institution
and state resource were worthy of US military defence, this being the Ministry of Oil
and oil reserves (Klein, 2007; Muttitt, 2011).

The exemplar demonstrates a US

commitment to the destruction of the existing Iraqi State along with its ideological
underpinnings, and a direction towards the reconstruction of a new configuration,
centred on oil.

The strategic importance of oil to an imperial power seeking to retain world hegemony
like the US, and to its dominant capital benefactors cannot be overstated. Catchpowle
and Cooper (2005, p. 3) have argued that “Middle-eastern oil, although essential to the
American economy is more important to the US as a ‘strategic commodity’”. Since oil
has become the most important fuel to industrial capitalism, with centres of world
industry like China, Europe and Japan entirely dependent on its use, any dominant
power seeking to preserve world hegemony needs to secure control over oil prices,
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thereby securing control over world industry (Bromley, 1991; Catchpowle and Cooper,
2005; Neale, 2004). In 1918, Britain’s First Secretary of the War Cabinet, Sir Maurice
Hankey, recognised oil’s strategic importance in the coming era when he warned that:
“Oil in the next war will occupy the place of coal in the present war … The only big
potential supply that we can get under British control is the Persian and Mesopotamian
… Control over these oil supplies becomes a first class British war aim” (Hankey, 1991,
p. 188). After British power gave way to US influence after World War II, the US also
acknowledged the importance of oil, especially that of the Middle East, which holds
over 60% of the world’s reserves at the lowest extractable cost; the US described Saudi
Arabian supplies as a “stupendous source of strategic power and one of the greatest
material prizes in world history” (quoted in Curtis, 1995, p. 21; Muttitt, 2005).

With the 1960 founding of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
in Baghdad, which largely regulates the price of oil worldwide, and the nationalisation
of oil by many Middle Eastern countries in the 1970’s, direct Western control over
Middle Eastern oil had been prevented. However, the US was able to maintain some
indirect control through its economic and strategic alliance with Gulf monarchs,
especially that of the Saudi Arabian regime. These relationships not only protected US
oil interests through the Gulf monarchs’ influence in OPEC, but had also become the
principal sources of sustenance to the USs MIC since the end of the Gulf War; the
complex had become dependent on a ‘circular trading relationship’ with the Gulf
monarchs who effectively refunded US dollars paid for oil by purchasing US weapons
with ‘petro-dollars’ (Catchpowle and Cooper, 2005; Muttitt, 2011; S. Pelletiere, 2004;
S. C. Pelletiere, 2004). However, Western fervour to dominate Middle-Eastern oil was
especially rekindled during the late 1990s. During this time, Western oil company
developments elsewhere around the world were in decline, their extraction costs were
very high, world demand for oil persisted in its relentless rising and the Gulf monarchs,
running budget deficits in their economies, were no longer able to sustain their petrodollar influxes unless they raised oil prices through OPEC. In 1999, Dick Cheney, CEO
of oil company Halliburton and future Vice President of the Bush administration,
summed the situation:
By 2010 we will need on the order of an additional fifty million barrels a day.
So where is the oil going to come from? … While many regions of the world
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offer great oil opportunities, the Middle East with two thirds of the world’s oil
and the lowest cost, is still where the prize ultimately lies … companies are
anxious for greater access there (Cheney, 1999).

Whilst in office as Vice President in 2002, Cheney lead an Energy Task Force to
establish a plan to secure the US’s long-term energy needs. Again, the report centred on
the strategic importance of Middle-Eastern oil as the viable solution to securing energy
security. Another report by the US-UK Energy Dialogue initiative reiterated a similar
narrative: oil demand was forecast to rise by 45 million barrels per day by 2030 and,
since the Middle East held a majority of the world’s reserves at the lowest costs of
extraction, its currently installed capacity needed to rise by over twofold in order to
meet projected demand (Muttitt, 2005, 2011). A 2003 report by the USAID conveyed
the solution to achieve energy security: the Middle East had to open its oil industry to
foreign direct investments, preferably through the use of production-sharing agreements
(PSAs), “to expand oil productive capacity significantly and quickly” (quoted in Muttit,
2005, p. 9).

Similarly, the ‘Oil and Energy’ working group of the US State

Department’s ‘Future of Iraq Project’ also recommended that Iraq “should be opened to
international oil companies as quickly as possible after the war” and that PSAs were the
most appropriate form of foreign investment in Iraqi oil (quoted in Juhasz, 2006).

Since outright US privatisation of Middle-Eastern oil reserves would be considered to
be an overt form of primitive accumulation and, thus, not a realistic modern-day
prospect, PSAs were pursued as an alternate covert mechanism to gain long-term access
and control over indigenous oil. PSAs are multi-decade contracts that relieve nationalist
pressures by keeping the ownership of oil with the state, whilst foreign companies gain
highly favourable compensations for their investments in oil production infrastructure
and their undertaking of risks. As such, “The government can be seen to be running the
show – and the company can run it behind the camouflage of legal title symbolising the
assertion of national sovereignty” (quoted in Muttitt, 2005, p. 11). Moreover, since
PSAs guarantee a company’s right to extract reserves for decades, the company is
permitted to immediately book the estimated value of these reserves into its accounts,
thereby increasing its market value and share price (Muttitt, 2005; 2011). Accordingly,
accounting practices contributed to the conveying of PSAs as an optimum political
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solution that would permit the exploitation of Iraqi oil whilst retaining the appearance of
indigenous ownership. By permitting immediate booking of the estimated full-value of
an oil reserve into corporate accounts, accounting effectively delivered them with the
market and financial benefits of full-ownership. Whilst PSA’s are common in countries
with small oil reserves and high extraction costs, they are taboo in countries with
reserves the size of Iraq’s, which consider them to be clandestine means of
dispossession as such countries are able to achieve investments on much more
beneficial terms.

The significance of oil to both dominant capital and power cliques cannot be
overstressed. In an industrial capitalist world where demand for oil relentlessly rises,
access to and control over increased oil productions and prices in the Middle East would
not only diminish OPEC power, but also provide dominant power with essential energy
security and a ‘stupendous source of strategic power’, whilst also granting dominant
capital access to the the ‘greatest material prize in world history’. Since Iraq harbours
the third largest oil reserves in the world after Saudi Arabia and Iran, with 115 billion
barrels of proven oil reserves, and is believed to contain the world’s largest unexplored
potential, ranging between another 100-200 billion barrels, it was a matter of paramount
eco-geopolitical weighting that US state-building of Iraq be centred around access to
and control of oil. The US needed to build an Iraqi state structure most conducive to
dominant power and capital interests, most prominent of these being oil (Bishop and
Shah, 2008; Catchpowle and Cooper, 2005; Energy Information Administration, 2005;
Juhasz, 2006; Muttitt, 2005, 2011).

Indeed, whilst the US had previously assumed nation-building ventures, such as its
transformation of both Germany and Japan following World War II, its 2003 Iraqi
venture was different. Noah Feldman, a key architect of Iraq’s transitional constitution
(TAL), explains that the US’s previous ‘nation-building’ ventures in Germany and
Japan had focussed on building stable, capitalist and rich allies that would support the
US against the Soviet Union and its satellites; the aim was to build strong allies, not to
build democratic states (Feldman, 2004). Recently, however, “strong countries like the
United States and the Western European powers have an interest in building nation165

states that seem reasonably legitimate to their citizens …” so as to avoid the perception
of being illegitimately imposed by foreign powers (Feldman, 2004, pp. 2–3). Indeed,
Fukuyama (2004, p. 161) notes that “for well over a generation, the trend in world
politics has been to weaken stateness”. This has been a neoliberal project that aims to
undermine traditional notions of state sovereignty whilst preserving its external
appearance through an emphasis of the state form, thereby distorting the division
between the national and supra-national scales of governance. Once achieved, a weak
state serves Western power interests by facilitating an extension of the influence of
Western powers and international institutions into domestic affairs, whilst formally
distancing them from visibility and, thus, from accountability (Chandler, 2006, 2010,
Chomsky, 1999, 2008; Harvey, 2003; Herring, 2009; Rotberg, 2004).

Neoliberal state structural reforms, as noted in chapter 2, have promoted
decentralisation policies, thereby creating ‘lean and mean’ states that reduce the social
safety net, unleash market forces and enable dominant capital’s jumping of
spaces/scales (Brenner, 2004; Harvey, 2005; Jessop, 2002; Lobao and Hooks, 2003).
Indeed, studies have shown that most countries on the periphery that have implemented
neoliberalisation programs have also implemented parallel decentralisation policies
(Pickvance and Pretecielle, 1991; Topal, 2010; Tulchin and Selee, 2004). Moreover,
neoliberal discourse has framed decentralisation policies within the realm of
democracy-promotion, thereby utilising emancipatory rhetoric pertaining increased
liberty and empowerment, and accounting rhetoric pertaining increased efficiency and
accountability, to advance its interests (Topal, 2010).

In addition, state scalar

devolution has advanced both horizontally, permitting a greater role for private agencies
and actors like contractors and NGOs, and vertically, by devolving authority to local
scales of governance. In sum, the US’s focus in Iraq was inverted; rather than building
a strong ally, the US sought to build a weak, decentralised and ‘democratic’ Iraqi state,
“a special category of weak state: the seemingly strong one”, which would secure the
US’s established ecopolitcal order, not resist external engagements in its affairs, and
unleash market forces throughout Iraqi space/scale, yet retain an appearance of full
sovereignty and legitimacy (Rotberg, 2004, p. 5).
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The building of such an establishment would benefit US interests in multiple ways.
Firstly, indigenous opposition to US occupation and to its CPA-imposed new order was
prevalent; a survey conducted by the CPA in May 2004 found that only 6% of Iraqis
wanted the US to remain in Iraq, whilst a vast majority of 86% wanted immediate US
withdrawal or withdrawal once an elected government was handed sovereignty
(Docena, 2005a; O’Hanlon and De Albuquerque, 2005). Additionally, a Gallup poll
survey found that only 16% of Iraqis believed that the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC),
the temporary Iraqi government that Bremer formed in July 2003 to provide a false
impression of ‘shared sovereignty’ between Iraqis and the CPA, was independent.
Rather, up to three in every four Iraqis perceived its actions as being “mostly
determined by the CPA” (Burkholder, 2003; Docena, 2005a). Such popular opposition
fed resistance to the occupation in general, and contributed to an insurgency that united
Iraqis against the US presence and was also eco-politically costly to the US.
Accordingly, the US’s establishment of a weak Iraqi state, to which it could transfer
‘full sovereignty’, would pacify the resistance and relieve the US of the costs of fighting
the insurgency. As a Pentagon official explained, “The transfer of sovereignty clearly
will have an impact on security because you rid yourself of the ‘occupation’ label … So
you remove the political claim from the ideological battle” (quoted in Docena, 2005a, p.
6; Shanker and Weisman, 2003).

Popular opposition to the new order stalled dominant capital investments, as the
possibility of future expropriations by a legitimate Iraqi government was omnipresent.
The establishment of a neoliberal Iraqi state would ratify the US neoliberal order that
had been illegally imposed under military occupation, and would provide protection to
investors and hasten the application of the neoliberal economic agenda. Furthermore, as
the state would be a ‘democratic’ establishment, its ratifications would provide the
imposed order with a perception of legitimacy through popular consent, whilst masking
its subordination to the dominant capital and power interests of its creator. Sir Philip
Watts, chair of Royal Dutch Shell, explained that “There has to be proper security,
legitimate authority and a legitimate process … by which we will be able to negotiate
agreements that would be longstanding for decades … When the legitimate authority is
there on behalf of Iraq, we will know and recognize it” (quoted in Docena, 2005a, p. 5).
Also, by creating a weak state, the US would retain sufficient influence so as to insure
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that the neoliberal configurations it had illegally imposed would remain institutionalised
under future Iraqi governments, thereby acting as a guarantor for dominant capital
group interests (Herring and Rangwala, 2006; Whyte, 2010).

A weak Iraqi state would facilitate continued US interference, influence and presence in
Iraq, thereby granting it geostrategic power at the heart of the Middle East. This would
provide it with a vantage point to press the region for reform, to secure its interests in
the region and to secure those of its Middle-Eastern regional allies, especially Israel
(Baker et al., 2010; Herring, 2008; Herring and Rangwala, 2006). Most importantly,
since Bremer did not have the capacity to impose favourable rules governing the
country’s most significant and vast oil reserves during CPA rule, it was imperative that
‘sovereignty’ be initially handed over to a weak Iraqi state with fragmented authority;
the resulting government would be dependent upon US military might to retain power
and, thus, dominated by US influence (Docena, 2005a; Ismael, 2015).

Such a

relationship of subordination would facilitate the US dictating its requirements with
regards to oil regulation, which the initial Iraqi government would be obligated to
authorise and entrench, thereby securing the fruition of dominant capital access to oil
(Baker et al., 2010; Herring, 2008; Herring and Rangwala, 2006).

Moreover, the

viability of agreements, decisions and regulations made with regards to oil by a
‘legitimate authority’ under US command would be protected by the sovereign shell of
a democratic Iraqi state, whilst conveniently masking US imperial interests and
distancing it from political accountability, as it is “Western elites’ desire to avoid
political responsibility for their relationships with large areas of the world” (Chandler,
2006, p. 30).

In sum, instead of building a strong, national ally, the US sought to establish a
‘governance state’, which exercises “political authority through local, national, and
transnational public and corporate actors with governance not necessarily channelled
through the national level” (Herring, 2009, p. 93). The US sought to limit challenges to
its power in Iraq and to secure the interests of dominant capital and power groups by
devolving the Iraqi state’s political authority amongst various public and private actors
and across multiple spatial/scalar configurations, whilst also limiting state capacity
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(Costantini, 2013, 2015; Herring, 2009; Herring and Rangwala, 2006). In order to
realise this state structure, and also grant it a perception of legitimacy in the midst of
popular opposition and unrest, the US primarily utilised two budgetary mechanisms for
the socio-geopolitical re-engineering of Iraq: the first being through a ‘divide and
conquer’ imperial strategy that sharpened ethno-sectarian cleavages and utilised
discriminative revenue-sharing arrangements to undermine the unity of the indigenous
socio-political fabric, whilst also setting a new system of internal competitiveness
among Iraqi spaces and scales. The second was through the establishment of anaemic
budgetary processes and institutions that weakened state capacity and facilitated power
gains through the deliberate creation of a corrupt state (Whyte, 2010). The following
section will discuss the US’s implementation of the former strategy during the various
stages of Iraqi constitution-making in order to show how its implementation enabled the
US to manipulate the outcome of the Iraqi constitution and, thus, the resulting Iraqi state
structure. A section that will show the various means through which the latter strategy
of weakening state capacity through the establishment of anaemic budgetary processes
and institutions will then follow.

US Imperial State-Building of Iraq: Constitution-making for a
weak but seemingly strong state.
Accounting for divide and conquer imperialism
An accounting mindset focuses on the maximisation of profit through the efficient
management of resources and the minimisation of costs. Chwastiak and Funnell (2015),
Chwastiak and Lehman (2008) and Chwastiak (1996, 1998, 1999, 2007a) have shown
that this form of reasoning had profound influence upon both the planning and
administering of wars by the British and US empires, and Nazi Germany. Most relevant
here is how it induced their endeavour to achieve efficiency in war as it was believed
that this would bring about victory and generate greater power gains.

Moreover,

accounting’s calculative techniques, which afford visibility to only that which can be
quantified, normalised their search for any means to achieve these objectives, including
the use of nuclear weapons and gas chambers, regardless of qualitative considerations,
such as morals, ethics, equity and justice. Therefore, accounting’s role in abetting
rather than deterring unethical behaviour has been exposed. Similarly, Abbott (1901),
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Posner et al (2010) and Newsome (2001) show that this mindset influenced imperial
and colonial powers, such as the Roman, British and US Empires, following their
victory in war and capture of territory, as it also provoked their search for the most
efficient means to exert maximum power over a subjugated people whilst expending a
minimum of resources and force. In this regard, accounting literature has shown the
role of accounting in facilitating the realisation of these objectives by both being a
technology of governance from a distance and by encouraging actions/inactions
consistent with them (Chwastiak and Lehman, 2008; Cooper and Catchpowle, 2009;
Davie, 2000; Gallhofer and Chew, 2000; Gibson, 2000; Miller and Rose, 1990; Neu,
2000a, 2000b; Neu et al., 2001; Neu and Taylor, 1996; Neu and Therrien, 2003). For
example, Neu (2000b, p. 278) showed “how government at a distance can be
accomplished through diverse sites and heterogeneous agents” by manipulating funding
and accountability mechanisms that encourage action/inaction from a distance.

Similarly, the realisation of efficiency in the management of resources and the reduction
of costs was a principal concern for the Bush administration during the 2003 war and
the occupation of Iraq. This is most evidently apparent through SECDEF Donald
Rumsfeld’s radical reduction of US troop and resource deployments in Iraq. As will be
shown in the following chapter, Rumsfeld was fixated on achieving efficiency within
the Pentagon to the extent that he announced a ‘war on bureaucracy’, to which he used
accounting discourse to elevate the significance of eliminating waste and the reduction
of costs to national security (Rumsfeld, 2001). The realisation of efficiency in war and
occupation was seen as essential to national security. It would facilitate the capability
to respond to perceived threats and to undertake multiple ‘necessary’ theatre wars
simultaneously (Donnelly et al., 2000). This mindset led Rumsfeld to radically cutdown troop deployments in Iraq, from a projected average requirement by military
generals of a minimum of 425,000 troops to only 130,600 (Belasco, 2009; Hersh, 2003).
Accordingly, this same mindset, which sought to achieve efficiency by radically
reducing costs and maximising capabilities, influenced the US’s implementation of
policies and tactics that would realise its interests and maximise its imperial power and
control over Iraq. Moreover, since US troops and resources were both overstretched
and understaffed, and the eco-political costs of remaining in an overt power position in
Iraq were unsustainable, an efficient strategy would be one that would establish this
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imperial relationship rapidly, and with a minimum of resources and force, so as to
facilitate for the US an equally rapid hand over of ‘full’ sovereignty to a controllable
regime.

In Iraq, the divide and conquer strategy offered a most efficient solution because its
implementation promised to achieve especially rapid and effective results, whilst also
requiring a minimum expenditure of resources and force, and also promising to reduce
US eco-political costs associated with its opposing a largely united Iraqi front. This
was because the Iraqi population’s composition was comprised of various ethnosectarian groups, most dominant of which were the Sunni Arab, Shia Arab and SunniKurdish Iraqis. Moreover, Kurdish aspirations for an autonomous northern Kurdish
area within a unitary Iraqi state had already been largely realised since the US and UK
imposed a no-fly zone over northern Iraq following the first Gulf War. Since then,
Kurdish aspirations had grown to envisage a federal bi-national formula “in which
Baghdad would remain in exclusive control of key sectors of government like the oil
industry and the security forces” and Kurdish leadership would be embedded within
Iraqi state institutions (Visser, 2010, p. 79). Also, there existed grievances within the
Shia community towards the Saddam regime, which was considered to be majority
Sunni, because of its favouritism patterns of recruitment of the political elite and
because of its repression of instances of Shia uprisings against tyranny (Visser, 2007a,
2010). Finally, oil fields, which provide over 95% of the country’s revenue, were not
uniformly distributed across Iraq, rather, they were largely concentrated in the northern
Kurdish-majority and southern Shia-majority areas (Muttitt, 2005, 2011; Visser,
2007b). As will be shown, these characteristics of Iraq’s modern eco-socio-geopolitical
reality would enable the two most common imperialist divide and conquer tactics, being
“fomenting divisions among subjugated groups by sowing mutual mistrust …”, and
utilising funding mechanisms, such as discriminatory revenue-sharing schemes, to be
most effectively applied (Posner et al., 2010. p. 451). In this regard, Posner et al (2010.
p. 240) remind us that
Divide and conquer has been a time-honored strategy of many … imperial
and colonial powers … because it is cheaper to set factions within the latent
opposition to fighting among themselves, and if necessary to defeat them
piecemeal, than it is to defeat them as a unified enemy (Posner et al., 2010,
p. 450).
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In order to apply the first strategy, to ‘sow mutual mistrust’ amongst Iraqi people, a
project for the tripartite ethno-sectarian federalisation of Iraq became the cornerstone. It
was a decision that ran “counter to many progressive and nationalist political actors in
the region, as well as popular preferences for solutions facing the Arab state(s) and
societies” (Ismael & Ismael, 2015, p.128). In order to justify this decision, the ‘artificial
state’ narrative was considerably recounted; the narrative claimed that Iraq was an
artificial creation that encompassed rival ethno-sectarian groups that would fragment
into their ‘natural’ components had it not been for the restraining hand of an
authoritarian regime like that of Saddam Hussein. Commentary in support of this
narrative had extended its relevance across the Middle East and proposed a cartographic
‘solution’, being the ‘new Middle East’, which sought to achieve a form of national
purity by imposing redefined border lines that would supposedly align identity with
geography, thereby creating multiple new states out of the dismembered fragments of
the existing Middle Eastern nation-states (Fromkin, 2009; Goldberg, 2008; Peters,
2006; Simon, 1997; Williams, 2014; Yapp, 1987). In 2006, during a press conference
that discussed the Israeli bombing of Lebanon as a result of an attack by Hezbollah, US
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also made reference to a ‘new Middle East’, noting
that “What we’re seeing here, in a sense, is the growing – the birth pangs of a new
Middle East and whatever we do we have to be certain that we’re pushing forward to
the new Middle East not going back to the old one” (Rice, 2006).

Whilst the Bush administration affirmed that it was committed to the territorial integrity
of Iraq’s borders on several occasions, it “pursued paradoxical policies of Iraqi
territorial integrity (including to continue isolating Iran) while in practice deepening
sectarianism” (Le Billon, 2015, p. 74). The US justified this policy by referring to
neoliberal formulations of its ‘good governance’ rubric: in order to create a viable
democracy within the contours of existing Iraqi space, US policy makers emphasised
that it was critical to establish a state system that proportionally reflected the three
major ethno-sectarian communities (Alkadiri, 2010; Ismael and Ismael, 2015).

In

effect, communal group identity was politicised in a way that privileged it, as an
efficient foundation for state-building in Iraq, instead of propagating universal
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citizenship, thereby empowering ethno-sectarian local elites and situating them in
competition both amongst each other and against state authority.

Indeed, several

scholars have shown that the politicisation of sectarianism within the diverse Levant
area has been a phenomenon of modernity, which has historically been mobilised to
achieve power gains (Ismael, 2015; Khoury, 2002; Makdisi, 2000; Masters, 2001;
Quataert, 2005; Said, 1979). Ismael (2015, p. 127) explains that
local indigenous differences did exist, as they have in all societies the world
over, and they were politicized in a manner that often undermined state
formation and invited foreign involvement … when promoted in the absence
of a functioning state, such mobilizations justify both overt foreign
intervention and the denial of local autonomy as being legitimate.

Paul Bremer evoked this rhetoric to justify the overpowering domination of the US over
the state-building of Iraq, and its newly imposed tripartite system; he framed them as an
obligation that was necessary due to indigenous incompetence stemming from their
ethno-sectarian cleavages: “those people couldn’t organize a parade, let alone run the
country” (Bremer, 2006, p. 171). Zaid Al-Ali, a legal adviser to the UN on statebuilding reforms in Iraq between 2005-2010, explained: “The CPA and its allies were
faced with a choice: to emphasize unity over division … or to treat Iraqis as incapable
of governing themselves democratically and to reinforce the divisions within the system
of government. Sadly, the second option had been selected well before the 2003
invasion” (Al-Ali, 2014, p. 65).

Contrary to the artificial state narrative that propagated an ethno-sectarian division of
Iraqi power and space, historically this had been non-existent. The establishment of
Islamic rule in the seventh century organised Iraq into regions, not sects while the 400
years of Ottoman rule from 1534 to 1914 divided Iraq into Ottoman provinces, not
sects. Both the monarchical and republic state forms that were established by the
British Empire and the subsequent military coups following the Ottoman’s overrun
were non-sectarian. Moreover, historical studies that are based on Ottoman documents
conclude an omnipresence of a supra-regional identity of ‘Iraq’ rather than it being a
modern and ‘artificial’ creation of the British Empire in 1920 (Al-Tikriti, 2009;
Cockburn, 2006, 2015; Fuccaro, 1999; Izady, 2003; Kadhim, 2012; Neep, 2003, 2015,
173

Pursley, 2015a, 2015b; Tauber, 1995; Telhami, 2005; Visser, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c,
2007d, 2008, 2009, 2010; Weidmann and Salehyan, 2013). This was most notably
evidenced in a quote by Basra historian Abdallah al-Basri, who died in 1831, as he
made reference to the existence of the supra-regional identity of ‘Iraq’ in his
announcement that “There are two Basras, a big one in Iraq, and a small one in
Morocco” (quoted in Visser, 2007a, p. 66). It was also evidenced through the demands
of Iraqi insurgents during the 1920 revolution against the British occupation and British
Mandate system, which demanded Iraq’s complete independence, ‘al-istiqlal al-tamm’,
within its ‘natural borders’ that they defined as being from north Mosul to the Persian
Gulf (Kadhim, 2012; Neep, 2015; Pursley, 2015b; Tauber, 1995).

Indeed, Visser

(2007a, p. 64) reminds us that “never before has any attempt been made to reshape the
entire region by establishing ethnic and sectarian cantons; doing so now would involve
extensive displacements of people in areas with mixed populations”.

In conjunction with the sharpening of ethno-sectarian cleavages, the second strategy of
divide and conquer, being through discriminatory revenue-sharing schemes, was also
applied to deepen the ethno-sectarian divide and to incentivise the Iraqi people to permit
the establishment of the US’s required Iraqi state structure. Wildavsky (1986, p. 2)
confirms that “The bonds between budgeting and ‘politiking’ are intimate.

The

allocation of resources necessarily reflects the distribution of power … it is through the
choices inherent in limited resources that consensus is established and conflict is
generated”. Since the territorial distribution of oil in Iraq was largely aligned with
Kurdish and Shia-majority areas, whilst the Sunni-majority western Iraq was oil
deprived, any discriminatory revenue-sharing budgetary scheme that privileged areas
with oil reserves over the rest of Iraq would almost certainly foment ethno-sectarian
based geo-ecopolitical divisions and conflict. Moreover, by utilising this budgetary
scheme in combination with political policies that sharpened ethno-sectarian identities,
the US would effectively incentivise Iraqi ethno-sectarian elite to maximise their selfinterest; it would lead to their own pursuit of building a weak and federalised Iraqi state
structure so as to devolve both authority and wealth to them. Once established, this
apparatus would itself fuel its sustenance through the interplay between the reformed
decentralised state structures and the flows of FDI; FDI’s resulting jumping of Iraqi
spaces and scales, whilst evading central state controls, would deepen “the gap between
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investment-rich and investment-poor governorates. This spatial inequality overlaps
with other inequalities and in particular with ethno-religious divisions, undermining the
country’s social cohesion” (Costantini, 2013, pp. 263–264). Finally, since a “polarized
distribution of investments – one not mediated by the central government – exacerbates
competition between Iraqi governorates”, dominant capital interests would be better
facilitated as the ‘competitive’ governorates would favour exclusive agreements at the
expense of national benefit (Costantini, 2013, p. 276).

As will be shown in the

following section, in order to successfully implement this divide and conquer strategy,
the US manipulated the intimate relationship between budgeting and ‘politiking’, as its
divisive potentials were profound within the Iraqi context. Indeed, Costantini (2013, p.
276) confirms that, “Instead of grounding these relations in the principles of
sustainability and equity, the reforms implemented in Iraq have unleashed dynamics
prone to social, political, and economic instability”.

In seeking an efficient strategy to rapidly establish an imperial relationship of power
and control over a weak Iraqi state that was structurally conducive to US interests, US
imperial state-building in Iraq became premised upon the divide and conquer strategy.
This strategy was a form of socio-reengineering as it involved sharpening ethnosectarian differences, and the utilisation of discriminatory budgetary arrangements so as
to fragment Iraqi society into groups that were largely driven by self-interest. Together,
these divide and conquer tactics served to create the necessary conditions that would
enable the devolution of Iraqi state spatial/scalar configurations of authority across
diverse sites and heterogeneous agents. Accounting’s mindset, which focuses on the
efficient management of resources and reduction of costs, contributed to the decision to
implement this divide and conquer strategy as it translated the strategy’s costeffectiveness and reduced need for resources as the most profitable to US interests. In
addition, accounting’s reduction of reasoning to quantitative instrumental rationality
enabled US leadership to exclude qualitative considerations pertaining to this strategy,
such as the disintegration of the unified Iraqi societal fabric and the possible
developments of civil war, ethnic cleansing and fragmentation of Iraq’s territorial
integrity, thereby facilitating its implementation as merely a rational solution to the
problem on hand. As such, accounting’s role in contributing to the establishment of
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imperial relations of dominance, and in generating profound societal instability is
exhibited.

The first stage of constitution-making for imperial interests
Arato (2009, p. 100) emphasises that “From the outset, the Americans wanted to impose
a constitution” on Iraq in order to establish the state structure that was conducive to US
interests. However, since it was necessary for the US to retain plausible deniability so
as to bestow the Iraqis a sense of self-ownership to the constitution, the US sought to
“use whatever available political façade for making and imposing a constitution that
could be … successfully presented and legitimated as a highly progressive and
indigenous achievement” (Arato, 2009, p. 101). For the first time in Iraqi history,
Bremer, whilst appointing the 25-member IGC of 13th July 2003 that would
theoretically be ‘consulted’ by the CPA with regards matters concerning the temporary
governance of Iraq, applied strict ethno-sectarian quotas later termed Mohassasa.
Whilst the IGC held no effective authority and lacked local legitimacy as its members
were predominantly drawn from US-loyal Iraqi exiles, it served the purpose of
projecting an Iraqi face to the occupation, whilst instilling the first seeds of an ethnosectarian political culture in Iraq (Al-Ali, 2014; Arato, 2009; Docena, 2005a; Jawad,
2013; Visser, 2007c). Al-Ali (2014, p. 77) stresses that “members had an ethnosectarian identity foisted upon them, regardless of his or her political beliefs …”, to the
extent that a Communist party member with an obvious non-sectarian mindset was
counted as a ‘Shia’ member.

Whilst the council was predictably beset with internal disagreements from the outset
and, thus, was ineffectual at posing a serious challenge to US dominance, it did serve
US interests in several ways. Importantly, at a time when even the UN special envoy to
Iraq, Lakhdar Brahimi, described Bremer’s overarching authority over Iraq as ‘the
dictator’ (Chandrasekaran, 2004; quoted in Docena, 2005a, p. 11), the council’s
appointment of a council of ministers enabled Bremer to suppress his dictatorial role,
asserting instead that they “serve at the pleasure of the Governing Council, conduct the
business of government. They set policy” (Bremer, 2003). As such, the US utilised its
appointment of the IGC as an imperial strategy to put “more Americans out back and
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more Iraqis out front”, as described by Thomas Friedman (Friedman, 2003).
Furthermore, in an effort to provide legitimacy to the US’s constitution-making process,
the IGC was utilised to appoint a Constitutional Preparatory Committee to outline the
procedure for drafting the permanent constitution, which the CPA insisted would be
drafted by another appointed body under the CPA’s sovereign authority (Al-Ali, 2014;
Arato, 2009).

When the plan for an appointed constitution preparation assembly met fierce opposition
by a majority of Iraqis who wanted an elected representative assembly, most notably
from Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani who was the most senior Iraqi cleric in Shia Islam
and had a following of approximately 60% of Iraqis, the IGC served the purpose of
being the medium through which the CPA imposed a two-stage transition compromise
(Al-Ali, 2014; Arato, 2009). The second-stage of this compromise arranged for a
constituent assembly to be elected in January 2005 so as to be tasked with drafting the
permanent constitution; this constitution would then be put to a referendum before the
December 2005 elections. In the meantime, however, a temporary interim constitution,
known as the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), would be adopted by the IGC as
part of the first-stage of transition. Most notably, the TAL would establish the system
of government for an interim government to administer and govern Iraq during
transition, and also set the parameters that would guide the process of permanent
constitution-making (Al-Ali, 2014; Arato, 2009; Docena, 2005a; Morrow, 2005).

Whilst this compromise appeared to be a victory for Sistani over Bremer by permitting
an elected constituent assembly to create the permanent constitution of Iraq, details
proved otherwise. Since the first stage’s TAL “would set the stage for the heated
negotiations over the new Iraqi constitution in 2005”, the US’s effective control over its
drafting and its passage was an imperative imperial objective that would extensively
safeguard the passage of its interests into the final constitution (Visser, 2010, p. 81).
Indeed, TAL-making turned out to be “a classic imperial enterprise”; it was drafted by a
small group of US technocrats and only two appointed Iraqi-American jurists, its
drafting was secretive with discussions being held outside of the IGC with US-aligned
elites, such as Kurdish elite, and it was poorly translated from English to Arabic only
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after several months of secretive drafting so as to be approved by the IGC (Al-Ali,
2014, p. 78; Arato, 2009; Jawad, 2013; Morrow, 2005). Moreover, the TAL secured
Bremer’s Orders by setting near impossible rules for the interim government to repeal
them.

The TAL also entrenched the newly imposed ethno-sectarian political culture by
underscoring divisive issues and differences instead of emphasising social cohesion and
a unified state, as done by the US constitution. For example, the TAL mentioned ‘sect’
a number of times, although “This divisive word had not been used in previous Iraqi
constitutions and its use was rejected by a large number of Iraqis” (Jawad, 2013, p. 8).
The TAL stipulated that members of the Transitional Iraqi Government, to whom the
CPA would hand over sovereignty on 28th June 2004, would also be appointed and their
appointment be based on ethno-sectarian quotas. The TAL also reinforced the deBaathification policy, which was enforced excessively and, thus, excluded and
marginalised large swaths of Sunni Arab Iraqis from participating in Iraqi politics. It
also conveyed the mechanism through which the final constitution would be approved:
Article 61(C) provided that the constitution would be ratified if a majority of voters
approved it, and if two-thirds of the voters in three or more provinces did not reject it
(Coalition Provisional Authority, 2004). This clause effectively bestowed the Kurds,
who constituted approximately 17% of the Iraqi population and formed a majority in
three provinces out of Iraq’s eighteen, with a ‘veto’ power over the majority population
of Iraq (Al-Ali, 2014; Jawad, 2013).

The TAL reconfigured the spatial/scalar structure of the state; Article 4 described the
state as “republican, federal, democratic, and pluralistic” (Coalition Provisional
Authority, 2004).

The scalar restructure of the state radically decentralised state

authority, leaving the state with only seven powers that didn’t even include a role in
taxation, health or education, thereby radically curbing state power and resting real
authority with the regions and provinces. Meanwhile, the spatial restructure of the state
established an initial ethnic-based federal system that recognised the three Kurdishdominated provinces of north Iraq as one federal region and the remaining Arab
territory as another, whilst also extending the right to future federal regions to other
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geographic provinces (Jawad, 2013; Visser, 2007c, 2010). The TAL also declared the
disputed oil-rich city of Kirkuk, which the Kurds had sought to merge to their territory,
as a ‘disputed territory’ whose status would be decided through a future referendum,
although the majority Sunni and Shia Iraqi Arabs regarded Kirkuk as a mixed province
of Iraq. Visser (2010, p. 81) explains that, since the merging of Kirkuk would provide
the Kurds with authority over its vast oil fields, this clause of the TAL “immediately
opened the possibility of full Kurdish independence and that also introduced an element
of instability into the existing administrative map of Iraq by allowing other areas across
the country to be similarly classified as ‘disputed’ zones”. In effect, the clause instilled
self-interested secessionist pressures within Iraq’s temporary constitution.

The possibility of such territorial instability was the reason why both Sunni and Shia
Arabs had opposed the federal state structure out of fear that it would lead to the
partitioning of Iraq; instead, they had favoured the granting of autonomy to the Kurds as
a solution to their issue. However, Kurdish aspirations for greater independence had
grown and were being radicalised by foreign influences (Galbraith, 2006; Visser, 2010).
A most notable influence was Peter W. Galbraith, a staff member of the US Foreign
Relations Committee and a former highly influential US ambassador, who was an
advisor to the Kurds during the transition period.

In his book, The End of Iraq,

Galbraith confirms that he played a decisive role in stimulating and encouraging
Kurdish interest in divisive policies, such as the development of their own oil sector,
curbing the powers of the state to a minimum, maintaining separate armies and seeking
full independence (Galbraith, 2006; Visser, 2010). Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani had
warned against such influence, strongly protesting against “the increasing number of
foreigners in favour of building on and elaborating sectarianism in Iraq”; he specifically
rejected policies that ‘enshrined’ and ‘deepened’ sectarian differences (Al-Sistani, 2007;
Visser, 2007c, p. 815).

It was through the US’s institutionalisation of an ethno-sectarian political culture into
each of the IGC, the TAL and the Transitional Iraqi Government that ethno-sectarian
identities were radicalised and mutual mistrust was sown. This socio-reengineering was
also further exacerbated by the US’s failure to provide security, which led to a rising
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tide of ethno-sectarian violence.

Sirri (2014, p. 352) explains, “once political

mobilisation around group identities was instituted, it became increasingly harder to
overcome – ultimately leading to existential fears in times of rising insecurity”. The
resulting mistrust and fear served US imperial interests as it granted it a position of
dominance in the midst of a disunited Iraqi front, and also radicalised Iraqi conceptions
of group identity, thereby setting each group to pursue self-interested objectives instead
of the interests of a unified Iraq (Al-Ali, 2014; Inglehart et al., 2006; International Crisis
Group, 2005; Sirri, 2014). In this regard, the TAL’s radical decentralisation of state
authority to the provinces and its enabling of discriminative revenue-sharing schemes
that would align control over oil fields with ethno-sectarian based territorial
configurations, served to sharpen each groups’ pursuit of self-interested objectives.
Indeed, this combination of budgetary and divisive policies eventually led the Supreme
Council of Islamic Revolution of Iraq (SCIRI), the dominant Iraqi Shia political party,
to support the state-building of a highly decentralised, federal Iraqi state structure, as it
too came to envision the establishment of a Shia super-region that would combine the
nine Shiite-majority provinces of south Iraq along with their stupendous oil reserves
(Al-Ali, 2014; Juhasz, 2006; Le Billon, 2015; Visser, 2007b, 2010). Accordingly, the
US was able to garner support from dominant Iraqi political elite for the establishment
of an Iraqi state structure that was most conducive to its power and dominant capital
interests, and that would otherwise be opposed by a majority of Iraqis. Indeed, a poll
taken during the transition period found that 69% of Iraqis wanted a strong centralised
government structure, with only 22% supporting a decentralised federal state structure
(Docena and Gershman, 2005; O’Hanlon and Kamp, 2005).

The second stage of constitution-making for imperial interests:
Accounting for the ideological re-engineering of Iraqi society
With the TAL successfully drafted and imposed; the US proceeded to also exert
influence and control over the January elections for the constituent assembly. Bremer
enacted an election law that gave a seven-member electoral commission, appointed by
him, broad powers to disqualify candidates that the US deemed unfit for the electoral
race (Chandrasekaran and Pincus, 2004; Docena, 2005a). Furthermore, Bremer enacted
CPA Order 96, which determined the legal framework for the elections; most
importantly, the Order established Iraq as a ‘single electoral constituency’, which meant
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that if voter participation in a particular province was lower than elsewhere in the
country, that province would simply not be represented in the constitutive assembly
(Al-Ali, 2014).

Since the majority-Sunni Arab provinces, whose political elite

remained defiantly opposed to US state-building policies, were engulfed in violence and
insurgency, residents would be unable and unwilling to participate in the elections and,
thus, would not be represented in the assembly. Finally, Order 96 also established a
‘closed list’ system, which meant that each political coalition had to submit a single list
of its candidates, and voters would have to choose between the lists. This further
entrenched ethno-sectarian deviances as voters could not vote for individuals, rather
they had to vote for a political bloc, which had unsurprisingly formed based on ethnosectarian lines.

In tandem with these arrangements, the US sought to embed its ideological principles
within the Iraqi state and society so as to build popular support for its regime and for
appropriate candidates in the elections.

Here, accounting’s role in facilitating the

achievement of imperial objectives is further exposed as the US utilised direct funding
mechanisms to achieve these objectives. In order to influence the elections, the US
increased its funding for ‘democracy building’ from $100 million to $458 million and
spent this money on its agencies and on contractors to promote US goals and USfavoured candidates within Iraqi civil society. For example, the Research Triangle
Institute’s (RTI) task, as quoted in its contract with USAID, was to make sure that “the
most appropriate ‘legitimate’ and functional leaders” prevailed in elections (quoted in
Docena, 2005b, p. 20). In fulfilling this provision, RTI utilised various techniques that
included acts of nepotism and corruption as legitimate methods to ensure that only those
who were conducive to US interests were elected (Bullard et al., 2005; Docena, 2005b,
2005a). Indeed, whilst discussing RTI’s processes and influence, employee Christian
Arandel conceded, “Let us be clear. These are not elections. These are all processes of
selections” (quoted in Docena, 2005b, p. 20). Moreover, the processes through which
RTI selected ‘legitimate’ candidates were aligned with the US’s imperial strategy of
division; instead of seeking talented Iraqis that were representative of the entire
community, the US’s criteria led to the selection of the most contentious candidates to
fill the new regime. John Agresto, the senior adviser to the Iraqi Ministry of Higher
Education and Scientific Research, observed:
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We’re more than happy to do exactly the opposite of what [our Constitution
tried to do] – we seek out the loudest and most virulent factions and
empower them … We gather together the representatives of the most
antagonistic factions and think thats good democracy. We’ve done nothing
to blur the lines separating people and everything to sharpen them. We will
not see moderate and thoughtful people representing the wider interest of
Iraq; rather we’ll see ideologues chosen for the very reason that they were
not mild, moderate or thoughtful but because they were ideologues (Agresto,
2007, p. 107).

Meanwhile, the US also utilised contractors to embed hundreds of ‘experts’ and
‘advisers’ into the interim government and its ministries so as to entrench the radical
neoliberal regime; contractors, such as Bearing Point, Creative Associates and RTI,
were tasked with securing US interests into key sectors, such as education, local
government and the economy (Docena, 2005). Docena (2005a, p. 9) explains that:
Along with the troops who entered Iraq was a silent battalion of agencies and
contractors whose mission was to build up a pro-US, pro-neoliberal ‘civil
society’ by creating, funding, and supporting NGOs, trade unions, business
councils, research institutions, professional associations, and other civil
society organizations.

Accounting’s role as a facilitator of imperial objectives is exhibited firstly through the
accounting techniques and calculations that allowed these contracts and funding
mechanisms to be administered and audited. Moreover, Neu (2000b) has shown that
imperial powers utilise funding mechanisms to drive heterogeneous sites and agencies
to employ a policy of assimilation to alter indigenous beliefs/practices so as to make
them conform to imperial ideology and practices. Similarly, the US’s use of funding
mechanisms to drive heterogeneous sites and agencies to entrench neoliberal ideology
and practices within the interim government and Iraqi society shows accounting’s
contributory role in the translation of the policy of assimilation into practice in Iraq. As
such, it demonstrates accounting’s role in the US’s attempted re-engineering of Iraqi
society from its indigenous socialist-based ontology to one that was neoliberal
capitalism-based. Following from this, Chwastiak and Funnell (2015) have shown the
role accounting plays in transforming state imperial techniques, including criminal
techniques, into a commodity and, thus, merely a business opportunity for capital
groups. This role of accounting is confirmed in this Iraqi context as US imperial
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techniques, including acts of nepotism and corruption, were transformed into mere
commodities within a business transaction, thereby facilitating a business-like approach
to their execution. This is because accounting focussed “the companies’ attention on
what is important in a capitalist economy, profit …”, thereby justifying all means to
realise this emphasis, whilst masking their malfeasance and their unethical/immoral role
in manipulating the free-will of a people to the benefit of an imperial power and its
capitalist interests (Funnell and Chwastiak, 2015, p. 180).

The second stage of constitution-making for imperial interests: Securing a
favourable permanent constitution
By the time the drafting committee was formed, and the US appointed fifteen Sunni
Iraqis due to a lack of Sunni representation, which was an expected result of the single
electoral constituency policy; the committee was left with only two months to complete
a final document. During this stage, internal discord and lack of time meant that the
committee failed to meet the US-imposed deadline and, although the TAL provided an
option for six months of extended negotiations, the US firmly denied its application.
Instead, “the incomplete process moved behind closed doors, to a ‘leadership council’
of selected political elites and US embassy official and advisers” (Sirri, 2014, p. 351).
During this stage, significant portions of the elected committee’s draft were replaced
with sections of the TAL and clauses changed to better suit US interests. At one point,
US Ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalizad, who became notoriously known for his
significant interference and influence during these negotiations, went to the extent of
putting forward a substitute text of the constitution in English (Al-Ali, 2014; Arato,
2009; Docena and Gershman, 2005; Sirri, 2014). A Kurdish member of the committee
complained: “The Americans say they don’t intervene, but they have intervened deep.
They gave us a detailed proposal, almost a full version of a constitution … The U.S.
officials are more interested in the Iraqi constitution than the Iraqis themselves …”
(quoted in Docena and Gershman, 2005; quoted in Finer and Fekeiki, 2005).

The drafting continued until just days before the scheduled referendum of the 15th
October 2005, when an initiative was announced to try to encourage Sunni Arabs to
vote in favour of the constitution; a provision had been inserted stipulating that the text
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would be amended within four months of its ratification. Al-Ali (2014, p. 90) described
this provision as a “logical absurdity” because “if their intention to amend the text was
sincere, they should simply have extended the drafting process”. Whilst the constitution
was eventually approved by approximately 80% of the population, most Iraqis were not
aware that the final draft was not a product of their elected representatives; nor did they
know what was in the final text as “the process was so opaque that even some members
of the original drafting committee were not clear what the final version actually said”
(Al-Ali, 2014, p. 90). With very limited knowledge of what the constitution contained,
Iraqis were again driven to vote based on their allegiances to ethno-sectarian political
blocs.

By comparing the draft constitution that had been formed by the elected representatives
during two months of negotiations with the final document secretively and
undemocratically negotiated behind closed doors, the extent to which the US was
successful at steering the draft in a direction other than that which the constitutional
committee intended becomes apparent. The early draft had favoured a conservative
vision of society, a strong central government and a Scandinavian-type welfare state
system that would uphold every citizen’s right to education, health care, housing,
employment and other social services (Al-Ali, 2014; Arato, 2009; Docena, 2007;
Docena and Gershman, 2005; Zunes, 2009). Indeed, it had declared, “Social justice is
the basis of building society” (quoted in Docena and Gershman, 2005), which was in
line with a poll of Iraqi opinions at the time that found 65% wanting a largely statecontrolled welfare economy, with only 6.6% supporting a free-market economy. In its
place, however, the final document obliged the state to “reform of the Iraqi economy in
accordance with modern economic principles to insure the full investment of its
resources, diversification of its sources, and the encouragement of the private sector …
the state shall guarantee the encouragement of investment in the various sectors …”
(Iraqi Constitution, 2005, Articles 25 and 26). With regards to welfare commitments, it
gave “vague assurances that the services will be delivered …”, whilst instilling the
private sector’s role in their delivery, thereby hinting “at the coming wholesale
privatization of social services in Iraq …” (Docena and Gershman, 2005). In effect, the
amended constitution established a neoliberal state with a focus on maintaining a
market-economy that created high levels of value (Docena, 2007; Docena and
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Gershman, 2005; Looney, 2004, 2005).

Most importantly, the strong central

government envisioned by the early draft was reversed: federal government authority
was narrowly defined in Article 110, and Article 115 allocated all other authority to the
regional and provincial governments. Additionally, Article 121:2 declared that any
contradiction between regional and federal legislation would be settled in favour of the
regional authorities.

Perhaps the most infamous article that further diminished the role of the central
government whilst realising dominant capital and power interests was Article 112.
Section one of this article highly decentralised authority over oil and gas resources by
delegating shared management over ‘present fields’ to both the federal and all other
provincial/regional governments.

The wording of this section provided a highly

contentious distinction as it granted the federal government shared management of only
‘present fields’, thereby blocking its authority over the country’s vast yet to be
discovered, or yet to be in production, fields. Al-Ali (2014, p. 96) emphasises that such
a distinction “was unheard of internationally, and … has since created enormous
problems”.

In addition, Article 112:2 effectively obliged both the federal and

regional/provincial governments to open the country’s oil reserves to the big oil
companies by decreeing that they must “develop the oil and gas wealth in a way that
achieves the highest benefit … using the most advanced techniques of the market
principles and encouraging investment”.

Together, the clauses of Article 112 effectively secured foreign control over a majority
of Iraq’s oil: firstly, since regional governments would have weaker bargaining power
than the federal government, which embodied the necessary institutional capabilities
that the regions lacked and also the power of consolidated sovereignty, Article 112
effectively secured inferior terms for the Iraqi people in deals with oil companies
(Muttitt, 2005, 2011). Indeed, even before the final constitution had been approved, the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) had already begun signing PSAs in spite of
central government warnings. During TAL negotiations in June 2004, the KRG signed
an agreement with a Norwegian company, DNO.

In 2009, Peter Galbraith, the

notorious US adviser whose legacy of radicalising Kurdish negotiators’ positions
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extended into the permanent constitution-making process where he gratified his
personal role in denying the central government a taxation role, was revealed to have
had a personal business interest in DNO; this personal business interest earned him up
to $100 million (Al-Ali, 2014; Glanz and Gibbs, 2009; Muttitt, 2005; Visser, 2010).

The oil fields that were currently in production, or ‘present fields’, amounted to just
seventeen of the eighty known fields, representing only 40 billion of Iraq’s known 115
billion barrels of known reserves. This meant that Article 112 effectively opened 64%
of known Iraqi oil to unfavourable deals and control by private oil companies.
Furthermore, this percentage was expected to rise to 81% once the widely believed 100
billion barrels of yet to be discovered reserves were found, and to 87% if the Oil
Ministry’s prediction of 200 billion barrels of unknown reserves materialised (Bishop
and Shah, 2008; Energy Information Administration, 2005; Juhasz, 2006; Muttitt, 2005;
Zunes, 2009). At the time, Iraqi Vice-President Abdul Mahdi acknowledged, “this is
very promising to the American investors and to American enterprise, certainly to oil
companies” (Abdul Mahdi, 2004; quoted in Docena, 2005a, p. 14; quoted in Zunes,
2009, p. 103). Given that oil accounts for over 95% of the Iraqi state’s revenue, such
prodigious foreign control over oil would effectively translate into a foreign
stranglehold on the Iraqi state. Finally, since the constitution devolved a majority of the
central government’s authority to regions, it effectively encouraged provinces to form
into regions so as to acquire this authority.

Most notably, they were particularly

incentivised to do this so as to gain authority over all non-present oil fields. In this
regard, the constitution preserved the TAL’s self-interest-based secessionist pressures
that were generated by its establishment of ‘disputed territories’, thereby sustaining
Kurdish ambitions to merge oil-rich Kirkuk and, one day, achieve full independence. In
addition, it did not restrict the number of provinces that could merge into regions,
thereby permitting for the formation of super-regions, such as the Shia super-region
envisioned by SCIRI, and also did not require that their borders be adjoining (Al-Ali,
2014; Iraqi Constitution, 2005). Finally, Article 138 re-emphasised the ethno-sectarian
quotas, thereby causing it to become “consequentially entrenched in popular
consciousness”. The article imposed a tripartite ‘Presidency Council’ system until
2010, which became “one of the greatest obstacles towards the formation of viable
cabinets” (Ismael and Ismael, 2015, p. 131).
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US Imperial State-Building of Iraq: Establishing anaemic
budgetary processes and institutions for a weak but seemingly
strong state.
Another budgetary-related mechanism that further secured US interests in Iraq was
corruption; Whyte (2007b, p. 164) reminds us that “Virulent and institutionalized
corruption in Iraq has extended the neo-colonial reach of the U.S., sustaining a much
broader strategy of domination aimed at securing the political and economic compliance
of future Iraqi governments”. Among other effects, the institutionalisation of corruption
in Iraq weakened state capacity to provide public services and undergo investment
projects, compelled the opening of the oil industry to foreign capital, fuelled sectarian
conflict and the radicalisation of ethno-sectarian identities, generated a political
economy of violence and enabled billions of dollars of wealth to be transferred from the
public sector to dominant capital groups (Al-Ali, 2014; Cooper and Catchpowle, 2009;
Savage, 2013a, 2013b, Whyte, 2007a, 2007b). Whilst corruption did exist under the
Saddam regime; prior to the first Gulf War, “it was dangerous for civil servants (and
even most ministers) to engage in corruption … “ (Al-Ali, 2014, p. 191), as “a
significant number of officials who were convicted of corruption-related crimes were
executed” (p. 192). Furthermore, whilst the thirteen years of US-led sanctions did
undermine Iraqi state capacity, thereby fostering increased corruption, since the 2003
invasion, corruption radically expanded and intensified (Al-Ali, 2014; Savage, 2013a).
By 2006, corruption was so powerful that Stuart Bowen, the US SIGIR, described it as
the ‘second insurgency’ (quoted in Al-Ali, 2014, p. 189).

This section will show the

juxtaposition between the US objective of state-building a weak Iraqi state structure and
its establishment of anaemic budgetary processes and institutions; dysfunctional
budgetary processes and institutions facilitated the institutionalisation of corruption and
fiscal malfeasance, whilst also diminishing state capacity and extending the imperial
reach of the US within Iraq.
CPA reforms to rules governing the budgetary system, as shown in chapter 3,
considerably decreased the possibility of securing corruption-related convictions, as
they created new institutions that significantly increased bureaucratic obstacles at a time
of staff shortages and rapid public expenditure (Al-Ali, 2014). In addition, the normal
rule of law with regards foreign misconduct in Iraq was lifted through both CPA Order
17 and Bush’s Executive Order 13303. The CPA deliberately navigated around and
187

obstructed the application of proper accounting, accountability and auditing
mechanisms.

Accordingly, CPA-era configurations of budgetary processes and

institutions effectively created liminal space for corrupt practices, such as
embezzlement, bribery and fraud, to flourish and become institutionalised within the
Iraqi state, thereby facilitating the transfer of billions of dollars in Iraqi oil revenue from
the public domain to dominant capital groups (Chwastiak, 2009, 2013, Whyte, 2007a,
2007b). Also, the existence of rampant corruption during the CPA’s reign served to
undermine Iraqi state sovereignty and facilitate the expansion of US influence so that it
became embedded within the Iraqi state. For example, whilst bombs achieved the
destruction of Iraq’s existing infrastructure, it was corrupt CPA budgetary processes
that facilitated for predominantly US multinational corporations to completely replace
existing Iraqi and European systems with US design and technology, thereby
subjugating the state to impoverished dependency on mostly US know-how (Chwastiak,
2009; Schwartz, 2007; Zunes, 2009). In addition, corrupt contracting practices, such as
little contract oversight, insufficient incentives for proper job completions and
insufficient measures of performance and auditing, generated a ‘reconstruction gap’,
which left the Iraqi state with incomplete and often incompetent infrastructure and,
therefore, undermined capacity to provide basic citizenry services (Whyte, 2007a,
2007b).
During the transition period, after the CPA’s handing over of sovereignty to the interim
Iraqi government in 2004, it was through corrupt budgetary processes that the US was
also able to retain a dominant role over a subordinated Iraqi sovereignty and to secure
the opening of the Iraqi oil industry. Since CPA-era corruption had enabled a rapid and
opportunistic disbursement of the majority of Iraqi oil revenue, the Iraqi state was left
largely subjugated to the controlling influence of the US over the expenditure of Iraqi
aid and donor funds (Savage, 2013a, 2013b).

This subjugating control occurred

although the act of channelling donor funds through the indigenous national budget is
considered to be one of five fundamental policies for effective state-building and for the
promotion of good governance through the development of effective public budgeting
(Carnahan and Lockhart, 2008; Castillo, 2008, 2011; Savage, 2013b). Nevertheless, the
US decided to retain command of these funds, thereby creating a parallel budgetary
system and undermining state capacity. As a result, the Iraqi state remained largely
reliant on US disbursals and US management of projects, which undermined its fiscal
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autonomy and fostered a relationship of Iraqi state dependency on donor funds and on
the US’s overarching command. Most importantly, since the Iraqi state was left with
insufficient funds to itself invest in the development of its own national oil companies
so as to generate increased revenues and achieve budgetary independence, it was
fiscally pressured to open its oil sector to foreign capital investments (Le Billon, 2005;
Muttitt, 2011, 2005). Indeed, in 2004, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office
issued a Code of Practice for the Iraqi oil industry that summed this reality: the
restoration of oil production would cost billions and, “Given Iraq’s needs, it is not
realistic to cut government spending in other areas, and Iraq would need to engage with
the International Oil Companies (IOCs) to provide appropriate levels of Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) …” (British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2004, pp. 4–5).

During this stage of occupation, US accounting regulations facilitated what Whyte
(2007b, p. 163) describes as “a system of ‘clean corruption’ in the allocation of
reconstruction funds”: the complexity of accounting regulations, which were written in
over 2,000 pages of rules in English and required paperwork to be completed using
specific accounting terminology, provided structural advantages to Anglo-American
firms over their Iraqi counterparts, whilst also enabling the US to appear to provide
equal access to all. Accordingly, the US procurement system facilitated the US’s
control over entry into the Iraqi market and to again divert capital accumulations to
mostly US dominant capital groups. The US used this control to maintain an importdriven Iraqi economy, rather than nurture indigenous production capabilities, and to
divert funds to cover administrative, military and security costs of the occupation (Le
Billon, 2005; Whyte, 2007b). This resulted in a trickle-down of US funds that left the
indigenous economy largely unstimulated, its unemployment exacerbated and state
capacity to provide adequate basic citizenry services deficient, thereby agitating societal
instability and decreasing state credibility (Le Billon, 2005). Moreover, Whyte (2007b,
p. 163) explains that even when “funds have been targeted to Iraqi business, the U.S.
has retained control over the recipients” (Whyte, 2007b, p. 163). As such, the US
procurement system enabled the US to effectively replace “Saddam’s nepotism with a
new structure of elites and a system of patronage and favouritism” that was more
accommodating to US interests (Le Billion, 2005; Savage, 2013a; Whyte, 2007b, p.
164).
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Another budgetary mechanism that was utilised by the US to secure its imposed
neoliberal regime during the transition period was through both debt relief and debt
burdening mechanisms. After over thirty years of being excluded from Iraq, and in
absence of a legitimate elected Iraqi government, both the IMF and the World Bank
were able to extend loans to the country in 2004, and the appointed interim Iraqi regime
also sought entry into the WTO, thereby subordinating state sovereignty to the
conditions and controls of the Bretton Woods institutions (Dominick, 2004; Sen and
Chu, 2005).

Such institutional leverage was also deepened through debt relief

agreements undertaken by both the Paris Club of Creditors, a 19-member cartel of the
world’s major creditors who were owed approximately $39 billion, and the US who was
owed approximately $4 billion. This was because the cancellation of a majority of these
Saddam era debts was conditioned upon the Iraqi state’s gaining approval of a ‘stand-by
arrangement’ (SBA) from the IMF by fulfilling key aspects of its 2004 Emergency Post
Conflict Assistance (EPCA) debt program. Together, the debt arrangements included
provisions for the privatisation of all SOEs, the ending of food subsidies, the
liberalisation of food and oil prices and the creation of a climate conducive for large
flows of FDI, including in the oil industry (Dominick, 2004; Klein, 2007; Looney,
2006; Sen and Chu, 2005; Whyte, 2007a). As Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz
stressed, whilst such policies may arguably be good for some countries they cause
disastrous effects on others, including increased instability, conflict and undermined
democratic institutions, which is what resulted in Iraq (Looney, 2006; Stiglitz, 2000,
2004). Moreover, the debt relief agreements, which were navigated by the US and
‘negotiated’ with an appointed interim Iraqi government, essentially shifted Iraq’s debt
from a few countries of the Paris Club to the international institutions that were more
acquiescent to US dominance and influence. In effect, “the Paris Club members took
advantage of the opportunity to impose conditions that could bind the successor
government in Baghdad to policies of free-market fundamentalism” (quoted in Looney,
2006, p. 40). Accordingly, debt was utilised as a tool to secure dominant power and
capital interests by forcing Iraq to maintain its surrender of sovereignty over its
economy even after the election of a legitimate government (Klein, 2007; Le Billon,
2005; Looney, 2006; Whyte, 2007b).
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In the period after the election of a legitimate Iraqi government, the US utilised a
discourse that epitomised the importance of building Iraqi budgetary capacity to justify
its imposition of a policy that further institutionalised corruption within the Iraqi state.
In 2007, US officials reasoned that in order to strengthen Iraqi state credibility and
legitimacy, and also to reduce US aid costs, the Iraqi state needed to rebuild its capacity
to deliver basic public services and be weaned from the donor-dependent mentality
(Savage, 2013a). A 2006 report by the DoD raised the concern: “under-spending of the
capital budget threatens to slow the pace of reconstruction and limit investment in oil
infrastructure” (Department of Defense, 2006, p. 19). Accordingly, the US Congress
passed a law that established eighteen benchmarks that sought accountability for
appropriations to Iraq by measuring progress of US capacity-building programs. The
‘17th Benchmark’ was a performance measure of how successfully Iraq spent money: it
measured Iraqi success at “allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for
reconstruction projects, including delivering of essential services on an equitable basis”
(US Congress, 2007, sec. 1314(b)(I)(A)(xvii)).

Budget execution and rates of

investment spending became overriding metrics in assessing US progress in building
Iraqi state capacity, and were closely monitored through the White House’s ‘Benchmark
Assessment Reports’.

However, since accounting performance measures limit

knowledge to only that which can be quantified, the metric only focussed on Iraq’s
spending of $10 billion of its money without considering qualitative factors, such as
accountability and transparency. Consequently, “In many cases, getting the Iraqis to
spend their budgets proved more important than either how effectively they spent the
funds or the sustainability of their investments” (Savage, 2013b, p. 8).

In effect, the ‘17th Benchmark’ allowed the US to again transform Iraq into liminal
space where corrupt practices could flourish. Since post 2003 US state-building of
budgetary capacity in Iraq had undertaken reforms that weakened state mechanisms to
combat corruption, and US engagements had already institutionalised corruption within
the Iraqi state, the US’s fervent application of the ‘17th Benchmark’ generated
incentives that countered normative good governance objectives of developing credible
accounting, accountability and auditing systems necessary to combat corruption.
Indeed, in emphasising spending in the midst of Iraqi liminal oversight capacity,
“Corruption, patronage, and rentierism are promoted because the drive to spend funds
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as quickly as possible encourages faulty contract and procurement processes” (Savage,
2013b, p. 11). Conceding this, Minister for Economic Affairs and Coordinator for
Economic Transition in Iraq, Charles Ries, concluded, “An exclusive focus on budget
execution … sort of says, well we just want them to waste money, and if they waste
money but spend all their money, it would be a good thing” (quoted in Savage, 2013a,
p. 158). Iraqi oversight institutions were not only overwhelmed by the size and rapidity
of imposed spending, but the situation was also exacerbated by the new state structure,
which established a system of fiscal decentralisation. Since provincial governments
were still being developed, they lacked adequate capacity to develop and execute capital
budgets, which lead the US GAO to warn against the implications of decentralising
capital budgeting to the provinces (Savage, 2013a). In effect, not only did the 17th
Benchmark facilitate a new wave of virulent and institutionalised corruption in Iraq,
reminiscent of the CPA era, where billions of dollars of Iraqi wealth would be
transferred to the dominant capital group, but its imposition in the midst of a newly
decentralised state structure also expanded corruption’s reach within Iraqi space and
scale. In sum, it contributed to the development of alternative agencies and dynamics
that abated efforts at building state-centred budgeting processes. This created additional
liminal spaces for corrupt practices to flourish in, and also generated an overall state
incapacity to administer full sovereignty over Iraqi territory (Carnahan and Lockhart,
2008; Savage, 2013a).
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Conclusion
The focus of this chapter has been to demonstrate the US’s socio-political reengineering of Iraq. It has shown that this was a necessary component of the neoliberal
re-territorialisation project in Iraq, and also demonstrated accounting’s roles within it.
The chapter demonstrated that US imperial interests, including those pertaining access
to and control over Iraqi oil, necessitated a weak Iraqi state with spatial/scalar
arrangements that dispersed authority across diverse sites and heterogeneous agents.
The US utilised the ‘artificial state’ narrative to politicise sectarianism and the
accounting-based ‘good governance’ rubric to justify the ‘solution’: to fragment state
authority along a tripartite ethno-sectarian federalisation of Iraq. Ethno-sectarian quotas
were applied in establishing the Interim Governing Council, the Constitutional
Preparatory Committee, the Transitional Iraqi Government, within the Transitional
Administrative Law and the Permanent Iraqi Constitution’s Presidency Council, and
throughout Iraqi state institutions.

Whilst Iraqi society did have ethno-sectarian differences, the notion of a spatial
reconfiguration of authority, outside of accommodating Kurdish aspirations for
territorial autonomy, was considered taboo by a majority of Iraqis. Furthermore, a
majority of Iraqis favoured a strong centralised government and a Scandinavian-type
welfare state system that upheld notions of social justice. Nevertheless, the US was
able to impose its requirements by centring its endeavours on two main strategies, both
of which predominantly revolved around the manipulation of budgetary arrangements.
The first, being the divide and conquer strategy, divided Iraqi society by sharpening
ethno-sectarian cleavages. Most importantly, a discriminatory revenue-sharing scheme,
which aligned authority over oil reserves with ethno-sectarian territorial configurations,
was embedded within the TAL and the permanent Iraqi constitution. This served to
radicalise notions of group identity, their pursuit of self-interests and, thus, their
acceptance of the new spatial/scalar configurations.

This outcome confirms

Wildavsky’s (1986) assertion that there exists an intimate interplay between budgeting
and ‘politiking’ that can either establish strength out of unanimity or weakness out of
dispute. Moreover, the divide and conquer strategy was chosen because it was most
cost-effective: it enabled the fragmentation of the Iraqi opposition, thereby reducing the
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eco-political costs of fighting a large-scale insurgency. The strategy also maintained the
US as an empire in denial as its roles in societal disenfranchisement were masked
behind plausible deniability. Finally, it granted the US a position of dominance that
enabled its overriding influence in the constitution-making process so as to state-build
that which was conducive to its interest with a minimum of resources and force.

The second strategy utilised by the US was its state-building of anaemic budgetary
processes and institutions, and the institutionalisation of corruption so as to weaken
Iraqi state capacity. Whyte (2010, p. 136) reminds us that “Power is … extended
through the deliberate creation of an anomic state”. Indeed, Iraqi state dependency
upon foreign capital and the subordination of its sovereignty to the US was a direct byproduct of the creation of a society absent social norms and values. Corrupt budgetary
practices were fostered by the US during both the CPA-era and during the ‘clean
corruption’ phase after their handing over of sovereignty. During the former, $50
billion in reconstruction contracts were awarded to 150 US corporations, thereby
subjugating the state to enforced foreign debt dependency and transferring billions of
Iraqi wealth to dominant capital groups (Herring and Rangwala, 2006; Whyte, 2007b,
2007a). Meanwhile, the latter phase deepened this dependency as ‘clean corruption’
enabled the US to create a parallel budgetary system that generated “its own sets of
loyalties and dependencies that undermines the state’s legitimacy, conflicts with state
funding priorities, encourages the state to remain dependent on donor contributions, and
deters efforts at building state capacity” (Savage, 2013a, p. 8). In addition, the US
shifted Iraqi debt to the Bretton Woods institutions, thereby securing its influence, and
further binding successor Iraqi governments to policies of free-market fundamentalism.

After an elected Iraqi government gained sovereignty, another stage of virulent
corruption was realised through the US’s obligating the Iraqi government to make
excessive and rapid expenditures whilst the state suffered from the anaemic budgetary
processes and institutions. Accordingly, an extended liminal space was created for
corrupt budgetary practices to flourish, thereby further weakening state capacity and
permitting transfers of wealth. Moreover, since the new state structure commanded
fiscal decentralisation, the created corruption was extended across a broader swath of
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Iraqi space and scale.

This extended the imperial reach of the US upon Iraqi

sovereignty, and secured compliance of future Iraqi governments. Accordingly, this
chapter has confirmed the CAS concept’s essential imperativeness of accounting
technology to the construction and re-inforcement of power structures that serve the
interests of imperial elites.

The destructive repercussions on the Iraqi state and society from the US’s utilisation of
these budgetary mechanisms to realise imperial interest cannot be exaggerated. By
premising Iraqi state-building upon the accentuation of ethno-sectarian cleavages, Iraqi
society has suffered from excessive disunity and violence. Indeed, “following the
artificial state narrative to its logical conclusion leads to one place, and that place is not
peace in the Middle East but rather the violence of ethnosectarian cleansing” (Pursley,
2015a). In addition, the US has created a dysfunctional, corrupt, underpowered and
deprived system of government that threatens the unity and territorial integrity of the
country.

In analysing the final draft of the Iraqi constitution, world leading

constitutional scholar, Professor Yash Ghai, condemned the constitution that he
believed
Could sharpen even further the divisions within Iraq and pose a serious threat
to the unity and territorial integrity of the country. There are also technical
deficiencies in the draft, which are to some extent tied to key substantive
provisions and will be hard to remedy. We have serious reservations whether
the [draft constitution] as it stands can be fully and effectively implemented,
without grave danger to state and society (quoted in Al-Ali, 2014, p. 99).

Whilst the post-2005 elected Iraqi governments have been plagued with massive
corruption, internal discord and ethno-sectarian competitions for power, they have
nevertheless acknowledged the destructive capabilities, especially the secessionist
pressures, of the new constitution. Accordingly they have attempted to steer away from
its full implementation. For example, the governments have generally pursued policies
to re-centralise government powers, resisted the full implementation of IMF
requirements and have so far successfully repelled the establishment of new federal
regions other than that of the Kurds (Alkadiri, 2010; Looney, 2006; Visser, 2007b,
2010). Also, in the 2010 elections, a majority of Iraqi society belied the underpinnings
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of the supposed ‘artificial state’ narrative by granting electoral success to cross-sectarian
parties promoting broader nationalist agendas (Alkadiri, 2010).

However, such

progressive indications continue to be obstructed by the post-2003 Iraqi establishment
that permits corrupt, “entrepreneurial politicians beholden to homogenized and narrow
groups as well as foreign patrons …” (Ismael and Ismael, 2015, p. 217) to continue
playing “Russian roulette with each other, using rules laid down by a flawed constitution
…” (Al-Ali, 2014, p. 102). In addition, the rise of the so called Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) and its capture of much of Sunni-majority western Iraq in 2014 not only
enacted “a de facto partition of the country …”, but also re-radicalised ethno-sectarian
identities, and enabled the KRG to gain control of oil rich Kirkuk and consider a
referendum for independence (Le Billon, 2015, p. 68). ISIS’s emergence is a testament
to the collapse of Iraqi state authority resulting “not as a causal factor of the 2014
deterioration, but as a consequence, of the failures of the post-2003 Iraqi state” (Ismael
and Ismael, 2015, p. 217).

Ultimately, the US’s fragmentation of Iraqi political

authority, its accentuation of ethno-sectarian cleavages and its limiting of Iraqi state
capacity have meant that “the prospects of maintaining a unified Iraq do not look good”
(Anderson, 2007, p. 160).

A central issue that resonates with regards the creation of liminal spaces of exception in
Iraq, which facilitated the conditions necessary for de-territorialisation effects, such as
the collapse of the Iraqi state, rampant corruption, the destruction of Iraqi collective
memory and the radicalisation of ethno-sectarian cleavages leading to ethnic cleansing
and civil war, was the critical shortage in the US’s deployment of troops and resources
during the invasion and occupation of Iraq. Whilst mainstream narrative attributed this
failure to mere overall ineptness in the US Military’s planning for Iraq; in actuality, it
was the DoD’s civilian command, namely SECDEF Rumsfeld, who ultimately held
power with regards resource allocation decisions.

Since the civilian command’s

decisions were not based upon military expertise, rather neoconservative ideological
directions of the Bush administration, the following chapter will demonstrate the role of
accounting technologies in building a power structure within the DoD that permitted the
primacy of neoconservative ideology over military expertise prior to, and during the
2003 Iraq War. This further substantiates the CAS concept’s assertion that accounting
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plays an intrinsic role in the building and re-inforcing of power structures that enable the
restructuring and management of space for capitalist imperialist interests.
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CHAPTER SIX

Planning, Programming and Budgeting, and Political
Competition Schemes in the Department of Defense.
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Introduction
The previous chapter demonstrated the US’s socio-political re-engineering of Iraq and
accounting’s role within these processes. Central features that accompanied these reterritorialisation processes were the escalation of ethno-sectarian violence and the
destruction of Iraq’s collective memory. Whilst destruction from the war and from the
eco-socio-political de-territorialisation processes were a direct cause of such violence,
numerous commentaries agree that another more subtle, yet fundamental, reason for the
breakout of such devastation was the critical shortage in troop levels, and their
resources, that the US committed to post-war Iraq (Dennison, 2006; Friedman, 2004;
Gordon & Trainor, 2006; Hersh, 2003; Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction (SIGIR), 2008; O’Hanlon, 2004; Patrick, 2006; Ricks, 2006; Rieff,
2003; Slavin & Moniz, 2003; Swansbrough, 2008; Talmadge, 2006; Woodward, 2006;
Yingling, 2007). Inadequate troop levels failed to control Iraq; to secure its porous
borders; to establish law and order; and to provide a secure environment for successful
reconstruction, humanitarian aid efforts and for economic growth. Also, they failed to
win the ‘hearts and minds’ of Iraqi civilians; to stop the epidemic mnemocide of Iraq’s
collective memory; to protect Iraq’s intellectual capital; and to guard weapons depots,
including the alleged WMD had they existed. Limited troops also failed to withhold the
development of resistance through insurgency; to stop the arming of insurgency and the
development of terror groups; to adapt to the demands of counter-insurgency; and to
withhold the development of a sectarian-based civil war and ethnic cleansing. Indeed,
the US’s assignment of inadequate troop levels to Iraq represented the breaking point.

The extent to which the shortage in troops was a critical component in the overall
failure of the US’s OIF is accentuated when results consequential to it, namely the
apparent collapse of the Iraqi State, the adjoining opaque partitioning of Iraq and the
rise of the new ‘global threat’, ISIS, are holistically evaluated. CPA chief, Paul Bremer,
emphasised the gravity of this shortage, proclaiming “The single most important change
… would have been having more troops in Iraq at the beginning and throughout”
(quoted in O’Hanlon, 2004). Indeed, there was a profound discrepancy between the
military command’s previously established requirement for an average troop force of
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425,000, and the 130,600 force that was eventually deployed by SECDEF Rumsfeld in
his initiation of the Iraq war. This chapter investigates the means through which the
DoD’s civilian command, namely SECDEF Rumsfeld, was able to gain power over the
Pentagon’s most senior generals to the extent that he was able to bypass their expertise
and knowledge and, instead, impose the Bush administration’s ideological-based
decisions upon the planning for war. According to a senior general, “All the Joint Staff
people now … churn out products to make the Secretary of Defense happy … They
don’t make military judgements – they just respond to his snowflakes” (quoted in Croci
& Verdun, 2006, p.122). Rumsfeld’s ‘snowflakes’ were a series of unsigned short notes
containing orders, questions or thoughts, which he regularly circulated throughout the
department so as to keep track of what was being done (Hersh, 2003; Woodward, 2006).
According to another senior general, “Rumsfeld was into everyone’s business. No one
was immune” (quoted in Woodward, 2006, p.29).

According to the CAS concept, accounting plays an intrinsic role in the building and reinforcing of power structures that enable the restructuring and management of space for
capitalist imperialist interests. As such, this chapter will demonstrate the accounting
means through which Rumsfeld was able to impose the Bush administration’s
ideological beliefs over the knowledge and expertise of the Pentagon’s generals during
planning for the Iraq war. It begins by briefly examining the historical role of the PPBS
in establishing the level of power of the SECDEF over decision-making within the DoD,
and its effects. The following section will move to trace the reforms that had been
enacted within this system prior to the arrival of the Bush administratio; it will show the
effects of these reforms upon reconfigurations of power and ideological primacy within
the DoD. This is followed with a demonstration of the neoconservative ideological
underpinnings of the Rumsfeld era, and how accounting was harnessed to legitimise and
justify his undertaking of reforms to the PPBS so as to afford neoconservative ideology
primacy within the DoD. The final section of the chapter will detail Rumsfeld’s reforms
to this system so as to facilitate his domination over funding decisions and his realisation
of power and control. Overall, the chapter will provide an accounting for the operation
and outcomes of the budgetary process within the DoD during Rumsfeld’s rein, and will
expose the ideological/political instrumentality of accounting in promoting distinct
interests. Since the shortage in troops also served to significantly reduce the economic
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costs of the war, invasion and occupation of Iraq, the chapter also demonstrates
accounting’s inherent purpose of projecting a feasible perception of imperial projects, as
per the CAS concept.

Troop Shortages: Military ineptness or power plays?
The miscalculation of appropriate troop levels has been attributed to the overall
ineptness in the military’s planning for post-war Iraq, known as Phase IV of Central
Command’s (CENTCOM) OIF. Indeed, the DoD’s report, Operation Iraqi Freedom:
Strategic Lessons Learned, concedes that “late formation of Department of Defense
[Phase IV] organizations limited time available for the development of detailed plans
and pre-deployment coordination” (quoted in Rieff, 2003). Similarly, the most recent
UK Report of the Iraq Inquiry, known as the Chilcot Inquiry, acknowledged that there
was an “absence of credible US plans for the immediate post-conflict period … Overall,
planning is at a very rudimentary stage” (Committee of Privy Counsellors, 2016, pp.83–
84). In the wake of such revelations, the DoD’s leadership, namely SECDEF Donald
Rumsfeld and the Pentagon’s generals, have together been accorded significant blame
for the ongoing post-war Iraqi debacle (Friedman, 2004; Gordon & Trainor, 2006;
Hersh, 2003; Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR),
2008; Patrick, 2006; Ricks, 2006; Rieff, 2003; Swansbrough, 2008; Woodward, 2006;
Yingling, 2007). However, since the US’s DoD is a bureaucratic establishment, which
encompasses multiple organisational processes and regulations specifically engineered
to prevent mistakes, the grave miscalculation of committing inadequate troop levels to
Iraq appears perplexing and compels further examination.

CENTCOM had already conducted extensive planning for a war and occupation of Iraq
since the 1990s, and an Iraqi war contingency plan, known as OPLAN 1003-98, was
complete. The original version of this plan recommended a necessary troop level of up
to 500,000 soldiers (Swansbrough, 2008). In 1999, CENTCOM commander Marine
General Anthony Zinni updated this recommendation after conducting a series of war
games known as ‘Desert Crossing’, which amounted to a feasibility study of ‘worst
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case’ and ‘most likely’ scenarios of a post-war Iraq, to explore the requirements for
post-war reconstruction of Iraq. The result of Desert Crossing’s After Action Report
drew a pessimistic conclusion regarding possible outcomes of a post-war, regime
changed Iraq, most of which eventually did materialise after the 2003 invasion
(CENTCOM, 1999). According to General Zinni, the report recommended a minimum
troop force of 400,000 for the invasion so as to “get in there right away, to flood the
towns and villages … We knew the initial problem would be security” (quoted in Slavin
& Moniz, 2003).

After Zinni’s retirement in 2000, and six months before the

inauguration of President Bush, Army General Thomas Franks assumed command of
CENTCOM and adjusted OPLAN 1003-98, initially calling for a necessary deployment
level of 385,000 troops (Gordon & Trainor, 2006). Meanwhile, in a briefing by Marine
Major Jeff Kojac of the National Security Council (NSC), Kojac used statistics from
previous post-war peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, which both had a
population distribution resembling that of Iraq, as a model for predicting troop level
requirements for a post-war Iraq. Accordingly, Kojac was able to estimate that Iraq
would need 364,000 troops based on the Bosnia scenario and 480,000 troops based on
that of Kosovo (Swansbrough, 2008). As the above reports demonstrate, in actuality,
CENTCOM had extensively planned and repeatedly updated troop level requirements
for deployments in Iraq many years before the US’s eventual 2003 war and occupation.
The combined average of these reports stipulated a necessary overall deployment of
approximately 425,000 troops so as to provide for successful peacekeeping duties. This
historical background of CENTCOM studies explains why, just before the initiation of
OIF during a February 2003 hearing of the Senate Armed Services committee, Army
chief of staff General Eric K. Shinseki’s reply to an enquiry regarding his professional
assessment of troop level requirements in Iraq was: “something on the order of several
hundred thousand soldiers …” (quoted in Swansbrough, 2008, p.142).

In spite of the existence of such a consensus within the US’s military command with
regards knowledge of conditions and, thus, troop requirements for a post-war Iraq, such
expertise was bypassed and excluded during pre-war planning for the 2003 war.
Indeed, Rumsfeld “believed that large ground forces with their ponderous artillery,
numbers, logistics and associated ‘dinosaur’ generals were a thing of the past” (Patrick,
2006, p.161). As such, “On at least six occasions … when Rumsfeld and his deputies
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were presented with operational plans … he insisted that the number of ground troops
be sharply reduced” (Hersh, 2003). Rumsfeld had positioned himself at the centre of
decision-making and was, therefore, successfully able to impose the Bush
administration’s ideologically-based perceptions, such as that of the need for minimal
ground forces, onto military planning. Indeed, a series of now declassified briefing
slides of military plans for war with Iraq show General Thomas Franks, who had
initially updated troop requirements in OPLAN 1003-98 to 385,000 just six months
before the arrival of the Bush Administration, reducing this quantity to just 270,000 by
2002 (Battle & Blanton, 2007). Moreover, at Rumsfeld’s repeated requests, Franks
continued reducing his requirements pertaining to the quantity of troops deployed in
Iraq up to the early months of 2003, just before the initiation of war in March (Gordon
& Trainor, 2006; Hersh, 2003; Patrick, 2006)

Meanwhile, General Shinseki, who had

testified to the need of ‘several hundred thousand soldiers’, was severely rebuked in the
hearing by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who anticipated a force of less
than 100,000 and called the general’s assessment “widly off the mark” (quoted in
Swansbrough, 2008, p.142). Rumsfeld then further humiliated General Shinseki by
later announcing his replacement a year and a half before his scheduled retirement,
effectively demonstrating his superiority in the difficult relationship between the
military command and their civilian counterparts within the DoD (Swansbrough, 2008;
Valelly, 2010).

The extent of Rumsfeld’s unprecedented interference in operational planning was
emphasised when he decided to reject the Time-Phased Force Deployment List
(TPFDL), which is a computer-generated spread-sheet of all resources needed for the
theatre of war, and instead insisted that CENTCOM planners consult him for such
requirements (Gordon & Trainor, 2006; Hersh, 2003; Patrick, 2006). Such a decision
cemented Rumsfeld’s unprecedented role as a civilian leader who was able to bypass
the Joint Staff and organisational processes, and assert his control over decisions
regarding timing and flow technicalities of Army and Marine troops at the combat zone.
By doing so, he reduced the previously detailed plans that had been prepared by
CENTCOM to a “’hit or miss’ shambles in which nothing could be predicted with any
assurance” (Patrick, 2006, p.162). As a result, and as late as February 2003, the
question of troop levels that were necessary to stabilise post-war Iraq had not yet been
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resolved (Slavin & Moniz, 2003). One month later, at Rumsfeld’s behest, the invasion
of Iraq was initiated with a ground force averaging only 130,600, and an occupying
force that peaked to just 157,800 during President Bush’s ‘surge’ scheme in 2007
(Belasco, 2009, p.13).

According to a hearing before the Committee on Foreign

Relations of the US Senate, chaired by Richard Lugar (United States Congress Senate
Committee 2003, 2003, p.66), When the capital city of Iraq fell on the 9th April 2003,
“Only three brigades of about 6,000 soldiers were in Baghdad … controlling just 15%
of a city with a population of more than 5 million”.

In order to understand how SECDEF Rumsfeld was able to force the committing of
such a grave military error upon the military commanders of the Pentagon, the
following section will provide a historical overview of the power structures that the
PPB system affords within the DoD, and its effects.

The Introduction of PPBS: McNamara wins power, but loses the
Vietnam War
The introduction of PPBS into the DoD can be traced back to the 1960s when a
‘revolutionary’ system for public sector decision-making was introduced by then
SECDEF, Robert S. McNamara under President John F. Kennedy. The system was
considered ‘revolutionary’ as it sought to introduce economically rational discourse into
the DOD by applying economic analysis to governmental expenditure decisions. The
system equated efficient decision making with that which could instrumentally relate
quantitative inputs with desired outcomes, thereby centring decisions upon the efficient
management of resources. Weidenbaum (1967, p.167) explains:
For military programs, ordinarily the benefits or results cannot be expressed
in dollar terms. However, the end objective, such as the capability to destroy
X number of enemy targets under stipulated conditions, can be expressed in
quantitative terms. And, more important, the alternative methods of
achieving the objective – Y bombers versus Z missiles or some combination –
can be priced out and a least cost solution arrived at.
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The PPBS effectively broke the defense budget down into programs, each containing
multiple facets that spanned traditional service lines, and compared them based on costeffectiveness. Consequently, the system’s requisite for final decision-making was for a
top-level official, the Secretary of Defense, who would base decisions upon a holistic
analysis of these comparisons when setting the final budget. The centrality of the
SECDEF’s role as the ultimate decision-maker within the PPBS was highlighted by
Schilling (1968, p.27), who conceded that “PPBS … works best for an aggressive
master; and … where the master wants the machinery to produce his decisions without
his own participation, the value of PPBS is likely to be modest and, depending on the
people, may even be negative”. In this way, accounting was harnessed to achieve
political power gains for civilians over their military counterparts as McNamara was
finally able to shift power over resource allocation decisions in the DoD to the
SECDEF, thereby, using the PPBS as a means to gain control over DoD decisions
through his domination over their funding (Chwastiak, 2006, 2001, 1999; Funnell &
Chwastiak, 2015a; Kaufmann, 1964; Sanders, 1973; Schelling, 1971; Stubbing, 1986;
Wildavsky, 1967). Indeed, Wildavsky (1967, p.390) explains that “A more useful tool
for increasing (a chief executive’s) power to control decisions vis-a’-vis his
subordinates would be hard to find”.

By basing decision-making upon quantitative information, McNamara’s PPBS was also
able to impose the rhetoric of quantification upon organisational discourse throughout
the DOD. Budgeting and planning for force structure, previously prescribed through
military officer expertise, became a product of the PPBS’s technique of systems
analysis, which “reduced weapons systems, troops, infrastructure, etc. to those qualities
which could be quantified and instrumentally related to a particular objective”
(Chwastiak, 2006, p.34), and were performed by the “‘whiz kids’ in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD)” (Jones & McCaffery, 2008, p.139). Sanders (1973) and
Chwastiak (2006) highlight how such a shift further enhanced McNamara’s power as
the military was obliged to present its budgetary requests in his language, addressing his
style of decision making, thereby further undermining their influence. Finally, as the
PPBS equated truth to only that which could be quantified, decisions based upon the
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system enjoyed an aura of objectivity, neutrality and scientific truth as they appeared to
adhere to an economically rational management style facilitated by the ‘system’, not
humans. As such, McNamara’s authority to intrude in decisions that were previously
made by DoD generals was legitimated as the prerequisite of military expertise was
exchanged with PPBS knowledge; McNamara’s decisions appeared apolitical, as
products of scientific truth through quantitative analysis rather than personal choice.
Highly impressed by McNamara’s successes within the DoD, President Johnson later
called for the adoption of the “very new and very revolutionary system of planning and
programming and budgeting throughout the vast federal government – so that through
the tools of modern management the full promise of a finer life can be brought to every
American at the lowest possible cost” (quoted in Weidenbaum, 1967, p.164).

Behind PPBS’s perceived objectivity, neutrality and efficiency, however, hid extensive
ethical dimensions, moral effects and technical complexities bearing problematic
implications. Since PPBS’s ontological mindset effectively reduced world issues into
technical problems to be solved through instrumentally rational quantitative analyses,
“war, starvation and intrigue simply became potential solutions” (Chwastiak, 2006,
p.35) to world issues.

Decision makers became distanced from the realities and

consequences of their decisions as propositions of moral meanings, such as
considerations of the social bearings of decisions, were disregarded. Indeed, Chwastiak
(2006) showed how the PPBS’s problem-solving design led the Kennedy
Administration to view the Vietnamese nationalist revolution as a technical problem
threatening US world order, and the subsequent Vietnam War as simply the most
efficient, instrumentally rational solution, regardless of resulting loss in life and
destruction. Such a marginalisation of rationalisation is an essential component for the
creation and maintenance of the ‘Other’. It is through the introduction of dehumanising
techniques that “… a distance between the designers and the victims of destruction” is
instituted (Chwastiak, 2006, p.34).

Accounting techniques were perceived as being able to methodically arrange the chaotic
act of war, “leading to the belief that … war could be won by the proper management of
resources” (Chwastiak, 2006, p.30). The PPB system’s resulting limiting of problem
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solving to only quantifiable inputs with desired outputs, deemed budgetary requests that
were based upon subjective or qualitative justifications, such as judgement-based expert
opinions, experiences and intuitions of military officers, as irrelevant and, thus,
invisible (Chwastiak, 2006, 2001; Kaufmann, 1964). This managerial model of warfare
led US leaders to only consider those aspects of defense problems that could be
counted, whilst all others, such as human emotions and Vietnamese eco-socio-political
and historical considerations, were dismissed as being irrational. Accordingly, there
was a marginalisation of US leaderships’ rationalisation that bore a gap between their
perceptions and the true holistic Vietnamese reality, including the experiences of US
troops on the ground. This gap deceived US leadership who accordingly based their
decisions on fallacious conceptualisations, analysis and monitoring, and bore
contradictions that not only depleted prospects of US success in the war, but also
became a trigger for the eventual breakdown of command.

Soldiers who felt

increasingly disenfranchised from leadership and burdened by performance measures
that awarded increases in their production of death, eventually revolted against their
very conscription (Chwastiak, 2006, 2001). Colonel Robert Heinl confirmed that “The
morale, discipline and battleworthiness of the U.S. Armed Forces are … lower and
worse than at any time in this century” (Heinl, 1971, p.327), causing the US Armed
Forces to suffer what Campbell (1998, p. 358) described as “the organizational
equivalent of a ‘near-death experience’”. Overall, the system hid the true complexities
of war, and contributed to the eventual failure of the US’s Vietnam War venture.

Halberstam (1992, p.248) describes McNamara’s claim that his emphasis on statistical
instrumental relations instigated efficiency in the management of resources and would
bring about victory in war as a

“vast unwitting and elaborate charade” that

institutionalised and legitimised “a hopeless lie”.

Indeed, Chwastiak (2006, p.26)

concludes that “In the end, the Vietnam War would be the longest, most cost-ineffective
and appalling war ever fought by the U.S.”.

McNamara’s PPBS provided civil

command with the means to perpetuate its ideological beliefs and attain power over
decision making within the DoD through its control of the budgetary system.
Historically, this is not the first time that civilian leadership has sought to maintain
control and power over the military through financial regulations and accounting
techniques. During the constitutional conflicts between the British Parliament and its
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monarchy in the 17th century, Funnell (1990, 2005) showed that the civilian Parliament
harnessed accounting as a tool to control the role of the army as an ally of the monarchy
against the Parliament.

Accounting was employed to impose the ‘constitutional

identity’ of the British Army in relation to Parliament, which, as propagated by the War
Office Cost Accounting Committee of 1918, “demanded the supremacy of parliament,
mostly through ‘a ruthless and dominant Treasury …’, in all matters related to the
granting of finance to the military and accounting for approved expenditures” (Funnell,
2005, p.309). Civilian leadership safeguarded against constitutional threats and ensured
the perpetuation of their ideological beliefs by harnessing an accounting system that
“had been designed and used … to control the loyalties and activities of the army …”
(Funnell, 1990, p.319). However, the magnitude of Parliament’s control over army
finance and budgets was so great that it created an army that was financially ignorant as
well as, more importantly, ill-prepared and inefficient. Such administrative failures
ultimately led to the army’s meagre performance in the Crimean War (1854-6) and
humiliating defeat in the South Africa War of 1899 (Funnell, 1990, 2005, 2006; Funnell
& Chwastiak, 2015b).

Tracing Significant Reforms in the PPBS: Budgetary control
and the reconfigurations of power
In the 40 years since the introduction of PPBS into the DoD by SECDEF McNamara,
three significant reform initiatives were undertaken that influenced the system and, most
notably, reconfigured power structures within the DoD.

Wildavsky (1961, p.183)

explains how,
Far from being a neutral matter of ‘better budgeting’, proposed reforms
inevitably contain important implications for the political system, that is
for the ‘who gets what’ of government decisions.

Melvin Laird, who succeeded McNamara as SECDEF during the Vietnam War, brought
the first significant reforms in 1969. The reforms sought to counter McNamara’s use of
the ‘scientific approach’ to gain control of the DoD’s decision-making process. Laird
de-emphasised the role of systems analysis, returned to an emphasis on budget ceilings
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for services to freely program within, and instilled decentralisation of power by giving
military leadership a more influential role in budgetary development and the selection
of force levels (Feltes, 1976; McCaffery & Jones, 2004). In effect, Laird pursued a
participatory management regime through which he empowered the military leadership
throughout the budgetary process so as to gain their cooperation in the reduction of both
the defense budget and troop strength in Vietnam, which fell from 549,500 in 1969 to
69,000 in 1972 (Laird, 2003). He conceded “I have no business being involved in how
many 20mm guns should go on a destroyer … I must let the Services take a greater
role” (quoted in McCaffery & Jones, 2004, p.9). Overall, the overarching result of
Laird’s reforms was the shifting of military planning back to military services and the
reduction of systems analysis’ role, thereby de-emphasising the centralisation of
decision making to the SECDEF (Feltes, 1976; McCaffery & Jones, 2004).

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 brought in the second significant reforms to the
PPBS. Congress passed this Act primarily in response to then Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General David Jones’ persistent calls for reform, which had also
previously been sounded by Presidents Truman and Eisenhower.

Jones (1982)

criticised the budgeting system as ‘lacking in discipline’, complaining that the
decentralised resource allocation process permitted the military services departments to
take control of the budget. This was because the budget was primarily focused on the
procurement of the military service programs, leaving the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
with an amalgamation of service needs that lacked both coherence and overall crossservice assimilation. The result was an augmented defense budget that “was driven by
the desires of the services (usually for more programs and money), rather than by a
well-integrated JCS plan” (McCaffery & Jones, 2004, p.12). Jones (1996, p.27) refers
to the way in which
The lack of discipline in the budget system prevents making the very tough
choices of what to do and what not to do. Instead, strong constituencies in
the Pentagon, Congress, and industry support individual programs, while
the need for overall defense effectiveness and efficiency is not adequately
addressed.
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In response, Goldwater-Nichols was passed, most notably delegating more power to the
CJCS by identifying important phases within the PPBS where the JCS would intervene
to set requirements and review plans. The Act established the national command
authority to run from the President to the SECDEF, to the unified commanders-in-chief
(CINCs), thereby increasing the unified CINCs war fighting and command authority,
including authority to partake in the calibration of force size (McCaffery & Jones, 2004;
Thompson & Jones, 1994). This authority was further enhanced by the establishment of
unified CINCs leading role, over individual military departmental and services CINCs,
within the budget chain of command to the Pentagon, thereby requiring individual
military budget proposals to be reviewed by unified CINC, and giving it a greater role
within the budgetary process. CJCS was also delegated responsibility to advise the
SECDEF with requirements in the PPBS as identified by both the unified and individual
CINCs, and also to assess individual military budgets, including the submission of
alternative recommendations when needed, in accordance with overall unified CINC
needs (McCaffery & Jones, 2004). In 1995, SECDEF Perry evaluated that GoldwaterNichols had “dramatically changed the way that America’s forces operate by
streamlining the command process and empowering the Chairman and the unified
commanders” (Locher, 1996, p.15).

The overall result of the above two significant reforms to the PPBS was political in
nature, pertaining to power structures within the DoD, whereby civilian decisionmaking authority was significantly reduced, with greater authority given to the military
command within the DoD. McNamara’s centralisation of power, which had allowed his
ideological conceptualisations to dominate the DoD’s decision-making process and to
discount military expertise and judgement, was significantly reversed as the
establishment of a decentralised decision-making structure granted the military
command a more influential role in the PPBS, thereby empowering them with greater
decision-making authority and eventually giving them ideological primacy within the
Pentagon. Indeed, up until the commencement of the Bush Administration’s tenure,
critics had been decrying what they perceived to be a Pentagon that was ideologically
captured by a doctrine that had been chartered by military chiefs who were “wimps in
uniform” (quoted in Campbell, 1998, p.357; Kegley & Wittkopf, 1996, p.392). The
doctrine, known as the Powell Doctrine and also termed the ‘doctrine of reluctance’ by
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critics, was condemned for its imposition of excessive limitations on the US’s use of
force, which they believed made it impotent in both addressing post-Cold War threats,
and in supporting modern day US foreign policy objectives.

The doctrine, named after General Colin Powell, was an amalgamation of the
Weinberger Doctrine of 1984, formulated by SECDEF Caspar Weinberger with the
advice of his then assistant General Powell, and General Powell’s own subsequent
preferences that he integrated whilst holding the highest military position in the DoD,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Weinberger Doctrine had surfaced as a
result of the learning process that followed the US military organisation’s ‘near-death’
experience of the Vietnam War. It formally solidified what Colonel Harry Summer,
who was assigned by the US Army to analyse the war’s failures, had determined in his
book, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, to be the fundamental
lessons learned. The book, and its lessons, had a major influence throughout the DoD;
it had been distributed throughout the Army, incorporated into the curriculum of its
educational institutions and had also even been circulated within the White House.
Most notably, it sought to prevent any repetition of the Vietnam War debacle by
outlining a suite of preconditions for the use of military force, including the
identification of clear political and military objectives, the proper sizing of forces to
achieve the objectives, assurance of public and Congressional support, and that force be
used as a last resort only after all political avenues had failed (Weinberger, 1985). The
Powell Doctrine emphasised these Weinberger’s conditions, also favouring “major
conventional combat operations” and emphasising “overwhelming force, exit strategies,
and clear, attainable objectives, not to mention the need for broad international support”
(Kaplan, 2008, p.3).

The doctrine was especially loathed by some US civilian leaders who viewed its effect,
the profound reluctance to use force, having “a profound impact … upon the American
military, U.S. foreign policy, the American political system, and the global strategic
environment” (Campbell, 1998, p.363). The political pendulum of power with regards
to these issues had been taken away from civilian leadership and been firmly pushed
into the hands of their military counterparts. Indeed, the doctrine had successfully been
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used by the Pentagon to block the introduction of US ground troops in Central America
during the 1980s, “despite the strong desires of some civilian policy-makers in the State
Department and the Reagan White House for direct U.S. military intervention”
(Campbell, 1998, p.365). When George H. W. Bush contemplated using force against
Saddam Hussein, the first major war since Vietnam, General Powell voiced serious
reservations and called for economic sanctions to be applied first. Once the decision of
war had been finalised, Powell strongly endorsed the Weinberger Doctrine by
committing overwhelming force to a limited, achievable and popular, UN-sanctioned,
Congressionally supported objective of expelling Hussein from Kuwait, which he won
decisively and exited quickly (Campbell, 1998; Record, 2007).

Colonel Summers

(1992, p.74) had himself noted how the doctrine had enhanced the democratic character
of US foreign policy by acting as a restraint upon the war powers of an ‘imperial
presidency’, and by compelling the need for wider Congressional and military support:
“The generals have already curbed the president’s powers, quietly and indirectly, but
more efficiently than have all the congressional critics of Executive War”.

The highly successful implementation of the Powell Doctrine during the Gulf War,
which brought about minimal US causalities and was largely funded by other nations,
was said to have ‘cured’ the US of the ‘Vietnam Syndrome’, being public detestation of
overseas US military involvements (Campbell, 1998; Record, 2007). As such, it was
carried into the Clinton Administration’s two post-Cold War terms in the 1990s, where
it gained strength and hegemony within US foreign policy.

During the Clinton

Administration’s second term, however, Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright voiced
frustration with Powell’s ideology, imploring “What’s the point of having this superb
military you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?” (Dobbs, 1996, p.A01).
Although the Clinton Administration did increase its forceful interventions into conflict
areas, such as Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Serbia, the doctrine’s effects were still evident
in the Administration’s hesitation, indecision and obsession with force protection,
which led to those interventions being limited in nature (Campbell, 1998; Hoffman,
1995; Preble, 2009; Record, 2007; Stevenson, 1996). With the commencement of the
Bush Administration, however, Clinton era hesitation and indecisiveness with regards
the use of force disappeared as the Administration was captured by neoconservative
ideology, which necessitated an aggressive foreign policy and risk taking; the use of
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pre-emptive force and the immersion into ‘multiple theatre wars’ in pursuit of US
interests and a unipolar international order in favour of US world hegemony (Bush,
2002; Dorrien, 2004; Fukuyama, 2006; Mearsheimer, 2001; Schmidt & Williams,
2008). Hindering the Administration’s application of this forceful and risky ideology,
however, was the non-ideologically compatible DoD’s ‘doctrine of reluctance’.

According to Wildavsky (1992, p.xi), when there exists deep political ideological
disagreements, these differences are “played out through the budget”. As such, it
became imperative that the new Administration’s SECDEF regain civilian superiority
over the DoD’s budgeting process and, thus, neoconservative ideological primacy over
that of the military command. Indeed, Bush’s SECDEF Rumsfeld sought to realign the
pendulum of power within the DoD in favour of his civilian command by revisiting and
reforming both the PPB and management systems. By exploiting the same approach of
his late predecessor, McNamara, Rumsfeld sought to to re-impose his overall authority
upon decision-making, foist his management style upon military command and, through
a new emphasis on performance measures and auditing, to compel the execution of the
Bush administration’s neoconservative conceptions throughout the DoD.

Rumsfeld’s Ideologically Driven ‘War on Bureaucracy’
Donald Rumsfeld, a Navy S-2 Tracker pilot, had a career divided between politics,
notably becoming the youngest SECDEF ever at the age of 43 under Gerald R. Ford,
and the business world, where he ran the pharmaceutical company G. D. Searle for
almost a decade, before returning to politics as SECDEF under the Bush
Administration. In the economic realm, Rumsfeld was a neoliberal enthusiast, having
been a regular attendee of seminars at the Chicago School of Economics, and referring
to Milton Friedman as his personal “good friend” (Rumsfeld, 2002a). As such, he
believed in laissez-faire economic liberalisation principles, such as decentralisation,
outsourcing, deregulation, privatisation and free markets, which aim at enhancing the
role of the private sector in the economy and minimising state intervention (Dumenil &
Levy, 2004). His reputation within the political realm was one of high intellect and
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intimidating character, a “ruthless little bastard” as described by President Nixon
(Kaplan, 2008, p.2). Rumsfeld was an earnest neoconservative, being one of ten top
Bush Administration officials who were members of the ideology’s notorious think
tank, the Project for the New American Century (PNAC). As such, he firmly believed
in PNAC’s underlying ideology of US exceptionalism, the active pursuit of US world
hegemony and a forceful vision for US foreign policy: most notably, the use of
unilateral pre-emptive force so as to enforce a global Pax Americana unrestrained by
international law (Dorrien, 2004; Fukuyama, 2006; Ryan, 2010; Scott, 2007). With
regards Iraq, he was amongst the early advocates for both forceful Iraqi regime change
and the presence of permanent US forces in the Gulf, which were both in line with
PNAC’s aims to challenge “regimes hostile to US interests and values” (Abrams …
Wolfowitz, 1997), and to establish “a substantial American force presence in the Gulf”
(Donnelly et al., 2000, p.14). He was a signee of the 1998 open letter initiated by
PNAC to President Bill Clinton calling for the removal of Saddam Hussein, and
supported all subsequent PNAC memos and letters in this regard, as well as the Iraqi
Liberation Act signed into law by Clinton in 1998 (Ryan, 2010).

PNAC’s insistence on forceful Iraqi regime change was an offshoot of its
neoconservative global Pax Americana ideology. Apart from its calling for the active
pursuit and maintenance of US interests, including those pertaining energy resources,
the ideology also rejected balance-of-power politics and was committed, instead, to the
maintenance of a unipolar international system. Mearsheimer (2001, p.163) explains
that the neoconservatives believed this would be achieved by operating according to the
‘bandwagoning’ logic: weaker states would choose to join forces with a more powerful
state “because the adversary will take what it wants by force anyway and inflict
considerable punishment in the process”. Indeed, whilst advocating for the war on Iraq,
leading neoconservatists, Robert Kagan and William Kristol (2003, p.247), indicated
that
once Iraq and Turkey – two of the three most important Middle Eastern
powers – are both in the pro-western camp, there is a reasonable chance
that smaller powers might decide to jump on the bandwagon.
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Neoconservatives believed that the US’s flexing of military might, rather than
diplomacy, was a necessary prerequisite for the realisation of its interests and world
hegemony.

Accordingly, PNAC resident fellow Reuel Marc Gerecht (2001)

emphasised the need to
re-instill in our foes and friends the fear and respect that attaches to any great
power … Only a war against Saddam Hussein will decisively restore the awe
that protects American interests abroad and citizens at home.

PNAC’s 2000 report, Rebuilding America’s Defenses, ascertained this desire and argued
for the imperative need to sustain an overfunded defense budget so as to grant the US
capability to “fight and decisively win multiple, simultaneous major theatre wars” as a
“core mission”, and to reorder the international system in favour of US interests
(Donnelly et al., 2000, p.iv). Indeed, Halper and Clarke (2004, p.26) argue, “from its
early beginnings, a proclivity toward the use of force has been an identifying badge of
the neo-conservative ideology”. The report considered current US defense planning as
“an empty and increasingly self-referential exercise, often dominated by bureaucratic
and budgetary rather than strategic interests”; therefore, it called for the matching of
“U.S. military forces and resources to a viable American strategy” (Donnelly et al.,
2000, p. 1). PNAC outlined their vision for this optimum match, narrating an American
strategy that required a matching defence budget that represented no less than 3.5-3.8%
of the US gross domestic product (GDP), and an end to the alleged ‘procurement
holiday’ in nuclear force planning. The resulting transfers of wealth to the defense
domain would insure the superiority of US forces by funding increases in their quantity,
to enable multiple deployments throughout the world, and to enhance their qualitative
capabilities through a ‘transformation process’ that exploited the ‘Revolution in
Military Affairs’ (RMA).

RMA entailed a two-stage process; the first involved the maximisation of “the value of
current weapons systems” (Donnelly et al., 2000, pg. v) by ‘wisely managing’ weapons
systems and “figuring out the right moments to halt production of current-paradigm
weapons and shift to radically new designs” (Donnelly et al., 2000, p. 51). The second
stage involved the production of

“more profound improvements in military

capabilities” so as to improve overall efficiency and effectiveness (Donnelly et al.,
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2000, p.v). In effect, RMA sought to exploit technology and the efficient management
of resources to produce more value for money, that is fighting and political power.
Mearsheimer (2005, p.2) explains that neoconservatives “believed that the United States
could rely on stealth technology, air-delivered precision-guided weapons, and small but
highly mobile ground forces to win quick and decisive victories”. This vision lay in
stark opposition to that of the well-manifested Powell Doctrine.

Indeed, PNAC

acknowledged that its ‘revolutionary’ changes would face extensive opposition from
domestic politics, industrial policy and the requirements of current missions: “the
process of transformation …”, it proclaimed, “is likely to be a long one, absent some
catastrophic and catalysing event – like a new Pearl Harbor” (Donnelly et al., 2000,
p.52).

In 1999, then Governor and Presidential candidate George W. Bush, whose brother Jeb
Bush was also a member of PNAC, sounded PNAC’s rhetoric, calling for the creation
of “the military of the next century” by piloting a “revolution in the technology of war”
where forces are “agile, lethal, readily deployable, and require a minimum of logistical
support” (Bush, 1999). Such a transformation, he emphasised, was a principal requisite
for the sustenance of power in a highly globalised world, and for securing unilateral preemptive capabilities against unconventional, highly mobile enemies. Once in office,
Bush reaffirmed his commitment to this neoconservative conception of the US military
in his Bush Doctrine, which is regarded “essentially, a synonym for neoconservative
foreign policy” (quoted in Schmidt & Williams, 2008, p.194). Bush had promised to
give his future SECDEF a ‘broad mandate’ “to challenge the status quo and envision a
new architecture of American defense for decades to come” (Bush, 1999). Indeed, upon
becoming Bush’s SECDEF in 2001, Rumsfeld was quick to announce his ideological
allegiance to the neoconservative RMA vision, proclaiming the ‘modernisation’ of the
DoD “a matter of life and death” (Rumsfeld, 2001, p.2). On the 10th September, at the
kickoff to the 2001 DoD Acquisition and Logistics Excellence Week, he declared to an
audience in the heart of Pentagon that the death of Americans would be the
consequence of inefficiencies in both the DoD’s PPB and management systems, which
together brought into bear a Pentagon bureaucracy that posed “a threat, a serious threat,
to the security of the United States of America” (Rumsfeld, 2001, p.1). “Every dollar
squandered on waste is one denied to the warfighter” he decried,
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Waste drains resources from training and tanks, from infrastructure and
intelligence, from helicopters and housing. Outdated systems crush ideas
that could save a life. Redundant processes prevent us from adapting to
evolving threats with the speed and agility that today’s world demands … In
this period of limited funds, we need every nickel, every good idea, every
innovation, every effort to help modernize and transform the U.S. military
(Rumsfeld, 2001, p.2).

The crux of Rumsfeld’s argument that justified and legitimised the need for his
imposition of transformational change was based on accounting discourse: that waste
and inefficient processes within the DoD were adversaries; a security threat that would
cost US lives. Hence, he elevated the need for reform to that of national security; the
efficient management of resources, the elimination of waste and the transformation of
the DoD would ‘protect’ “hardworking people of America and the tax dollars they earn”
(Rumsfel, 2001, p. 2). He described how ‘decades old’ financial systems had led to an
estimated $2.3 trillion in untraceable transactions, and assured that his reforms were
“about professionalism … respect for ourselves, about how we feel about seeing GAO
reports describing waste and mismanagement and money down a rat hole” (Rumsfeld,
2001, p. 8). In effect, Rumsfeld harnessed accounting rhetoric pertaining to the proper
management of resources to justify and legitimise change. Accordingly, he declared an
initiative to kerb mismanagement and “transform … the way we conduct our daily
business” (Rumsfeld, 2001, p. 2). “We must employ the tools of modern business” (p.
7), he ascertained, so as to become “Like the private sector’s best-in-class companies”
(p. 6). As such, he announced major neoliberal initiatives, including the outsourcing of
all non-cove activities, privatisation and downsizing administrative staff. To assist and
guide such reforms, he also announced the establishment of a ‘Defense Business
Board’, which comprised of elites of the business world, so as to “tap outside expertise
as we move to improve the department’s business practices” (Rumsfeld, 2001, p. 4).

Although Rumsfeld’s rhetoric unambiguously framed the DoD within the bounds of a
‘business’, thereby elevating the prominence of the bottom line in what he described as
a ‘war on bureaucracy’, he also paradoxically conceded that his reforms were not “in
the end, about business practices, nor is the goal to improve figures on the bottom line”,
rather, “a campaign to shift Pentagon resources from the tail to the tooth” (Rumsfeld,
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2001, p. 8). Therefore, just like his predecessor, SECDEF McNamara, “surely did not
use PPBS and other techniques of financial management merely to cut waste and
improve efficiency or to save money …”, rather to take “advantage of his central role in
the defense-budgeting process to exercise … his authority over military policy”
(Schilling 1968, 29), Rumsfeld was to utilise reforms in order to impose his ideological
strategy of a capability-centred US military machine. As such, the ultimate goal was
not efficient resource management and the reduction of waste, rather, to control the
ideological-base of military policy and to achieve the organisational efficiency
necessary to qualify the US military to fulfil its role as defender and server of US
interests according to neoconservative agenda.

Indeed, although organisational efficiency did improve during Rumsfeld’s tenure
(McCaffery & Jones, 2004; Walker, 2005) and the US military did embark on multiple,
simultaneous major theatre wars, including in Afghanistan and Iraq, numerous reports
have confirmed decreased DoD waste management capabilities and overall increases in
waste, fraud, cronyism and corruption (Committee on Government Reform, 2006;
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2007; Editorial, 2008; Hedgpeth,
2008; Schwellenbach, 2009; The Center for Public Integrity, 2003; The Industrial
College of the Armed Forces, 2010). Whilst the Bush Administration almost doubled
the Pentagon’s budget between 2000-2008, Rumsfeld failed to correspondingly increase
personnel in the DoD’s Inspector General (DOD’s IG) office to provide the necessary
oversight. Instead, he maintained a static number of auditors during his tenure. As a
result, “An auditor previously responsible for vetting $642 million in defense contracts
must now somehow deal with more than $2 billion worth” (Editorial, 2008, p.A. 20).
According to the Center for Public Integrity, such a shortage in DoD’s IG auditors
created a 76% drop in the number of contracting fraud and corruption cases sent by
DoD investigators for potential criminal prosecution during the Bush administration
(Schwellenbach, 2009). A May 2008 DoD IG report revealed that
of the $8.2B in DoD spending that was inspected, the Pentagon failed to
adequately account for $7.8B paid to contractors in Iraq—a staggering 95%
failure rate. Moreover, $1.4B (17% of that inspected) did not meet minimal
requirements (The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 2010, p.14).
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Similarly, in the US House of Representatives’ Committee on Government Reform’s
report, Dollars, Not Sense (2006), it was found that procurement spending within the
DoD increased by 102.3% in the period between 2000-2005, rising from an initial
$133.5 billion to $270 billion.

This growth in contracting was accompanied by

widespread mismanagement due to awarding non-competitive contracts, inadequate
contract oversight and a reliance on the awarding of abuse-prone contract types, such as
cost-plus, monopoly and middlemen contracts (Committee on Government Reform,
2006). Furthermore, contract officials from the Program Management Office of the
DoD, who provided oversight on DoD spending in Iraq, were also severely understaffed. According to the report (2006, pp.31–32), the DoD “had only 110 to 120
employees on the ground in Iraq to oversee $18.4 billion in contracts”, compared to the
Army Corps of Engineers that “has 30,000 employees to administer an annual budget of
$14 billion …”. Moreover, in the same committee’s following year report it found “that
the worrisome trends identified last year have worsened significantly” (Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, 2007, p.i). According to Hedgpeth (2008), the
accumulated effect of such deficiencies was a Pentagon accounting that, by 2008, could
not adequately trace almost $15 billion worth of contractor purchases in the Iraq
reconstruction effort.

Whilst Rumsfeld harnessed accounting rhetoric pertaining to efficiency, in actuality,
resource mismanagement within the department increased rapidly.

Ironically,

nevertheless, Rumsfeld could essentially exploit the 76% reduction in auditor reported
cases of fraud and corruption as evidence of a surge in efficient financial management
practices. In addition, by exploiting rhetoric that conjoined the need for surges in the
defense budget to achieve national security with an emphasised need for efficient
financial management to reduce waste and increase accountability, Rumsfeld both
justified increased transfers of wealth into the defense realm, whilst also legitimising
the process by which such wealth would be spent. Moreover, the use of such rhetoric
positioned his neoconservative policies on an elevated moral/ethical platform over those
of the DoD’s existing ideology, as it promoted a narrative that his policies were a form
of liberation from the existing ideology’s wastes, deficiencies and inefficiencies.
Accordingly, Rumsfeld underscored that waging an “all-out campaign to shift
Pentagon’s resources from bureaucracy to the battlefield” was not an attack on the
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people of the Pentagon, rather an effort to ‘liberate’ it, to free its men and women from
their ‘frustrations’ with the system, to ‘fix it’, and to “save it from itself” (Rumsfeld,
2001, p.2). Rumsfeld reasoned his reforms as being a source of liberation, a means of
emancipation from the confines of the current ideological grasp that bore organisational
processes and regulations that were
engineered to prevent any mistake, and by so doing, they discourage any risk
… risk aversion is not America’s ethic … it must not be ours. Those who fear
danger do not volunteer to storm beaches and take hills, sail the seas, and
conquer the skies (Rumsfeld, 2001, pp. 3-4).

Finally, Rumsfeld, just like PNAC’s report of the preceding year, acknowledged the
gravity and, thus, difficulty of accomplishing this vision: “there will be real
consequences from, and real resistance to, fundamental change. We will not complete
this work in one year, or five years, or even eight years … Some say it’s like turning a
battleship. I suspect it’s more difficult” (Rumsfeld, 2001, p. 7).

Rumsfeld’s ‘Transformational’ Reforms
Under the pretext of enhancing efficiency, reducing costs and cutting waste, Rumsfeld’s
‘transformational’ reforms followed two paths, both having an overall effect of
providing the SECDEF with greater authority and decision-making power over military
policy. The first involved an ‘overhaul’ of the DoD’s 40-year old internal PPBS, which
he described as “a relic of the Cold War … one of the last vestiges of central planning
on Earth” (Rumsfeld, 2001, p. 4). The second path involved an attempt to pass the
Defense Tranformation Act for the 21st Century (DTA), which sought to grant the DoD
greater autonomy from the controls of Congress so as to enable SECDEF to
unrestrictedly implement neoliberal principles such as downsizing, outsourcing and
privatisation without Congress’ oversight. Both paths of Rumsfeld’s ‘transformational’
reforms and their effects will be discussed below.
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1. Overhauling the defense budgeting process: From PPBS to PPBES
Rumsfeld’s changes to PPBS began on the 2nd August 2001, with a memo that
explained that the PPB process would be collapsed; both the programming and
budgeting phases would now operate concurrently so as to provide a streamlined
process that would reduce redundant bureaucracy, costs and speed decision-making.
This change was built upon the acknowledgment that a high degree of reciprocal
interdependence between the two functions existed and, thus, that the PPBS’s existing
consecutively phased process was inefficient and “was not producing the outputs
desired by Secretary Rumsfeld quickly enough” (McCaffery & Jones, 2004, p.45). The
imposition of this new concurrent process created substantial interdependence between
units, requiring them to work collectively to problem-solve and to realise outputs
desired by SECDEF more quickly and efficiently. In addition, Rumsfeld set up the
Senior Leaders Review Group (SLRG), which comprised of all senior leaders in the
DoD, civilian and military, which “aimed to function like a corporate board, with
SECDEF being its chairman” (McCaffery & Jones, 2004, p.39). SLRG’s role was to
provide early review of the programming/budgeting process and “to evaluate and
integrate major issues at the start of the process”, thereby providing SECDEF with
earlier influence over the programming/budgeting process (McCaffery & Jones, 2004,
p.39). Meanwhile, whilst military departments and CINCS were given a tool, the
Program Change Proposals (PCP), to affect changes within the programming/budgeting
phase, Rumsfeld controlled their frequency by imposing a set dollar threshold that a
proposal had to exceed before being considered, and by requiring any proposal to
include suggested offsets to cover its costs. McCaffery and Jones (2004, p. 47) explain
that “This is meant to be a zero-sum game. Changes have to be accompanied by offsets
or billpayers”. In so doing, Rumsfeld was able to enhance his power by obliging the
military to present budgetary requests in his language of cost-effectiveness and
efficiency, addressing his style of decision making and, thereby, undermining their
influence.

McCaffery and Jones (2005, p. 158) explain that the impact of Rumsfeld’s August 2001
“memo was dwarfed by the events of 11 September 2001 and subsequently … when
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business-as-usual was resumed, budget process players found that the game had
changed”. Indeed, Rumsfeld exploited the 9/11 attacks as an opportunity to promptly
press for greater change and, rapidly consolidated his authority over military policy.
During a speech in January 2002, Rumsfeld expressed further impatience with the
PPBS, criticising its production of “100 percent of a budget for a single year, and it
comes back having been altered by 21 percent, with thousands of earmarks” (quoted in
McCaffery & Jones, 2004, p.38).

Therefore, he rationalised a need for the

simplification of the process, which would reduce costs and time associated with its
annual implementation.

Accordingly, the PPBS was divided into biennial

programming/budgeting ‘on-year’ and ‘off-year’ cycles: the budget would be prepared
using the full PPBS during the ‘on-year’, whilst the ‘off-year’ cycle would “not
introduce major changes to the defense program, except as specifically directed by the
Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense” (Secretary of Defense, 2003a, p.5). As such,
the OSD would set the budget during the ‘off-year’ using existing budget estimates,
allowing only a ‘discrete number’ of changes to be performed to reflect ‘real world
changes’ and align programs with SECDEF’s overall defense strategy (McCaffery &
Jones, 2005, 2004; Secretary of Defense, 2003a). Whilst the biennial cycle was a costeffective alternative to the implementation of the full PPBS annually, most importantly
it augmented the OSD’s authority over its military counterparts as it enhanced the
systematic mechanism for top-down planning and the allocation of resources, thereby
centralising management and policymaking. SECDEF could take advantage of his
central role in the defense budgeting process to exercise his authority over military
policy.

In addition, the ‘off-year’ cycle was utilised to focus on a newly initiated ‘execution’
phase, where comptrollers and budget officials monitor and control execution of
programs and funding, and accounts are reconciled with appropriations and spending
(Jones & McCaffery, 2008; McCaffery & Jones, 2005). To reflect the inclusion of this
new phase, the redesigned PPBS was accordingly altered to become the Planning,
Programming, Budgeting and Execution System, or PPBES in 2003. Whilst budgetary
execution was traditionally delegated to military departments, “the revised process
provides OSD with greater opportunity to examine and critique the budget execution
decisions of the military departments and services”, thereby allowing SECDEF greater
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authority over military spending, and providing further resistance to the autonomy of
service departments (McCaffery & Jones, 2005, p.156). Indeed, management audits,
performed by the OSD and its military departments’ OSD Inspector General offices, in
addition to those performed by other external and internal agencies, were performed
regularly to the extent that it led “some command-level and Pentagon officials to
complain that they are nearly ‘audited to death’” (Jones & McCaffery, 2008, p.167).
The addition of this phase was a sign of Rumsfeld’s purported heightened concern with
accounting, monitoring and control of spending so as to insure efficiency and
accountability within the DoD. In actuality, Rumsfeld also utilised these accounting
techniques to increase his influence, whereby he could identify underutilised funds that
could be subsequently shifted to areas of higher priority, in accordance with his
ideological requirements.

Indeed, the addition of this phase was an example of

“strategic budget behaviour …”, as it signified an attempt by Rumsfeld “to gain and
sustain a significant degree of discretion and flexibility in execution of their budgets”
from congressional oversight (Jones & McCaffery, 2008, p.168).

As such, it was an

“inevitably political as well as managerial” affair as Rumsfeld aimed to gain more
independence from budgetary congressional oversight and, thus, increase his delegated
power within the DoD (p. 168).

To further enhance his control over budgetary execution, Rumsfeld also implemented
performance-based budgeting (PBB), which focussed the budget on the costs of
achieving outcomes, rather than on administrative and production related details of
programs.

PBB was driven by the concept of effects-based capabilities, which

reiterated a core initiative within PNAC’s RMA that called on the efficient management
of military capabilities to profoundly improve them and achieve desired end results. As
such, PBB offered a means for realising this initiative by forcing the alignment of
desired capability outcomes with the most cost-effective appropriation of resources.
Most importantly, PBB reviews provided Rumsfeld with quantitatively measurable
goals that would enable performance measurement and management, and the promotion
of accountability for results, thereby further enhancing his authority. Rumsfeld did this
by establishing a Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) in 2002, which scored
programs using multiple criteria to establish the degree of their compliance with budget
submission requirements. In this regard he admitted: “The old adage that you get what
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you inspect, not what you expect … that what you measure improves, is true. It is
powerful, and we will be measuring” (Rumsfeld, 2001, p. 8).

Indeed, Jones and

McCaffery (2010, p.496) report that, since PART’s implementation in 2002, “by 2003
… virtually all departments and agencies were complying with … budget submission
requirements”. Whilst PART’s provisioning of effective performance management and
enhancement to SECDEF’s control was apparent, Gilmore and Lewis (2005) concede
however, that the extent by which PART improved department efficiency and
effectiveness was uncertain.

Finally, Rumsfeld was able to consolidate his overarching authority over the PPBES
and, thus, military policy, by also entrenching his influence into the planning phase.
Rumsfeld’s overhaul of this phase came after a post-Cold War period of ambiguity with
regards justification of US military budgetary needs due to the absence of a distinct
adversary to plan against. However, “The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 ended
this period of doubt and confused reflection”, bringing to bear a novel archenemy that
encompassed a wide range of global agile threats instead of the “old bipolar geographic
analyses that focused on the USSR, potential enemies in Asia or elsewhere” (McCaffery
& Jones, 2005, p.168).

Correspondingly, this new global disorder rationalised

Rumsfeld’s demand for the implementation of a capabilities-based approach that would
‘profoundly improve’ and efficiently manage US capabilities so as to enable the US to
simultaneously address a wide variety of threats, rather than the theatre-based approach
that only focussed on defeating a specific adversary (Rumsfeld, 2002b). Rumsfeld
described the existing process as a ‘train wreck’:
What happens in the Department of Defense – and it runs me up the wall –
is each service comes up with their things … and how in the world do you
get those four things into a single fighting force at the end? It’s a train
wreck … every year when you’re trying to do a budget. It’s just a meat
grinder trying to pull things together … And we’re going to fix that. I’ll be
the meat grinder” (quoted in Walker, 2005, p.2).

The existing approach had empowered each Service department with the autonomy to
formulate its own vision of war fighting and, accordingly, to generate capability
requirements to fulfil this vision. Only near the end of the process were the independent
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proposals integrated.

This process was criticised as being a form of bottom-up

‘bureaucratic stovepiping’, which gave rise to a procedure, the attempt to integrate the
independent proposals and then budget accordingly, that was both resource and time
inefficient (Rumsfeld, 2002b; Walker, 2005). Capabilities-based planning, primarily a
business approach that was widely credited for the success and growth of large
corporations like Wal-Mart, shifted the focus in planning from inputs to outputs. Its
central principle was that a capability was advantageous only if it cost-effectively
enhanced the business as a whole by adding value to the end customer. Likewise,
Rumsfeld’s capabilities-based planning methodology sought to provide the most costeffective enhancements to joint military capabilities, which would add value to the enduser combatant. This would be achieved through an analysis of a range of capabilities
against differing threat variables, and then making choices based on cost-effectiveness
and value to war fighting, end-user combatants. As such, and as depicted on the right
hand side of Figure 1 below, Rumsfeld’s capabilities approach inverted the existing
paradigm; the planning process now began with a top-down allocation of war fighting
vision and strategic direction, which was to be jointly followed by all service
departments. Subsequently, joint capability requirements would be derived and service
departments would then be tasked with the development of these requirements.

Figure 4: Capabilities-Based Approach (Walker, 2005, p.2).
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This inversion effectively enforced Rumsfeld’s management style upon the service
departments as it imposed a shift to top-down planning that focussed on the realisation
of cost-effective outputs rather than inputs and, thus, centralised decision-making.
Although this shift was articulated as being revolutionary, it actually represented a
return to SECDEF McNamara’s basic principles of PPBS, where he “used capabilitiesbased, systemic analyses to inform his decision-making, and then implemented these
civilian-controlled decisions that spanned policy and program” (Walker, 2005, pp.3–4).
Indeed, the most major outcome of this approach was Rumsfeld’s heavy involvement in
decision-making from the early stages of the planning process, rather than later in the
cycle. According to business management studies, such top level control and authority
is intrinsic to the capabilities approach as
leveraging capabilities requires a panoply of strategic investments across
SBUs and functions far beyond what traditional cost-benefit metrics can
justify … building strategic capabilities cannot be … left to operating
managers, to corporate staff, or … to SBU heads. It is the primary agenda of
the CEO. Only the CEO can focus the entire company’s attention on creating
capabilities that serve customers (Stalk et al., 1992, p.63).

Figure 2 highlights the extent of Rumsfeld’s acquired influence within the new process
model, with all grey shaded areas representing the SECDEF’s areas of influence. In
addition to these areas, SECDEF also chaired the overarching Strategic Planning
Council, which provided overall assessments and drive during the planning process.
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Figure 5: New Process Model (Walker, 2005, p.8).

Within this process model, SECDEF provides the services with the Joint Programming
Guidance (JPG), which directs their implementation of decisions reached during the
enhanced planning process.

This document is fiscally constrained, meaning its

delegated guidance is quantitatively costed to demonstrate that it is “fiscally
executable”, and also to provide a basis for future performance management through
budget and performance grading of services’ programs and budgets (Walker, 2005,
p.13).

2. The defense transformation act for the 21st century
Whilst Rumsfeld transformed the internal PPBES, he also attempted to gain greater
autonomy from Congress through the passing of the DTA. During a 2003 hearing
before a Committee on Armed Services in the House of Representatives, Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who was also a core member of PNAC, presented
a statement to promote the bill. Using rhetoric that echoed that of Rumsfeld and the
PNAC 2000 report, Wolfowitz utilised a backdrop of the September Attacks to warn of
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“a new era, possibly the most dangerous era this country has ever confronted”, of
“shadowy terrorists and their networks” (Wolfowitz, 2003, p.20). Escalating these
threats was an inefficient DoD management system, which kept the department “bogged
down … in the micro-management and bureaucratic processes of an earlier era”
(Wolfowitz, 2003, p.20), and withheld taxpayers from “getting the value that they could
from their defense dollars” (Wolfowitz, 2003, p.22). Accordingly, he presented the dire
necessity to transform “not just the way we deter and defend, but also the way we
conduct our daily business” (Wolfowitz, 2003, p.19), pressing Congress to empower the
department with the “freedom to move resources, shift people and acquire new weapons
more rapidly” (Wolfowitz, 2003, p.20). Indeed, Rumsfeld had complained of an
existing defense authorization bill that required the DoD to submit 26,000 pages of
justification and over 800 reports to Congress each year with regards budgetary requests
and execution. Not only did he consider such requirements as time-consuming, costly
to observe, and a security impediment as they doubled the time needed to produce a
new weapons system, but they also represented an overarching means of control over
his decisions (Rumsfeld, 2003). As such, Rumsfeld essentially pressed Congress to
delegate authority for budgetary execution, and the managerial flexibility to implement
neoliberal business practices such as downsizing of headquarter staffs; reduction of
physical assets by closing excess bases; expanded authority for competitive outsourcing
of non-core activities; the elimination of arduous rules that limited small corporate
dealings with the DoD; privatisation of utility services for military housing and health
care delivery; and more flexible rules for the management of the acquisition-related
process and personnel (Francis & Walther, 2006; McCaffery & Jones, 2005, 2004;
Rumsfeld, 2001). He “put special emphasis on the importance of more horizontal,
decentralized structures that share and leverage the information necessary for effective
and timely decision-making …” (quoted in Kaplan, 2008).

Overall, the DTA would further delegate authority and power to Rumsfeld through
provision of flexible management authority and delegation of budgetary execution
authority. Notably, although Rumsfeld had repeatedly emphasised the importance of
budgetary oversight to provide accountability and transparency and to achieve
efficiency and the elimination of waste, he simultaneously sought to reduce Congress’
budgetary oversight over the DoD by eliminating DoD’s obligation to provide it with
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budgetary reports. Believing that the Congressional budget process should mainly
focus on ‘macro’ rather than ‘micro’ management issues, leaving specific details to the
executive of the department, DTA proposed to eliminate DoD reporting requirements
within five years, including the Selected Acquisition Reports that provided costing and
budgetary execution information to Congress and to the GAO. Such reports were
critical for Congress and the GAO in conducting budgetary oversight responsibilities
over the DoD. Furthermore, DTA’s proposed reforms to personnel management would
authorise the SECDEF to freely rewrite the employment conditions of 700,000 DoD
civilian employees, without Congressional oversight. Indeed, in a letter written by
Representatives David Obey and John Spratt (2003, p.2) of the Appropriation
Committee and Budget Committee respectively, both argued that the DTA would
concede “unprecedented reduction in Congressional oversight and accountability, and in
some cases unlimited increases in the powers of the Secretary of Defense”.
Accordingly, although Congress did pass a new Defense Authoization Act of 2003,
which included substantial sections from the DTA including those pertaining authority
to outsource, privatise, downsize and reduce physical assets, it was reluctant to provide
SECDEF with all the discretionary powers he had sought (Jones & McCaffery, 2008;
McCaffery & Jones, 2004, 2005).

Rumsfeld had already realised one of his requests for discretionary power within the
DoD regardless of Congressional approval. Rumsfeld had eliminated 31 of the 72
acquisition-related advisory boards under the pretext of decentralising the acquisition
process so as to cut down “some 17 levels of bureaucracy …” between “a line officer’s
to my desk”, and “now budget based on realistic estimates” (Rumsfeld, 2001, p.4). This
change was designed to centralise SECDEF’s influence over decisions on major
acquisitions by allowing him to decide outside of the PPBES, and before decisions were
made elsewhere within the Pentagon (McCaffery & Jones, 2004). Such an exemption
empowered him with the means to realise the requirement of PNAC’s RMA, being to
‘wisely manage’ weapons systems by forcing cancellation of some projects, whilst
shifting production to other ‘radically new designs’. Indeed, by 2003, Rumsfeld had
already succeeded in cancelling the Army crusader heavy-artillery system and in
consolidating the B-1 bomber force in spite of strong opposition from the Pentagon,
Congress and industry (McCaffery & Jones, 2005, 2004, Rumsfeld, 2001, 2002b).
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Meanwhile, he had also authorised the development of “’bunker-buster’ nuclear
weapons and …” made “‘star wars’ a national priority” (Pilger, 2002).

Conclusion
After revealing that the US’s assignment of inadequate troop levels to Iraq represented
the breaking point element in the development of a most evident Iraq War fiasco, this
chapter questioned how the DoD, with its multiple organisational processes and
regulations that are specifically engineered to prevent mistakes, could commit such a
grave miscalculation.

The chapter showed that, although the DoD’s CENTCOM

already possessed a comprehensive plan for an invasion and occupation of Iraq, and its
senior generals had already established the need for several hundred thousand troops, all
such military expertise and knowledge was overruled by the civilian leadership of
SECDEF Rumsfeld, who imposed the Bush administration’s neoconservative
ideological beliefs over military knowledge and initiated the war with less than a third
of the troops recommended.
According to Wildavsky (1961, 1992), when there exists political ideological
disagreements, these differences are sorted in the budget, which ultimately determines
who gains sovereignty over decision-making; that is, financial control equals power.
Indeed, by showing the historical role of accounting, specifically that of the PPBS, in
delegating decision-making authority and power within the DoD, this chapter exposed
the ideological/political instrumentality of accounting in the promotion of distinct
interests. The chapter showed how civilian leadership has historically either used the
PPBS to establish its ideological dominance over the DoD’s decision-making process,
or to delegate a substantial amount of that authority to the military command. In order
to gain power with the DoD, the chapter demonstrated how SECDEF Rumsfeld utilised
accounting rhetoric to justify and legitimise his imposition of reforms to the budgeting
process, and how he also capitalised on the disaster of 9/11 to press for rapid change.
Accordingly, he was able to impose his reforms, thereby bringing about an overall
outcome that firmly entrenched his pre-eminence over the DoD’s PPBES, and provided
him with the means to permeate neoconservative ideological conceptions throughout the
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department. This was because PPBES afforded a systematic mechanism for top-down
planning and the allocation of resources, thereby centralising management and
policymaking. Moreover, it provided the organisational tools for the centralisation of
legal authority into the OSD and for resisting the autonomy of the service departments.
In addition, Rumsfeld was able to further enhance his authority by pressing Congress to
pass the DTA.

As a result of Rumsfeld’s successful domination over the DoD, the Powell Doctrine was
effectively dismissed. Also known as the ‘doctrine of reluctance’ by its critics, this
school of thought had successfully withheld the US from embarking into risky military
interventions by establishing stringent restrictions and guidelines for the planning for
war, such as the use of overwhelming force, exit strategies, and clear, attainable
objectives. In exchange, what Thomas Friedman (2004) describes as ‘the Rumsfeld
Doctrine’: ‘Just enough troops to lose’, was employed. This doctrine was primarily
built upon neoconservative ideology, which had been encapsulated within PNAC’s
2000 report, Rebuilding America’s Defenses. The report had proclaimed as an essential
requisite that the US undertake multiple, simultaneous major theatre wars so as to
maintain supremacy and global domination. Richard Perle, a founder of PNAC and
consultant of President Bush, eloquently articulated this ideology, announcing:
No stages, this is total war. We are fighting a variety of enemies. There
are lots of them out there. All this talk about first we are going to do
Afghanistan, then we will do Iraq … this is entirely the wrong way to go
about it. If we just let our vision of the world go forth, and we embrace it
entirely and we don’t try to piece together clever diplomacy, but just wage
a total war … our children will sing great songs about us years from now
(quoted in Cooper, 2006, p.50).

In order to permit realisation of this ‘total war’ strategy, PNAC called for a surge in the
defense budget and an end to the ‘procurement holiday’, so as to exploit the RMA. In
effect, neoconservatives believed they could win multiple, simultaneous theatre wars by
relying on technology, air-delivered weaponry and small, highly mobile and nimble
ground forces. In accordance with this ideology, the Bush administration substantially
increased the defense budget, whilst its SECDEF Rumsfeld exploited his newlyacquired influence and authority within the DoD to enact the transformational
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alterations prescribed by the RMA, including that of smaller ground forces in war.
Indeed, Talmadge (2006, p.16) acknowledged that
Rumsfeld’s hour of greatest influence probably came during his extensive
revisions of the plans for Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. Over the
objections of his generals, Rumsfeld dramatically whittled the ground forces
brought to bear against the Iraqi regime.

Accordingly, this chapter confirmed the CAS concept’s assertion that accounting plays
an inherent role in the building and re-inforcing of power structures that enable the
restructuring and management of space for capitalist imperialist interests.

It also

demonstrated how it was utilised by US political elites to project a perception of
feasibility and efficiency with regards their management of the war, invasion and
occupation of Iraq. The following chapter will further elaborate upon and strengthen
these chief accounting purposes of the CAS concept by analysing the effects of the
PPBES on visibilities and decision making during the US’s occupation of Iraq.
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Chapter Seven

Accounting for Unjust War
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Introduction
The previous chapter analysed the historical role the PPBS played in calibrating power
structures within the DoD and in redefining “the normative and cognitive facets of the
defense political process” (Chwastiak, 2001, p.501). The chapter then exposed how
SECDEF Rumsfeld utilised a conjunction between rhetoric of fear pertaining to
multiple lurking threats, and accounting rhetoric pertaining to the proper management
of resources and the reduction of waste, to elevate efficiency’s importance to that of
national security and to legitimise the imposition of new reforms to the PPBS. Once the
disaster of the 9/11 attacks occurred, Rumsfeld was able to transform the attacks into an
‘opportunity’ to press for rapid imposition of change. As such, the chapter exposed the
budgetary means through which Rumsfeld was able to afford himself power within the
DoD, thereby providing the Bush administration’s neoconservative ideology a superior
platform within the decision-making process, and altering the perspective of defense
scrutiny to conform to its agenda. Since neoconservative ideology believed the US
would need to wage multiple theatre wars simultaneously so as to retain its global
position of dominance and safeguard its national interests, Rumsfeld sought to apply the
RMA in conjunction with neoliberal principles, such as privatisation and outsourcing,
so as to generate sufficient capabilities to cover such ventures. In doing so, he bypassed
the generals and the PPBS’s TPFDL and, instead, imposed his vision of an Iraq War
and occupation that would be waged through the utilisation of streamlined forces that
were supported by overwhelming air force. Accordingly, the chapter exposed how
Rumsfeld’s PPBES afforded him the power to initiate the US war, invasion and
occupation of Iraq with less than a third of the average troop levels that had been
projected by military experts.

This chapter will elaborate on this knowledge by re-visiting the PPBE system so as to
further demonstrate its effects in building power structures that facilitated the
restructuring and managing of Iraqi space for US imperial interests. Also, it will further
corroborate accounting’s essential purposes of devaluing Iraqi space and of projecting a
feasible perception of the imperial project. Overall, the chapter will demonstrate that
the PPBES brought to bear an unjust war that contributed to the eventual failure of OIF.
Firstly, it will show that PPBES’s mindset restructured everything into a problem to be
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solved; this mode of reasoning permitted the discounting of qualitative considerations,
such as morals and ethics, and instead focussed leadership thoughts on a mechanical
form of problem-solving. In addition, the chapter will show that PPBE’s cause-effect
mindset equated truth with that which could be quantified and instrumentally related to
an output, thereby enabling critical qualitative indicators to be negated form visibility.
Importantly, this mindset will be shown to have led US leadership to perceive victory as
being contingent upon achieving cause-effect relationships; these incentivised US
troops to increase both their capture rate of potential insurgents and their generation of
intelligence, regardless of qualitative considerations such as justice and human rights.
As such, injustices were generated through the operationalisation of mass-incarceration
and torture systems in Iraq.

Also, the chapter will exhibit the unjust effects that

materialised due to the critical shortage in US troops, such as the laissez faire Rules of
Engagement (ROE) that permitted the excessive use of force. It will demonstrate that
the combined effect of resulting troop vulnerability, their perception of all Iraqis as
objects of fear and hate, and the laissez faire ROE was the devaluing of Iraqi life and
the inciting of unjust killings of civilians from a distance.

Whilst US political elite projected a perception that the PPBES would increase
feasibility and economic efficiency within coercive exertions of US power, this chapter
will show that, contrary to this perception, dubious contracting practices and
mismanagement led to waste, fraud, contract abuse, and colossal transfers of wealth
from the public domain to dominant capital groups. Furthermore, whilst the political
elite benefited from decreased public accountability and the legally grey zone in which
private contractors operated in Iraq, vast injustices transpired as the country was turned
into a ‘free-crime zone’ for civilian employees who committed acts of abuse, torture,
kidnap, murder, human trafficking and rape. These acts of injustice were exacerbated
when US leaders sought to further reduce their eco-political costs by outsourcing the
Iraqi government and ethno-sectarian militia units.

Such outsourcing, which was

primarily motivated by accounting’s cost-saving logic, facilitated grave injustices to
transpire, such as torture, mutilation, killing, ethnic cleansing and civil war; all of which
threatened the future territorial integrity of Iraq as a unified country.
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PPBE, Rationality and the Representation of the Iraq War as a
Rational Solution
SECDEF Rumsfeld’s neoconservative ideological underpinnings led him to believe that
the application of neoliberal business practices within the DoD would achieve an
economically rational management of resources that would permit the waging of
multiple, simultaneous wars with success (Rumsfeld, 2001a). Fundamental to this
belief is the use of statistics to instrumentally relate inputs with desired outputs, break
down costs and achieve cost-effectiveness.

The degree to which Rumsfeld was

committed to the implementation of quantitative instrumental rationality within the
DoD is apparent from his initiation of the new ‘execution’ phase within the PPBS,
which utilised PBB to focus on costs to achieve outcomes, and his emphasis on the
employment of performance measurements. Echoing this mindset, Rumsfeld monitored
the progress of the Iraq War, invasion and occupation through quantitative
measurements that could be instrumentally related to the goal of victory. During a radio
interview in 2005, Rumsfeld elaborated on how he instrumentalised metrics as
indicators of progress:
Well, we've got literally dozens of ways we do it. We have a room here, the
Iraq Room where we track a whole series of metrics. Some of them are inputs
and some of them are outputs … We track, for example, the numbers of
attacks by area. We track the types of attacks by area … we track a number of
reports of intimidation, attempts at intimidation or assassination of
government officials, for example. We track the extent to which people are
supplying intelligence to our people so that they can go in and actually track
down and capture or kill insurgents … No one number is determinative … We
probably look at 50, 60, 70 different types of metrics, and come away with
them with an impression (‘Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with National Public
Radio’s Steve Inskeep for “Morning Edition”.’, 2005).

Accordingly, the primary instruments utilised for operational assessments and
evaluations during OIF were PPBE’s quantitative MoPs and MoEs, which were used to
relate inputs with desired outputs.

As a result of this reliance on quantitative

representations, visibility was predominantly afforded to only technical aspects of
decisions, whilst masking qualitative factors, such as those pertaining morals, ethics,
236

human rights and justice. As such, the PPBES served to simplify complexities and to
reduce multi-dimensional representations of reality into one-dimensional orderly
existences. This marginalisation of reality fostered a problem solving mindset that
narrowed the scope of military reasoning and distanced subjective considerations or
qualitative-based judgements from visibility.

The effects of this mindset are apparent from the outsets of OIF, in the way in which the
Bush administration’s grievances with the Saddam Hussein regime were restructured
and conceptualised.

Chwastiak (2006, p.35) explains that PPBS restructured

“everything into a problem to be solved and in so doing, war, starvation and intrigue
simply became potential solutions”.

Accordingly, the Kennedy Administration

restructured the Vietnamese nationalist revolution as a problem, and the Vietnam War
was presented as the rational solution (Chwastiak, 2006).

Similarly, the Bush

Administration restructured Iraq as a problem that threatened US interests and its
desired world order, and forceful regime change was presented as the rational solution
(Borger, 2004a; Donnelly et al., 2000; Pilger, 2002; Suskind, 2004).

Indeed, US

Secretary of Treasury Paul O’Neill recalls that, shortly after Bush’s inauguration during
a January 2001 meeting of the NSC, “there was a conviction that Saddam Hussein was a
bad person and that he needed to go” (quoted in Borger, 2004a). The problem of
Saddam Hussein was objectified within the bounds of instrumentally rational reasoning
to the extent that the qualitative dimensions of the solution of war, such as the US’s
right to intervene in Iraq, and the ethical/moral dimensions of initiating a pre-emptive
war were not scrutinised (Borger, 2004b; Suskind, 2004). Instead of questioning the
solution of forceful regime change and occupation of Iraq, members of the NSC were
preoccupied with “finding a way to do it. The President saying ‘Go find me a way to do
this’” (quoted in Borger, 2004).

PPBES’s mechanical problem-solving mindset was also apparent in the way the Bush
administration solved the problem of establishing legitimacy for the initiation of war.
The necessity to fulfil requisites of the law on the recourse to force, know as jus ad
bellum, was also restructured into a problem that required a rational solution (Ratner,
2002). Moreover, since the PPBES emphasises economically rational reasoning,
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decisions that exploit even disasters so as to realise material gains are tolerated.
Accordingly, when the 9/11 attacks occurred, US leadership conceptualised the attacks
as an ‘opportunity’ to be capitalised upon so as to achieve desirable ends. Indeed,
National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice called on members of the NSC to “Think
about ‘how do you capitalize on these opportunities?’” (quoted in Lemman, 2002, p.44),
and President Bush declared, “Through the tears of sadness, I see an opportunity”
(quoted in Harnden, 2001).

A day after the attacks, Rumsfeld also heeded the

opportunity, “Why shouldn’t we go after Iraq, not just al Qaeda?” he questioned (quoted
in Woodward, 2003, p.49).

In a declassified 27th November meeting between Rumsfeld and CENTCOM
commander Gen. Tommy Franks regarding planning for the Iraq War, Rumsfeld listed
the establishment of a link between Saddam and the 9/11 attacks as a solution to the
justification problem concerning the initiation of the desired war (Rumsfeld, 2001b).
Other solutions listed by Rumsfeld included the establishment of a link between
Saddam and a possible anthrax attack, an attack by Saddam on the Kurds in the north
and a dispute over WMD inspections.

Absent from such reasoning were the

ethical/moral considerations regarding both the authenticity of such claims and the
destructive effects that would be built upon them, which PPBES’s mindset contributed
towards. Indeed, the UK’s now declassified ‘Downing Street Memo’ affirms that US
decision-makers intentionally skewed information so as to provide justification for war
that had been pre-decided, and that little consideration had been given to consequences:
Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the
conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being
fixed around the policy … There was little discussion in Washington of the
aftermath after military action (Rycroft, 2002, p.1).

Further substantiating this report were two other reports, issued by the Inspector
General for the DoD in 2004 and 2007, concerning investigations into what has been
described as “the shadow rightwing intelligence network” that was established in
September 2002 and dismantled just after the invasion of Iraq in June 2003 (Borger,
2003b). Known as the Office of Special Plans (OSP), it had been tasked with the
provisioning of alternative intelligence assessments against those of the Intelligence
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Community (IC) - the CIA and its military counterpart the Defence Intelligence Agency
(DIA). The OSP was accused of manipulating information so as to establish a link
between Saddam, al Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks in the wake of the IC’s reporting of a
lack of concrete evidence (Borger, 2003b; Coman, 2004; Committee on Armed
Services, 2007; Inspector General US DOD, 2007; Sharpe, 2006; Sneigoski, 2008).
The agency had been directly initiated by three staunch neoconservatives: SECDEF
Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, who were also all members of the PNAC, thereby
sharing its ideological goal of forceful Iraqi regime change. OSP was considered a
shadow government agency. Most of its employees were contracted ‘consultants’ who
had little or no experience in intelligence and were “off the official payroll and beyond
congressional oversight” (Borger, 2003b). According to defence analyst, John Pike,
this contracting system offered a means for Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Feith to “pack the
room with their little friends” (quoted in Borger, 2003b). Nevertheless, the IG’s reports
found that the DoD’s leadership gave OSP’s findings precedence over those produced
by the professional expertise of the IC, and facilitated a privileging of OSP intelligence
during presentations to executives at the White House (Borger, 2003b; Coman, 2004;
Committee on Armed Services, 2007).

The two reports of the IG were discussed during a 2007 Senate Hearing before the
Committee on Armed Services, where the acting Inspector General of the DoD, Tom
Gimble, provided a briefing on the activities of the OSP prior to the war in Iraq.
Gimble (Committee on Armed Services, 2007, p.2) informed the committee that the
IG’s 2004 report had concluded that:
An alternative intelligence assessment process was established in the Office of
Under Secretary for Policy, Douglas Feith, that was predisposed to find a
significant relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda. His staff then conducted
its own review of raw intelligence reports, including reporting of dubious
quality or reliability. Drawing upon both reliable and unreliable reporting,
they arrived at an ‘alternative’ interpretation of the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship
that was much stronger than that assessed by the Intelligence Community and
more in accord with the policy views of senior officials in the administration.
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For example, Gimble referred to a meeting that had allegedly taken place five months
before the 9/11 attacks between the lead hijacker and an Iraqi intelligence officer, which
was considered by the OSP as ‘key’ evidence of Iraqi involvement, “despite the fact that
the Intelligence Community was skeptical that the meeting ever happened …”
(Committee on Armed Services, 2007, p.2). With regards the IG’s 2007 report, Gimble
informed the hearing that the report found that the OSP “was inappropriately
performing intelligence activities of developing, producing, and disseminating that
should be performed by the Intelligence Community”; that such activities were
authorised by the SECDEF; that OSP analysis was presented to executives within the
White House without prior knowledge of the IC; and that such analysis was not vetted
by the IC (Committee on Armed Services, 2007, pp.2–3). Most importantly, the report
found that the OSP’s conclusion that there existed a cooperative relationship between
Saddam and al Qaeda, “and shared interest in and pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and some indications of possible Iraqi coordination with al Qaeda
specifically related to September 11”, was not supported by the available intelligence
(Committee on Armed Services, 2007, p.3). Gimble concluded,
The bottom line is that intelligence relating to the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship
was manipulated by high-ranking officials in the DOD to support the
administration’s decision to invade Iraq when the intelligence assessments of
the professional analysts of the Intelligence Community did not provide the
desired compelling case. The IG’s report is a devastating condemnation of
inappropriate activities by the DOD policy office that helped take this Nation
to war (Committee on Armed Services, 2007, pp.3–4).

PPBE and the Creation of Contradictions: Perceptions v. Reality
Another consequence of the PPBES’ emphasis on quantified forms of instrumental
reasoning was that it redefined the cognitive facets of defense knowledge and limitted
the scope of their discourse. As such, critical qualitative indicators were made invisible,
thereby generating contradictions that created a gap between perceptions and reality.
For example, in a declassified letter from Major General Glen Shaffer, the Director of
Intelligence of the Military’s Joint Staff, in which he provided a report on the status of
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, Shaffer made note that
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a couple of weeks ago SECDEF asked me what we don’t know (in a
percentage) about the Iraqi WMD program. We’ve struggled to estimate the
unknowns, and the attached briefing sums up our best % sense. We range
from 0% to about 75% knowledge on various aspects of their program
(Shaffer, 2002, p.2).

As shown in this letter, the SECDEF obliged the Joint Staffs to present their knowledge
in his language, quantitative metrics, and underscored his commitment to the
domination of quantitative instrumental rationality. Also apparent, however, is that this
obligation imposed a limitation to the scope of knowledge that the Joint Staff could
present, as they ‘struggled’ to dismiss qualitative variables so as to translate their
knowledge into strictly quantifiable terms. Since the question concerning the extent of
Iraq’s alleged WMD program was subject to multiple qualitative judgements with
regards intelligence, such as the variances in levels of reliability and authenticity, the
attempt to represent the program in concrete probabilities was effectively flawed.
Indeed, the Joint Staffs conceded within the report, “Our knowledge of the Iraqi nuclear
weapons program is based largely – perhaps 90% - on analysis of imprecise
intelligence” (Shaffer, 2002, p.5). Therefore, Rumsfeld’s requirement discounted from
reality the fact that the matter was primarily judgement-based and, instead, obligated
that it be predictable to the extent that it could be represented in concrete probabilities.
This not only undermined the precision of the report and the knowledge upon which US
leadership were basing a decision of war, but also imposed a redefinition of the
cognitive facets of military knowledge, causing a degree of perplexity that was
encapsulated in Shaffer’s (2002, p.4) articulation, “We don’t know with any precision
how much we don’t know”.

PPBES’s limiting discourse also impacted the way in which US leadership measured
progress in Iraq. As was displayed earlier, the primary instruments for operational
assessments and evaluations during OIF were quantitative MoPs and MoEs, which were
gathered and monitored in Rumsfeld’s ‘Iraq Room’. As such, aspects that were most
reducible to quantification received most attention, whilst qualitative features were
distanced from visibility. For example, since the number of Saddam’s Baathist regime
leaders could be counted, the dominant means for the administration’s evaluation of its
success rate during the initial phases of invasion was “by how many of those on its list
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of the fifty-five most wanted members of the old regime – reproduced on playing cards
– had been captured” (US House of Representatives, 2004, p.9730). However, the
administration did not request progress on the establishment of law and order and the
adequate provisioning of essential utilities to a greatly deprived and terrorised Iraqi
populace. Such qualitative aspects of the invasion were critical to the success of OIF as
they impacted on US capability to win the hearts and minds of Iraqis and, therefore, the
stability of the Iraqi nation. By driving US leaders’ focus to be absorbed on the number
of regime members caught, instead of on winning the hearts and minds of Iraqi
citizenry, PPBES’s limiting discourse created a gap between perception and reality: US
leaders perceived that they were succeeding, whilst, in reality, they were fuelling Iraqi
antipathy towards the US occupiers.

PPBES’s flawed conceptualisation of the ‘enemy’, which perceives them as
economically rational agents, led US leaders to consider early violent forms of Iraqi
resistance as merely being desperate acts from members of Saddam’s dying regime.
During the Vietnam War, the Vietnamese were also assumed to be economically
rational agents who would weigh the benefits of fighting against associated costs, such
as their deaths and further destruction of their country and, therefore, were expected to
reach a rational decision of submitting to the will and overpowering weight of US
strength (Chwastiak, 2006). A parallel assumption was made with regards the people of
Iraq: throughout pre-war planning and the initial phases of invasion, top US leaders,
including president Bush, vice-president Cheney and SECDEF Rumsfeld, repeatedly
spoke of the expectation of a submissive Iraqi people who would welcome with open
arms the US invaders as liberators (Friedman, 2004; Hersh, 2003). However, such an
interpretation failed to consider the social and cultural reality of the Iraqi people who
valued their right to self-determination more than their material assets and were, thus,
willing to forgo all to resist and achieve independence. As such, what were initially
perceived as finite attacks from only Baathist regime loyalists, were in actuality, the
beginnings of a resistance/insurgency that included Iraqis from all its ethno-sectarian
groups. Moreover, since the PPBES ignored factors impacting Iraqis as human beings
and on the stability of the Iraqi nation, more Iraqis, who may have initially been unsure
of US intentions, became convinced that the US was a foreign destructive force that was
occupying Iraq only in pursuit of its self-interests and eco-geopolitical gains. This
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increased the feelings of anger, distrust and patriotism within Iraqis that fuelled the
ideological basis for their resistance/insurgency (Dominik et al., 2008; Jenkins, 2003;
Osborne & Kriese, 2008).

The dominant measurements of OIF’s progress and success within the ‘Iraq Room’
included the number of insurgent attacks, number of informants, number of weapons
caches seized and the number of insurgents caught, which later also developed into the
notorious body count, the number of insurgents killed (Oppel, 2005; Oppel & AlNeami, 2006). Such metrics were used by the DoD to provide a quarterly report,
Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, and were also used by the State Department to
provide its weekly status reports on Iraq to Congress. However, Cordesman (2006,
p.2), from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, described the use of such
metrics as “deeply flawed”, because the resulting report did “more than simply spin the
situation to provide false assurances. It makes basic analytical and statistical mistakes,
fails to define key terms, provides undefined and unverifiable survey information, and
deals with key issues by omission”. The use of quantitative data to report on Iraq’s
multi-dimensional reality produced inaccuracies as it simplified complexities and
claimed “that there is a world of objective reality that exists independently of human
beings and that has a determinate nature or essence that is knowable” (Chua, 1986,
p.606). Moreover, the use of statistics granted the reports’ representations a perception
of absolute scientific truth, thereby negating the fact that its representations were
primarily a construction of the researchers and their a priori assumptions. Accordingly,
whilst the DoD’s quarterly reports enjoyed an aura of scientific truth due to their
predominant reliance on quantitative data, the reports were not value-free, rather valueladen as they presented “a unique understanding of the state … by the reader of the
accounts/text, through the medium of that text” (Cooper & Puxty, 1994, p.129). Indeed,
US Congress members generally considered the reports “as unproblematically linked to
the intentions of their authors …” and, therefore, failed to scrutinise the reports’
interpretations, hence, sustaining the forged gap between the reports’ constructed truths
and the Iraqi reality (Cooper & Puxty, 1994, p.127).

243

For example, the metric regarding the number of insurgent attacks only concentrated on
attacks that could clearly be attributed to insurgents, thereby dismissing from account
sectarian/ethnic attacks, criminal kidnappings, and actions by the ‘death squads’. Here,
this limited definition of attacks led US leaders to focus only on significant insurgent
attacks as a measure of Iraq’s stability and security, thereby discounting from attention
the overall pattern of increased sectarian violence and insecurity that led to the outbreak
of civil war. Indeed, while the DoD’s first quarterly report of 2006 attributed 68% of
attacks as targeting Coalition forces, other reports on Iraqi violence indicated that
“Iraqis have become the primary target and suffer more than five times as many losses
as Coalition forces, and this ratio might rise to 10:1 if all sectarian and ethnic violence
were counted” (Cordesman, 2006, p.8). Similarly, while the report claimed that the
locations of 80% of attacks were limited to only four of Iraq’s provinces, thereby
providing an impression that attacks had significantly decreased and were confined to a
minority of provinces, a different analysis of information showed that “50% of the
population is experiencing a near constant threat including the key province of
Baghdad” (Cordesman, 2006, p.8). As such, PPBES’s quantitative MoPs and MoEs
were not impartial as they were guided by constructed limitations to their definitions
and to their applications; quantification “can be utilized in activities that have desired
ends …” (Wolk et al., 2016, p.37). Moreover, the result of this dominant reliance on
statistics was that it generated a gap between the perceptions of US leaders and reality:
US leaders focussed on a perceived targeting of US troops, rather than an actual
escalation of overall violence in Iraq that was reconfiguring its eco-socio-political
reality. As a result of this narrowing of discourse, remedial actions that could have been
undertaken to counter the plunging Iraqi eco-socio-political reality and the failure of
OIF, were never taken.

Accounting for Injustice: Collective punishment and the
operationalisation of mass-incarceration and torture systems
In addition to the construction of a gap between perceptions and reality, and to the
limiting of discourse, the dominant use of PPBES’s quantitative MoPs and MoEs also
generated dysfunctional actions and injustices that contributed to the failure of OIF. For
example, since PPBES’s mindset is built upon a cause-effect relationship, US
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leadership conceived victory as being contingent upon producing a capture rate of Iraqi
insurgents that was higher than their reproduction, thereby weakening the insurgency.
Accompanying this cause-effect relationship was another that also linked increases in
intelligence gathering, obtained through interrogations, to the weakening of the
insurgency and its defeat.

Accordingly, the number of people detained in

counterinsurgency and the amount of intelligence generated became dominant MoPs
and measurements within the military’s rewards system (Ricks, 2006; Sotire, 2009).
However, the focus on these metrics brought about dysfunctional actions, as US troops
became incentivised to produce both a high detainee rate and increased intelligence. As
such, house raids, military patrols, checkpoints, cordons, searches, citizen round-ups
and other coercive direct action tactics became rampant (Conetta, 2005; Ricks, 2006;
Sotire, 2009).

Whilst the objective of such coercive tactics was to weaken the insurgency and realise
victory, the following statistics demonstrate that they were dysfunctional as they incited
a system of collective punishment that failed to quell the insurgency, rather, became a
potential recruitment tool for the insurgency for those who encountered its injustices. In
the period between 2003 and 2005, the Project on Defense Alternatives (Conetta, 2005,
p.6) reported 8,000 raids had taken place, citizen round-ups had produced 80,000
detainees and military patrols were running at approximately 12,000 per week. With
regards their effectiveness, an estimated 70% of house raids failed to generate anything
of significance, and division and brigade units that could hold up to 1,300 detainees at a
time generated a detainee turn-over rate of between 66-75%, who were released without
charge within a few days (Conetta, 2005; Spinner, 2005; Wong, 2005). Remaining
detainees were either sent to one of several overt US controlled prisons, such as the
notorious Abu Ghraib prison or Camp Bucca (Taguba, 2004), or were held “in secret
detention centers, CIA interrogation sites and other ‘ghost’ locations” (Paul & Nahory,
2007, p.34). Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, commander of prison guards in 2003,
estimated that the overt prisons produced a prisoner turnover rate of between 4-6
months (Amnesty International, 2006a). Meanwhile, the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC 2004) reported that military intelligence officers estimated between
70-90% of prisoners were being held by mistake. With regards the covert incarceration
centres, formal means of oversight and accountability were absent and conventional
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metrics, such as the number of prisoners held and their turnover rate, have not been
publicly disclosed (Blakeley, 2006; Khalili, 2015; Paul & Nahory, 2007). Certainly, the
covert and secret nature of these facilities represent the “highest stage of development
of the state of exception …” (Whyte, 2010, p.136), where “a detainee cannot be found,
seen, heard, known or legally represented, then that detainee simply cannot exist”
(Khalili, 2015, p. 94).

The above statistics provide an insight into the scale of the US’s capture, arrest and
imprisonment of Iraqi people. Overall, because of routine daily releases and new
arrests, US forces deprived hundreds of thousands of Iraqis of their freedom and
exposed them to the harsh prison system (McCoy, 2014; Mottern & Rau, 2008; Paul &
Nahory, 2007). Furthermore, the scope of people who these tactics were administered
upon was intentionally broadened to include wider families, friends and even whole
neighbourhoods of suspected insurgents, as a form of collective punishment and
deterrence (Amnesty International, 2006a; Borger, 2003b; Conetta, 2005; Filkins, 2003;
International Committee of the Red Cross, 2004; Paul & Nahory, 2007; Ricks, 2003).
The PPBES facilitated this behaviour as US military leaders used its metrics to justify a
‘get-tough strategy’, which they alleged decreased insurgent attacks, increased
intelligence and increased numbers of insurgents captured. The strategy was built upon
a “conviction that only a tougher approach will quell the insurgency and that the new
strategy must punish not only the guerrillas but also make clear to ordinary Iraqis the
cost of not cooperating” (Filkins, 2003). As such, there were instances where whole
towns were incarcerated in barbed-wire fences that left only one US-run checkpoint to
control the (out)inflow of people; whole buildings from where attacks had been
launched were bulldozed to the ground; all men aged 18 to 65 were ordered to get
‘identification cards’ that assigned them a number and was in English; and curfews of
up to fifteen hours a day were applied (Borger, 2003a; Filkins, 2003).

The PPBES’s MoPs and MoEs contributed to the nurturing of a nation-wide, mass
incarceration system, which transformed all Iraqis into potential detainees, and US
troops into the manufacturers of Iraqi detainees. Furthermore, as processed prisoners
were identified through an Internment Serial Number, and were counted on either the
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National Detainee Reporting System, the Biometric Automated Toolset System or on a
“self-created ‘change sheet’” (Taguba, 2004, p.23), PPBES eased the operation of this
system as it effectively dehumanised the Iraqi people by reducing them “to quantified
objects, thus eliminating their troublesome qualities of humaneness… “ (Rosenberg,
1983, p.12). Funnell (1998, p.436) recognised that “The enduring metaphor for the
Holocaust is that of the operation of an efficient machine … processing millions of
people … to produce corpses”; correspondingly PPBES facilitated the metaphorical
treatment of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi people as factory inputs, to be processed as
quickly and cost-effectively as possible through the US’s mass-incarceration ‘machine’
to produce outputs, being intelligence and more captives. Indeed, the sheer scale and
design of both the US’s overt and covert transnational incarceration sites that were
established to punish Iraqi people and others in their WoT brought together the elements
of a modern-day production line, with “assembly line efficiency, people and objects as
aggregate numbers, an emphasis upon process, routine, and petty rules” (Brown, 2005,
p.983). The production line metaphor was exemplified in 2008 when the US Army
solicited bids for a company to operate a ‘Detainee Property Warehouse’. The task
description not only exhibited the process’ lack of accountability for detainees, but also,
it effectively encapsulated the mundane operation of a production system that
disregarded qualitative human consequences of detention and fostered a culture of
neglect, dehumanisation and unworthiness of Iraqi victims.

With regards the

warehouse, the bid stated:
It stores the property of approximately 60,000 detainees, of which their
status is unknown. Some of the property belongs to detainees that are still
being held in theatre, while some of the property is of released, deceased,
unknown, or escaped detainees. The contracted personnel will identify the
status of each detainee to determine the disposition of the property (Mottern
& Rau, 2008).

A direct consequence of the operation of this ‘machine’ was the emboldening of a
pattern of brutal actions by US troops towards the Iraqi people that were premised upon
a mindset that sought retribution, domination and punishment. Indeed, in the wake of
the 9/11 attacks, President Bush constructed a narrative, the ‘axis of evil’, which
elevated the US to “the greatest force for good in history” (Bush, 2002b), while
dehumanising the enemy by positioning them as the desensitised evil other (Creed,
2013). Furthermore, Bush repetitively used word choices within his speeches that
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served to humiliate and dehumanise the ‘Other’ that, when reinforced by an
“interlocutor positioned in a place of authority and power shapes new ethics and norms
that sanction violence, both physical and verbal, fuelling cycles of both” (Creed, 2013,
p.36; Hartling & Miller, 2005; Lindner, 2004, 2001). Finally, although Bush alleged to
seek justice through the waging of war, his use of “militant and aggressive tone and
speech … throughout the 9/11-Iraq War narratives … constructed not a discourse of
justice, but a narrative of retribution and revenge” (Creed, 2013, p.37). Following from
Minow (1998, p.10) that vengeance is a “notion of equivalence that animates justice”
however, it generates acts that can greatly transcend those commissioned by the scales
of justice; Bush’s narrative of retribution and revenge effectively broadened the scope
of aggression and violence perceived as acceptable forms of punishment.

Within this largely hostile political context of the Iraq War, PPBES’s facilitation of acts
of collective punishment and the operation of a mass incarceration machine
demonstrated its ability to convert political hostility and provocative speech into
practical actions. Accordingly, accounting’s role as a technology of government that
provides the “mechanisms through which authorities … have sought to shape,
normalize and instrumentalize the conduct, thought, decisions and aspirations of others
in order to achieve the objectives they consider desirable” is exposed (Miller & Rose,
1990, p.8). Moreover, by dehumanising Iraqis into numbers to be counted, disregarding
qualitative considerations such as human rights and justice, and providing incentives for
the mass extrajudicial capture, interrogation and detainment of the Iraqi people,
accounting’s role as a technique that mediates social relations, and that encourages
action from a distance is exemplified (Bauman, 1989; Foucault, 1991; Funnell, 1998;
Funnell & Chwastiak, 2015; Miller & Rose, 1990; Neu, 2000a, 2000b; Preston et al.,
1997; Said, 1993).

Ultimately, accounting’s facilitation of the operation of the

‘machine’ signified a mechanism that implicitly endorsed further violations of human
rights and the production of injustices, as it legitimised a broadening of the scope of
aggression and violence perceived as acceptable forms of retribution, revenge,
punishment, control and domination of the ‘evil’ Other from a distance.
In the case of house raids, as PPBES’s MoPs and MoEs underscored the quantity of
insurgents caught whilst rendering qualitative considerations invisible, the ICRC (2004,
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p.6) reported “a fairly consistent … pattern of brutality by members of the CF
[Coalition Forces] arresting them”. The pattern was mostly of heavily-armed, Englishspeaking troops raiding homes at night, breaking down doors through kick-downs,
shotguns or explosives; corralling women and children into one room, while flexicuffing, hooding and arresting men, including the elderly, handicapped and sick.
Household items, mattresses and the contents of cupboards and drawers were then
clattered on the floor while troops searched the premises for anything of significance.
Treatment included pushing, insulting, punching, kicking, striking with rifles and taking
aim with rifles. Those arbitrarily arrested were taken away in whatever attire worn,
including in their underwear, to be exposed to extrajudicial confinement in detention
centres, the location of which, was most often not communicated to family members
(Beaumont, 2003; Carlson & Weber, 2012; Conetta, 2005; Greenberg & Dratel, 2005;
Hendawi, 2003; Hudson, 2003; International Committee of the Red Cross, 2004; Loyd,
2004; Osborne & Kriese, 2008; Paul & Nahory, 2007). Loyd (2004) and Conetta
(2005) report that mistaken addresses and identities led to common occurrences where
troops would attack up to two incorrect homes before making a correct raid of a night.
In addition, amongst those who suffered arbitrary arrest and extrajudicial detention in
prisons were women and juveniles: by 2006, hundreds of children, as young as ten years
of age, had been incarcerated with many displaying symptoms of serious trauma as a
result of their incarceration experiences (Paul & Nahory, 2007; UN Integrated Regional
Information Networks, 2006).

The pattern of brutality and violence was also echoed with regards the interrogation of
Iraqi detainees. The PPBES created an incentive for the increased production of
intelligence through its MoPs and MoEs, and its discourse on efficiency and costeffectiveness also requisitioned that intelligence production be as quickly and costeffectively as possible. Since US leaders perceived increased and speedier production
of information from detainees as being contingent upon the extent of manipulation of
“the detainee’s emotions and weaknesses to gain his willing cooperation” (Secretary of
Defense, 2003b, p.5), counter-resistance techniques that were otherwise illegal and
equated to torture were authorised (Bush, 2002a; Sanchez, 2003; Secretary of Defense,
2003b; Taguba, 2004; Working Group, 2003). Initially, the techniques were authorised
by Rumsfeld, as per advice of a working group of executive branch lawyers that he set
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up, which recommended detainees of the WoT be interrogated “in a manner beyond that
which may be applied to a prisoner of war who is subject to the protections of the
Geneva Convention” (Working Group, 2003, p.3). Since president Bush had earlier
declared Al Qaeda and Taliban captives ‘unlawful combatants’ and, thus, not covered
by the Geneva Convention’s protections for prisoners of war (Bush, 2002a), Rumsfeld
issued a memorandum that authorised the use of twenty four previously unlawful
counter-resistance techniques (Secretary of Defense, 2003b) and appeared to endorse
severity in their application; objecting to a Pentagon lawyer’s advice on stress positions,
he scrawled in handwriting on the lawyer’s memorandum, “However, I stand for 8-10
hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?” (Haynes, 2002, p.1). In addition, he
“dismissed concerns about torture and insisted that minors held in Guantanamo Bay
were ‘not children’” (Burkeman, 2006).

Just five months later, General Ricardo

Sanchez, commander of US forces in Iraq, issued guidelines for the interrogation of
Iraqi detainees and authorised techniques that were almost a verbatim copy of those
authorised by SECDEF Rumsfeld (Sanchez, 2003).

Although Sanchez claimed

‘modifications’ had been made to the techniques so as to comply with the Geneva
Convention that applied to Iraqi detainees, ambiguity with regards both the scope of the
modifications and the definition of ‘unlawful combatants’ left “thousands of Iraqis at
the mercy of their captors” (Paul & Nahory, 2007, p.45). In a report by Human Rights
Watch (2006, p.2), one military interrogator testified that they had attended briefings by
lawyers regarding detainee abuse, “on why this is necessary, why this is legal, they’re
enemy combatants, they’re not POWs, and so we can do all this stuff to them and so
forth”.

Following from Neu (2000a, p.282), “It is through the alteration of accountability
relations that governments seek to encourage action at a distance …”, a primary effect
of the constructed ambiguity surrounding the application of ‘counter-resistance
techniques’ on Iraqi detainees was to alter accountability relations and apply a state of
exception that would permit greater efficiency in the production of intelligence in Iraq,
as established elsewhere in the WoT. Indeed, a memorandum issued by a US Army
Military Intelligence (MI) officer in Iraq in August 2003 notes, “The gloves are coming
off gentleman regarding these detainees, [Redacted] has made it clear that we want
these individuals broken” (Redacted, 2003, p.3). Not only did this state of exception,
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manufactured by the highest levels of authority in US leadership, permit a
transformation in the legal standing of Iraqi people, but it also facilitated the
manifestation of a broader scope of criminal transgressions against them as legitimate
means for increased and quicker productions of intelligence. Indeed, not only were
Rumsfeld’s counter-resistance techniques employed upon Iraqi detainees by
interrogators (Human Rights Watch, 2006; Paul & Nahory, 2007; Senate Armed
Services Committee, 2008), but a report by Major General Antonio Taguba into alleged
detainee abuse, the Taguba Report, also found that MI interrogators would “insinuate to
the guards to abuse the inmates” so as to set favourable conditions and hasten the
process leading to a prisoner’s ‘willing cooperation’ (Taguba, 2004, p.19). Sergeant
Javal Davis testified that “The MI staffs … have been giving [the guards] compliments
… statements like, ‘Good job, they’re breaking down real fast. They answer every
question.

They’re giving out good information …” (Taguba, 2004, p.19).

The

applauded techniques included punching, slapping and kicking, keeping detainees naked
for several days, videotaping and photographing naked detainees (both sexes). Other
techniques included forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate themselves while
being photographed/videotaped, forcibly arranging detainees in sexually explicit
positions for photographing, arranging male detainees in a pile and then jumping on
them and putting leashes around detainee’s neck and having a female soldier pose for a
picture.

Apel (2005) explains that the use of pornography was intentionally

administered to devastate the predominantly Muslim-Arab mindset that would be
especially humiliated by sexual exploitation. In addition, the pornography served to
establish a “necessary emotional distancing and dehumanization of the Other …” (Apel,
2005, p.93). Indeed, “The photos were meant to add to the shaming as well as provide
souvenirs” (Apel, 2005, p.93). Other techniques that were applauded included the use
of military dogs for inducing phobia, pouring phosphoric liquid on detainees, rape of
(fe)male detainees and children, sleep deprivation, prolonged stress positions, neardrowning/waterboarding, intolerable noise, electric shocks, and death as a result of
torture, abuse or murder (Amnesty International, 2006b; Harding, 2004; Human Rights
Watch, 2006; Paul & Nahory, 2007; Taguba, 2004).

Whilst US leadership initially alleged such acts were not a sign of systemic abuse,
Taguba concluded “numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses
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were inflicted …”, and “This systemic and illegal abuse of detainees was intentionally
perpetrated …” (Taguba, 2004, p.16). Within the operationalisation of this system of
brutality, accountability mechanisms were implicated as they were intentionally
manipulated to manufacture a state of exception in the quest to realise increased
productions of intelligence. Indeed, an investigation into detainee abuse by the Senate
Armed Services Committee concluded,
The abuse of detainees in U.S. custody cannot simply be attributed to the
actions of ‘a few bad apples’ acting on their own. The fact is that senior
officials in the United States government solicited information on how to
use aggressive techniques, redefined the law to create the appearance of
their legality, and authorized their use against detainees (Senate Armed
Services Committee, 2008, p.xii).

Furthermore, a pattern of impunity where whistle-blowers “faced significant obstacles
at every turn when they attempted to report or expose the abuses” (Human Rights
Watch, 2006, p.2); “punishment for bad behaviour too little and too late …” (Human
Rights Watch et al., 2006, p.29); and high ranking officials and senior officers are yet to
be held accountable (Human Rights Watch et al., 2006; Paul & Nahory, 2007),
reinforced the acceptability of this fractured space.

Since such alterations to

accountability mechanisms at the macro level effectively devalued the legal standing
and perceived worth of detainees, lapses in accountability mechanisms at the microlevel of detainee management also echoed.

For example, access to detainees by

lawyers, families, human rights groups, UN experts or army criminal investigators was
exceedingly restricted, leaving detainment facilities with very limited independent
oversight (Amnesty International, 2006b; Human Rights Watch, 2006; Paul & Nahory,
2007). This lapse in conventional accountability relations enhanced the conditions
needed for the generation of acts of retribution, domination and punishment under the
legitimising guise of generating more intelligence. In effect, insufficient monitoring
provided an environment where “angry and battle-weary officers and soldiers have
seriously abused detainees, as have CIA and Military Intelligence interrogators” (Paul
& Nahory, 2007, p.45).

PPBES’s discourse on cost-effectiveness, which led to shortages in the supply of troops
and resources, also served to exaggerate the conditions leading to abuse and neglect as it
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created an environment where prisons were filled beyond capacity, undermanned and
short on resources; “This imbalance has contributed to the poor living conditions,
escapes and accountability lapses” (Taguba, 2004, p.25). Most notable of the reported
accountability lapses was that concerning detainee accountability; the report found
“inaccurate detainee Internment Serial Number (ISN) counts, gross differences in the
detainee manifest and the actual occupants of an individual compound, and significant
confusion of the MP Soldiers” (Taguba, 2004, p.23). This finding not only reveals
gross inaccuracy in US accounts of those subjected to incarceration under its occupation
of Iraq, but also further exposes the means through which accounting and accountability
mechanisms facilitated a process of incarceration that devalued Iraqis to the extent of
being rendered unworthy of account. Under such context, detainee abuse, torture or
even death became unproblematic as the system normalised a demeaning form of
unaccountability where even a detainee’s numeric existence could be disregarded.
Indeed, Taguba (2004, p. 24) noted that there were several unreported cases of escape
“that were probably ‘written off’ as administrative errors or otherwise undocumented”.
Furthermore, he found “there is no indication that accounting errors or the loss of a
detainee in the accounting process triggered any immediate corrective action …” (p.
23); in fact, “There was no indication that the journals were ever reviewed by anyone in
their chain of command” (p. 24).

Accounting for Injustice: Inciting civilian killings from a distance.
The perception of the war by US leaders through the lens of PPBES meant that they
believed that the efficient management of inputs of the war would lead to the desired
outputs. Whilst Rumsfeld’s relatively small forces, buttressed by air power, achieved
victory during the initial combat phase of OIF by conquering Baghdad in just a few
weeks (Dennison, 2006; Talmadge, 2006), Rumsfeld’s quest to minimise costs through
the deployment of minimal troops brought about further contradictions and injustices
that contributed to the collapse of OIF.

For example, from the onset of the invasion, senior generals complained from a critical
shortage in supplies and reinforcements that left troops with insufficient numbers of
tanks and armoured vehicles, and left supply lines overextended and vulnerable to
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attacks (Friedman, 2004; Hersh, 2003). Since the insurgency relied heavily on the use
of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), snipers and RPG teams to attack military
vehicles, shortages in armoured vehicles led US troops to reinforce their vehicles with
improvised armour from what they could salvage from scrap materials (Burns, 2004;
Schmitt, 2004; Sonnenfeldt & Nessen, 2004). When questioned by a soldier on why US
troops didn’t have sufficient resources, Rumsfeld famously replied, “It’s a matter of
production and capability of doing it … you go to war with the army you have – not the
army you might want or wish to have …” (Sonnenfeldt & Nessen, 2004). Furthermore,
shortages in troops left even the capital, Baghdad, unsecured; the lack of control over
whole neighbourhoods and cities gave insurgents sanctuary to co-ordinate easily,
position strategically and plant IEDs ubiquitously (Filkins, 2006). The constant fighting
transformed whole neighbourhoods into ruin, which greatly debilitated the civilian
‘hearts and minds’ aspect of counterinsurgency efforts and contradicted reconstruction
objectives. Meanwhile, shortages in resources exacerbated the situation, as troops were
unable to effectively safeguard themselves against constant attacks.

As such, the

soldiers cultivated feelings of insecurity and vulnerability that, when combined with the
political elites’ manufactured sense of retribution and revenge, led troops to perceive the
entire Iraqi population as objects of fear and hatred (Filkins, 2006; Jespersen, 2013;
Paul & Nahory, 2007). Accordingly, many troops converted such feelings into “a grim
attitude of resolve and a defiant lack of concern for Iraqis … the Iraqis were all guilty.
And they all deserved to die” (Jespersen, 2013, p.22). Indeed, Filkins (2006, p. A5)
reported on the ‘habits of minds’ that were present on posters or sheets of paper hung up
by marines in their quarters in the city of Ramadi; whilst “Most are unprintable”, one
read “Be polite, be professional and have a plan to kill everyone you meet”, whilst
another “that got a lot of laughs: ‘Kilo Company: killed more people than cancer’”.
The conversion of feelings of fear and hate into a defiant sense of Iraqi unworthiness
was further exacerbated by lax rules of engagement (ROE) set by US senior
commanders (Burns, 2005; Conetta, 2005; Paul & Nahory, 2007). Since troop and
resource shortages left marines vulnerable to attacks, US leaders sought to decrease the
political costs of war - the number of US deaths and injuries - by establishing
permissive ROE “to insure a swift and unhesitating use of force and to minimize their
own casualties” (Paul & Nahory, 2007, p.65). Although the military maintains a policy
of ROE confidentiality, Conetta (2005, p. 10) explains that the basic ROE for marines
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was that posted on the bumpers of their vehicles, “Keep back 50m or deadly force will
be applied”. Indeed, each of Human Rights Watch, the American Civil Liberties Union
and Amnesty International individually reported concerns regarding permissive ROE
resulting in a rapid escalation of force, violence and indiscriminate civilian killings
(American Civil Liberties Union, 2006; Amnesty International, 2004; Human Rights
Watch, 2003; Paul & Nahory, 2007). For example, embedded photographer Chris
Hondros described a night street patrol he attended on the 18th January 2005 in Tal Afar
where an officer ordered troops to halt an oncoming sedan by firing three shots into the
air, 100 yards away in the dark. However, the car kept approaching so,
Half a dozen troops fired a least 50 rounds, until the car was peppered with
bullets and rolled gently to a stop against a curb. ‘I could hear sobbing and
crying coming from the car, children’s voices’, Mr. Hondros said … one of
the rear doors opened, and six children … tumbled into the street. They
were splattered with blood … the parents of four of the children lay dead in
the front seat. Their bodies were riddled with bullets, and the man’s skull
had smashed (Burns, 2005, p.A11).
A similar pattern of ‘accidental’ civilian killings at roadblocks, checkpoints, during
house-raids and air-strikes surfaced throughout Iraq, with the US frequently confirming
that troops were following ROE (Brown, 2006; Human Rights Watch, 2003;
Knickmeyer, 2005; Meštrović, 2008; Oppel & Al-Neami, 2006; Paul & Nahory, 2007;
Rubin, 2006; UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, 2005). Human Rights
Watch repeatedly criticised the unnecessary deaths of civilians that were a result of the
failure of Coalition forces to take basic safety precautions, such as putting clear
warnings at a distance in Arabic, forming physical barriers to force vehicles to slow
down, utilising bright lights and the use of rubber cones (Human Rights Watch, 2005,
2003). In effect, by relaxing the rules regulating the right to kill Iraqi people, senior US
commanders officially devalued Iraqi life, thereby manipulating accountability
mechanisms and easing the process through which troop fear, vulnerability,
inexperience, mistake or hate could be converted into killings. A US marine captured
this depiction: “Iraqi civilian lives are not as important as U.S. lives, their deaths are
just the cost of doing business” (Ricks, 2009, p.7). As a result of this mindset, acts of
outright murder could escape notice as the killings could simply be accounted for as a
cost of alleged Iraqi ‘threatening behaviour’ or ‘insurgent attack’ and, therefore,
justifiable under ROE. For example, on 12 March 2006, four soldiers attacked the
home of the al-Janabi family, two daughters aged five and fourteen, and their parents.
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The soldiers gathered the parents and the five year old in one room and murdered them,
then proceeded to each rape the fourteen year old, Abeer, before killing her and burning
her body to conceal the crime. The soldiers had initially attributed the attack to Iraqi
insurgents (Jervis & Stone, 2006; MacAskill & Howard, 2007; Mail Foreign Service,
2010; Paul & Nahory, 2007; Whitmire, 2006). In another incident, soldiers murdered
twenty-four civilians, including women, children and the disabled, when they went
home to home on a killing rampage.

Initially, they claimed “they were under a

concerted attack by insurgents”, therefore their actions were a “justifiable use of lethal
force” (Paul & Nahory, 2007, p.69). Later, however, it was discovered that their actions
were a form of revenge for the killing of one of their comrades in a roadside bomb
(Jespersen, 2013).
The shortage in troops and resources also led commanders to apply other techniques and
technologies that would provide an efficient victory. One such technique was known as
‘grazing’ or ‘suppressive’ fire, where soldiers would shoot directly into and around
buildings they were ordered to clear prior to their entry (Meštrović, 2008). A similar
tactic was also applied from the air where “planes often rake the ground with high
calibre cannon-fire” (Paul & Nahory, 2007, p.68).

Furthermore, Air Force ROE

permitted ‘surgical’ air strikes to destroy whole buildings/structures deemed ‘enemy’
targets, thereby causing the indiscriminate killing of tens of thousands of civilians,
including women and children (Knickmeyer, 2005; Meštrović, 2008; Oppel & AlNeami, 2006; Paul & Nahory, 2007; UN Integrated Regional Information Networks,
2005). Destruction of the ‘enemy’ from the air was deemed efficient such that the
number of air strikes in Iraq rose five-fold between January to November 2005 alone.
By March 2007, airstrikes averaged 48 daily (Knickmeyer & Aldin, 2006; Paul &
Nahory, 2007). In addition, the killing of Iraqis from the air was further mechanised,
and eco-political costs reduced, through the use of unmanned predator aerial drones,
which enabled distant drone operators to bring death and destruction by means of a
computer joystick (Begley, 2015; Brown, 2013; Cohn, 2015; Pilkington, 2015; Scahill,
2016). Finally and as previously discussed in chapter three, accounting discourse also
rationalised the US’s use of WMD in the form of chemical weaponry, such as Napalm,
White Phosphorus and DU, as US leadership perceived them to be economically
efficient mechanisms for achieving the instrumentally related goal of increased ‘enemy’
deaths, and thus victory. A similar conception also justified the use of cluster bombs.
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Although such techniques and technologies violated the Geneva Conventions as they
caused mass and often pre-emptive, indiscriminate killings of civilians not engaged in
hostility, accountability mechanisms were altered whilst accounting discourse seeking
efficiency in combat provided justification, regardless of moral/ethical considerations
(McNeal, 2014, 2011).
Mirroring this mindset at the local level, local commanders did not hesitate to order
frequent use of deadly force; indeed, some utilised ‘enemy’ killings as a measure of
performance (MoP). Captain del Gaudio explained, ''We go out and kill these people …
I define success as continuing to kill the enemy to allow the government to work and for
the Iraqi Army to take over'' (Filkins, 2006, p.A3). Reports surfaced describing the use
of ‘kill counts’ by local commanders to encourage competition among their soldiers to
increase their production of ‘enemy killings’ (Daragahi & Barnes, 2006; Paul &
Nahory, 2007). Furthermore, ROE ambiguity, stemming from its failure to clearly
define and clarify meanings, such as ‘enemy’, exacerbated the situation. For example,
in May 2006, Operation Iron Triangle was undertaken against a target named Objective
Murray. During the operation, four Army soldiers “killed one elderly person whom
they perceived as an enemy, took four prisoners, and then killed three of the four
captured prisoners” (Meštrović, 2008, p.19).

The four soldiers were accused of

murdering the three Iraqi prisoners, but not of murdering the elderly man as he was
perceived as an ‘enemy’ although he was not actively taking part in hostilities.
Furthermore, the soldiers claimed their killing of the three captives was legitimate as
they had simply been following the ROE. Indeed, upon learning that the soldiers had
taken prisoners,
The first sergeant on the mission, Eric Geressy, asked over the field radio why
the soldiers had bothered … since the new ROE stipulated that all militaryaged males on the scene should have been killed … Minutes after he broadcast
this question … the soldiers killed three of the four prisoners (Meštrović,
2008, p.15).
Whilst the application of such techniques of death and destruction were perceived to be
forms of efficiency that would create victory; in actuality, they brought to bear
contradictory effects as “the more the US relied on such surgical police actions, the
more insurgency and hostile action toward US soldiers increased” (Meštrović, 2008,
p.17). Nevertheless, as PPBE discourse equated truth to only that which could be
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quantified, such qualitative consequences were ignored, thereby contributing to the
failure of OIF. Instead, the notorious Vietnam-era ‘body count’ seemed to be revisited
as the military, seeking to provide the public with measures of success and assurance,
began to provide media outlets with regular statistics of ‘terrorist/insurgent/rebel’ kills.
During ‘Operation Matador’ of May 2005, the New York Times’ headline read: “100
Rebels Killed in U.S. Offensive in Western Iraq” (Oppel, 2005).

Accounting and the Outsourcing of Injustice
Outsourcing injustice to private military corporations
Accounting is a value-laden technology as its discourses play a role in mediating social
relations in accordance with dominant capital and power interests, and can be harnessed
to encourage (in)action from a distance (Bauman, 1989; Eagleton, 1990; Foucault,
1991; Funnell, 1998; Funnell & Chwastiak, 2015; Miller & Rose, 1990; Neu, 2000a,
2000b; Preston et al,, 1997; Said, 1993). As was demonstrated, SECDEF Rumsfeld
utilised accounting discourse to underscore the military’s ‘need’ to achieve businesslike efficiency through the application of neoliberal principles. In so doing, he justified
the outsourcing of Private Military Contractors (PMCs) so as to decrease the need for
US troop deployments and, thus, reduce the eco-political costs of warfare (Rumsfeld,
2002, 2001a). In reality, however, as the salary of a corporate mercenary in Iraq was
between 7 to 12 times that of an experienced Army corporal; and dubious contract
awarding and mismanagement practices led to waste, fraud and abuse in federal
procurement; the practice of outsourcing PMCs increased costs rather than achieved
cost-reductions (Bergner, 2005; Chwastiak, 2007a; Committee on Government Reform,
2006; Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2007; Gutman, 2004).
PMC use accelerated during the 2003 Iraq War; the ratio of PMCs to troops was one in
six, up from approximately one in fifty eight during the 1991 Gulf War (Avant, 2004).
Following from Chwastiak’s (2007, p. 22) evaluation that “If PMCs will add to the
financial costs of war, not subtract from them, the payback from privatizing war must
lie elsewhere”; Rumsfeld’s accelerated outsourcing exposes accounting’s role in serving
the interests of dominant capital and power groups, whilst generating injustices to
society. Indeed, the DoD’s accelerated use of PMCs served dominant capital group
interests by facilitating significant transfers of wealth from US taxpayers to burgeoning
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dominant capital groups, such as the security-industrial complex (Minow, 2005).
According to a report by the US House of Representatives Committee on Government
Reform (2006, p.5), between 2000 and 2005, “The department with the largest growth
in contract spending in dollar terms is the Department of Defense”, which grew by
102.3% or $136.5 billion. A subsequent report by the same committee the following
year, 2006, found for that year alone procurement spending by the DoD had increased
by a further 10% or $27.6 billion, now being “over 72% of the total federal procurement
budget” (Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2007, p.3). Dubious trends
that led to waste, fraud, and contract abuse, such as the awarding of non-competitive
contracts and contract mismanagement also increased during this period. Overall, the
DoD’s accelerated outsourcing of PMCs granted private contractors unprecedented
accumulations of capital, whilst facilitating a rapid and colossal transfer of wealth from
the public to the private sector (Committee on Government Reform, 2006; Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform, 2007; Minow, 2005).
In addition, the accelerated outsourcing of PMCs served the interest of dominant power
groups as it provided a crucial means for the political elite to manage the state’s
production of injustices in Iraq in an effort to reduce their legal accountability and
political costs (Chwastiak, 2007a; Jamieson & McEvoy, 2005). For example, half the
interrogation and all translation services within US detention centres in Iraq were
outsourced to private corporations, such as Titan Corporation and CACI (Singer, 2005).
After CPA Order 17 extended immunity from the Iraqi criminal system to private
contractors, the political elite benefited from the legally grey zone in which these
private contractors operated in Iraq as civilian employees were allegedly involved in the
abuse and torture of detainees, yet were beyond conventional accountability measures
associated with both military personnel and Iraqi laws (Ante & Crock, 2004; Borger,
2004b; Chwastiak, 2007a; McKelvey, 2006; Niman, 2004; Pugliese, 2005; Singer,
2005). As such, privatisation benefited the political elite as it increased the production
of intelligence, whilst setting them apart from both the political costs and legal
accountability associated with criminal acts of abuse/torture undertaken on their behalf.
Moreover, since accounting affords superiority to the profit motive, introducing the
profit motive to interrogations ensured that the production of intelligence was the only
relevant consideration for such corporations, regardless of qualitative issues such as
human rights and justice. Accordingly, questions pertaining the human ramifications of
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abuse/torture techniques were not considered, as acts of torture simply became an
element within the business’s production line that led to a successful business
transaction and the generation of profits.

In actuality, accounting’s emphasis on

profitability incentivised such corporations to inflict abuse/torture in order to enhance
their performance, please their client and increase profits,.
Also, the outsourcing of PMCs brought about kidnap, murder, human trafficking and
rape, as Iraq was turned into a ‘free crime-zone’ (Chwastiak, 2007). Not only were
PMCs immune from both local Iraqi laws and those covering US military personnel, but
also the US government failed to properly provide managerial accountability of PMC
operations in Iraq, thereby facilitating conditions for unaccountable crime (Bergner,
2005; Miller, 2006,; Pugliese, 2005; Singer, 2007, 2005). Furthermore, the profitmotive exacerbated this situation as, unlike the military’s scrupulous recruitment
procedure, PMCs were incentivised to broaden the scope of acceptable recruits so as to
increase their employee numbers and, thus, work load capacity. As such, disreputable
applicants, such as former assassins from apartheid South Africa, people with criminal
records and ex-soldiers and police from repressive regimes, were employed and
deployed to Iraq (Chatterjee, 2004; Chwastiak, 2007a; Yeoman et al., 2004). According
to a Special Forces operator, some PMC employees were in Iraq just because they
“’really want to kill somebody and they can do it easier there … [not] everybody is like
that, but a dangerously high element’” (quoted in Chwastiak, 2007a, p.30).

By

positioning possibly notorious PMC employees with guns in a war zone, and granting
them immunity for their actions, permissive conditions were established for the
materialisation of criminal actions.

According to Chwastiak (2007), Khalili (2015) and Rutherford (2005), the accelerated
use of PMCs is a rational development of imperialist tactics. Modern-day imperialism
bypasses the territorial expansion of nation states, rather focuses on the extension of US
sovereignty overseas and the expansion of neoliberal markets; therefore, it is in growing
need for a denationalised army of mercenaries to fight for its cause.

Indeed, by

outsourcing government functions to PMCs, the political elite are able to bypass
conventional modes of democratic accountability, such as Congressional limitations and
press inquiries, as PMCs are democratically unaccountable (Chwastiak, 2007a; Singer,
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2007, 2005).

Hence, political interferences in decisions of war and violence are

decreased, thereby facilitating further initiations of imperialistic wars. In Iraq, the Bush
administration counterbalanced troop shortages by outsourcing between 20,000 and
30,000 PMC employees, whilst not being held legally accountable for their actions and,
as PMC deaths/injuries were largely invisible from public oversight, benefitting from
reduced political costs (Singer, 2004, 2005, 2007). Furthermore, the Administration
was able to appease the public by decreasing the war budget since PMC costs were
primarily accounted for in the reconstruction budget (Gutman, 2004). Notably, the
reconstruction budget is a part of the discretionary budget, which is the “part of the
federal budget that the President has the most control over …” (Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, 2007, p.2). Certainly, the Bush administration was
able to construct “a regime of invisibility in the age of liberal empire …” (Khalili, 2015,
p. 103) by utilising the “unaccountable mercenary force that operates with immunity …
to exert whatever level of coercive force is deemed necessary to achieve the desired
results” (Chwastiak, 2007, p. 31).

Outsourcing injustice to the foreign ‘Other’
As the political cost of operating the systematic process of intelligence production
through torture increased, especially in light of the Abu Ghraib torture scandal of early
2004, the US sought to enhance its ‘regime of invisibility’ by advancing its utilisation
of proxies to transform Iraq “into interstitial landscapes of uncertainty and complexity
where who may act and whom may be held responsible for that action is not always
apparent” (Khalili, 2015, p.103). As such, the US also began to outsource its process
of intelligence production to the Iraqi government, thereby putting criminal abuse at a
deniable distance, whilst also decreasing the associated economic costs, such as the
utilisation of US troops and resources.

The US transferred hundreds of existing

prisoners over to Iraqi government-run prisons, thereby extinguishing its legal liability
for detainees, whilst US personnel retained overall influence and control by providing
training, direction and being present during interrogations (Amnesty International,
2006b; Leigh & O’Kane, 2010; Parker, 2007; Paul & Nahory, 2007).

In response to

revelations of US personnel presence during acts of torture at Iraqi prisons, SECDEF
Rumsfeld absolved US liability by explaining that soldiers were not legally obliged to
intervene when witnessing torture/abuse by foreign perpetrators (Milbank, 2005; Paul &
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Nahory, 2007). Indeed, soon after the Abu Ghraib scandal, a military ‘fragmentary
order’, FRAGO 242, was issued in June 2004 that institutionalised non-interference; the
order relinquished the requirement to investigate violations of the Laws of Armed
Conflict, such as the abuse of detainees, so long as they didn’t involve US forces
personnel (Khalili, 2015; Leigh & O’Kane, 2010; Wikileaks Iraq War Logs, 2005b).
Even after the order was modified a year later with the issuing of FRAGO 039, it only
required the reporting of Iraqi-on-Iraqi abuse through ‘operational channels’, and if “the
initial report confirms US forces were not involved in the detainee abuse, no further
investigation will be conducted unless directed by HHQ [higher headquarters]” (quoted
in Khalili, 2015, p.98; Wikileaks Iraq War Logs, 2005a). As such, the US was able to
maintain the production of intelligence through a system of abuse and torture by
reconstructing its state crime into a foreign state’s criminal misconduct, whilst reducing
both its economic and political costs. In addition, because the US’s role was that of the
powerful state that dictated action to the subordinated violence workers of the Iraqi
government, this proxy relationship served “to extend and deepen the domination and
control of the powerful state” (Khalili, 2015, p. 103).

Another means through which the US sought to implement notorious counterinsurgency
tactics whilst narrowing the scope of popular accountability and economic costs was
through its arming and training of a new Iraqi military, police force and ‘Special Police
Commandos’ paramilitary force. The PPBES intrinsically supported and facilitated this
strategy through its MoPs and MoEs: a significant metric used for measuring OIF
progress, and regularly cited as a measure of success by top Bush administration
officials, was the number of trained Iraqi forces. Moreover, accounting logic pertaining
cost minimisation also served to legitimise and justify the application of this strategy, as
increases in armed and trained Iraqi forces would translate into decreased deployments
of US forces, resources and costs. Finally, the strategy was also facilitated by the
motivation to decrease political costs of war as the US could “leverage relatively small
numbers of their own forces to dramatically increase the counterinsurgency
effectiveness of indigenous forces”, thereby outsourcing resulting injustices to the
foreign ‘Other’ (Nagl, 2010, p.160). Indeed, many scholars have conceptualised this
strategy as a technique of modern imperialism as imperialist-armed and trained
indigenous forces offer a means for the imperial centre to exert control and maintain
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order over the periphery from a distance (Blakeley, 2006; Gill, 2004; Kaplan, 2005;
Khalili, 2015; Nagl, 2010). Kaplan (2005, p. 48) explains:
Imperialism [is] less about conquest than about the training of local armies.
Reliance on American techniques and weapons systems, and the relationship
established between American officers and their third world protégés, helped
give the US the access it needed around the globe.

Whilst counterinsurgency tactics undertaken by US-armed and trained Iraqi forces of
the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and Army were notorious, (Davies et al., 2010; Forte,
2011), it is the tactics and effects of the paramilitary ‘Special Police Commandos’ units
that are most significant. In 2004, in the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal and an
escalating insurgency that was claiming over fifty US lives a month, the Pentagon
decided to pursue the ‘Salvador option’ in Iraq to achieve victory (Carr, 2010; James
Steele: America’s mystery man, 2013; Leigh & O’Kane, 2010; Maass, 2005; Mahmood
et al., 2013; Tepperman, 2005). During El Salvador’s twelve year civil war, the US
armed and trained the Salvadoran military and “allegedly supported the use of rightwing paramilitaries and death squads to liquidate the leaders of the rebellion”
(Tepperman, 2005, p.11). Similar methods had previously been deployed by the US in
Vietnam. In Latin America, US supported death squads appeared in Brazil, Uruguay,
Colombia, Chile, Peru and Guatemala, causing widespread extrajudicial killings, torture
and deliberate civilian targetings and mass relocations, thereby coming to be known as
Central America’s Dirty Wars (Carr, 2010; Chomsky, 2002, 2001, Chomsky & Herman,
1979a, 1979b). The US strategy proved efficient as, whilst the militias and death
squads killed, tortured, raped and intimidated their opponents, political interests were
achieved and US troop deployments, casualties and costs were minimised.
Furthermore, the acts were undertaken at a distance so that US accountability was
diminished to that of plausible deniability.

Indeed, In light of the strategy’s

effectiveness at the time, SECDEF McNamara declared that
Our primary objective in Latin America is to aid, wherever necessary, the
continual growth of the military and paramilitary forces, so that together with
the police and other security forces, they may provide the necessary security
(quoted in Carr, 2010, p.86).

263

In Iraq, US leaders, influenced by PPBES’s mindset, applied the ‘Salvador Option’ in
order to fill the power vacuum from insufficient troops, to decrease costs, and to
achieve an efficient victory. Indeed, following Commander General David Petraeus’
advice: “Do not try to do too much with your own hands” (Petraeus, 2006, p.3), elite
commando units comprising Shia militiamen and Kurdish Peshmerga, were armed and
trained by American Special Operations Forces and two most notable veterans of
counterinsurgency training during the ‘dirty wars’, retired Colonel James Steele and
retired Colonel James Coffman, so as to pursue the Sunni insurgency (Carr, 2010;
Dimaggio, 2008; Dreyfuss, 2003; James Steele: America’s mystery man, 2013; Maass,
2005; Madlena et al., 2013; Mahmood et al., 2013; Tepperman, 2005). According to
Mahmood et al (2013), the major aim of the new commando units was to “halt a nascent
Sunni insurgency in its tracks by extracting information from detainees”.

Indeed,

speaking of his El Salvador experience, Colonel Steele had emphasised the efficiency
derived out of prioritising intelligence gathering during counterinsurgency:
in an insurgency the principal focus has to be on human aspects … That
means getting people to talk to you … That has been the emphasis for the
last two years, and it has paid off … when you get the human intelligence
working, the technical indicators really do help … you get a fusion and a
synergistic effect (Prisk & Manwaring, 1988, p.314).

In order to ‘get the human intelligence working’, a network of secret detention centres
were established throughout Iraq where horrific acts of torture were rampant and death
through torture was often (Carr, 2010; Dimaggio, 2008; Leigh & O’Kane, 2010; Maass,
2005; Madlena et al., 2013; Mahmood et al., 2013; Sengupta, 2005). In addition, since
the US-installed sectarian-based political system generated a Shia-dominated
government, the US’s additional provisioning of arms and funding to a predominantly
Shia-based militia against the politically disenfranchised Sunni population not only
summoned the atrocities of the death squads of Central America’s dirty wars, but also
rapidly drove the country into civil war (Carr, 2010; Dimaggio, 2008; James Steele:
America’s mystery man, 2013; Mahmood et al., 2013; Tepperman, 2005). As former
CPA adviser, Larry Diamond, had earlier warned, “If militias ‘start picking off
prominent… Sunni leaders … then one of the possible ultimate nightmares – ethnic
civil war – becomes much more plausible” (quoted in Tepperman, 2005, p.14). Despite
this result being highly plausible from the outset, PPBES’s mindset rationalised the
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initiation of a deadly sectarian militia, which would terrorise the Sunni population and
generate a civil war, as simply being an efficient means to outsource collective
punishment and deterrence. An unnamed US officer explained this mindset: “the Sunni
population is paying no price for the support it is giving to the terrorists … From their
point of view, it is cost-free. We have to change that equation” (quoted in Davies,
2010, p.251).

At the height of the civil war three years later, atrocities were rampant and killings
generated approximately 3,700 bodies on Iraqi streets per month (O’Hanlon &
Campbell, 2008). Although Iraqi space was previously non sectarian, rather a tribal
society where sectarian inter-marriages and mixed-populated cities were the norm
(Cockburn, 2006, 2015; Izady, 2003; “Robert Fisk: Somebody is trying to provoke a
civil war in Iraq,” 2006; Telhami, 2005; Weidmann and Salehyan, 2013), sectarian
warfare led to ethnic cleansings throughout mixed populated neighbourhoods, thereby
literally disintegrating the unified Iraqi space into partitioned mutually-exclusive
enclaves. Cartographer Dr. Michael Izady of Columbia University demonstrated these
effects in the following two maps, which show the ethnic composition of Baghdad’s
landscape pre-2003 invasion, and at the peak of the civil war in late 2007:
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Figure 6: Baghdad, Iraq, Ethnic Composition in 2003 (Izady, 2003).

Figure 7: Baghdad, Iraq, Ethnic Composition in late 2007 (Izady, 2007).
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In 2007, after civil war and ethnic cleansing waged relatively unrestricted for almost
three years, the Bush administration announced a ‘surge’ of over 20,000 troops to quell
the violence, known as Operation Imposing Law (Weidmann & Salehyan, 2013). A
major strategy of US military planners was to divide Baghdad into several zones and
build a security wall to separate ethnic communities, which they described as “one of
the centrepieces of a new strategy by coalition and Iraqi forces to break the cycle of
violence” (quoted in Weidmann & Salehyan, 2013, p.54; Wong & Cloud, 2007). Since
violence dropped in 2008, US leaders hailed the ‘surge’ and its ‘wall’ as a colossal
success (McCain & Lieberman, 2008). However, Agnew et al (2008) and Weidmann
and Salehyan (2013) dismiss the proclaimed effectiveness of the limited increase in
troops, because “a vicious process of interethnic cleansing” (Agnew et al., 2008,
p.2295), which led to “Ethnic unmixing and the establishment of relatively homogenous
enclaves were responsible for declining violence in Baghdad through reducing contact”
(Weidmann & Salehyan, 2013, p.55). Indeed, the above maps authored by Izady (2003;
2007) confirm that by the time the US deployed its surge in troops in 2007, ethnic
cleansing was almost complete, thus, the ‘wall’ only served to reinforce the status quo
of an already partitioned Baghdad along sectarian lines.

This led Weidmann and

Salehyan (2013, pp. 62-63) to confirm the culpability of accounting:
resources would have been better used if sufficient forces were in place from
the start. In the future, policy makers must exercise extreme caution before
engaging in military occupations, and do so only if they are willing to devote
overwhelming resources to contain an insurgency.

Conclusion
This chapter has provided an accounting for unjust war. It has demonstrated that
accounting and accountability discourses and mechanisms do not operate as objective
scientific truths that are independent of social influences, rather, they are essential
technologies of dominant power groups, which facilitate their shaping, normalizing and
instrumentalising of society in ways that permit the realisation of that which they
perceive as desirable.

Indeed, these technologies provide the political elite with

techniques that can overtly/covertly be applied to facilitate the generation of desirable
representations, (in)actions, outcomes and transfers in wealth to dominant capital
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groups from a distance (Bauman, 1989; Chwastiak, 2007a, 2006; Foucault, 1991;
Funnell, 1998; Funnell & Chwastiak, 2015a; Miller & Rose, 1990; Neu, 2000a, 2000b;
Preston et al., 1997; Said, 1993). This chapter accentuated these relationships by
exposing the roles that accounting and accountability discourses and mechanisms
played in bringing about a war simply because it was desired by the US’s political elite,
and in their generation of injustices against the Iraqi people from a distance.
Firstly accounting normalised the “war by transforming it from a horrific potentiality to
a series of problems to be solved” (Chwastiak, 2001, p.501).

Indeed, whilst

rationalising the war, the Bush administration was able to dismiss from discussion any
qualitative considerations and instead reconstruct their grievances with the Saddam
Hussein regime into a problem that would rationally be solved through outright war. In
a similar way, they were able to reconstruct their need to satisfy requirements of the law
on the recourse to force into a problem, thereby rationalising the use of skewed
intelligence as a rational solution. As such, accounting’s problem-solving mindset
facilitated the Administration’s initiation of a pre-emptive war and occupation based
largely upon inaccurate and unjust reasons. Secondly, the PPBES equated truth to that
which could be quantified and instrumentally related to an output. However, this
chapter demonstrated that without analysing metrics in conjunction with the multifaceted qualitative dynamics of reality, what was perceived as progress and success
was, in actuality, counterproductive. As such, a gap between US leaders’ perceptions
and reality transpired that caused their attention to be diverted away from critical
influencers, such as the establishment of law and order and the provision of basic
civilian needs, which contributed to the failure of OIF.

Thirdly, since PPBES’s mindset is built upon a cause-effect relationship, US leadership
conceived victory as being contingent upon achieving cause/effect relationships that
would lead to a reduction of insurgents and, therefore, victory. Accordingly, the metrics
measuring the number of captured insurgents and the quantity of intelligence generated
became dominant determinants of progress and performance. As a result, collective
punishment mechanisms were justified, a nation-wide mass-incarceration machine came
into operation, and torture was legitimised, all of which served the counterproductive
purpose of traumatising Iraqi civilians, and becoming a recruiting tool for the
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insurgency (Conetta, 2005; Ricks, 2006; Sotire, 2009).

Fourthly, the PPBES’s

discourse on the efficient management of resources and cost-effectiveness effectively
masked underlying neoconservative ideological motivations, whilst bringing about a
radical reduction in troop and resource deployments.

The reduced capabilities

exacerbated lawlessness and left troops vulnerable to increased insurgent attacks. In
response, US leadership established laissez fair ROE that devalued Iraqi life and
brought about injustices, such as unnecessary civilian killings and outright murder.
Similarly, techniques and technologies that provided efficiency in combat by increasing
‘enemy’ deaths whilst minimising US casualties, such as ‘suppressive’ fire, ‘surgical’
air strikes and the use of WMD, were justified as economically rational means for the
realisation of victory. Whilst such techniques of death and destruction did provide
efficiency in combat, they were also counterproductive as they caused mass
indiscriminate killings of civilians and destruction that debilitated the ‘hearts and
minds’ aspect of counterinsurgency.

Finally, accounting discourse on efficiency was utilised to justify the outsourcing of
PMCs so as to decrease the economic costs of warfare.

However, since dubious

contracting practices and mismanagement led to waste, fraud and contract abuse,
Rumsfeld’s accelerated outsourcing actually increased costs whilst facilitating
significant transfers of wealth from the public domain to dominant capital groups,
thereby exposing accounting’s interested nature. Meanwhile, whilst dominant power
groups benefited from the legally grey zone in which PMCs operated in Iraq, the
civilian population suffered vast injustices, such as abuse, torture, kidnap, murder,
human trafficking and rape, as PMC employees transformed Iraq into a state-sanctioned
free-crime zone. Moreover, since US leaders’ mindset sought even greater efficiency in
warfare and less political costs, their decision to outsource the mass-incarceration and
torture systems to the US-trained Iraqi government was perceived as rational, thereby
bringing about additionally horrific injustices upon the Iraqi people.

Perhaps the war’s ultimate injustice transpired when accounting discourse rationalised
the US’s implementation of the ‘Salvador Option’ in Iraq as an eco-politically rational
decision. An investigative documentary, co-produced by the Guardian and the BBC,
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described this decision as “How the US administration funded a deadly sectarian
paramilitary force to fight those threatening the American presence. It was a decision
that helped fuel a sectarian civil war that ripped Iraq apart” (James Steele: America’s
mystery man, 2013, pt.1:43-2:00m).

The irrationality of bringing civil war and

partitioning to a country that was to be liberated was captured by Brown (2005, p.976),
who described the creation of such states of exception as “the kind of ‘unanticipated
event’, dramatic, poignant, and ugly all at once, in which the ‘normality of the abnormal
is shown for what it is’ – terror as usual”.
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Chapter Eight

Conclusion
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The central research objective of The Political Economy of Accounting and the 2003
Iraq War has been to explore the relationships between the socio-ecopolitical
dimensions of accounting and US exertions of imperial power upon Iraqi space. More
broadly, it has revealed the interested roles of accounting in contemporary constructions
of the soico-ecopolitical dimensions of space for capitalist imperial interests. In doing
so, not only has the thesis demonstrated the rich and fundamental intersections between
questions of space and accounting, thereby revealing the extent to which accounting
technologies were intrinsic to the US’s attempted conquering of Iraqi space, but also
developed an understanding of why this exertion of power unfolded.

Whilst the concept that accounting performs interested roles within imperial spatial
expansions was, until recently, considered implausible, contrasting academic
contributions of late have mostly sought to counter this impression by demonstrating the
roles of accounting within distinct processes or practices of historical empires,
particular those of the British Empire. Accordingly, there have been no thorough
analyses of a capitalist imperial project in its entirety, which would enable a
comprehensive understanding of the roles of accounting, not only within distinct
processes/practices, but also in overall objectives of imperial projects. This would
enable a confirmation of how various accounting dynamics, played out during various
stages and processes of a project, combine to perform fundamental overall roles that
essentially contribute to the accomplishment of the overall objectives of an imperial
project. By focussing on the case study of the 2003 Iraq War, this thesis sought to
address this gap in knowledge by targeting a specific contemporary imperial project and
exploring the central research objective within the project’s temporal stages of preinvasion, invasion and occupation. As such, it is the first trans-disciplinary study that
attempts to investigate in considerable detail the interplay between capitalism,
accounting and the recent imperial attempt to socio-ecopolitical re-territorialise Iraqi
space.

In order to garner a guiding general conception of why and how capitalist imperial
projects are enacted, the thesis utilised the Captialism’s Accountings of Space (CAS)
concept, which applied an accounting expansion to Harvey’s (1985, 1998, 2001, 2004,
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2005a, 2007a) Historical Geography of Capitalism theory. Harvey’s theory explained
that capitalism’s crisis of over-accumulation necessitates the repetition of the ‘spatial
fix’, a process of geographic expansion and restructuring that effectively deterritorialises and re-territorialises space in a way that eliminates barriers to the
accumulation process. CAS expanded upon this theory to develop an understanding of
the position of accounting within this intersection of space and capitalism.

CAS

embraces an ontological view of accounting and space that does not recognise their
existence as being merely physical, static and objective, rather as being socially
constructed, with their socio-ecopolitical dimensions being influenced by capitalism.
Within this tripartite relationship, accounting is a technology that is appropriated by
capitalism in ways that make it essential for the development of space as per the
requirements of the spatial fix.

Moreover, whilst the malleability of accounting

facilitates the production of counter-accounts that can challenge capitalist interests,
accounting is generally inundated by capitalism to an extent that both the occurrence
and effects of counter-accounts can be contained and distorted. Chiefly, the CAS
concept establishes that accounting plays three primary roles within capitalist spatial deterritorialisation and re-territorialisation projects.

Firstly, accounting provides

indispensable contributions to a narrative of (de)-valuation of space that provides the
‘scientific’ rationale for capitalist spatial expansion/restructuring. Secondly, within
accounting techniques lay the primary means for the manipulation of the socioecopolitical costs of such projects, thereby empowering capitalist elites with the ability
to project feasible or ‘profitable’ representations to decision makers and the general
populace. Finally, the socio-ecopolitical dimensions of accounting power make it a
profound tool for the building and reinforcing of various power structures that work to
facilitate the restructuring and management of space for capitalist interests.
Accordingly, CAS exposes the rich and fundamental intersection between accounting’s
roles, and the contouring of space for capitalist interests.

By applying an accounting expansion to the historical trajectory of capitalism, the thesis
was able to evaluate several accounting dynamics that traverse the progression of
capitalism through space and time. Accordingly, it was able to establish a preliminary
methodical understanding of why and how capitalism’s progression through space and
time led to Iraq 2003, whilst also confirming that “The evolution of modern accounting
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consists essentially of a series of pragmatic responses to the needs of capital” (Funnell,
2001, p.187). The thesis established that the hegemonic power bloc of the time, that is
the US state and dominant capitalist groups, required the extension of neoliberal
capitalist ideology and imperatives globally. This required the creative destruction of
opposing eco-political regimes and their re-territorialisation through an amalgamation
of US imperial radiance, which included the use of accounting, accountability and
auditing techniques, and through the US’s MIC, which has been importantly sustained
and augmented through accounting technologies. The capture of Iraqi space was of
great strategic significance to the US hegemon bloc as it would enable the realisation of
its greater interests, including benefits reaped from the extension of its neoliberal
regime within the Middle Eastern region. By incorporating the region into its orbit, the
US Empire would extend its eco-political reach, increase its power, secure the interests
of its regional allies and, most notably, gain access and leverage over the region’s most
significant and eco-politically strategic oil resources.

Since Iraqi space remained

defiantly opposed to being incorporated within this orbit, it was degraded with imperial
rules of difference that devalued it as being a ‘bad governance’ space and a ‘geography
of fear’ within Bush’s ‘axis of evil’. This devaluation was critical in legitimising and
justifying a ‘necessary’ forced de-territorialisation of Iraq’s existing socio-ecopolitical
landscape, and its re-territorialisation with the opposing neoliberal eco-political
alternative.

According to the CAS concept, narratives of devaluation cannot materialise without the
omnipresence of both the quantitative and social dimensions of accounting technology,
as they provide the ‘scientific’ mechanisms through which a valuation of space can be
achieved. Indeed, this thesis demonstrated that the narrative of Iraqi spatial devaluation
was largely facilitated through accounting means. Accounting, which is embedded in
neoclassical economics that seeks to measure societal well-being as a measure of
economic policy, provided the underlying logic of neoliberalism’s assessment of state
legitimacy as a measure of its economic efficiency. According to this logic, a state’s
effectiveness in operating as a ‘competitive state’ that efficiently allocates resources,
minimises waste and facilitates the unhindered pursuit of self-interest and capital
accumulation positively correlates with the extent of its adherence to notions of
freedom, democracy, prosperity and global wealth and security.

The thesis
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demonstrated that both the Bush Administration and President Bush’s 2002 US
National Security Strategy sanctified this logic, using it as an essential determinant in
their assessment of foreign space and in their appointment of imperial rules of
difference upon it.

With regards Iraqi space, several examples were documented

showing how the Bush Administration repeatedly equated their assessments of a corrupt
and economically inefficient Iraqi eco-political regime with a consequent Iraqi space
that lay within the ‘non-integrating gap’. This facilitated a branding of Iraqi space as a
‘bad governance space’ and a ‘geography of fear’; a space that generated socioecopolitical repressions and dangers that not only affected the Iraqi people, but also
threatened the world over. Such branding facilitated the hyping of tensions and fears,
and an overall acceptance of the Bush Administration’s notorious WMD accusations
with little scrutiny, thereby justifying the 2003 war and invasion. As such, the thesis
confirmed that accounting logic was key in the devaluation of Iraqi space, which was a
fundamental precursor for the initiation of de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation
processes. This also confirmed that accounting is a significant tool of legitimisation and
justification of imperial rules of difference, which are used to facilitate imperial
interests.

Also essential within the narrative of devaluation of Iraqi space were accounting
performance and efficiency measures, which were utilised in the appraisal of the
existing Iraqi regime. Since accounting employs a quantitative instrumentally rational
mode of thought, it enabled a discounting of qualitative socio-ecopolitical dimensions
of Iraqi space, whilst focussing instead on quantitative capitalist-based measures that
only assessed the state’s efficiency in the production of value or ‘proper commerce’.
Accordingly, central qualitative dynamics of historical, social and eco-political
significance, such as the historical eco-political performance of the existing regime, the
effects of successive wars and the radically punitive sanctions that left Iraq with an
estimated $383 billion in financial obligations, devastated public service infrastructure
and a largely impoverished population, were deemed invisible in the appraisal of Iraqi
state efficiency. As such, accounting transformed the socio-ecopolitical complexities of
Iraqi space into a technical zone of control and calculation that was devoid of critical
qualitative considerations. Had such considerations been included within a narrative of
valuation, the perceived present inefficiencies would have been situated within a
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broader context that would have reasoned their existence and their resulting effects of
decreased Iraqi state capacity. Such an outcome would have largely discredited the
US’s devaluation of Iraqi space within the limited bounds of its proclaimed ‘space of
fear’, bringing into visibility broader sources and causes of Iraqi problems that could,
thereafter, have been addressed and remedied through peaceful means.

Accounting’s perceived production of value-free, objective and scientific knowledge is
another imperative means through which a narrative of devaluation of Iraqi space was
formulated. This was exemplified in the thesis by showing outcomes from the use of
capitalist-based accounting measures to appraise an Arab socialist-based regime,
especially in the appraisal of Iraq’s efficiency in managing its stupendous oil resources.
Capitalism’s ideological conceptions of state performance, efficiency and value-creation
fundamentally oppose those of socialism: whilst capitalism is built upon notions of
private ownership, capital accumulation and maximisation of profit, socialism focuses
on measures of collective ownership and social equity.

Since capitalist-based

accounting representations will necessarily identify inefficiencies according to
capitalism’s underlying ideology, the use of them in the assessment of Iraqi efficiency
allowed its socialist-based processes to be readily devalued. Qualitative elements of
ideological differentiation, such as socialism’s consigning value to the nationalisation of
oil resources whilst devaluing privatisation, and its valuing the prioritisation of
budgetary spending on social services over investments that increase efficiency in the
oil industry, were wholly discounted from account. As such, the thesis demonstrated
that accounting representations constructed a valuation of Iraqi space that was not
objective and value-free. Instead, framed in concurrence with capitalist conceptions
and, thus, value-laden. Nevertheless, since accounting’s representation were perceived
to be a form of scientific knowledge, the constructed devaluation of Iraqi space became
entrenched within public consciousness by becoming accepted as a form of absolute
truth and, thus, not reasonably subject to sceptical critique.

In a similar way, within accounting’s capitalist-based representations of ‘problems’
there will necessarily be a reflection of ‘solutions’ that also follow the capitalist value
system. Indeed, within accounting’s representation of the Iraqi spatial problem was also
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reference to the required solution of dominant power and capital groups, that is the need
to bring ‘state-ending’ to the ‘inefficient’ indigenous socialist state and to commence
building of the ‘efficient’ neoliberal alternative. As such, accounting not only played an
instrumental role in the construction of a narrative that devalued the existing socioecopolitical territorialisation of Iraqi space but was also essential in guiding towards an
alternative ‘solution’ narrative by espousing value to the neoliberal territorialisation
alternative. Accordingly, the thesis was able to demonstrate how accounting was
utilised to serve the interests of US political elites by making their decision to wage
war, invade, dismantle and reconfigure Iraqi space appear to be a result of an objective,
scientific mechanism; a product of fair and impartial numbers, not of eco-political
interests.

By shedding light on these multiple processes and roles of accounting in the (de)valuation of space, the thesis was also able to identify their combined role in the
transformation of Iraq into a space of exception. Accounting’s various contributions to
the devaluation of Iraqi space, which centred on Iraq’s perceived failings to execute
proper commerce, ultimately echoed the ideological pretexts that historically justified
applications of the res nullius and terra nullius principles. Under the guide of these
principles, Iraq’s perceived eco-political failures, especially its failure to properly
‘cultivate’ its oil resources, rendered its existing territorialisation primitive and
valueless, thereby warranting the disregarding of its existing juridical apparatuses and
the regarding of it as a clean slate to territorialise. Indeed, this thesis demonstrated that
the CPA’s actions in Iraq pointed to an underlying terra nullius-like approach to Iraqi
space. CPA chief, Paul Bremer, was described as the new dictator of Iraq as he
suspended the country’s constitutional order and marginalised indigenous ideology,
agency, interests and juridical apparatuses, whilst effecting rapid and radical
impositions of neoliberal eco-political territorialisation; a ‘settler’s contract’ that served
the interests of the hegemon bloc rather than the indigenous population. Accordingly,
accounting was shown to have provided the primary ideological perception through
which Iraqi territorialisation was ultimately devalued to a terra nullius-like status, the
modern space of exception, which was a decisive outcome required for the pending
rapid de-territorialisation, appropriation, exploitation and re-territorialisation of Iraqi
space for imperial interests.

In addition, deficient accounting and accountability
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practices were shown to have intrinsically contributed to this outcome as they were
utilised so as to further transform Iraq into a liminal space for corrupt transactions to
flourish, thereby facilitating capitalism’s annihilation of space by time as they
accelerated transfers of Iraqi wealth and the accumulation of capital. Finally, whilst
KPMG’s audit of the CPA showed the potential of accounting to produce counteraccounts by identifying some of these accounting/accountability deficiencies, the scope
of their investigations was shown to have been limited and the effects of their findings
to have been contained by the overriding power of the capitalist hegemonic bloc. This
overriding power was again demonstrated through Bremer’s imposed reforms to the
indigenous Board of Supreme Audit. The reforms, which included the imposition of
bureaucratic hurdles, inconsistent methodologies and incompetent recruitment
mechanisms, had the combined effects of radically reducing the Board’s powers,
capabilities and effectiveness, thereby serving to obstruct and contain future effects of
Iraqi counter-accounts.

The transformation of Iraq into a space of exception was also a crucial precursor to the
devaluation of the socio-political dimensions of Iraqi space, such as Iraqi collective and
institutional memory, history, heritage, intelligentsia, and ultimately to Iraqi life. This
was largely demonstrated through the US’s policy of intentional indifference towards
the de-territorialisation of Iraqi socio-political space: whilst the Iraqi Ministry of Oil
was accorded value indicated through US protection, remaining Iraqi political
institutions, cultural, historical, educational and health facilities were left completely
unsecured, signifying their perceived insignificance and devaluation. Indeed, SECDEF
Rumsfeld notoriously dismissed the resulting de-territorialisation, in the form of
widespread destruction, looting and arson, as simply being part of the ‘price’ of
liberation and that ‘stuff happens’.

In a similar manner, what the UN High

Commissioner for Refugees described as ‘systematic’ violence and targeted
assassinations of Iraqi intelligentsia, was a reality that was left largely unchallenged
throughout years of US occupation. Not only did this US indifference facilitate the
systematic nature of these attacks, as they continued relatively unobstructed and amidst
scant prospects of accountability, but it also facilitated the mass departure of thousands
of surviving Iraqi intellectuals who feared for their safety as a result of intentional
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campaigns to degrade Iraq’s unifying culture and to deplete the Arab socialist-based
intelligentsia tied to it.

The apparent unworthiness of Iraqi socio-political capital, as indicated through the US’s
decision not to preserve and protect this in contravention of UN Security Council
Resolution 1483, was shown to be a result of US policy that was legitimised and
justified through accounting mechanisms. Accounting’s emphasis on cost-minimisation
and its efficiency-related logic were shown to have significantly founded SECDEF
Rumsfeld’s decision to deploy insufficient quantities of US troops to Iraq. Thus, the US
political elite used the resulting shortage in troops as justification for US failure to
uphold law and order in Iraq. Under this guise, their decision to leave the majority of
Iraqi socio-political capital unsecured was not a result of a policy of intentional
indifference due to the devaluing of Iraqi social space, rather a product of calculations
pertaining to the ‘economy of risk’; a necessary balance between limited troops and US
strategic interests.

In this way, US failings were simply unfortunate results of

miscalculations that led to policy failures, not expected consequences from a policy of
failure.

An important contribution of this thesis, achieved through its analysis of the roles of
accounting within multiple stages of a specific imperial project, is that it enabled a
broad and panoramic examination that permitted the identification of modes through
which separable accounting processes/practices can interrelate and combine to serve
multiple overall accounting purposes within imperial projects. Indeed, whilst the above
mentioned processes/practices were shown to have combined to serve an overall crucial
role of devaluating Iraqi space, some of these also interrelated with another prime
purpose, recognised in CAS as accounting’s unique capability to manipulate the socioecopolitical costs related to the implementation of an imperial project. For example,
accounting was identified as having played two essential roles in the devaluation of
Iraq’s historical capital: its contributions to a US policy of indifference towards its
destruction, and it being a source of legitimisation and justification of this policy. In
addition, the thesis demonstrated that these processes of devaluation also combined to
facilitate a reduction in both the eco-political and social costs of the project as a whole.
279

For example, had Iraq’s main cultural heritage sites, such as Ur, Babylon and Samarra
been appropriated value within accounting representations and reports, the US’s
building of military bases at these locations, which destroyed thousands of years of
historical data and material, would have been deemed economically infeasible due to
the incalculable cost of property, plant and equipment.

Similarly, had accounting

reports appropriated value to the qualitative costs of war, invasion and occupation, the
US’s policy of indifference towards the destruction of Iraqi historical capital would
have been deemed infeasible due to its ensuing upsurges in the costs of the project. As
such, the thesis showed how accounting technologies are essential tools to imperial
elites as they are appropriated in multiple, intertwined ways that serve their broader
interests and further their overall power objectives.

Accounting’s fundamental role in the manipulation of the socio-ecopolitical costs of an
imperial project was expanded upon in the thesis. Firstly, the thesis demonstrated the
immense political significance of this role by showing that the bottom line of an
imperial project held considerable power to either propel or deter the initiation of an
imperial project.

Clausewitz’s accounting-based concept of ‘political commerce’,

which is the dominant ideology underlying US foreign policy, was shown to have
directed decisions regarding US exertions of power within the narrow realm of
quantitative forms of instrumentally rational reasoning.

Under this logic, imperial

exertions of power were considered to be forms of business-like investment in US
hegemonic power and, thus, related decisions were to be contoured within the bounds of
accounting measures pertaining costs, efficiency and profitability.

In addition, a

profitable bottom-line, in the form of minimised costs and maximised benefit was
recognised as a decisive factor in influencing public preferences and, thus, overall
consent or dissent. In this way, the immense political significance of accounting logic
and techniques, which could be instrumentalised by political elites to manipulate costs
and to project a favourable bottom-line, was acknowledged.

Indeed, the thesis

demonstrated how accounting techniques have historically empowered the ruling elite
with the ‘magician’s trick’: the means to under-cost expenditures of imperial power by
not only manipulating the degrees of visibility of economic costs, but also by
obfuscating social costs into the realm of invisibility. The thesis demonstrated the ways
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through which this fundamental CAS purpose of accounting was exhibited within the
US’s project to batter down the defiant doors of Iraqi space.

According to Clausewitz dogma, imperial exertions of power are continuations of
politics by other means. Thus, the thesis recognised the need to broaden its temporal
scope so as to incorporate an analysis of all major US imperial footprints upon Iraqi
space, thereby acknowledging these as fundamental continuations of the imperial
project in its entirety. This enabled identification of an initial means through which
accounting was appropriated to serve the interests of imperial elites, being the use of
accounting to maintain an ‘empire in denial’ by casting ‘scientific’ doubt upon antiimperial effects within the populace. By using accounting in a way that failed to
account for the costs of the imperial footprints on Iraq en masse, the existence of an
overall imperial project targeting Iraqi space was ‘scientifically’ denied.

Instead,

accounting was utilised to afford each imperial footprint a representation of isolation;
this contributed to the narrative of the political elite, which ascribed detached
justifications that directed interpretations away from imperial motivations, thereby,
quelling dissent, affording legitimacy and facilitating the garnering of popular support.
Another accounting mechanism that was utilised to dramatically reduce reported costs
was the use of cash-based accounting within official budgets.

Since cash-based

accounting enables the narrowing of representations of costs to only immediate
expenditures, unlike the accrual accounting alternative that reports liabilities when they
occur regardless of when cash transactions take place, its use facilitated a significant
under-costing of the US’s imperial expenditures of power. For example, the thesis
showed that hundreds of billions of dollars in health related expenditures, such as the
long-term treatment of injured or disabled veterans and their long-term disability
entitlement payments, were hidden from visibility as they were not reported in the cashbased official budgets for both the Gulf War and 2003 Iraq War. Similarly, official
budgets failed to report costs pertaining to future expansions, repairs and refits that
would be required for the military to return to pre-war capabilities, the extra
depreciation costs for damaged or rapidly expended equipment due to war, and war
veteran’s eligibility for educational and home loan benefits.
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The ability of accounting to narrow the definition and representations of costs also
served a CAS accounting purpose by enabling a reduction or outright dismissal of a
variety of war-related costs from official budgets, including budgetary, social and
macroeconomic costs. For example, whilst US safety and environmental regulations
valued human life at between $7-8 billion, the war’s death gratuity was reported at only
$500,000. Moreover, US expenditures on research into treatments for the Gulf War
Syndrome, expenditures resulting from excess rates of birth defects and abnormal health
problems in the children of war veterans, opportunity costs from foregone productivity,
and relative increases to broader national security costs like Homeland Security costs,
were dismissed from official war budgets. In a similar way, hundreds of billions of
dollars in costs pertaining to the use of economic sanctions as a coercive form of
imperial power, such as losses to the export sector, job cuts, forgone investments and
disrupted oil markets, were shown to have been dismissed from official budgets and,
thus, from public awareness.

Finally, US political elites were shown to have

manipulated projected costs by exploiting taxation and borrowing mechanisms, and
concealing their resulting costs.

Instead of financing war through revenue from

increased taxes, the elite were able to defer the fiscal effects of war from the populace
by lowering taxes and instead, selling US Treasury Bonds. Accordingly, the political
elite sought to deceive the populace by projecting a ‘war for free’ representation
through impalpable war costs. Meanwhile, the cash-based accounting techniques either
deferred or outright concealed long-term debt costs, including the long-term cumulative
interest payments and losses from both forgone investments and job-cuts.

Had

accounting reports brought into visibility a multi-dimensional definition of costs,
outlays of imperial power would be much less tolerated, and the emancipatory potency
of accounting much more apparent.

Substandard government accounting and accountability practices in both federal and
DoD budgets also served the interests of the capitalist hegemonic bloc. Deficiencies
within these systems were shown to have facilitated for limited transparency, and inept
and misleading representations that ultimately sustained the MIC and permitted vast
transfers of wealth from the public to private capitalist blocs, which enabled the
progression of imperial ventures.

The extent of deficiencies was encapsulated in

SECDEF Rumsfeld’s announcement that defective accounting practices within the DoD
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alone had led to $2.3 trillion in untraceable transactions as of September 2001. The
thesis demonstrated how such deficiencies played a major role in facilitating the
magician’s trick with regards Iraq. For example, a key technique for under-costing the
2003 Iraq War was through a failure to separate operation funds from overall baseline
funds, which permitted war-related costs to become ‘institutionalised’ within the DoD’s
base budget. As a result, hundreds of billions worth of war-related incremental costs,
such as various procurements of extra weaponry, increased recruitments of DoD civilian
employees, increased base and bonus active duty payments, and increased military
constructions were obfuscated and rendered relatively undetectable within the base
budget.

Moreover, deficient budgetary practices that lacked proper scrutiny and

oversight facilitated transfers of wealth as Congressmen and Senators exploited
politically favoured ‘emergency appropriation’ bills to fund defense equipment
unrequested by the DoD. As such, deficient government accounting and accountability
practices served as legitimate processes through which profound waste, corruption and
transfers in wealth to dominant capital groups, as well as favourable under-costing of
imperial power outlays and the sustenance of the MIC, were facilitated.

The

subservience of accounting to elitist interests of the capitalist hegemonic power bloc
was, therefore, further confirmed.

The thesis was also able to demonstrate how the under-costing imperative of imperial
elites was justified and pursued within the DoD through accounting rhetoric pertaining
to cost-minimisation and efficiency. SECDEF Rumsfeld was shown to have evoked
this rhetoric throughout the stages of the 2003 war, invasion and occupation to justify
his quest to minimise actual and perceived costs.

Meanwhile, the DoD’s PPBE

accounting system was shown to have served this purpose by facilitating a decisionmaking process that was devoid of qualitative considerations like morals, ethics, justice
and troop morale.

Instead, it centred upon an economically rational mindset and

quantitative-based instrumental reasoning. A major example of the effects of this was
presented through Rumsfeld’s decision to deploy minimum troops to Iraq; he sought the
least quantity deemed capable of realising US interests. Whilst a primary objective of
the decision was to radically reduce the quantitative costs of the imperial project upon
Iraq, increases in critical qualitative costs, such as the resulting deficit in troop
capabilities to achieve law and order, increased safety and security dangers, increased
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US deaths and injuries, and decreased troop morale, were hidden from perception.
Similarly, the decision to delay delivery of sufficient quantities of armoured vehicles
was perceived by Rumsfeld as a necessary form of economic rationality, a matter of
efficiency in production and capability and also a means of decreasing immediate costs
within cash-based accounting reports. However, this form of quantitative instrumental
reasoning enabled a disregarding of the resulting qualitative costs, such as subsequent
increases in troop deaths and injuries, and the resulting decrease in troop morale. Also,
cash-based accounting was shown to have further contributed to these effects as it
enabled a corresponding discounting of quantitative costs that would ensue as a result of
these decisions. For example, future expenditures arising from increased troop deaths
and injuries, such as death gratuities, the long-term treatment of injured or disabled
veterans and their long-term disability entitlement payments, were hidden from
visibility.

The thesis also identified the socio-ecopolitical costs that materialised upon Iraq,
thereby also bringing into perspective the de-territorialisation processes that were
realised. Whilst these were extensive and severe, the US’s failure to account for them
not only served to further devaluate Iraqi space and its people as per the CAS concept,
but also to under-cost the project, thereby enabling the pursuit of their interests with
minimal costs and relative impunity. Recognising this, the thesis sought to account for
the ‘unaccounted for’; by bringing into visibility the costs to Iraq from each US imperial
footprint, not only were the tremendous human, environmental and eco-political costs
collated, thereby exhibiting the potential for resistance and emancipatory change, but
also the existence of an overall imperial project to de-territorialise Iraq was confirmed.
This is because each of the three footprints was shown not to have been a regular
exertion of power; rather, each was a severe incarnation of its kind that wrought
unnecessary radical destruction to Iraq’s existing spatial configurations. The 1991 Gulf
War commanded “the heaviest bombing campaign in the history of war …” to that date
(Ismael & Perry, 2014, p.95); the ensuing economic sanctions were “the most severe
ever imposed” (Nordhaus, 2002, p.53); and the 2003 Iraq War utilised ‘Shock and
Awe’, which was the military version of free-market fundamentalism’s annihilation of
space by time. The sequence of continued and needless use of excessive coercive force,
with a mutual outcome of largely de-territorialising Iraqi space, confidently pointed to
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the existence of shared underlying motivations other than the disconnected justifications
publicised in the mainstream. The thesis’ analysis, informed by the CAS concept,
brought into motion the US’s gradual transformation of Iraqi territorialisation: from
being an Arab welfare state approaching standards comparable to developed countries
in the mid-1980s, to a relatively desolate and largely de-territorialised space with a
ruptured social fabric; a clean slate ready for neoliberal re-territorialisation. As such, it
was able to confirm the CAS concept: there existed an underlying imperial project that
was persistently advanced so as to batter down Iraq’s defiant doors to neoliberal
territorialisation.

The ways through which Clausewitz’s accounting-based ‘political commerce’ dogma
and the PPBE accounting system were utilised by eco-political elites to facilitate and
justify these exaggerated exertions of coercive imperial power were also identified in
the thesis. Clausewitz’s political commerce conception was shown to have guided three
different US presidents in their decision to continue the imposition of the ‘genocidal’
sanctions over a thirteen-year period. Under this conception, sanctions were recognised
as a continuation of politics by other means; determinants affecting a decision to exert
this form of power, instead of others, centred within the bounds of economically
rational considerations pertaining to cost and benefit. The thesis explained that whilst
accounting rhetoric pertaining to the ‘efficiency’ of the Pentagon’s precision smart
bombs had been utilised to justify the excessive bombing campaign of the 1991 Gulf
War, US political elites of the time were reluctant to continue the assault and forcefully
dislodge the Iraqi regime, as this would have engendered ‘incalculable’ eco-political
costs. Instead, sanctions offered an exceptional alternative to the military war and its
effects; they were a low-costing and silent form of warfare that brought about immense
destruction to the Iraqi economy, ‘institutionalised’ acute poverty and undermined the
Saddam regime. The perception of US leaders that sanctions were an almost costless
and invisible alternative was largely afforded by accounting techniques that minimised
quantitative representations of costs and wholly disregarded from account the
tremendous social costs. Indeed, the Congressional Budget Office encapsulated these
functions not only through its pointing to the high feasibility of this foreign policy tool,
but also through its endorsement of the imposition of severe sanctions for greater gains.
The office reported that costs to the US from the imposition of sanctions were minimal,
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especially when imposed upon small developing economies like Iraq. Meanwhile,
benefits to the US, in the form of realisation of its interests, would increase the more
costly that sanctions became to targeted countries.

Accordingly, the thesis

demonstrated accounting’s roles in transforming the decision-making process regarding
the employment of genocidal sanctions into a mechanical affair, thereby also
confirming its potency in encouraging unethical behaviour. Both accounting’s costminimisation logic and techniques focussed the attention of decision-makers on
economically rational considerations pertaining cost and benefit, whilst divorcing them
from the immensely corrupt qualitative ramifications of their decisions.

The US’s decision to employ the 2003 Shock and Awe military campaign, which
primarily aimed to expose Iraqi space to the non-nuclear equivalent of both the physical
destructions and psychological terrors and traumas experienced from the Hiroshima and
Nagasaki atomic bombs, was shown to have been founded upon the perceived
efficiencies of shock therapy. Subjecting Iraq to the rapidity and degree of physical
destruction that corresponded to nuclear warfare was assessed as not only being the most
eco-politically cost-effective means to realise rapid capitulation of Iraqi space to US
power, but was also considered to be the most efficient means to psychologically
manipulate the Iraqi people; it was considered to be a form of shock therapy that would
prime the indigenous population for rapid submission, exploitation and adaptation.
Moreover, the PPBE accounting system was shown to have been a pivotal tool that was
used to facilitate resources for the project, to justify the use of excessive weaponry
including WMD, and to manage the post-invasion occupation within the binds of
economic rationality and free from qualitative considerations, such as morals, ethics,
justice and human rights. Overall, the roles of accounting in contributing to a favourable
representation of the US’s employment of shock therapy upon Iraqi space also
confirmed the CAS concept’s final essential purpose for accounting within imperial
projects, being its building and reinforcing of power structures that enable the
restructuring and management of space for capitalism. Indeed, the US’s use of Shock
and Awe to psychologically manipulate the Iraqi people was an attempt to build a power
structure that would enable the restructuring and management of Iraqi space for
capitalism. Similarly, accounting’s roles in the destruction of Iraq’s collective memory
served this purpose by contributing to the dislocation of shared historical, cultural and
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socialist underpinnings of Iraqi society and the rupturing of the cohesiveness of its social
fabric. These delivered power to the US in its attempt to re-engineer the collective
mindset and the building of the individualist-based, fragmented spatial order of
neoliberalism.

Accounting’s role in the rupturing of Iraq’s social fabric also served to ease the
implementation of a divide and conquer policy, which was an instrumental tool that
afforded the US the power to state-build its new Iraq. The thesis demonstrated that the
US’s choice to implement this policy accorded with Clausewitz’s accounting-based
measures by providing an efficient, low-eco-political-cost solution to the US’s
opposition to a largely united Iraqi resistance front.

In this regard, the thesis

demonstrated the power afforded by budgeting mechanisms. Discriminative revenuesharing arrangements were utilised by the US to undermine the indigenous sociopolitical fabric by using oil wealth to empower ethno-sectarian local elites and to situate
them in competition both amongst each other and against state authority. Moreover,
these discriminative arrangements, along with their resulting sharpening of ethnosectarian identities, effectively incentivised the Iraqi ethno-sectarian elite to maximise
their self-interest. This self-interest led them to actively direct their local populations
into accepting an imperial constitution that built a tripartite ethno-sectarian
federalisation that was most conducive to imperial interests. Moreover, US funding
mechanisms, which drove heterogeneous sites and agencies to entrench imperial
ideology within Iraq in an attempt to re-engineer the collective mindset of Iraqi society,
also reinforced this policy of assimilation.

Finally, the sharpened ethno-sectarian

identities and their inter-competition in the midst of US failure to uphold law, order and
security radicalised individual identities and fomented mutual mistrust, which served to
legitimate the artificial state narrative used by imperial elites to justify and legitimate
their foreign intervention into Iraqi state-building, and the denial of local autonomy.
Moreover, accounting’s role in transforming acts of US contractor nepotism and
corruption within local elections, which furthered the denial of local autonomy and
social division, was demonstrated as it was shown to have transformed such acts into
commodities and, thus, merely business opportunities for capital groups.
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The thesis has demonstrated how the use of discriminative revenue-sharing
arrangements, accompanied by a plethora of other accounting-influenced effects, such
as US failure to uphold law and order, assimilation policies and acts of electoral
corruption, served the combined interests of the US’s capitalist hegemonic bloc. The
discriminative revenue-sharing arrangements provided a cost-effective and vital means
to divide the Iraqi populace and to rapidly establish an imperial relationship of power
and control over a weak Iraqi state formation that devolved Iraqi state spatial/scalar
configurations of authority across diverse sites and heterogeneous agents. Not only did
these configurations serve US eco-political interests by drawing Iraqi space into its
reigning orbit, especially with regards power over Iraq’s strategic oil resources, but they
also facilitated the ability of dominant capital to finally fracture Iraq’s doors and to
commence exploitation at multiple spatial/scalar endpoints. Moreover, accounting’s
reduction of decision-making to quantitative-based instrumental reasoning was shown
to have excluded from visibility the enormous qualitative costs of this strategy,
including the rapid transfer of Iraqi wealth, the disintegration of Iraqi social fabric and
the possible developments of civil war, ethnic cleansing and fragmentation of Iraq’s
territorial integrity through resulting self-interested secessionist pressures.

Overall,

accounting’s profound roles and effects in building and reinforcing US power structures
over Iraqi space so as to facilitate the attempted re-territorialisation of Iraq’s socioecopolitical underpinnings was confirmed.

Another key source for the US’s building of imperial power structures in Iraq was
through its deliberate establishment of anaemic Iraqi budgetary processes and
institutions, which facilitated the institutionalisation of corruption and fiscal
malfeasance, whilst also diminishing state capacity. This had the effect of extending the
reach of the capitalist hegemonic bloc, and ultimately served to sustain a broader
strategy of domination aimed at subordinating future Iraqi governments to imperial
interests. For example, the thesis demonstrated how dysfunctional CPA-era budgetary
processes and accounting/accountability techniques created liminal space for corrupt
practices to flourish and become institutionalised within the Iraqi state. This facilitated
the transfer of vast Iraqi oil revenue from the public domain to dominant capital groups,
and sanctioned structural advantages to western firms entering the Iraqi economy.
Moreover, the structural advantages facilitated the replacement of Iraqi and European
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systems with predominantly US design and technology, thereby subjugating the state to
impoverished dependency on mostly US know-how. During the transition period, the
US utilised its created deficit in Iraqi revenue, wrought by rampant corruption, to extend
its power through Iraq’s consequent reliance on US and international donor funds and
debts. Importantly, Iraq’s revenue deficit also empowered the West to fiscally pressure
Iraq to further open its oil sector to foreign capital investments so as to increase
production efficiencies and repay debts. The thesis also demonstrated how the US
procurement system enabled the US to effectively reinforce a favourable system of
patronage and favouritism in Iraq during later years of the occupation. Finally, this was
shown to have been complemented in 2007 with the US’s passing of the ‘17th
Benchmark’, which served to sustain corruption in Iraq by generating incentives that
deterred the development of credible accounting, accountability and auditing systems,
thereby reinforcing US power gains reaped from their deliberate upholding of a corrupt
Iraqi state.

Another power structure that was of especial interest in this thesis was that created
within the DoD and that permitted the primacy of the Bush administration’s
neoconservative ideology over military expertise prior to, and during the 2003 Iraq War.
Since the central underpinnings of neoconservatism’s ‘total war’ ideology led to an
essential requisite that the US undertake multiple, simultaneous major theatre wars so as
to maintain supremacy and global domination, the Bush administration’s bypassing of
the existing Powell Doctrine’s ‘doctrine of reluctance’ within the DoD was imperative.
Moreover, the ideological requisite for ‘total war’ necessitated a reliance on small,
highly mobile and nimble ground forces so as to extend US capacity to undertake
multiple wars simultaneously, instead of the Powell Doctrine’s use of overwhelming
force. Indeed, the chapter demonstrated in the lead up to the 2003 Iraq War that the
DoD’s civilian command, namely SECDEF Rumsfeld, was able to bypass military
expertise and its extensive prior planning. Instead of deploying the military command’s
average troop requirement of 425 000 troops, SECDEF Rumsfeld initiated war on Iraq
with only 130,600 troops. The significance of this decision becomes salient when
situated within the context of the CAS concept, as the deficiency in quantities of troops
was a central source of facilitation and justification for much of the post-invasion’s deterritorialisation processes, as well as for the establishment of post-invasion power
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structures. Since the CAS concept identifies accounting as an imperative source for the
building of power structures, the thesis sought to identify accounting’s role within the
DoD’s power play.

The thesis confirmed Wildavsky’s (1961, 1992) concept that power is afforded through
financial control. Rumsfeld was shown to have utilised accounting rhetoric to elevate
the significance of efficiency in the management of resources, the reduction of costs and
the elimination of waste, to national security. This enabled him to justify the need for a
‘war on bureaucracy’ and for transformational change, most notably in the DoD’s
budgetary system, the PPBS. His reforms to this system inverted the existing model by
creating a systematic mechanism for top-down planning and the allocation of resources,
thereby centralising management and policymaking.

Moreover, it provided the

organisational tools for the centralisation of legal authority into the OSD and the
resistance of the autonomy of service departments. Therefore, the reformed PPBE
system served the ultimate purpose of delivering a power structure to the SECDEF over
military policy. In addition, Rumsfeld was shown to have complemented this authority
by using accounting rhetoric pertaining to efficiency and cost-minimisation to press
Congress to pass the DTA. The bill would delegate to him authority for budgetary
execution, and the managerial flexibility to implement neoliberal business practices,
such as downsizing and privatisation, that would ultimately serve the underlying neoconservative agenda. Overall, the thesis showed that Rumsfeld’s reforms didn’t serve
the proclaimed purpose of improving the DoD’s efficiency in resource management.
Instead, they were shown to have been crucial in enabling transfers of wealth to
dominant capital; in affording Rumsfeld the means to impose neo-conservative strategy
within the DoD that ultimately facilitated a realisation of the neo-conservative objective
of achieving ‘state-ending’ in Iraq; and in under-costing the eco-political costs of the
project.

Finally, the thesis further analysed the effects of the PPBE accounting system and
identified several other means through which it served the overall accounting purposes
of the CAS concept.

For example, the use of the PPBES’ MoPs and MoEs for

operational assessments and evaluations detached US leadership from the qualitative
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effects of their decisions by fostering a quantitative-based cause-effect and problemsolving mindset. Not only did this transform Iraqi people and space into numbers to be
gathered, monitored and controlled, thereby contributing to their devaluation, but it also
empowered US leadership to operationalise injustices against them as these were
assessed as being most efficient in serving US interests. For example, since metrics
regarding the capture rate of insurgents was conceived to be an indication of US success
and affecting decreases in insurgent attacks, troops were incentivised to maximise the
number of people detained in counterinsurgency, regardless of human rights, justice,
and the imperative objective of winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi populace.
This mindset incited a system of collective punishment, whereby hundreds of thousands
of Iraqi citizens were rounded up in the production line of the US’s mass incarceration
‘machine’ in a ‘get-tough strategy’ that aimed not only to punish members of the
insurgency, but also to intimidate the broader Iraqi society into submission and
assimilation. Moreover, PPBES’ dehumanisation of Iraqi people by quantifying their
existence, served to embolden a pattern of brutality towards them that helped
subordinate their existence to US dominance and supremacy. As such, accounting’s
role in mediating social relations and encouraging actions from a distance for imperial
interests was demonstrated.

Another example of the empowering effects of the PPBE system that facilitated US
management of Iraqi space was demonstrated through its influences on US intelligence
gathering. MoPs and MoEs led US leadership to believe that increased productions of
intelligence would lead to decreased insurgent attacks, decreased costs and ultimately
deliver victory. Moreover, the PPBES’s cost-minimisation and efficiency-maximisation
logic requisitioned that intelligence production be as quickly and cost-effectively as
possible. Therefore, it served to justify and legitimate the decision of US leadership to
utilise torture as an efficient means to rapidly break the psychological will of detainees
and realise intelligence gains. The thesis showed that this strategy was complemented
by lapses in conventional accountability mechanisms, such as inaccurate detainee
Internment Serial Number (ISN) accounts, which further devalued the Iraqi population
and enhanced the conditions needed for acts of retribution, domination and punishment.
Finally, since troop and resource shortages left marines vulnerable to attacks, US
leadership sought to decrease eco-political costs by sanctioning permissive ROE that
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empowered US troops with relative impunity, devalued Iraqi life and facilitated civilian
killings from a distance.

In a similar way, the cost-minimisation motive led US

leadership to sanction the use of techniques and technologies that provided efficiency in
combat by increasing ‘enemy’ deaths whilst minimising US casualties, such as the use
of ‘suppressive’ fire, ‘surgical’ air strikes and WMD. Such techniques were perceived
to provide efficiency in combat; absent from US leadership’s view, however, were the
qualitative effects, such as mass indiscriminate killings of civilians and wide-spread
destruction that together debilitated the ‘hearts and minds’ aspect of counterinsurgency
and occupation.

The US’s outsourcing of PMCs was shown to have also been primarily justified by
accounting-based logic pertaining cost-minimisation and the realisation of efficiency
gains.

Whilst the thesis demonstrated that these objectives were not fulfilled as

deficient contracting practices and mismanagement led to acts of fraud and waste that
ultimately served dominant capital groups, it showed that PMC-use also served the
interests of US political elites as it empowered them with a means to manage the
production of injustices for imperial interests in Iraq at a distance and with relative
impunity.

Indeed, the Bush administration counterbalanced troop shortages by

outsourcing 20,000-30,000 PMC employees. The use of a denationalised army of
mercenaries facilitated a regime of invisibility as US sovereignty was extended across
space, yet its imperial effects were masked through plausible deniability. Furthermore,
the emphasis of accounting on profitability served to reconstruct the resulting state
crimes into a commodity. This reconstruction transformed acts of PMC abuse, torture
and murder into mundane, profit-realising activities within their business cycle.
Therefore, PMC-use facilitated for US political elites the means to bypass conventional
modes of democratic accountability, to realise neoconservative ideological requisites of
further initiating imperialist wars, and to decrease consequential political costs by
maintaining an empire in denial.

Additionally, since PMC economic costs were

primarily accounted for in the reconstruction rather than war budget, accounting was
again appropriated by imperial elites to project an under-costed and feasible deception
of war and occupation.
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Finally, the thesis demonstrated that the US was also able to counter its troop shortages
by funding, arming and training indigenous Iraqi forces for imperial interests. This
enabled the building of power structures that subjugated Iraqi forces to impoverished
dependency on US military expertise and equipment. Accordingly, indigenous forces
were transformed into extensions of the empire’s regime of invisibility as they offered
another means for the imperial centre to exert control and maintain order over the
periphery from a distance. Moreover, since increases in armed and trained Iraqi forces
translated into decreased expenditures of US troops, resources and their associated ecopolitical costs, the US’s appropriation of indigenous forces for its interests served to
project a feasible perception of war and occupation. Also, the PPBE system was shown
to have incentivised an expansion of these proxy forces as its metrics were utilised to
account for the number of Iraqi forces trained, and these were instrumentally related to
US victory in Iraq. Finally, indigenous forces were also utilised in the production of
injustices for imperial interests in Iraq, such as in the use of torture to gather
intelligence. Also, the thesis demonstrated that elite commando units comprising Shia
militiamen and Kurdish Peshmerga were armed and trained by the US, as they
constituted eco-politically efficient means of bringing an end to the Sunni insurgency.
Accordingly, imperial interests were realised, whilst US accountability for the resulting
acts of murder, torture, rape, ethnic cleansings, and the eventual breakout of civil war,
remained at a distance of plausible deniability. The empire remained in denial.

In view of the above-developed conclusions, The Political Economy of Accounting and
the 2003 Iraq War has extensively confirmed the central underpinnings of its
capitalism’s accountings of space concept by verifying them in and through the Iraq War
case study. In so doing, it has realised its central research objective of exploring the
relationships between the socio-ecopolitical dimensions of accounting and US exertions
of imperial power upon Iraqi space. Furthermore, it has provided solutions to its two
primary questions of why, and the accounting means surrounding how, this imperial
exertion of power was executed upon Iraqi space. In conclusion, the thesis has delivered
a broader understanding of the interested roles of accounting in contemporary
constructions of the soico-ecopolitical dimensions of space for capitalist imperial
interests, thereby demonstrating the rich and fundamental intersections between space,
capitalism and accounting.
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Appendix 1

Enlargement on Categories of Sources of Data

Official Governmental Sources: including the Commission on Wartime Contracting in
Iraq and Afghanistan, the Committee of Privy Counsellors, the Committee on
Government Reform, the Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research
Service, the Coalition Provisional Authority Inspector General, the Department of
Defense, the Department of Defense Inspector General, the Office of the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, the Research Advisory Committee on Gulf
Veterans’ Illnesses, United States General Accounting Office, US Congress, US
Department of Energy, US Department of Veterans Affairs, US House of
Representatives, US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, US State Department,
USAID, and from the Committee on Government Reform. Reports and regulations of
the Coalition Provisional Authority were also utilised, and data was gathered from the
Iraqi Constitution. Data was also gathered from the National Security Strategy of the
United States of America and from declassified letters and documents from within
government institutions.

Official Communications: including US governmental Press Releases, Presidential State
of Union Addresses, Public Papers of the Presidents and speeches of top leaders within
the Bush administration.

294

International Institutions: including the United Nations Security Council, the United
Nations Humanitarian Panel, the United Nations Integrated Regional Information
Networks, UNESCO, UNICEF, UNHCR, International Advisory and Monitoring Board
on Iraq and the International Monetary Fund.

Non-Governmental Organisations: including Amnesty International, Human Rights
Watch, Christian Aid, GRAIN, the Red Cross, the International Crisis Group, Iraq Body
Count, Iraq Survey Group, the National Priorities Project, the Nuclear Policy Research
Institute, Revenue Watch, Research Unit for Political Economy, The Center for Public
Integrity, the Project for the New American Century, and Wikileaks.

Military Institutions: including National Defense University, The Industrial College of
the Armed Forces and the United States Central Command.

Trans-disciplinary Journal Articles and Books

Private Accounting Firms: such as auditing reports by KPMG.

News

Media

Sources:

including

television

and

radio

material,

interviews,

documentaries and newspaper and magazine articles.
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